

Roman Military Service

Ideologies of Discipline in the
Late Republic and Early Principate

Sara Elise Phang

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ROMAN MILITARY SERVICE

In this book Sara Phang explores the ideals and realities of Roman military discipline, which affected the behavior of soldiers in combat, their punishment for infractions, and their economic activities, such as compensation and other benefits, work, and consumption. Her thematically organized study analyzes these aspects of discipline using both literary and documentary sources. Phang emphasizes social and cultural conflicts in the Roman army. Contrary to the impression that Roman emperors “bought” their soldiers and indulged them, discipline restrained such behavior and legitimized and stabilized the imperial power. Phang argues that emperors and aristocratic commanders gained prestige from imposing discipline, while displaying leadership in person and a willingness to compromise with a restive soldiery.

Sara Elise Phang is a scholar of Roman history and author of *The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 BC–AD 235): Law and Family in the Imperial Army*, which won the Gustave O. Arlt Award in the Humanities in Classical Studies.

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IDEOLOGIES OF DISCIPLINE IN THE LATE REPUBLIC AND EARLY PRINCIPATE



SARA ELISE PHANG



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IN MEMORY OF DR. SAMUEL H. PHANG
AND DR. LILLIAN PHANG LEE
WHOM I KNEW TOO BRIEFLY

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS



In 134 BC, Scipio Aemilianus, one of the two consuls of that year, imposed severe military discipline and training on the Roman army at Numantia in Spain. The army had been demoralized by repeated defeats and the surrender of a previous commander, C. Hostilius Mancinus, to the Numantines.

Scipio expelled all traders and prostitutes; also the soothsayers and diviners, which they were continually consulting because they were demoralized by defeat. For the future he forbade the bringing in of anything not necessary, even a victim for purposes of divination. He also ordered all wagons and their superfluous contents to be sold, and all pack animals, except such as he himself permitted to remain. For cooking utensils it was only permitted to have a spit, a brass kettle, and one cup. Their food was limited to plain boiled and roasted meats. They were forbidden to have beds, and Scipio was the first to sleep on straw. . . . He did not venture to engage the enemy until he had trained his army by many laborious exercises. He traversed all the neighboring plains and duly fortified new camps one after another, and then demolished them, dug up trenches and filled them up again, constructed high walls and overthrew them, personally overseeing the work from morning until night. . . . (Appian, *Iber.* 85–86)

Scipio trained his soldiers this way, with digging and on the march, until “he judged that the army was alert, obedient to himself, and patient in labor.”

This episode is representative of Roman ideals of discipline, but from a modern point of view it contains many strange features. Scipio emphasizes labor and the building of camps to restore discipline; from the late seventeenth century onward, a modern army would use drill. Scipio also emphasizes austerity, to a degree unexplained merely by the need to reduce baggage. In other anecdotes of discipline, the commander forbids his soldiers to buy baked bread; Pescennius Niger, a rival of the emperor Septimius Severus, allegedly forbade cooked food and made his soldiers drink water. Yet other literary accounts of military discipline

and indiscipline stress the evils of giving soldiers excessive payments of money and denounce soldiers' slipping into an effeminate way of life. Discipline also imposed a legal ban on marriage for serving soldiers. These representations of military discipline are not based simply on functional concerns. They articulate political, social, and cultural tensions and anxieties. This book explains what the Romans believed about military discipline, how it was specific to their society and culture, and how emperors and commanders exercised command consistent with discipline.

This book began over ten years ago, with my student paper on the representations of the Roman army in Latin literature. It is also an outgrowth of (and complement to) my doctoral dissertation and first book *The Marriage of Roman Soldiers (13 BC–AD 235): Law and Family in the Imperial Army* (Leiden: Brill, 2001), which concerns the ban on legal marriage mentioned above. The present work is different in emphasis. It does not focus on gender or the property law of military personnel, subjects of the earlier book and a subsequent paper. This book focuses on economic and social themes and emphasizes literary sources rather than papyri and inscriptions. *Disciplina militaris* was shaped by and addressed ancient Roman political, economic, social, and cultural phenomena. The analytical framework is that of Weberian sociology, though it also uses the *habitus* theory of Pierre Bourdieu.

It is impossible for any one work to do justice to the breadth of Roman army studies and Roman social history. Some works and authors are left out. I have chosen not to rehearse in detail technical issues (such as the pay scales of the Roman army) or to survey archaeological evidence. *Roman Military Service* does not discuss the status of veterans; it pertains to serving soldiers. *Roman Military Service* is also not intended to replace Roy W. Davies' *Service in the Roman Army* (1989), the various standard works on the Roman army, or narrative histories of campaigns and wars.

I thank the members of the University of Southern California Department of Classics for their hospitality while I held an Andrew W. Mellon fellowship in Classics in 2001–02, especially Clifford Ando, Tom Habinek, and Amy Richlin. I am grateful to Amy Richlin for advice, Iain Ferris's *Enemies of Rome*, and Brig-Gen. Silas Casey's *Infantry Tactics*. I am especially grateful to Karen Dang for her discussions and friendship. I would also like to thank Paul Erdkamp and the contributors to Erdkamp 2007, as well as Jean-Jacques Aubert and Zsuzsanna Várhelyi, Walter Scheidel, and Rosemary Moore. Moore's work on the discipline of the Roman army emphasizes the Republic; my study emphasizes the first

two centuries of the Empire, for which the mid- and late Republic provides a background.

I would also like to thank the Center for Hellenic Studies for a Summer Stipend in 2003 and my use of the CHS library thereafter, where later stages of the research for this book were done. At the CHS I thank especially Temple Wright, who provided the new books I needed, and the staff of the Dumbarton Oaks collection for use of their library. I also did research at the Library of Congress, and the staff there also receive my thanks. I would also like to thank William V. Harris for supporting my early graduate work and dissertation work on the Roman army.

Beatrice Rehl was patient while the book proceeded through various drafts and revisions. Susan Mattern-Parkes went beyond the call of duty in time and effort, brought the book under control, and saved me from many disasters. The other reader's more pithy remarks were also valuable. Cherry Wunderlich was of invaluable assistance with the proofreading. James Dunn, Peter Katsirubas, and William H. Stoddard assisted with copyediting and production. I finally thank my parents for their support while I was finishing this book.

ABBREVIATIONS



Major classical authors and works are cited as in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (1996); periodicals as in *L'Année Philologique*. Abbreviations and full references to papyri, ostraka, and tablets appear in *The Checklist of Editions of Greek, Latin, Demotic, and Coptic Papyri, Ostraca, and Tablets*, ed. J. S. Oates, R. S. Bagnall, et al. (2005)

<i>AArchHung</i>	<i>Acta Archaeologica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae</i>
<i>AE</i>	<i>L'Année Épigraphique</i>
<i>AESC</i>	<i>Annales (Économies Sociétés Civilisations)</i>
<i>AHB</i>	<i>Ancient History Bulletin</i>
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>Amm.</i>	Ammianus Marcellinus
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i> , ed. Joseph Vogt et al. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1972–)
<i>Asclep. Tact.</i>	Asclepiodotus, <i>Tactica</i>
<i>Aug. RGDA</i>	Augustus, <i>Res Gestae Divi Augusti: The Achievements of the Divine Augustus</i> , ed. P. A. Brunt and J. M. Moore (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967)
<i>Aur. Vict. Caes.</i>	Sex. Aurelius Victor, <i>De Caesaribus</i>
<i>AW</i>	<i>The Ancient World</i>
<i>BHAC</i>	<i>Bonner Historia-Augusta Colloquium</i>
<i>BICS</i>	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies of the Univ. of London</i>
<i>BJ</i>	<i>Bonner Jahrbücher</i>
<i>BMC</i>	<i>Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum</i> , ed. H. Mattingly and R. A. G. Carson (London: British Museum, 1923–)
Campbell 1994	<i>The Roman Army 31 BC–AD 337: A Sourcebook</i> , ed. and trans. Brian Campbell (London/New York: Routledge, 1994)
<i>ChLA</i>	<i>Chartae Latinae Antiquiores</i> , ed. Albert Bruckner and Robert Marichal (Olten: U. Graf, 1954–)
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i> , ed. Th. Mommsen et al. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1893–)
<i>CA</i>	<i>Classical Antiquity</i>

<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CPh</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
Daris	<i>Documenti per la storia dell'esercito romano in Egitto</i> , ed. S. Daris (Milan: S. Cruore, 1964)
<i>DHA</i>	<i>Dialogues d'histoire ancienne</i>
Eutr.	Eutropius, <i>Breviarium</i>
Flor.	Florus, <i>Epitome</i>
Gell.	Aulus Gellius, <i>Noctes Atticae</i>
<i>G&R</i>	<i>Greece & Rome</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>HThR</i>	<i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
Hdn.	Herodian
Hdt.	Herodotus, <i>The Histories</i>
Hes. <i>Op.</i>	Hesiod, <i>Works and Days</i>
<i>ILS</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Latinae Selectae</i> , ed. H. Dessau (Berlin: Weidmann, 1892–1916)
<i>IRT</i>	<i>Inscriptions of Roman Tripolitania</i> , ed. J. M. Reynolds, J. B. Ward Perkins, et al. (Rome: British School, 1952)
<i>JHSex</i>	<i>Journal of the History of Sexuality</i>
<i>JRA</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Archaeology</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
Justin	Justinus, <i>Epitome of the Philippic History of Pompeius Trogus</i>
Lact. <i>Mort. Pers.</i>	Lactantius, <i>De mortibus persecutorum</i>
<i>LEC</i>	<i>Les Études Classiques</i>
Lib. <i>Or.</i>	Libanius, <i>Orations</i>
Macer <i>Re mil.</i>	Aemilius Macer, <i>De re militari</i>
Menander <i>Re mil.</i>	Arrius Menander, <i>De re militari</i>
Macrobian. <i>Sat.</i>	Macrobius, <i>Saturnalia</i>
Maur. <i>Strat.</i>	Maurice, <i>Strategikon</i>
Max. Tyr. <i>Or.</i>	Maximus of Tyre, <i>Orations</i>
<i>MAAR</i>	<i>Memoirs of the American Academy in Rome</i>
Modestinus <i>Poen.</i>	Herennius Modestinus, <i>De poenis</i>
Musurillo	<i>Acts of the Christian Martyrs</i> , ed. H. Musurillo (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972)

Onas. <i>Strat.</i>	Onasander, <i>Strategos</i>
PBSR	<i>Papers of the British School at Rome</i>
Paul <i>Poen. mil.</i>	Paulus, <i>De poenis militum</i>
PCPhS	<i>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</i>
RE	<i>Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertums-wissenschaft</i> , ed. G. Wissowa et al. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1890—)
REA	<i>Revue des Études Anciennes</i>
REL	<i>Revue des Études Latines</i>
RFIC	<i>Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica</i>
RIB	<i>Roman Inscriptions of Britain</i> , ed. R. G. Collingwood and R. P. Wright (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965–95)
RbM	<i>Rheinisches Museum</i>
RIC	<i>The Roman Imperial Coinage</i> , ed. H. B. Mattingly et al. (London: Spink, 1923–81)
RMR	<i>Roman Military Records on Papyrus</i> , ed. R. O. Fink (Cleveland, OH: Case Western Reserve, 1971)
RSA	<i>Rivista storica dell'Antichità</i>
SCI	<i>Scripta Classical Israelica</i>
SDHI	<i>Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris</i>
TAPA	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
TR	<i>Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis</i>
YCS	<i>Yale Classical Studies</i>
ZRG	<i>Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte (Romanistische Abteilung)</i>

GENERAL INTRODUCTION



THE DISCIPLINE OF THE ARMY (*DISCIPLINA MILITARIS*) WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT of Roman imperial culture. Modern authors usually focus on loyalty and mutiny and on the stereotypical avarice of the Praetorian Guard, raising emperors to the throne and toppling them.¹ Other modern impressions stress the orderly tactical formations and steadfastness of the Roman army in battle and the absolute, self-sacrificing obedience of soldiers.² Still other modern stereotypes emphasize the severity of Roman military punishment, giving the English language the term “decimate,” inaccurately equated with annihilation. Decimation was a punishment in which one in ten soldiers were executed. These impressions are exaggerated, sometimes anachronistic.

Disciplina militaris sought to control soldiers in more respects than obedience or formal discipline. Why, for instance, did the emperor Hadrian banish gardens, porticoes, and dining rooms from military camps, and why did he take care to be seen eating the soldiers’ campaign fare and to walk twenty miles in armor?³ Other aspects of Hadrian’s management of the army more resembled modern institutional discipline: the repression of corruption, for instance, and the promotion of efficient administration.⁴ The passage of the *Historia Augusta’s Vita Hadriani* is also remarkable for its omissions. Though we learn that he refused to wear ornamented armor, Hadrian did not take a particular interest in mass drill or uniform, essential elements of military training and discipline in modern times.⁵ This passage suggests larger themes: the political economy of the army (soldiers’ pay, work, and expenditures) and the masculinity of soldiers: Hadrian prohibited either boys or old men from serving as soldiers and purged luxurious items that might promote effeminacy.⁶ He is said to have “bestowed gifts on many and honors on a few, so

¹ Gibbon [1776–88] 1932: v. 1: 9–10, 107, 119; Marx and Engels 1978: 607, 613; Rostovtzeff 1957: v. 1: 499–501; Momigliano [1954] 1966: 99; and Wes 1990.

² Keegan 1976: 63; Goldsworthy 1996: 247–51; Braudy 2003: 35–7, 58, 130–31.

³ HA *Hadr.* 10.4, 10.2.

⁴ HA *Hadr.* 10.3, 10.6–7, 11.1.

⁵ HA *Hadr.* 10.5.

⁶ HA *Hadr.* 10.7–8.

that the troops might submit more willingly to his stricter regulations.”⁷ Hadrian thus displayed an ability to compromise, but the imperial biographer does not explain why he wanted to treat the army strictly.

European military discipline and military culture have been influenced and shaped by the culture and politics of the day. Knightly training and chivalry were an essential part of medieval feudalism. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the development of professional armies was closely associated with the formation of nation-states and absolutist monarchies, such as those of Louis XIV and Frederick the Great.⁸ The order and discipline of these armies signified the power of these states. These professional armies were created in ideological opposition to the mercenaries who had ravaged Italy, France, and central Europe in the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries.⁹ The new professional armies invoked Roman traditions, but, as this book implies, the seventeenth-century military reformers’ invocation of Roman military tradition had more to do with politics than with tactics.¹⁰

If Clausewitz said that “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” military service may be the continuation of social policy by other means, given a heightened intensity because such policies are imposed to maintain or augment the fitness of the military. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century professional armies became test subjects and proving grounds for new social sciences, such as vital statistics, psychology, sanitation, and sexuality.¹¹ Perceived national crises in public health and morals have been and are projected onto the military; for instance, in U.S. Army training camps during World War I, the authorities prohibited or restricted dancing and access to prostitutes.¹² From the mid-twentieth century onward, the United States military achieved the inclusion of African-Americans and of women.¹³ However, a conservative ideal of military service emphasizing traditional masculinity has opposed the integration of openly homosexual personnel.

⁷ HA *Hadr.* 10.2.

⁸ Oestreich 1982; Braudy 2003: 131, 211, 246–7 (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries); Delbrück 1990: 157, 252–3, 273–5; Ehrenreich 1997: 180–81; Myerly 1996; Theweleit 1989: 153–62; Braudy 2003: 375 on nineteenth- and twentieth-century militarism.

⁹ Singer 2003: 23–31.

¹⁰ Hahlweg [1941] 1987; Weitz 1998.

¹¹ Foucault 1978: 138–40 (theory), 1978: 118–19, 135 (stresses prevention of degeneration).

¹² Bristow 1996: 7, 79–88. Radine 1977; Trustram 1984; Bourke 1996 also emphasize social control.

¹³ Bérubé 1990: 149–54 (homosexuality), 167 (neurosis in general); Braudy 2003: 317–19.

Certain branches and zones of the military (especially training) contrast military service with civilian “decadence.”¹⁴

In the late Republic and early Empire, *disciplina militaris* addressed a social and political crisis, though slow-moving and transmitted through literary tradition, so that responses to it spanned centuries, from Polybius in the late second century BC to Vegetius in the late fourth century AD. This ideological crisis concerned the political economy of the Roman imperial army, its material dependence upon the state, and its legitimacy. The Roman Republican citizen militia of the fourth and third centuries BC was recruited from farmer-soldiers levied for short periods of time and waging war almost every year. The consuls, the Republic’s two chief executives and commanders-in-chief, were elected yearly, attaining the top of a ladder of magistracies. They traditionally waged campaigns and celebrated their victories with triumphs, festive processions in which the commander displayed the plunder won by his army and his glory as *triumphator*. *Virtus* (courage in battle) and *gloria* (fame, glory) were core aristocratic values in the traditional Republic. The Romans conquered Italy by the early third century BC, most of the Mediterranean from Spain to the Near East by the mid-first century BC, Gaul in the 50s, and part of Germany by the end of the first century BC.¹⁵

The soldiers, however, served longer and longer in overseas campaigns and became impoverished. By the late second and early first centuries BC, soldiers were recruited from the landless poor and depended on their generals for both pay and assignments of land or money so that they could support themselves as veterans.¹⁶ Accordingly, the upper classes depicted these soldiers as a mercenary rabble, whose demands were exploited by increasingly ambitious generals. The generals’ ambitions, in turn, depended on their soldiers’ loyalty.

With the establishment of the Principate, Augustus and his successors and the Roman governing classes (who were also the literary classes) sought to routinize the professional army and to legitimate it through *disciplina militaris*. Thus, they sought to prevent the syndrome of civil war. Employing Weberian sociology, this study explores to what extent *disciplina* imposed formal or bureaucratic rationality

¹⁴ Ricks 1997: 162–3, 274–97; Marines instructors characterize civilian society as “undisciplined” and “nasty” in order to motivate recruits; the U.S. military is increasingly separate from civilian society.

¹⁵ Rosenstein 1999; Harris 1979; Rosenstein 1990, 2006. Fuller notes on Roman society and the army start in Chapter One.

¹⁶ Brunt 1962; moderated, [1971] 1987; challenged, Rosenstein 2004; Phang 2006 reviews the question of Roman soldiers’ impoverishment.

on the Roman army, resembling the Weberian concept of discipline, and to what extent *disciplina* remained irrational, constrained by elite preconceptions and values. In this period the army became separated from civilian society; the aristocracy had less and less military experience, drawing their knowledge of military service from the literary tradition.¹⁷ One of the aims of *disciplina militaris* was this separation of soldiers from civilians, as well as the maintenance of Roman qualities in soldiers, as opposed to “barbarian” qualities.

Augustus rationalized the conditions of service.¹⁸ Legions of approximately 5120 men were supplemented by the *auxilia* or “helping” troops, units of cavalry and infantry with 500 to 1000 men. First created by Julius Caesar, the auxiliaries were noncitizens, who received Roman citizenship on their discharge from service. There was also a naval fleet, and in Rome the Praetorian Guard of 10,000 men, the urban cohorts, and the night watch or *vigiles*, whose duty was to keep order. Augustus reduced the number of legions to 28, so that some 300,000 soldiers (urban troops, legionaries, auxiliaries, and sailors) were under arms at any one time. He stabilized their pay and length of service and ensured that Praetorian and legionary pensions would be paid from taxation rather than from confiscation of aristocratic estates. The number of legions fluctuated slightly and reached 33 under Septimius Severus, giving at that time a total of about 400,000 troops.¹⁹ Other elements of bureaucratic discipline, which appeared over the next two centuries, included promotion patterns; an extensive military bureaucracy, with pay and work records; a more routine and humane approach to punishment; and various policies repressing corruption and extrainstitutional work and income.

However, *disciplina militaris* was also a highly moralistic and conservative ideology that sought to turn back the clock and reproduce an ideal social hierarchy. *Disciplina* sought not only to maintain soldiers’ combat skills in peacetime, but also to repress the syndrome of civil war. According to *disciplina*, the emperors and senatorial commanders should impose austerity on soldiers, repressing their avarice, and preventing luxury and degeneration. They should impose traditional harsh punishments and uphold an authoritarian model of obedience. They should

¹⁷ Mattern 1999.

¹⁸ Raaflaub 1980; Gilliver 2007. On this transitional period also Cornell 1993.

¹⁹ MacMullen 1980; Campbell 1984: 4–5; Garnsey and Saller 1987: 88; Le Bohec 1994: 34–5; Campbell 2002: 7, 84, 89; Gilliver 2007: 186–9; slightly higher figures, Mattern 1999: 82–3.

keep soldiers constantly at work, lest soldiers' idleness lead to mutiny. In this ideology, generals who behaved thus were less likely to become usurpers. However, imposing this severe, politicized discipline was more difficult than it seemed, as the emperor Galba found out to his cost in AD 69. He decimated a legion and refused to pay the Praetorian Guard a promised donative (a gift of cash), and in short order he was overthrown.

Disciplina became a contest for legitimacy between the emperors, the senatorial and equestrian aristocracy, and the army, as well as lower-class civilians in Rome and the provinces. The emperors needed to retain both the loyalty of the army and the good opinion of the aristocracy. Some emperors were irresponsible patrons of the soldiers, bestowing privileges freely upon them, subverting hierarchy, and thwarting the aristocratic ideal of discipline.²⁰ Insofar as formally rational elements of *disciplina militaris* developed, they did so not just to expedite administration but to check patronage and usurpation. Thus most emperors also sought to enforce discipline. Senators and emperors belonged to this same elite, after all; they were educated in the same rhetorical and historical tradition.²¹ *Disciplina* frequently invoked this tradition.

However, both emperors and senatorial or equestrian commanders needed to make discipline legitimate to the soldiers. Many recruits were volunteers. A model of authority that relies on coercion of unwilling subjects is inefficient. *Disciplina militaris*, though authoritarian, avoided the direct coercion of soldiers in the manner of slaves. The elite ideal of discipline and presumptions of the soldiers' irrationality and lack of self-control conflicted with the soldiers' assertion of their own relatively honorable status.²² The soldiers contested aristocratic standards of discipline by claiming that they were being treated like slaves, and emperors and commanders might compromise in order to maintain the loyalty of the army. An emperor or general might compromise by taking on the hardships of the soldiers, as Hadrian did. He also balanced stricter discipline, repressing corruption, with the bestowal of honors on deserving personnel.

The aim of this book is not a narrative political history of each episode of discipline or each military conflict, nor is it a biographical examination of each commander's or emperor's actions. It explores major themes in *disciplina* and the

²⁰ Campbell 1984 presents this as a model.

²¹ Mattern 1999: 2–3, 15–16.

²² Carrié 1993: 103–6.

cultural assumptions behind them, stressing Roman rather than universal concepts. Concepts of wage-earning, redistribution, and labor and concepts of the body and of masculinity were among these, as was elite class prejudice. The upper orders regarded the lower classes (especially soldiers) as irrational and potentially violent. A major conceptual problem in imperial *disciplina militaris* was the promotion of *virtus*, courage of prowess in combat, which *disciplina* redefined as also displayed by activities such as labor and effort in peacetime. *Virtus* thus was produced by disciplinary activities and thus took on new meaning, as when Hadrian was able to display his *virtus* by walking twenty miles in full armor.²³ A recent study of Greek and Roman warfare emphasizes the tension between *disciplina* and *virtus* in combat; this book stresses general service and the political aspects of such service.

In studies of the Roman army, modern scholars have written little about Roman *disciplina*, despite the ancient authors' obsession with it.²⁴ This study employs sociological and critical theory as an analytical model. The moral and rhetorical nature of the ancient literary sources requires explanatory models. Though this study emphasizes Weber, it also employs Pierre Bourdieu's theory of the *habitus* and of symbolic violence.

Ancient literary authors did not construct their narratives from documents and statistics, but from *exempla*: biographical episodes, often rhetorical and emphasizing morals and behaviors to imitate or avoid. Even Roman authors with military and administrative experience fashioned their histories and biographies from such *exempla*; the governing classes of the empire were also the literary classes.²⁵ The ancient authors did not observe modern disciplinary boundaries; legal experts, writing on military discipline, might allude to legendary history; administration was inseparable from moral concerns. Ancient authors were also influenced by Platonic and Stoic philosophy, adapted for Latin audiences by Cicero and Seneca the Younger in the mid-first century BC and mid-first century AD. Ancient technical treatises also display the literary mentality, such as Frontinus's *Stratagems*, a collection of anecdotes on strategy, tactics, and military discipline, and Vegetius's

²³ HA *Hadr.* 10.4.

²⁴ Older literature on *disciplina militaris* is represented by Sulser 1920; Mauch 1941; Neumann 1936, 1946, 1948, and 1965; General works of regional pertinence: Le Bohec 1989; Le Roux 1992; Isaac 1992; Mitchell 1993 (not only about the army); Alston 1995; studies focused on a shorter period, Blois 1984; Blois 2002.

²⁵ Millar [1977] 1992: 96–108; Mattern 1999: 2–8, 15–18; A. R. Birley 2003; on Vegetius, Lendon 2005: 283–5. On approaches to literary anecdotes, Saller 1980; Plass 1988; Woodman 1988: x and *passim*; Habinek 1998.

Epitoma rei militaris, a handbook on the Roman army.²⁶ For the Romans, commanding an army was not a technical task; it was conceived of in moral and social terms, as will become apparent.

In this book, when late Republican or imperial authors cite as *exempla*, precedents, or justifications episodes from the older Republic before the late second century BC or from classical or Hellenistic Greece, these anecdotes represent this exemplary mentality, intended to instruct the authors' contemporaries. Later Roman sources (fourth and fifth centuries AD), such as Vegetius, Ammianus Marcellinus, and the *Historia Augusta*, are also cited as evidence of traditional attitudes. Roman *disciplina militaris* reflects these habits of thought, frequently invoking tradition.²⁷ Despite the exemplary mentality, individual leaders and soldiers can be glimpsed exaggerating, resisting, or subverting *disciplina militaris*.

Due to the limitations of space, certain topics and source materials will be treated briefly or not at all. These include the marriage ban and the privileges of veterans; coin issues as imperial ideology; military career inscriptions; detailed narratives of individual battles; Christian sources on the Roman army; and the source problems of Vegetius and the *Historia Augusta*.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

THEORIZING *DISCIPLINA*: SOCIAL CONFLICT, LEGITIMATION, AND POWER

Besides reviewing the hierarchies of Roman society and the army, this chapter applies Weberian concepts of legitimate authority and of rationalization to Roman society and the Roman army. Pure Weberian ideal types, including Weberian discipline, are not applicable. The Roman army displayed patrimonial, formally rational, and value-rational policies. The concept of *habitus* in Pierre Bourdieu's sociology is also relevant, as many aspects of *disciplina militaris* represent not rational administration but habitual dispositions of the body and mind. The inculcation of *habitus* promoted the social and cultural reproduction of the Roman military hierarchy. Commanders and emperors' restrained benefactions to soldiers and adoption of austerity and hardship inflicted symbolic violence (the acknowledgement of hierarchy).

As later chapters show, *virtus* and *disciplina* were associated with a masculine *habitus*; indiscipline represented the catastrophic collapse of this *habitus*. *Disciplina*

²⁶ Campbell 1987; on Vegetius, Zuckerman 1994; Lenoir 1996; Richardot 1998.

²⁷ Lendon 2005: 5–12 (general antiquarianism), 280–85 (Roman).

also maintained the distinct identity of soldiers, separating them from persons and activities defined as shameful in the military context, such as camp followers, trade, and revelry.

COMBAT TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE

Vegetius depicts the Roman empire as maintained by the combat training of soldiers. Representations of Roman combat training emphasized individual fitness, combat skills, and aggression more than mass drill and coordination. This combat training made weapon use second nature and reduced soldiers' fear of wounds. In the field, the general and his officers imposed mass discipline, making soldiers keep order and follow the standards or keep up with the line of march. However, relatively little is known about Roman mass formation and drill.

Mass formation did not give Roman *disciplina militaris* its paradigm, as in early modern and modern militaries, in which social control was achieved by parade-ground drill. In the Roman army, social control was achieved not by drill, but by the imposition of work or *labor*, the subject of a later chapter, and by castrametation, the building of temporary and permanent camps. Roman tactics required individual fighting skills and aggression. Because these could not be reduced without compromising combat performance, *disciplina* sought to control other aspects of military service.

VIRI MILITARES: HABITUS AND DISCIPLINE

This chapter focuses on *disciplina's* prescription of relatively static aspects of military service, such as soldiers' attitudes to their superiors, the social origins of soldiers, etiquette and religion, and the wearing of armor, replaced by uniform in modern armies. All of these contributed to the military identity of soldiers. Soldiers displayed discipline not simply through their outward appearance and attitude. *Disciplina* inculcated a masculine *habitus* into soldiers, both through sexual propriety and the avoidance of effeminacy, and, to a greater degree, through a general disposition of the body and mind. Discipline promoted a state of *intentio* or "readiness" that powered soldiers as fighters or as workers.

DISCIPLINA AND PUNISHMENT

In imposing punishment on soldiers, Roman commanders negotiated tradition and their present. *Disciplina's* traditions stressed absolute obedience and extreme severity. The imperial elite was nostalgic for this severity. Soldiers, however, might

perceive excessive severity as *saevitia* (cruelty). Otho persuaded the urban troops to revolt from the emperor Galba in AD 69 in part because Galba decimated a legion. The harshest corporal and capital punishments, such as flogging as execution or decimation, became obsolete. Nevertheless, corporal and capital punishment of individual soldiers persisted during the empire. Alternative punishments included public humiliation, demotion, and dishonorable discharge or disbandment, given greater force by the rationalization of conditions of service. A bureaucratic approach to punishment developed. Leaders also compromised with severity in interpreting the law concerning desertion. However, the archaic prestige of severity and the commander's freedom to punish never disappeared; no permanent evolution toward greater leniency is apparent, as the jurists of the late second and early third centuries AD prescribed capital punishment for many offenses, invoking archaic *exempla*. A *habitus* of obedience was thus inculcated in soldiers.

DISCIPLINING WEALTH: THE IDEOLOGIES OF *STIPENDIA* AND *DONATIVA*

Soldiers profited from military service, obtaining plunder and receiving pay and their leaders' gifts, including pensions in the form of land grants or money. The civil wars and proscriptions of the late Republic rendered questionable the legitimacy of soldiers' access to wealth. Though Augustus rationalized the pensions of soldiers, their pay (*stipendia*) and donatives were still a matter of contention. *Stipendia* were rarely raised, and soldiers' control over their income was restricted, especially in the early Empire, when soldiers' pay was reduced by extensive deductions. Discipline attempted to repress soldiers' illegitimate acquisition of income, services, and material goods through extortion or corruption.

Imperial donatives or gifts of cash to the army, a matter of controversy, had to be reconciled with disciplinary ideology. *Disciplina* required that *stipendia* and *donativa* be routinized in the Weberian sense and given in a way that would not corrupt discipline. On the one hand, donatives were given at predictable events such as imperial accessions, the distribution of predecessors' legacies, and the adoption of heirs. On the other hand, donatives (especially given at whim or under extraordinary circumstances) were personal gifts from the emperor, intended to subordinate soldiers and invoke their loyalty. Such gifts established a personal relationship that emperors violated at their peril: refusing to give was an insult. Furthermore, the *donativa* as gifts might not elicit loyalty; emperors' and usurpers' too obvious bids for material support elicited the soldiers' contempt.

These relations of exchange conflicted with a more rational and impersonal standard of discipline. A form of benefaction preferable to handouts of money was the grant of legal privileges to soldiers, protecting their rights to property they already possessed. Imperial coin issues and military decorations, usually construed as representing imperial patronage, also underwent a routinization.

LABOR MILITARIS: WORK AS DISCIPLINE

According to the ideology of discipline, soldiers should be kept always at work, performing *labor* (toil). This military *labor* resembled in some respects modern work-discipline, formally documented and administered by the military bureaucracy. But *labor* was also value-rational, conditioning soldiers to obedience. *Otium* (idleness) was regarded as a source of insubordination.

Not all forms of *labor* were acceptable to the soldiers. Menial labor, tedious, repetitive, and degrading, risked the assimilation of soldiers to slaves. Soldiers resented such labor, resisting it with direct mutiny or through their acquisition of slaves to do their chores; from time to time commanders expelled such slaves from military camps. The commander's symbolic labors, sharing to some degree the toil of his men, may have reconciled soldiers to their tasks.

During much of the Principate, the soldiers were not involved in active campaigns. *Disciplina militaris* imposed *labor* and thus maintained soldiers' *virtus*. *Virtus* could be displayed under peacetime conditions as the might and energy expended by soldiers in permanent building, a demonstration of imperial power, as well as in other forms of labor.

FEASTS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: *DISCIPLINA* AND AUSTERITY

The political economy of *disciplina militaris* also sought to control soldiers' consumption, especially eating and drinking. Dining and feasting were a major mode of social power in the Roman world, but *militia* was ideally a zone of austerity. Austerity was both formally rational, due to the vast scale of the army's needs and the limitations of ancient production and transportation, and embedded in elite values.

A double standard applied: officers might dine graciously, but soldiers were regarded as incapable of controlling their intake, so that drunken and gorged armies were easily ambushed and overcome. Luxury caused the collapse of military *habitus*. Soldiers' aggressiveness manifested as beastlike or cannibalistic savagery. Excessive consumption of meat was associated with "barbarian" status. *Disciplina*

militaris imposed an archaically simple diet on soldiers, emphasizing grain rather than meat, and imposing simple methods of preparation. This austerity was made palatable by the commander's or emperor's symbolic adoption of a similar lifestyle on campaign. In practice, soldiers sought a greater variety of foodstuffs than their limited rations.

I THEORIZING *DISCIPLINA*: SOCIAL CONFLICT, LEGITIMATION, AND POWER



INTRODUCTION

Social conflict, as distinguished from overt struggle or violence, is a prominent theme in Roman military discipline. An account of social conflict in the Roman military should explain why the soldiers' mutinies were relatively infrequent. The usual explanations are political and material: soldiers' loyalty was secured by their annual oaths of allegiance to the emperor; by reverence for the emperor, fostered by the imperial cult; and by pay, benefits, and imperial gifts of money and privileges. These methods suggest a patrimonial mode of authority, in which the emperor was a personal benefactor of his soldiers. Little attention has been paid to a countervailing ideology of *disciplina militaris*, which commanders (both aristocrats and emperors) imposed to legitimate their commands; *disciplina* repressed unrestricted patronage of the army. However, the commander who imposed *disciplina* also needed to persuade the soldiers. This chapter examines the applicability to the Roman army of Weberian sociology, Marxist theory, and Pierre Bourdieu's theories of *habitus* and social and cultural reproduction. The social status of Roman soldiers is debated by modern scholars. Soldiers occupied an intermediate, subelite position in the Roman social hierarchy, in which their status was highly relative; this occupational status was reinforced by separation from low-status groups and activities.

SOCIAL HIERARCHY AND POTENTIAL CONFLICT

The Marxist definition of "class" is insufficient to describe social differentiation in the Greek and Roman world. Social differentiation incorporated such factors as landed and financial wealth, legal status and privileges, political power, ownership of slaves, leisure, consumption of prestige goods, access to education, display of

culture, and health.¹ The first three *ordines* (orders), senators and their families, equestrians and their families, and decurions, composed a tiny percent of the population: between 350,000 and 500,000 individuals in a total population of about 50 million. Of these, there were a mere 600 senators and approximately 2000 senatorial family members; there may have been as many as 10,000 equestrians, many of whom did not live at Rome. There were about 100,000 veterans, possessing the legal privileges of decurions.² Except for the veterans and some decurions, the upper *ordines* were very wealthy. Senators were required to possess 1,000,000 sesterces, equestrians 400,000, to qualify for membership in these orders, and many possessed far more wealth.³ To put the property qualifications in perspective, a Roman legionary of the first century AD, before Domitian raised pay, earned 900 sesterces a year, equivalent to a workman's wage, so that 1,000,000 sesterces were worth an order of magnitude more than "a million dollars."

In the late Republic, senators had been required to possess 400,000 sesterces, and the social pinnacle was occupied by a fluctuating *nobilitas*, families whose male members were often elected to the consulship, the highest political office. Consuls without consular ancestors were termed *novi homines*, "new men," such as Marius. Male aristocrats' access to political offices was not automatic. Many of these aristocrats never pursued political careers. Those who attained distinguished political offices could not count on their descendants' attaining them; as a result, the senatorial order failed to replace itself and "new men" were constantly promoted from equestrian status.⁴ In the early Empire, various "servants of the throne" such as educated, capable imperial slaves and freedmen attained wealth and power, but the traditional elite denied them prestige. The elite also regarded the army as a source of social upstarts.

Legal privileges also marked status. In the legal interpretation of the second and early third centuries AD, the upper orders were classified as *honestiores*, "more honorable" individuals exempt from degrading corporal and capital punishments. The upper orders' households contained many slaves, both as house servants and field laborers. A wealthy senator might have 400 or 500 slaves in his establishment

¹ On multivariate aspects of status Hopkins 1965: 14; Scheidel 2006.

² Scheidel 2006: 41–2, 49–50.

³ Alföldy 1988: 106, 110, 115–22; equestrians, 122–7; Garnsey and Saller 1987: 112–14; Potter 2004: 66–81; Rowe 2002: 70–73.

⁴ Hopkins and Burton 1983a: 194–7, 1983b; M. Roller 2001: 99–100.

in the city of Rome alone.⁵ Leisure was a privilege of elite status, but contrasted with an ethic of physical and mental effort in public or military service.

Due to the rapid turnover of the senatorial order, the elite sought legitimacy through literary, philosophical, and legal education and through the display of culture and of traditional Roman values. This exemplary tradition conditioned the approach of aristocrats to command, giving a moralistic and often archaic tone to *disciplina*. Whether *disciplina* reached the common soldiers as advertised is a persistent problem, addressed in this work through documentary sources. Often of similar wealth, senators and equestrians in late Republican and imperial society socialized and married with each other. Literary and rhetorical education had a leveling effect within these orders, countering the differences in wealth between them, but excluding less educated individuals, such as common soldiers. This education required leisure (*otium*), which soldiers also lacked.

The command hierarchy of the Roman army reflected the social hierarchy of civilian society.⁶ In the Republic, the consuls or dictator (sole executive magistrate in emergencies) were commanders-in-chief; in the Empire, the emperor was commander-in-chief, usually delegating actual field command to members of his own family or trusted aristocrats. In a province with only one legion, the governor also commanded the legion; in a province with more than one legion, a legionary legate commanded each legion, but the provincial governor (usually a proconsular legate) was superior to the legionary legates.⁷ Under each legionary legate ranked one laticlavian (broad-stripe) tribune, a senatorial officer who held this post for a year or two before entering the Senate at age 25; thus, he was often very young.⁸ Five angusticlavian (narrow-stripe) tribunes, also fairly young, were of equestrian status, providing the legate with administrative support. Formerly prefects of auxiliary cohorts, these tribunes went on to be prefects of *alae* (auxiliary cavalry units). The gulf between these senatorial and equestrian

⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 14.42–44. On *honestiores* Scheidel 2006: 46–7.

⁶ Alföldy 1987: 28.

⁷ Domaszewski 1908; Parker [1928] 1958: 187–211; G. Watson 1969: 23–4, 77–9, 85–8; Campbell 1975, 1984: 317–61, 1994: 28–9, 46–7, 56–7, 61–2; Le Bohec 1994: 24–5, 36–46; Isaac 1995; Le Bohec 1995; G. Webster 1998: 112–18; Wesch-Klein 1998: 13–36; Gilliver 2007: 189–92. Southern 2007: 59, 125–30. On elite officers as literati, Wellesley 1969: 64–5; Wheeler 1977; Campbell 1984: 325–32, 1987; Mattern 1999: 13–18; A. R. Birley 2000: 97–9; Blois 2000: 15–17; Saddington 2003; A. R. Birley 2003; Gilliver 2007: 190.

⁸ Campbell 1975: 18–19.

officers and the common soldiers was considerable. When their status is not designated, these men are termed “officers” in this book; the commander of an unit, whether a legionary legate or an auxiliary prefect, is termed “commander” or “general.”

In the early Empire, senatorial and most equestrian officers obtained military command as civilians, by imperial appointment or favor. They had no special training, though in the Republic aristocrats had been required to serve in the army for ten campaigns before running for office.⁹ The highest-ranking officer who might have risen from the ranks was the *praefectus castrorum*, the chief logistics officer for the legion. He was a former centurion who had attained equestrian status (and thus was at least middle-aged).¹⁰

Below these officers, legionary centurions and auxiliary decurions were typically promoted from the ranks after serving for at least a decade. Centurions had usually served 10–15 years, though some centurions might be promoted from the Praetorians or commissioned *ex equite Romano*, as equestrians who received appointments.¹¹ The aristocracy regarded nonequestrian centurions as part of the collective *miles*, also called *milites caligati* or those who wore the *caliga*, the soldier’s boot. Common soldiers were *milites gregarii*.¹²

For common soldiers, social ascent through promotion was possible, but under stable conditions (rather than civil war) lengthy and slow. A soldier who was promoted to centurion rank entered a highly competitive hierarchy of 59 centurions within his own legion, competing for five highest-ranking centurionates in the first cohort. The first of these, the *primus pilus*, was promoted into the equestrian order on discharge, after which he might be appointed *praefectus castrorum*. Of some 600 active or retired *primi pili* at any one time, a few might be promoted to procurator (a financial official in the imperial bureaucracy).¹³

In the legions, a hierarchy of pay grades and functions, both administrative and tactical, separated common soldiers and centurions. *Principales* –the deputies (*optiones*, sg. *optio*) of centurions, *tesserarii*, and *signiferi* (standard-bearers) – received a higher salary; so-called *immunes*, including *librarii* (clerks) and artisans, were paid the same amount as common soldiers but were exempted from fatigues. Collectively

⁹ Domaszewski 1908: 122–34; Harris 1979: 10–14; A. R. Birley 2003: 5–7.

¹⁰ Domaszewski 1908: 119–20; Roth 1999: 274.

¹¹ Domaszewski 1908: 80–97; Dobson 1974; Goldsworthy 1996: 31–2; Gilliver 2007: 190–92.

¹² Gilliam 1946; Sander 1954–5; Wesch-Klein 1998: 41–3.

¹³ Alföldy 1987: 31; Dobson 1970, 1974; on *primi pili* and *primipilares* Dobson 2000.

these low-ranking officers still counted as *militēs caligati*.¹⁴ All *militēs caligati* were marked by long service: Praetorians 16 years, legionaries at first 16 (between 31 BC and AD 5), then 20, and finally 25 years, auxiliaries 25 years, fleet soldiers 26 to 28 years. The pay grades and ranks below the centurionate are attested in soldiers' dedications and epitaphs; the literary authors speak more vaguely of soldiers as *militēs*. In this book the *militēs* are called "common soldiers" or "soldiers," and centurions are distinguished when applicable.

Officers of the upper orders had no systematic military training; there was no military academy, officer candidate school, or even gymnasium with ephebic (cadet) training in the manner of Hellenic cities.¹⁵ Scholars of prosopography, the study of administrative and military careers in literary sources and epitaphs, have suggested that Roman emperors promoted on a separate track so-called *virī militares*. These were aristocrats showing a special aptitude for military affairs and receiving more extensive training through the tenure of more military posts than usual.¹⁶ Such a promotion track may not have existed; many aristocrats appointed as officers did not have any special experience.¹⁷ Their approach to military service was traditional, influenced by literary and rhetorical aristocratic education and conveyed through historical narratives and *exempla* (edifying anecdotes).¹⁸ Elite commanders and emperors imitated exemplary predecessors. Military service and military command were the traditional duties of Roman Republican aristocrats. *Virtus*, courage or prowess in combat, was the traditional measure of manliness.¹⁹

¹⁴ Domaszewski 1908: 1–59; Breeze 1971, 1974; McDermott 1970 on *militēs gregales*; Gilliver 2007: 192. Usually called *principales*.

¹⁵ The sons of the upper orders rode in the paramilitary spectacle called the *ludus Troiae*, revived by Caesar, Agrippa, and Augustus: Verg. *Aen.* 5.545–622; Suet. *Iul.* 39.2; Dio 43.23.6, 48.20.2, 49.43.3; Suet. *Aug.* 43.2. Severy 2003: 83. Adult equestrians (living in or near Rome) rode in the *transvectio equestrum*.

¹⁶ Eck 1974; E. Birley 1953 and older authors; moderated by A. R. Birley 1981, 1992, 2000, 2003; Eck 2001.

¹⁷ Campbell 1975; Alföldy 1976; Hopkins and Burton 1983b: 73–5; Saller 1982: 41–77, 79–117; Campbell 1984: 319–32; Alföldy 1987: 28; Campbell 1987; Lendon 1997: 185–91; Alston 1998: 214–15; Mattern 1999: 16–17; Campbell 2002: 40–41; A. R. Birley 2003: 4–5. Promotion of nonconsulars and equestrians from mid-second century and in third century AD, Potter 2004: 74–5; Blois 2001b: 148–52.

¹⁸ Mattern 1999: 3; Lendon 1997: 27–9, 2005: 281–5; Goldsworthy 2003: 205.

¹⁹ Harris 1979: 39–40; Rosenstein 1990: 117–21; Lendon 2005: 176–7, 188–9. Rosenstein 1990: 118 n. 7 enumerates nobles slain in combat; Zhmodikov 2000: 68–70. On willingness to die in combat, Barton 2001: 40–43. On *virtus* McDonnell 2006b. On duels, Oakley 1985; the last recorded Republican duel was in 45 BC, [Caes.] *Hispan.* 25.3–5. Marius fought at Aquae Sextiae, Plut. *Mar.* 20.5–6; Goldsworthy 1996: 154. Wiedemann 1996: 98; younger elite officers still fought in the front lines. Campbell 1984: 65–9 is skeptical whether emperors fought in person, doubting Plin. *Pan.* 17.2–3. Later Roman emperors might

In the late Republic, as the aristocracy became civilianized, philosophical writers extended *virtus* to other competitive excellences, such as distinction in oratory or moral virtue. However, the Romans still valued military *virtus*; one role of *disciplina militaris* was to maintain it in soldiers. As this study argues, the moral and rhetorical emphasis of *disciplina* both restrained patrimonialism and limited the development of Weberian rationality (legal-rational bureaucracy) in the Roman army.

Soldiers were accustomed to obey their centurions and decurions, the officers with whom they had most social contact, and who most often inflicted direct corporal punishment. But higher-ranking officers and commanders from the upper orders needed to legitimate their authority. The Greek and Roman civilian elite tended to fear and dislike the soldiers as a *vulgus* or “mob” or as resembling paupers or brigands.²⁰ In an ancient author’s erroneous etymology, the word *miles* derives from the number *mille*, a thousand; the soldiers’ “numbers inspired fear.”²¹ The imperial army comprised between 300,000 and 400,000 men, in twenty-eight legions under Augustus, reduced to twenty-five after three were lost in Germany in 9 AD, and raised to thirty-three under Severus.²² The social control of so large a force (even dispersed in legions of about 5120 men each and auxiliary units of 500 to 1,000 men) was a foremost concern in *disciplina*.

Documentary sources disprove the view of soldiers as a “mob.” Epitaphs and inscriptions present common soldiers as middle-class, Romanized individuals, often recruited from towns, and papyri show literate soldiers corresponding with their family members.²³ But the social status of soldiers was low relative to that of the Greco-Roman elite, and especially the senatorial order, which grew wealthier as the centuries passed. The late Republican tradition depicting soldiers as “mercenary” paupers persisted in the Empire, influencing literary authors.

Common soldiers fit uneasily into the Roman schema of society, between the elite and the more or less impoverished and unprivileged masses. This study argues that discipline defined many aspects of soldiers’ status, fashioning an occupational

fight in person, starting with Maximinus Thrax (235–8); on the later Roman period M. P. Speidel 2000. In the Principate, to exercise more control, commanders oversaw the battle at a distance or behind the front lines, Goldsworthy 1996: 149–50.

²⁰ Campbell 1984: 9–10, 13, 30, 2002: 32–4; MacMullen 1984 (see MacMullen 1990: 226).

²¹ Carrié 1993: 105.

²² Campbell 1984: 4; Mattern 1999: 82–3.

²³ Le Bohec 1994: 88–93, 92; Carrié 1993: 107. The auxiliaries, originally non-Roman, were increasingly recruited from citizens. Ethnicity is discussed further in Chapter 3.

status that separated soldiers from both the elite and the civilian masses. In the first century AD, the legionary or auxiliary foot soldier's income was low by civilian standards, resembling a daily wage laborer's, but soldiers received additional benefits: health care, donatives, and pensions for legionaries and Praetorians. If soldiers were not demoted or dishonorably discharged, they were assured of this income and benefits. Soldiers were probably healthier than the civilian masses. They received sufficient food, and were accustomed to and capable of strenuous exercise. Probably idealized recommendations for the height of recruits suggest that recruits came from a relatively prosperous social stratum, not stunted by childhood malnutrition.²⁴ Yet, as Chapter 5 will show, disciplinary ideology still constrained soldiers' disposal of this money. Other chapters emphasize that soldiers did not have the privilege of leisure while in service, and their consumption of food and drink was also subject to social control.

These issues are compounded by provincial recruitment. By the second century AD, military service attracted provincial recruits from a more privileged economic background than that of the Italian recruits of Augustan times. The Augustan soldiers may have had no other income than their *stipendia* and *donativa*, but some provincial soldiers (or their relatives) may have owned land, despite being forbidden to purchase it in the provinces where they served. In Roman Egypt, these soldiers also displayed more Greek and Latin literacy than imperial elite authors attributed to them.²⁵ In the provinces, a legionary infantryman's wage may have had greater purchasing power than in Rome and Italy. From an absolute perspective, compared to the masses, soldiers were privileged, though less so than the elite groups. Soldiers claimed basic elements of privilege (such as owning slaves, buying diverse foods, or not being beaten). They resisted severe discipline that treated them like slaves.

Soldiers' privileges were a matter of contestation. Both the upper *ordines* and the lower strata regarded privileged soldiers as a social problem. Lower-status provincials petitioned the emperor to redress military abuse of civilians, emphasizing the soldiers' arrogance; a typical strategy of appeal depicted one's abuser as more powerful than oneself. The elite also regarded unprivileged soldiers as a social problem, perceiving poor peasants or the urban plebs as violent and disorderly;

²⁴ Veg. *Mil.* 1.5.1–3; Garnsey 1999: 59. On imperial soldiers' rising status, Wesch-Klein 1998: 208–9; M. A. Speidel 2000; Phang 2001: 186–8.

²⁵ Harris 1989: 253; Phang 2007: 500.

excessively poor soldiers were avaricious. In particular, imperial soldiers' occupational status conflicted with their social and economic status, that of plebeian laborers dependent on wages. The latter had a very low status in Roman society. Imperial patronage and the occupational status of soldiers conferred greater honor on soldiers, but *disciplina* was necessary to control their acquisition and consumption of money and goods. Such control of soldiers' access to wealth had a legitimating purpose, reconciling the civilian elite to the influence of the army in politics. At the same time, soldiers' rise in material status caused conflicts: the Roman elite ideal of discipline was a repressive one, but it had to be made acceptable and legitimate to the soldiers, who retained the ability to mutiny.

A MARXIST VIEW OF THE ROMAN MILITARY

As subsequent chapters of this book argue, the Roman elite sought through *disciplina* ideology not just to control soldiers in battle, but also to control the military's conditions of production, redistribution, and consumption. Military production subsumes both the daily labor of logistics, artisan production, and construction and the production of the soldiers themselves as trained fighters. *Disciplina* was ideological in the Marxist sense, intended to justify and make possible this control.

However, the complexity of *disciplina* in theory and practice is unsuited to a traditionally Marxist frame of analysis. Marx and his best-known follower in classical history, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, viewed the Roman economy as dominated by the slave mode of production. Thus, in antiquity the class struggle chiefly was a struggle between owners and slaves; the army was a variation of the proletariat, but employed by owners to repress slaves and other social inferiors.²⁶ In particular, the conflict of aristocrats with free poor citizens was regarded as an agrarian conflict over the distribution of land, a theme adopted also by Max Weber. The land question was no longer an issue in the Principate, but the elite continued to contest imperial redistribution of money to soldiers.

Imperial soldiers were hardly mere victims of economic exploitation. They were assured of their wages, despite deductions from pay for equipment and rations in

²⁶ Strictly a *Lumpenproletariat* as in Marx's *Eighteenth Brumaire* (1852). On Marxism in classical studies, *Arethusa* (1978 special issue) surveys older work; Ste. Croix 1981; for Marxist views of the Roman army, Harmand 1969; Garlan 1974. On critical theory, Ando 2000: 19–25.

the first century AD. Soldiers therefore could not be motivated by direct coercion as with slaves or by the specter of starvation as with impoverished free wage labor. However, Roman *disciplina militaris* socialized soldiers and rising officers and thus forestalled mutiny, let alone social revolution. In the mid- and late third century AD, the dominance of military emperors from the equestrian order and lower strata, who excluded senators from military commands, cannot be equated with social revolution.

Ste. Croix regarded the Greco-Roman dominant ideology with derision.²⁷ However, ideology is very important. The ideology of the dominant classes must persuade the subordinate classes that the social hierarchy and their subjection or exploitation are legitimate; it must habituate workers to such exploitation, the subject of E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963). According to critical theory, ideology socializes the dominant and subordinate classes to identify with the established order, enabling social reproduction. Cultural production and cultural reproduction become as important as material production. These theorists, in particular Louis Althusser and Pierre Bourdieu, will be discussed later in this chapter. The discusses Weberian concepts of legitimate authority and typology of institutions, inquiring to what extent the Roman army was a patrimonial institution or a legal-rational bureaucracy.

MAX WEBER AND THE ROMAN ARMY

The historical sociology of the Roman army, as with modern (twentieth century) Greek and Roman social history, owes a great deal to Max Weber, the great German sociologist of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Weber had professional training as an ancient historian.²⁸ In recent years, ancient history has moved away from the agrarian emphasis of Weber's early work. Such history stressed the decline and fall of the Roman Republic, in which the small farmers from whom the legions were recruited became impoverished and were expropriated by large landowners who converted their farms to slave-worked plantations; the landless poor entered the army. This model, also popular with Marxist historians,

²⁷ Ste. Croix 1981: 409–52.

²⁸ On Weber, see Camic et al. 2005; W. Mommsen 2005 analyzes the composition of *Economy and Society*. On Weber and antiquity Finley 1986; Mueller 1986; Love 1986 and 1991: 268–74; Lendon 1997: 7–12; Nippel 2000; Ando 2000: 21, 25–8; M. Roller 2001: 130–34, 174; Kelly 2004: 275 n. 1; Lendon 2006.

is now discredited in the material sense.²⁹ Nonetheless, because the imperial elite believed this narrative, represented by literary authors, it is an important aspect of *disciplina* ideology.

In studying the Roman army, modern authors have employed as implicit models Weber's concepts of charismatic authority and routinization, legitimation, traditional authority and patrimonial societies, and legal-rational bureaucracy. This chapter discusses such models in explicit terms. The Weberian typologies of charisma versus routinization, of traditional patrimonial authority versus formally rational bureaucratic authority, and of primitive economies versus economic rationality are too rigid for the Roman army. The Roman army and Roman society display both patrimonial and legal-rational forms, as shown in recent debates on the "ancient economy." Roman *disciplina militaris* displays only some features of modern military discipline or Weber's "ideal-type" discipline, which stresses unquestioning obedience, rational recruitment and promotion, rational bureaucracy, and formal laws or regulations.³⁰

CHARISMA AND ROUTINIZATION IN THE ROMAN ARMY

In Weberian sociological theory, charismatic institutions derive their authority solely from the personal qualities of their leaders, whether a founder of a dynasty, a revolutionary cadre, a warlord, or a messiah of a new religion. Charismatic movements are highly unstable and tend to dissipate unless they undergo routinization: the conversion of charismatic into legitimate authority.³¹ This legitimate authority may take a traditional form, that of patriarchy or feudal monarchy or aristocracy. Traditional authority contrasts with legal-rational bureaucratic authority, that of modern corporate, governmental, and military organizations; a charismatic or traditional institution undergoes rationalization to become a legal-rational bureaucracy.

Though the Roman army of the Republic was not a pure charismatic institution, Republican warfare had distinct charismatic qualities compared with the imperial

²⁹ Popular: also Toynbee 1965, Brunt 1962, [1971] 1987. Discredited: Rosenstein 2004 and reviewed by Phang 2006.

³⁰ Weber 1946: 253, 1978: 1148; Garlan 1975: 110–11 imposes a Weberian model of discipline.

³¹ *Herrschaft* (domination) differs from *Macht* (power) in that *Herrschaft* possesses legitimation and is routinely obeyed: Weber 1978: 53, 212–30. Cf. *autoritas* and *potestas* in the Roman political lexicon. On charismatic, legal, and traditional authority, Weber 1978: 241–5, 217–26, 226–41. Routinization: Weber 1978: 246–54, 1111–57, esp. 246, 250–51, 1122.

period. The consuls were usually aristocrats, a feature of traditional authority. However, their election depended on connections, bribery, and popular favor. Furthermore, as commanders, consuls possessed *imperium militiae*, an uncoded and unlimited authority, which Weber regards as charismatic. Within the army, promotion from the ranks was relatively rapid and irregular, compared with the Principate.³²

Furthermore, Weberian charismatic authority is marked by its irrational political economy, relying on unpredictable or predatory means of acquisition: gifts, donations, or plunder.³³ Traditional Roman warfare sought the predatory acquisition of land and booty and the promotion of the commander's *gloria*, his personal fame and prestige.³⁴ These objectives expanded out of control in the late Republic. The Romans approved of plundering alien peoples, but were appalled by commanders' and soldiers' predatory acquisition of citizens' property during the civil wars and proscriptions. The powers of generals and leaders expanded in scope from Marius' repeated consulships to Augustus' unlimited *imperium* at the end of the civil wars. Though their powers might have been conferred legally, in literary tradition these charismatic commanders became "rogue males," subject to no law or custom.³⁵ Commanders rewarded their soldiers' loyalty with pay increases, donatives, or land grants; they even induced other armies to defect by such means. Soldiers frequently mutinied because they were not paid or discharged.

This description describes the Greek and Roman literary tradition on the civil wars, which influenced elite attitudes in the Empire. Modern scholars of the late Republic have argued that internal discipline persisted at the organizational and tactical levels. Soldiers of the late Republic did not behave like mercenaries; they remained loyal to the state.³⁶ Except for Caesar's *Commentaries*, elite authors do not emphasize this. Instead they emphasize ordinary soldiers' piratical extravagance, greed, aggression, and glory-seeking, all of which commanders exploited.³⁷ This tradition shaped imperial military discipline.

³² On professionalization of the Republican army, Patterson 1993; Isaac 1995: 23–4; Keppie 1998; Blois 2000; Goldsworthy 2003: 154–5; Lendon 2005: 229–31; Blois 2007: 165–8.

³³ Weber 1978: 153, 240, 245, 1111–13, 1118–20.

³⁴ Harris 1979: 54–104; Rich 1993 stresses material and political gain from conquest.

³⁵ Barton 2001: 100–05.

³⁶ Carrié 1993: 107–8, 111; on officers, Blois 2000.

³⁷ E.g., Suet. *Jul.* 67.

To secure peace after the triumviral wars, Augustus needed to convert his unstable charismatic authority to legitimate authority. Augustus drew upon traditional forms of authority to routinize and legitimate his power, though he combined these forms in unprecedented ways.³⁸ The imperial power continued to be somewhat charismatic, demonstrated by acclamations, imperial cult, and panegyric and its converse, the execrations and *damnatio memoriae* (destruction of imperial statues and inscriptions) of unpopular emperors who were assassinated.³⁹ Succession crises also demonstrated the charismatic aspect of imperial rule, contrasting with traditional monarchy. Despite the existence of imperial families, hereditary succession was not *ipso facto* legitimate. The literary tradition disparaged the quasi-hereditary succession of young, untried men, such as Caligula, Nero, Commodus, and Caracalla. According to aristocratic ideology, the reigning emperor should designate a mature and competent successor, whose legitimacy proceeded from this designation, not from his connection to the imperial family by birth, adoption, or marriage (though such connection was usual).⁴⁰ The emperor's authority remained charismatic in that he was acclaimed by the army as *Imperator*, a custom deriving from Roman triumphs, before being confirmed by the Senate.⁴¹ As would happen in 69 and 193 onward into the third century AD, emperors could be acclaimed and overthrown by the soldiers and their generals.

For this reason, to make imperial power stable and legitimate, military service must also be routinized and rationalized. Soldiers could not continue to depend on the victories of their generals and on political confiscations as the source of their pay and pensions. These necessities became apparent in the late Republic, when literary authors praised military *labor* and austerity and deplored rapacity. However, as Chapter 5 will show in detail, Augustus routinized and rationalized the conditions of service, regularizing pensions after a fixed length of service, and funding them from a military treasury filled from taxation. However, *disciplina* ideology went further in discouraging soldiers from pursuing wealth; it thus was value-rational. As will be seen, many other aspects of *disciplina* were value-rational rather than instrumental.

³⁸ Syme 1939; Brunt and Moore eds. 1967 (commentary); Zanker 1988; Nicolet 1993: 29–31, 43, 46.

³⁹ Ando 2000: 25–32; Price 1984: 240–48 and Lendon 1997: 9 and 2006 regard emperors as uncharismatic.

⁴⁰ Hartke 1951.

⁴¹ Campbell 1984: 122–7, distinguished from public acclamations as praise.

THE ROMAN ARMY AS A LEGAL-RATIONAL BUREAUCRACY

Through the mid-twentieth century, studies of the organization and career structure of the Roman army stressed bureaucratic rationality and tended to assume or argue that promotions were meritocratic. The model was explicitly that of the modern army.⁴² The archaeologists who excavated, reconstructed, and admired Roman provincial towns and frontier bases often adopted a legal-rational view of the Roman army. They projected their own colonial ideologies onto the ancient Roman empire, suggesting that most of the building was done by Roman soldiers and that the indigenous inhabitants, especially in North Africa and the Middle East, were incapable of such projects. They presented the army as an active and deliberate force of Romanization.⁴³

Weber views discipline as a mode of routinization that produces legal-rational bureaucracy.⁴⁴ He includes military discipline in this category, citing the Roman legions and other premodern military societies that stressed obedience and an austere “warrior communism.”⁴⁵ However, the requirements of Weber’s ideal-type rational bureaucracy are stringent. Such bureaucrats draw monetary salaries and receive no other remuneration. They are chosen on rational technical qualifications attained by formal training and proven by testing. They are promoted according to these skills or seniority. They regard their office as a career and have no other sources of income. They follow a legal code or handbook. They obey an impersonal authority. They prepare and archive documentation that covers every aspect of the bureaucracy.⁴⁶

In contrast, Roman elite administrators and officers were not dependent on salaries, possessing wealth from landed estates, and were not formally trained or tested. Aristocrats regarded political or military office as honors or privileges of rank, and were promoted by imperial favor. The *milites* more resembled a rational bureaucracy, with administrative and artisan specialties, receiving *stipendia* and

⁴² E. Birley 1953. Such assumptions ran both ways. In WWII Eric Birley, heading MI14’s Military Intelligence Research Section, drew on his Roman studies to analyze the Wehrmacht’s command structure, Hinsley and Stripp 2001: 74–5.

⁴³ Woolf 1998: 4–6, 26–7; Hingley 2000: 36–7, 56–9; Mattingly 1996: 50–54; still presented by Goldsworthy 2003: 197, 221, 234, 349, 368–9.

⁴⁴ Weber 1978: 1148–56.

⁴⁵ Weber 1946: 255–60.

⁴⁶ Weber 1978: 220–21, 956–1005.

pensions, and promoted by seniority as well as merit and favor. Instances of the paperwork of this extensive bureaucracy survive. On the other hand, relatively little is known about promotion criteria for *milites*.⁴⁷ The military's pay and work records and numerous injunctions against corruption were value-rational as well as bureaucratic, repressing and punishing greed and idleness. Stoicism may have promoted bureaucratic rationality.⁴⁸ However, many authors regarded the rational control of soldiers' work, leisure, pay, and consumption not as an end in itself, but as instrumental in preventing mutiny and usurpation.⁴⁹

Weberian discipline required unquestioning and automatic obedience of given orders. As chapters of this study show, the obedience of Roman soldiers was not automatic. Far from displaying unquestioning deference, soldiers often urged their generals to fight the enemy against the generals' wishes. Furthermore, no formal handbook or legal code on Roman military discipline is extant. A jurist cited and quoted a work called *disciplina Augusti*, pertaining to military discipline. In the late second and early third centuries AD, jurists also wrote prescriptive treatises on military affairs (*de re militari*).⁵⁰ Imperial *mandata* (administrative regulations) and edicts pertained to discipline, but most of these do not survive. Some *constitutiones* or laws of emperors on military affairs are attested.⁵¹ The emperor could judge cases involving soldiers; such judgments and imperial rescripts to soldiers are preserved in the Digest.⁵² However, no comprehensive, official manual of military discipline or law survives. Most of *disciplina militaris* consisted of custom or tradition, not law. It was a social rather than legal code, conveyed via *exempla* or anecdotes about notable Roman commanders.

According to some, Roman *disciplina militaris* was originally religious or sacral in nature, enforced by taboo and sacrilege, and underwent Weberian *Entzauberung* (disenchantment), becoming more rational.⁵³ This book will not examine this

⁴⁷ Promotions studied through inscriptions: Dobson 1970; Breeze 1971; Dobson 1974; Breeze 1974 (and works in n. 16). Besides seniority and a standard progression, the criteria may have been moral.

⁴⁸ Veyne 1990: 218–19.

⁴⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.16, 2.55, *Hist.* 1.46, 2.80; Dio 52.27.4–5.

⁵⁰ *Disciplina Augusti*: D. 49.16.12.1 (Macer *re mil.* 1) Neumann 1936, 1946.

⁵¹ Millar [1977] 1992: 313–17; Lintott 1993: 116, 122; Robinson 1997: 34–5. Surviving *mandata* are usually local, preserved as inscriptions, Mitchell 1976. Imperial *constitutiones* and *mandata*, e.g. Veg. *Mil.* 1.8.11; D. 29.1.1.pr (Ulpian *Ad edict* 45).

⁵² Trajan in Plin. *Ep.* 6.31.4–5, 10.19–20, 29–30; Millar [1977] 1992: 516–27; rescripts, Campbell 1984: 273–81. Plin. *Ep.* 10.29.1 addresses Trajan as *conditor disciplinae militaris firmatorque*.

⁵³ Rüpke 1990: 80, 93–6, 239.

transition, due to the problems posed by antiquarian accounts, written many centuries later, of archaic Roman religion. However, it does appear that Roman military punishment left the sacral sphere, in which disobedience was a sacrilege and capital punishment an expiatory sacrifice, and became rationalized.

The other view, often seen, is that imperial military discipline, cohesion, and obedience were reinforced by religious practices such as the cult of the standards, the imperial cult, and “military” cults such as those of Mithras and Jupiter Dolichenus. This book examines military religion briefly in Chapter [Three](#). The imperial cult and the cult of the standards promoted routinization and identification with the army. Nonetheless, in the imperial period there is little sign of a religious component to *disciplina*. When imperial authors depict indiscipline, they lament that soldiers neglected their training and let their weapons rust, not that the cults of the army were neglected.

THE ROMAN ARMY AS A PATRIMONIAL BUREAUCRACY

In Weber’s historical sociology, ancient bureaucracies were patrimonial. The ruler promoted his relations, friends, or dependents to offices and influential positions as honors or signs of rank, dispensing his munificence rather than providing routine salaries.⁵⁴ Midlevel officials and governors dispensed similar favors to those below them. Many mid- to late twentieth-century scholars have depicted the Roman Empire as a Weberian patrimonial society.⁵⁵ The Roman empire, in their view, also lacked formal economic rationality. Recent scholars have challenged this view.⁵⁶ But whether or not the Roman economy *at large* lacked formal rationality,

⁵⁴ Weber 1978: 228–32, 237–40; Roman, 227, 1007–8; generally, 1006–69.

⁵⁵ Saller 1982: 4; Lendon 1997: 1–11 warn against rigid Weberian typologies; however, patrimonialism is emphasized by Finley 1973 and 1986; Millar [1977] 1992: 59–61; Saller 1982: 42–58; Garnsey and Saller 1987: 148–59; MacMullen 1988: 96–118; Wallace-Hadrill 1989b; Braund 1989; Love 1991: 268–9; Duncan-Jones 1994; Lendon 1997: 11–13, 236, 242–7, 296; M. Roller 2001: 131; Blois 2001b: 146–7; Potter 2004: 61. Nippel 1995: 7–9, 40–42, 97, 100–01 on policing emphasizes low level of rationalization. Ando 2000: 117–30 argues that imperial authorities promoted a rational image, as a value-rational or patrimonial promise of order. However, Veyne 1990: 201–61, 293–341, 345–6 (on which M. Roller 2001: 131–2, 174–6) stresses the bureaucratic nature of *donativa* and *congiaria*.

⁵⁶ Finley 1973 emphasizes ancient lack of Weberian formal economic rationality. Weber’s criteria for economic rationality are stringent (Weber 1978: 70–76, 82–4, 98, 107, 162), requiring double-entry accounting, unknown in antiquity. Weber 1978: 84, 139–40, 164–6, 199, 201, 204–5, 1118–29 describes the Roman empire as practicing “political capitalism” through tax-farming, confiscation, and warfare, followed by Polanyi [1944] 2001, 45; Love 1991: 246–68. Revisionist Roman studies, such as Hopkins 1980; contributors to Scheidel and von Reden eds. 2002; Whittaker 2004: 172–6; Harris 2006b; Kehoe

the imperial finances, especially donatives to the army, were formally irrational, constrained by social and political necessities and by value-rational factors, and subject to the emperor's personal decisions and whims.

The typical form of patrimonial authority in Roman society was that of a *patronus* (patron) over his client(s). A study of the Roman emperor's relationship to the army applies the Weberian typology of patrimonial authority, emphasizing the emperor's personal relationship with his soldiers, as a leader, a material patron, and a granter of privileges. The emperor's soldiers were in effect his clients.⁵⁷ This model of the relationship of emperor and army suggests why Cn. Calpurnius Piso, the governor of Syria suspected of plotting against Tiberius, was called "father of the army" by his "Pisonian" troops; why the emperor Septimius Severus allegedly said to his sons, "Support each other, enrich the army, and despise everyone else"; and why Caracalla said, "Nobody except myself should have any money, and I want to give it all to the soldiers."⁵⁸ But it does not explain these anecdotes' strongly negative slant. Senatorial patronage of the troops, as in the case of Piso, was illicit, because such a patron might use his troops to start a civil war and usurp the throne. But even imperial patronage of the troops was regarded askance, if done in the wrong way. Ideal imperial benefaction imposed subordination and loyalty on the recipients, reinforcing hierarchy as well as conferring favors and honors on soldiers. Illicit patronage equated the soldiers and emperors or pretenders who exchanged material benefits: the soldiers traded their support of the emperor or pretender for money, as seen in the Praetorians' "auction of the empire" to Didius Julianus. Such mutual exchange rendered the emperor or pretender illegitimate; even his soldiers might cease to respect him.

2007: 39–43 stress partial economic rationality and economic growth. Nonetheless, the public economies of elites and rulers were constrained by irrational or value-rational social and political factors: Mattern 1999: 123–6. For Greece, Reden 1995; Ober 1989; Davidson 1997. For the Roman period, on redistribution Kloft 1970; Veyne 1990; Duncan-Jones 1994; Cornell and Lomas 2003; Zuiderhoek 2007; on elite production Veyne 1979 and much recent archaeological work; on consumption patterns, Edwards 1993; Gowers 1993; Dench 1996 and 1998; Purcell 2003; Donahue 2004.

⁵⁷ Campbell 1984: 25, 32–59, 96–8, 386–88, 417–19; Hekster 2007: 343–5. Southern 2007: 59, 138. Campbell 2002: 83–5, 107–19 moderates this. Lendon 1997: 20, 25, 258 presents military discipline as more "objective." The Roman army was certainly not a "patrimonial army" as in Weber's mamluks and janissaries, royal slaves or bondsmen: Weber 1978: 1015–20.

⁵⁸ Piso: SC *de Cn. Pisone patre*, lines 54–7; Eck, Caballos and Fernández 1996; Potter 1999; Rowe 2002; Tac. *Ann.* 2.55, 3.13; Severus, Dio 76.15.2; Caracalla, Dio 78(77).10.4. On the emperor as *pater* of the troops, also Suet. *Calig.* 22.1; Campbell 1984: 53–5.

Both Weberian ideal types (formal or legal-rational bureaucracy and patrimonial authority) are probably too rigid to describe the Roman government and army. The government and army formed a patrimonial bureaucracy that included both formally rational and traditional elements of authority. Though the army had many patrimonial features, some areas, such as documentation, financial accounts, and work-discipline, displayed formal rationality. Furthermore, despite the basic fact of imperial patronage of the army, this patronage was routinized and subjected to value rationalization. Restraining soldiers' access to wealth and imposing *labor* and austerity were value-rational as well as instrumentally rational; the elite regarded these practices as restoring traditional virtues.

Weberian analysis provides a useful approach to institutional aspects of Roman military discipline, but it is less explanatory of embodied aspects of *disciplina*. Most of the *disciplina militaris* literature concerns the bodies and character of soldiers: their physical fitness, the effects of work or idleness, their austerity or consumption of luxuries, and their general bearing. In the theory of Althusser, an institution forms the subjectivity or identity of its members; Bourdieu's theory of *habitus* suggests how the bodies of Roman military personnel enact what he terms "political mythology."

ALTHUSSER AND IDEOLOGY

Louis Althusser shifts Marxist analysis from the material conditions and mode of production to social and cultural reproduction: how people are educated to reproduce these conditions. Subordinate individuals and groups must be induced to believe in and submit to the dominant ideology, and the dominant classes and individuals must be socialized to reproduce the ideology itself, transmitting it to future generations.⁵⁹ Althusser terms major institutions such as schools, universities, the Roman Catholic Church, and the family itself ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), which imprint ideology in a manner more indirect than outright coercion and indoctrination. The ISA inculcates its members not through forcing them to believe dogma, but by assigning identities to members who then perform them. An ISA "hails" its members as subjects, for example, as Catholics in the Roman Catholic Church.⁶⁰ Though Althusser, viewing them from outside,

⁵⁹ Althusser [1971] 2001: 89.

⁶⁰ Althusser [1971] 2001: 95–101.

depicts the police, prisons, and the military as repressive state apparatuses, those who enter the law enforcement and military professions experience these institutions as ISAs.⁶¹ Indeed, police and soldiers in training probably undergo subject formation to a much greater degree than do civilians in less authoritarian, hierarchical, and tradition-oriented ISAs. Althusser presumes that the ISA is a modern school or disciplinary institution, which regiments, qualifies, and promotes its members in a Weberian formally rational manner. Even the Church, his example, is an elaborate bureaucratic organization. The Roman army accomplished such subject formation, but in a less formal manner.

Althusser's view of ideology is fluid. Ideology represents "above all the (imaginary) relationship of individuals to the relations of production and the relations that derive from them."⁶² According to Althusser, ideology has to some degree an independent existence, taking shape according to its own rules in the collective imagination of the people who produce and reproduce it. Such a definition is appropriate to Roman *disciplina militaris*, transmitted by a Greco-Roman literary and rhetorical tradition learned by men of the upper orders. Many features of *disciplina* conceptualize the world according to this tradition, employing the stereotypes of the barbarian, the superiority of a gift economy to commerce, the irrationality of the mob, or the superiority of men over women. Literary *topoi* (stereotypes, motifs, or floating anecdotes) tend to recur in this thought-world. However, ideology by definition, however "imaginary," reproduces domination and exploitation. The imperial Greek and Roman elite's negative stereotypes of barbarians, their contempt for commerce and the populace, and their admiration of masculinity produced ideologies of discipline that both created the identity of soldiers and promoted their social control.

BOURDIEU: IMPROVISATION, *HABITUS*, AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

Pierre Bourdieu's theories of pedagogy and of *habitus* formation are also appropriate to analyzing Roman *disciplina militaris*. Bourdieu analyzes both modern French educational and social institutions and the traditional Mediterranean society of the Algerian Kabyle, comparable to rural societies in classical antiquity.⁶³ He also

⁶¹ Althusser [1971] 2001: 96–8.

⁶² Althusser [1971] 2001: III.

⁶³ Bourdieu 1977, 1990, 1993, 2001. *Habitus* defined: 1977: 78, 1990: 53; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977: 31; cf. Mauss 1979. On Bourdieu, Jenkins 2002.

analyzes how dominant individuals or classes achieve legitimation, which he terms symbolic violence, stressing its reinforcement of hierarchy.

Bourdieu emphasizes that in many societies or fields (disciplines, social milieux), the processes of pedagogy and of *habitus* formation are highly fluid. Even without formal instruction, the individual who grows up in a social class or is educated in a field may acquire what Bourdieu calls *le sens pratique*, a “feeling” for appropriate behaviors and responses.⁶⁴ For example, the children of highly educated and well-to-do French professionals tend to reproduce that status because they are exposed to high culture from childhood, acquiring a cultural capital that promotes their success in school. In the primitive Algerian Kabyle, the members of this highly traditional society acquire a belief system that Bourdieu reconstructs in painstaking detail but that the Kabyle improvise upon.

The traditions or cultural capital of Roman military discipline were also acquired informally and required such improvisation. These were conveyed through historical narratives and *exempla* that Roman elite males acquired through their regular literary education and social contacts. Historiography was didactic, providing “examples of behavior which readers should imitate or avoid.”⁶⁵ Individuals improvised upon *disciplina* tradition to gain prestige or symbolic capital; some of the emperors and commanders discussed in this book had a better feel than others for what worked. The imitation of predecessors was a common strategy. Hadrian ate common soldiers’ rations – bacon, cheese, and vinegar – in imitation of Scipio, Metellus, and his adoptive father Trajan.⁶⁶ Other improvisations invoked the past while making concessions to present social conditions.

The *sens pratique* is a product of the *habitus*, a durable, ingrained disposition of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is characteristic of a given field. The *habitus* is the product of pedagogic action, the process of the social and cultural reproduction of an institutional hierarchy through education.⁶⁷ Elite *habitus* reinforces hierarchy by inflicting symbolic violence, the perception of the legitimacy of statements or social relations that are in fact contingent. Bourdieu terms such statements or relationships cultural arbitraries.⁶⁸ The subjects of pedagogic action are inculcated (indoctrinated, trained to accept as second nature) with a *habitus* or bearing that embodies the cultural arbitraries. Bourdieu uses both *habitus* and *hexis* to describe

⁶⁴ Bourdieu 1977: 79, 94–5, 1990: 82.

⁶⁵ Woodman 1988: 93–4.

⁶⁶ HA *Hadr.* 10.2

⁶⁷ Bourdieu and Passeron 1977: 5, 9–10.

⁶⁸ Bourdieu 1977: 190–97; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977: 17–23.

this disposition: the *hexis* may be more solely physical. The terms *habitus* and *hexis* themselves are Latin and Greek, employed in classical ethical and rhetorical theory. Roman aristocrats and orators controlled their *habitus* in order to manipulate and convey impressions of character and emotion, thus convincing their audiences and acquiring prestige.⁶⁹

From the point of view of new recruits, many features of *disciplina militaris* appear to be cultural arbitraries: the appointment of inexperienced aristocratic commanders; the virtues of relative parsimony, hard work, and dietary austerity; the prohibition of legitimate marriage. These were perhaps not totally arbitrary – physical fitness, diet, and training obviously affected combat performance – but they were contingent, maintaining the social and command hierarchy. *Disciplina militaris* depicted these practices as necessary, admirable, and literally virtuous, promoting *virtus*. Indiscipline was associated with military incompetence and defeat and with rejected identities, the abjection discussed at the end of this chapter.

Bourdieu and Passeron define pedagogic work as “a process of inculcation which must last long enough to produce a durable training, i.e. a *habitus*, the product of internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after [pedagogic action] has ceased.”⁷⁰ In the case of the Roman army, this pedagogic work was a process of physical and combat training; routine fatigues and other duties; and castrametation and building projects. Furthermore, such work was not confined to a delimited period as in modern basic training or education, but ideally was continuous. If soldiers had too much *otium* (leisure), the military hierarchy risked dissolution.

Bourdieu analyzes forms of cultural production in modern society that disavow commercial exchanges. In Bourdieu’s France, the true artist, often a novelist or visual artist, disavows motivation by material gain.⁷¹ Bourdieu analyzes the translation of artistic production from a material to a symbolic stratum, conferring not profit but symbolic capital on its producers. Such an elision of material interest was essential to *disciplina militaris*. The Roman literary class believed that the Republic had fallen due to *avaritia* and *luxuria*, including the greed of the soldiers. Because imperial soldiers depended on pay and benefits, *disciplina militaris* and its emphasis on *labor* and austerity disavowed this dependence and paradoxically

⁶⁹ Gleason 1995; Connolly 1998: 133–5; Gunderson 2000; Corbeill 2002: 184–9, 2004: 109–10.

⁷⁰ Bourdieu and Passeron 1977: 31.

⁷¹ Bourdieu 1993: 75–6, 81.

legitimated the political economy of Roman military service. As much as possible, material relations of exchange were translated into symbolic ones.

Concerning hierarchy in Kabyle society, Bourdieu emphasizes gift-giving or benefaction that inflicts “gentle” or symbolic violence, in which the subordinated recipients acknowledge the legitimate authority of the giver or benefactor.⁷² The wealthy giver’s assertion of superiority over the poorer recipient is a familiar social phenomenon in anthropology.⁷³ The giver exacts gratitude for his or her benefactions, an emotion that subordinates the recipient; the recipient is obliged to respect and obey the giver.

Gift exchange and benefaction were prominent activities in archaic and classical Greek and Roman societies. Public benefaction by Greek and Roman magistrates, monarchs, and emperors is the subject of an important study.⁷⁴ Roman leaders’ gifts to the army, *donativa*, are usually regarded as emphasizing the personal relationship of emperor and army. Ideally, such gifts inflicted symbolic violence, subordinating the soldiers and reinforcing hierarchy. However, too mutual a relationship of emperor and troops dissipated such symbolic violence. Payments to the army required rationalization and routinization, dissociating them from mutual exchange.

Another paradoxical behavior that inflicted symbolic violence was the commander’s or emperor’s endurance of the hardships he imposed, a prominent theme in *disciplina* anecdotes. The commander’s performance induced soldiers to accept him as one of themselves, effacing the hardships’ nature as cultural arbitraries. As Bourdieu would put it, the soldiers misrecognized such hardships as legitimate and necessary, rather than contingent upon their own subordination. According to Sallust’s Marius, for the commander to impose hardships while living in luxury himself is to be a slave-master, not a commander.⁷⁵ The commander’s willingness to undertake hardships or risk dangers also shamed his soldiers into obedience. Roman military punishment relied on shaming to constitute a *habitus* of obedience in soldiers.

Roman military *habitus* was highly masculine, embodying *virtus*, manliness or courage. This hypermasculine *habitus* effected symbolic violence upon subordinates

⁷² “Gentle” violence: Bourdieu 1977: 192.

⁷³ Mauss [1925] 1990: 38–9.

⁷⁴ Veyne 1990; other studies of Roman benefaction, *op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 146; Chapter Seven n. 9.

⁷⁵ Sall. *Jug.* 85.33.

and upon the subjects of the empire.⁷⁶ The codes of masculinity were cultural arbitrariness. *Virtus* put the need for military discipline beyond question, because the alternative to discipline was effeminacy, regarded as shameful and disgusting even when not linked with military defeat. Emperors in the field, senatorial and equestrian officers, and centurions and decurions displayed masculine appearance and behavior to legitimate their commands. If they did not fight in person (many emperors did not), they could at least display the techniques of combat in exercising their men.

In the main text, *Roman Military Service* avoids the Bourdieuvian terms symbolic capital, cultural capital, and social or political capital. Because the Roman Empire did not possess a modern capitalist economy, it is best to avoid potential confusion. Where Bourdieu speaks of symbolic capital, the terms *prestige* or *honor* will be used. Where Bourdieu speaks of symbolic violence, this book will use *subordination*, *social control*, or *legitimation*, because the Roman army's violence was often all too material.

DISCIPLINA AND ABJECTION

To reproduce domination and inculcate its members with a professional or class *habitus*, an ideology must also teach its members to reject certain behaviors and identities. In the theories of Julia Kristeva and Mary Douglas, positive psychic and social identities are constituted through the rejection of elements and identities that become "abject," evoking disgust. Abjection occurs when the subject (self) cannot separate itself from the elements rejected in its formation; the abject is "a thing . . . ambiguously positioned between self and other."⁷⁷ The most visceral foci of abjection are excrement and other bodily effluvia, which people learn to separate from themselves and dispose of discreetly as part of the civilizing process. But abjection may also be defined by specific cultures and settings. "Dirt" is defined by Douglas as "matter out of place." In Ann Carson's image, a poached egg in a bowl in the kitchen is not out of place, whereas a poached egg on the floor of the British Museum elicits revulsion.⁷⁸

An ISA or pedagogic institution socializes its pupils to reject certain behaviors and identities. This socialization is complete when such behaviors elicit automatic

⁷⁶ Bourdieu 2001: 33–42.

⁷⁷ Kristeva 1982: 1–31; Bartsch 1997: 19–20.

⁷⁸ Carson 1999: 87; Douglas [1966] 2002: 44–5; Douglas' theory applied to Roman frontiers, Whittaker 2004: 3–5.

revulsion. During U.S. Marines' training at Parris Island in the 1990s, some drill instructors taught military recruits to regard civilian lifestyles with disgust.⁷⁹ The U.S. military continues to regard open homosexual identities as abject, forbidding personnel to display them. Bourdieu's Kabyle man avoids behaviors, gestures, and spaces associated with women, whom he regards as defiling.⁸⁰

Roman standards for disgust, as for sanitation and health, were not modern.⁸¹ Nevertheless, a typology of Roman disgust identifies *per se* disgust and ideological disgust. The former was self-explanatory and lacked a wider social context; disgust for certain insects and for overcooked cabbage are examples. Ideological disgust, in contrast, reproduced social hierarchies and values.⁸² The Roman elite tended to regard with disgust slaves and behavior that they denoted servile; they felt a deep disgust for cowardice and effeminacy. The lowest social strata might be designated as "filth."⁸³

The disgust that military indiscipline evoked in Roman authors is also ideological. Rejected or abjected identities shape *disciplina* ideology. Soldiers are dissociated from barbarians, slaves, effeminate males, and petty traders and other camp-followers. In the largest sense, the Roman elite authors depict cowardice, luxury, insubordination, and civil warfare as abject.⁸⁴ The greed and violence of soldiers during the late Republican and imperial civil wars and blatant patronage by civil war leaders were behaviors rejected by *disciplina militaris*.

CONCLUSION

Roman Military Service argues that *disciplina militaris* was a legitimating ideology, in Weberian terms, that partially routinized the "charismatic" nature of late Republican warfare, though it did not realize the Weberian ideal type of rational discipline. This book will argue that the legitimation of the imperial army was not achieved so much by the invocation of political loyalty or through imperial cult and other religious practices – both of which have received extensive study – as through

⁷⁹ Ricks 1997: 162–3.

⁸⁰ Bourdieu 1990: 69–72, 76–8, 2001: 10–22.

⁸¹ Scobie 1986; Gowers 1995 (city of Rome).

⁸² Kaster 2001: 149–58 on *per se* disgust; 159–60, 161–6 on ideological disgust. Ideological disgust for the female body: Richlin 1997; Carson 1999.

⁸³ Gowers 1995: 29–30.

⁸⁴ Bartsch 1997: 14–17, 19, 34.

economic practices, in the sense of political economy. *Disciplina militaris* imposed controls upon redistribution to soldiers (wages and benefits), their training, their productive or unproductive labor, and their consumption; its aims were as much domination and social reproduction as production. These economic forms of discipline, as well as other forms, fashioned the *habitus* of soldiers and officers. *Disciplina militaris* both promoted formally rational elements and created a *sens pratique* in the Roman elite as to how they should command, train, and manage soldiers, and how they themselves should live in *militia*. *Disciplina* inculcated a distinct *habitus* into Roman soldiers that was the product of history, or rather of the “political mythology” of the Republic.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ Bourdieu 1990: 56; 73.

2 COMBAT TRAINING AND DISCIPLINE



COMBAT TRAINING WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF ROMAN *DISCIPLINA MILITARIS*. Soldiers acquired and maintained physical fitness and combat skills by training to fight with swords, javelins, and other weapons; marching long distances; and carrying out mass exercises and simulated campaigns. The training of soldiers was not fully rationalized in the Weberian sense. The sources do not emphasize a discrete period of training such as modern basic training or boot camp; training was ideally ongoing and was the responsibility of individual commanders. Such responsibility was still emphasized in the imperial period, though inscriptions show that low-ranking officers specialized as trainers. Some emperors adopted a highly visible role in overseeing training.

Combat training emphasized individual physical fitness and endurance and combat skills: technique, speed, agility, accuracy, and aggression. *Virtus*, courage or prowess demonstrated in combat, was the objective of training. Group maneuvers in formation, marches, and mock battles were also taught. However, the need to maintain ranks (*ordines servare*) in battle competed with the prestige of prowess in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.

Soldiers who were well trained demonstrated a high degree of *animus* (confidence, morale) and *impetus* (onslaught, energy) in combat. These qualities, deployed against Roman citizens in periods of civil war, were hard to distinguish from *furor* (madness) and *ira* (rage). The aristocracy regarded the aggressiveness of soldiers as a double-edged sword.

Mass drill rationalized and legitimated professional armies in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century Europe, serving as a method of social control and a spectacle of national power. In this period, close-order drill was used to subordinate and punish soldiers, or to restore their morale and *esprit de corps*. The display of parade-ground drill glorified regimes and intimidated civilians. In the field, such drill, employing coordinated musket volleys, greatly increased combat effectiveness.

In contrast, Roman fighting methods could not subject troops to such a degree of coordination. The evidence for mass formation and drill in the Roman army

suggests that drill was not used as a form of social control. The Romans regarded highly coordinated mass formations as a spectacular entertainment rather than a display of power. Roman formations in battle and on the march were maintained by officers' exhortation and coercion; by soldiers' following the standards; and by the honor of courage or endurance and the shamefulness of flight. Such honor and shame were reinforced by military decorations and punishments, discussed in later chapters.

Castrametation, the building of camps, most paralleled early modern drill in displaying social control, the rationalization of labor, and the imposition of order upon nature. Castrametation imposed coordinated work that was regimented in time and space. Castrametation and other forms of work were used to maintain and restore the discipline of the army, accustoming soldiers to labor and obedience. The Roman camp represented the military hierarchy and demonstrated the Romans' rational control of nature and labor and their superiority to other peoples. Occasionally in the mid-second century AD, and especially in the later Empire, infantry tactics adopted a phalanx-like formation, conditioned by Greek tradition: the "shield wall," employed against enemy cavalry but also emphasizing order.

TRAINING THE ROMAN ARMY

The Romans believed that combat training enabled them to conquer and dominate all other peoples.¹ Many sources emphasize Roman superiority in courage and endurance, fostered through training. Vegetius states the purpose of his treatise: "should anyone wish to be diligent in raising and training recruits, he will find it easy to strengthen an army in emulation of ancient moral virtue."² Vegetius claims that recruits should be trained daily, morning and afternoon, in every military skill in order to emulate the ancient conquerors of the world.³ He states that the Romans conquered all other peoples solely through their military training, owing their conquest of the world to the exercise of arms, the discipline of the camps, and military custom.⁴

¹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.1.pr; 1.28.1–5.

² Veg. *Mil.* 1.28.1.

³ Veg. *Mil.* 2.18.5.

⁴ Veg. *Mil.* 1.1.2. On the late fourth- or early fifth-century date and literary nature of Vegetius Zuckerman 1994; Lenoir 1996; Lendon 2005: 280–85.

Because of this prestige, training was never fully institutionalized. Roman military culture did not emphasize a “basic training” or “boot camp” period of intensive training, as found in modern militaries. Though Roman recruits underwent a short period of instruction known as *tirocinium*, soldiers’ training was ideally ongoing and lasted as long as they served in the army.⁵ In the Empire, training underwent some degree of routinization: *campidoctores*, officers in charge of training, are attested in military inscriptions. Literary authors, however, emphasize the personal role of leaders in training. The emperor Hadrian prescribed routines in cavalry training, mentioned in Arrian’s *Tactica*.⁶

In training troops, leaders claimed to restore discipline, alleging that their predecessors had spoiled or neglected the army.⁷ By training the army, the Republic’s commanders waged war – on the political battlefield.⁸ In 204 BC, to refute the claim of his political enemies that he was spoiling the Roman army and taking up Greek ways at Syracuse, Scipio Africanus gave a display of military training.⁹ New commanders and emperors may have instituted cosmetic reforms, possibly by changes to the schedule of training. Avidius Cassius is said to have held military exercises weekly, in order to accustom soldiers to *labor*.¹⁰ Vegetius states that both recruits and trained soldiers exercised with arms daily, recruits twice daily, and that soldiers should be led out thrice monthly on mass exercises. According to Vegetius, the untrained soldier remains no better than a raw recruit, no matter how long he has served.¹¹ Emperors might employ training in order to address specific political groups. Tiberius, around AD 25, exhibited the training (*gymnasia*) of the Praetorians to the Senate, in order to intimidate the senators with the soldiers’ numbers and vigor.¹²

The question, which these anecdotes often leave vague, is whether these exercises were primarily displays of individual combat skills, as in gladiatorial fighting, or displays of mass formation, as in modern parade-ground drill. Josephus claims that the Romans constantly trained their soldiers, so that in the actual shock

⁵ Rosenstein 1990: 110–11; Horsmann 1991: 11. Initial training (Veg. *Mil.* 1.8) may have weeded out the most unsuitable.

⁶ Horsmann 1991: 90–92; Arr. *Tact.* 42–44, *sub. vid.* nn. 167–8.

⁷ Davies 1968a (reprinted in 1989: 83–4), Wheeler 1996: 254–71, and Lendon 2005: 185–8, 235.

⁸ Livy 29.22.1–3.

⁹ Livy 29.22.1–3.

¹⁰ HA *Avid.* 6.3–4, *Maxim.* 6.1–2.

¹¹ Veg. *Mil.* 2.23.2–3; thrice a month, 1.27.1.

¹² Dio 57.24.5; Caligula gave a donative at exercises (*gymnasia*), Dio 59.2.1.

of battle they maintained formation as if they were drilling: “their maneuvers [are] bloodless battles and their battles sanguinary maneuvers.”¹³ Josephus thus emphasized mass formation.

Other depictions of Roman military training stress the promotion of soldiers’ physical fitness and competence at hand-to-hand combat with swords, javelins, and other weapons.¹⁴ The emphasis is on *virtus*; even descriptions of mass exercises stress combat. Roman aristocrats traditionally acquired physical and weapons training from family members; Cato the Elder taught his son to throw a spear, fight in armor, ride a horse, box, endure heat and cold, and swim in the Tiber.¹⁵ Scipio Africanus trained his recruits at New Carthage in 210 BC, having them run in armor for four miles on the first day; care for and clean their weapons on the second day; practice combat and mock battles on the third day, using wooden foils and spears with buttons on the ends; and rest on the fourth day.¹⁶

Before the battle of Pydna in 168 BC, Aemilius Paullus instructed his soldiers to maintain their physical fitness and to keep their swords sharp and their food ready for marching.¹⁷ During his retirement, Marius continued to train young men on the Campus Martius, displaying techniques in person. At the outset of the civil war against Caesar, Pompey did the same, and despite his advanced age, was “foremost in everything,” wielding a sword from horseback and hurling javelins.¹⁸ Marius and Pompey thus demonstrated individual combat techniques; merely ordering maneuvers would not have earned remarks on their physical efforts.

Imperial commanders and emperors also emphasized combat training and demonstrated techniques in person. Pliny, in his panegyric to Trajan, depicts Trajan (at least while he was an officer) as instructing his soldiers in individual combat, even trading practice blows and “mingling his sweat and dust” with them.¹⁹ Hadrian also displayed his prowess with arms, prescribed cavalry exercises, and in person praised soldiers at a review at Lambaesis in North Africa.²⁰ In a description of poorly trained soldiers, Fronto emphasizes their lack of individual physical

¹³ Joseph. *Bf* 3.70–75.

¹⁴ Veg. *Mil.* 1.11.4, 1.12.pr.–4. On combat *virtus* Lendon 2005: 186–8, 252, 257; McDonnell 2006: 71.

¹⁵ Plut. *Cato Maior* 20.4.

¹⁶ Polyb. 10.20.2–3; Livy 26.51.4; Rance 2000: 261–5.

¹⁷ Livy 44.34.3; cf. 44.34.7.

¹⁸ Plut. *Mar.* 34.3, *Pomp.* 64.1–2; App. *BC* 2.8.49: “thus he readily gained the good will of his soldiers, and the people flocked to his military exercises as to a spectacle.”

¹⁹ Plin. *Pan.* 13.1–2; cf. 15.4; HA *Avid.* 6.3–4.

²⁰ HA *Hadr.* 10.10; *sub. vid.* n. 172.

skills, such as inability to vault upon horses or throw javelins with vigor.²¹ In the previous century, Corbulo had taken the Syrians in hand in person.²² Caracalla adopted all the duties of soldiers on campaign; obsessed with fighting, he trained at combat but neglected the “duties of a general.”²³ The *Historia Augusta* heroizes Maximinus as training soldiers in person, displaying individual athletic and combat skills.²⁴ Vegetius prescribes that tribunes, prefects, and centurions be able to instruct and lead their men in combat skills.²⁵ Soldiers *en masse* displayed these skills in mass exercises known as *armatura*, *ambulatoria*, *exercitationes*, and *decursiones*, but descriptions of these continue to emphasize individual technique and prowess.

PHYSICAL AND COMBAT TRAINING

Vegetius stresses teaching weapon skills.²⁶ He describes training at fencing with wicker shields and wooden weapons at six-foot wooden posts.²⁷ An exercise known as *armatura* demonstrated sword combat techniques; it also may have combined them with group maneuvers.²⁸ Especially in the later Empire, *armatura* displayed soldiers’ skill with weapons as a public spectacle, but Vegetius seems also to regard it as training. He prescribes frequent practice with javelins, archery, slings, and lead-weighted darts.²⁹

Sword combat was essential to military training. Roman tradition glorified hand-to-hand combat, as seen in Republican aristocrats’ single combats with the enemy, and persisting in the Empire as gladiatorial combat. As Livy wrote, “it is with the sword that the Roman soldier wins his battles.”³⁰ The relatively open

²¹ Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; cf. Tac. *Hist.* 2.99; Dio 64(65).10.2 (Vitellians).

²² Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.

²³ Dio 78(77).13.1–2, 78(77).3.3; Hdn. 4.7.4–7.

²⁴ HA *Maxim.* 6.1–7 (including a mock battle).

²⁵ Veg. *Mil.* 2.14.3–7.

²⁶ Veg. 1.4.6–9, 2.23.1–14. Neumann 1948; Davies 1968a (reprinted in 1989: 81–5); G. R. Watson 1969: 54–62; Horsmann 1991: 115–32 (fitness), 133–48 (sword combat), 149–57 (spears); Goldsworthy 1996: 248–82; Le Bohec 1994: 105–7; Campbell 2002: 56–8. Southern 2007: 133–8.

²⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.11.1–4, 13.1–2, 2.23.2–4.

²⁸ Veg. *Mil.* 1.13.1–2, 2.23.3; Horsmann 1991: 146–8; Rance 2000: 248–50.

²⁹ Javelins, Veg. *Mil.* 1.14; archery, 1.15; slings, 1.16; lead-weighted darts, 1.17. M. P. Speidel 1992: 14–19; Davies 1968a (reprinted in 1989: 86–8) also discusses special weapons. Wheeler 1978: 359; Rance 2000: 249 discuss *armatura* as spectacle.

³⁰ Livy 44.35. On the prestige of single combats, Oakley 1985; Wiedemann 1996. Wheeler 1982: 223–53 depicts stylized hand-to-hand combat as part of Greek ephebic training.

formation of Roman cohort tactics left space between soldiers for hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.³¹ Valerius Maximus illustrates the importance of hand-to-hand combat and the close relationship of military training to the arena. In 105 BC Rutilius Rufus brought in gladiatorial trainers (*lanistae*) to instruct Roman soldiers in more effective methods of attack and defense.³² Vegetius repeatedly stresses the need to train soldiers in hand-to-hand combat, teaching them to aim weapons accurately with great force, to handle a shield and deflect the blows of an attacker, and to guard themselves from wounds while boldly inflicting them on others.³³

An emphasis on training for sword combat suggests that Roman military training sought to overcome the natural fear of cold steel and inhibition toward killing at close range.³⁴ *Virtus* had to be inculcated and was easily imperiled. Even though the aristocratic authors fear the *virtus* or *ferocia* of soldiers in civil warfare, they dread the lapse of Roman *virtus* in combating external enemies.³⁵ To kill at close range requires extensive desensitization, usually through simulated practice during military training. In First World War training camps, American recruits practiced bayoneting straw-stuffed dummies, an exercise realistic enough so that some recruits allegedly passed out upon transfixing or “disemboweling” the dummies; later, during the Vietnam War, American soldiers learned to shoot at human-shaped targets that popped up at random on the training ground.³⁶ Roman training may have used straw dummies, but more often involved fencing at a six-foot post in the place of the enemy.³⁷ As the above anecdotes of leaders training show, Roman soldiers also fenced with each other and with their training officers.

Vegetius’ advice that soldiers not slash with their swords but thrust suggests that Roman training sought to overcome psychological inhibitions against killing at close range.³⁸ To slash with a sword is the easier and less lethal response. Modern soldiers not habituated to combat often shoot over the enemy’s heads. Roman

³¹ Wiedemann 1992: 36, 1996: 97–8 contrasts the Roman line with the phalanx.

³² Val. Max. 2.3.2; Neumann 1948: 162–3, 1963: col. 148–50, 154, 156, 158.

³³ Veg. *Mil.* 1.4.7–8. Cf. 2.23.4.

³⁴ Though Lendon 2005: 257 depicts *virtus* as innate or an ethnic trait, Grossman 1996: 120–30 emphasizes the difficulty of killing at edged-weapon (sword or knife) range.

³⁵ Lendon 2005: 242–3, 257.

³⁶ Stout 1920–21: 429; Grossman 1996: 252–5; Bourke 1999: 60–84.

³⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.11.3–7, 1.14.1–2, 2.23.5–6. Davies 1969c (reprinted in 1989: 100).

³⁸ Veg. *Mil.* 1.12.1–4, 3.4.4.

soldiers had to be taught to thrust with their swords, inflicting a killing blow.³⁹ The Romans' wielding a short sword (*gladius*) demonstrated their greater lack of inhibition and their willingness to close with the enemy at minimum distance.⁴⁰ This recalled the grim moment when the classical hoplite phalanx ceased thrusting with spears, which held off the enemy at a greater distance, and began wielding swords.⁴¹ Furthermore, the brutal behavior of Roman soldiers toward civilians also suggests disinhibition.⁴²

However, training may not have produced disinhibition to killing (and resultant brutality) in all soldiers. Vegetius suggests that many soldiers could not bring themselves to thrust with the point of their swords, *punctim*.⁴³ Nor, in Roman warfare, did every soldier have to close with the enemy; only those in the front line might have to do so, and the fear of cold steel might make the enemy break and flee *en masse*.⁴⁴ It was psychologically easier to kill fleeing soldiers; Vegetius compares fleeing soldiers to sheep.⁴⁵ Roman commanders instructed new recruits that they were safest if they confronted and fought the enemy instead of fleeing. Sulla urged his men never to turn their backs to the enemy, shamefully relying on their unarmed feet and exposing the most vulnerable part of their bodies to the enemy while they still had weapons in their hands.⁴⁶

According to Vegetius, the Romans also maximized combat effectiveness by using weighted (blunt) weapons or wooden staves in training. Becoming accustomed to the greater weight, soldiers would wield real swords and spears with more force.⁴⁷ Roman fighters allegedly strewed the battlefield with dismembered body parts, intimidating the Greeks facing Roman conquest in the second century bc.⁴⁸ This level of violence in combat persisted in the late Republic and early

³⁹ Slash wounds to vital blood vessels or major tendons and muscles could kill or disable a fighter; a thrust wound into muscle might not kill. Rosenstein 2004: 125–8 argues that fewer sword wounds became infected than more destructive and septic early modern shot wounds.

⁴⁰ Grossman 1996: 22–7; *contra*, Bourke 1999: xiii–xxiii (general remarks), 41–6, 60–69.

⁴¹ Hanson 2000: 165–7.

⁴² Campbell 1984: 246–54.

⁴³ In modern combat not all soldiers shoot to kill, Grossman 1996: 15–16, 21–5; slashing, Goldsworthy 1996: 217–18; Lendon 2005: 221–2, 253 stresses Roman soldiers' aggression.

⁴⁴ Sabin 2000.

⁴⁵ Cf. Grossman 1996: 127–8.

⁴⁶ Sall. *Jug.* 107.1.

⁴⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.11.1–4, 1.14.1–2.

⁴⁸ Polyb. 10.15.4–6; Livy 31.34.4. Harris 1979: 51–2; A. Ziolkowski 1993: 69–91.

Empire, inspiring the gory imagery of Lucan's *Pharsalia*, in which dismembered corpses suggest the fragmentation of the body politic in civil warfare.⁴⁹ Skeletal evidence from Maiden Castle in Dorset, England, probably from the defenders of the Late Iron Age fort against the Roman invasion in AD 43, and from medieval battles, such as Wisby in 1361, attest dismemberments.⁵⁰

Extensive training in combat technique made Roman soldiers confident of their abilities. Literary authors stressed that Celtic and Germanic barbarians lacked Roman fighting skills. A document from the fort of Vindolanda near Hadrian's Wall around AD 100 attests this belief at a lower official level. The fragment depicts the "wretched Britons" (*Brittunculi*) as unable to wield weapons effectively: "[their] cavalry do not use swords nor do the wretched Britons mount in order to throw javelins."⁵¹ Roman soldiers were inculcated by official praise and reward to identify with their combat skills and regard them as a source of honor.⁵² In his epitaph, a Batavian auxiliary cavalryman boasted of swimming the Danube in full armor under Hadrian's eyes and of breaking an arrow fired into the air with a second shot.⁵³

THE TRAINING OF DIFFERENT BRANCHES OF THE ARMY

There is little literary evidence for whether different branches of the Roman military received different training. Vegetius concerns himself with the *antiqua legio*. The fleet soldiers (*classarii*) and the *vigiles* (the night watch of Rome, whose tasks included fire-fighting) must have received specialized training distinct from the regular legionary and auxiliary infantry and cavalry. Cavalry units may have received more drilling in order to accustom the riders to controlling their horses. Such exercises are described in a later section of this chapter. Ethnic units, *numeri*, were trained in the traditional fighting methods of their peoples. Specialized units such as slingers, bowmen, and firers of lead-weighted darts probably received special training.⁵⁴ If subunits specialized in performing military spectacles such

⁴⁹ Bartsch 1997: 11–13, 15–17; also Tac. *Hist.* 2.70 (Vitellius' visit to the site of Bedriacum); Hoyos 2007: 69.

⁵⁰ Goldsworthy 1996: 219, 221; Campbell 2002: 65–6.

⁵¹ *T. Vindol.* 2.164.

⁵² *IIS* 2487; Le Glay 1977: 552–4; M. P. Speidel 2006.

⁵³ *CIL* 3,3676 = *IIS* 2558; Davies 1969c (reprinted in 1989: 111); M. P. Speidel 1991; Lendon 2005: 251.

⁵⁴ M. P. Speidel 1992: 14–19.

as Arrian's *hippika gymnasia*, they needed more coordinated drill than was usual in the rest of the forces.⁵⁵

It has been suggested that, in the imperial period, legionaries were increasingly used for building and administrative and police work, whereas auxiliaries were increasingly used for fighting; such a division of labor is depicted on Trajan's Column, and at Mons Graupius, Agricola sent the auxiliaries into action first, using legionaries as a reserve.⁵⁶ This division is schematic and may apply only to pitched battle – auxiliaries are found building at Vindolanda, and at isolated outposts legionary vexillations were probably expected to fight in low-intensity conflicts.⁵⁷

No service was exempted from combat. The soldiers designated in the Digest as *immunes* were exempted not from combat duties but from routine fatigues, freeing them to work as administrative officers or artisans.⁵⁸ *Immunis* was a legal status, an extension of civilian exemptions from *munera* (duties such as corvée labor). *Immunis* was not viewed as a title or military rank, as soldiers did not call themselves *immunes* on tombstones. *Immunes* ranked with the *munifices*, common soldiers who performed fatigues, and were paid at the same rate.⁵⁹ In letters to his mother, the newly promoted legionary *librarius* (clerk) Iulius Apollinarius bragged that he was exempted from the ordinary soldiers' stone-cutting to build a road through the new *provincia Arabia*.⁶⁰ In the early and middle Empire, all soldiers, including *librarii* and other *immunes*, were expected to train and fight; if his promotion followed the patterns that have been reconstructed, Iulius Apollinarius would later hold tactical as well as administrative posts.⁶¹ The later Roman Empire termed the civil service a *militia*, distinguished from the real army, the *militia armata*. Within the army, clerks and *immunes* were now promoted on a separate track from combat soldiers.⁶²

Due to the prestige of the *labor* of training and of *virtus* in combat, if legionaries or *immunes* had been exempt from combat, the Roman elite authors would have

⁵⁵ Wheeler 1978: 357–8; on cavalry training, Davies 1969c.

⁵⁶ Lendon 2005: 242–3, moderated 250–52; Gilliver 1996a. Caes. BC 1.78 (auxiliaries were not trained in carrying burdens) and Veg. *Mil.* 2.3.4 (recruits prefer the *auxilia* to avoid *labor*) are statements centuries apart; in the early empire, documentation and legal sources show little differentiation.

⁵⁷ At Vindolanda, *T. Vindol.* 2.155; Bu Njem, Rebuffat 2000.

⁵⁸ D. 50.6.7. Only fatigues: Davies 1974 (reprinted in 1989: 40); G. R. Watson 1965, 1969: 77; Le Bohec 1994: 60, 62; Wesch-Klein 1998: 31–4; M. A. Speidel 2001: 55. Southern 2007: 103.

⁵⁹ Sander 1954–5: 92.

⁶⁰ *P. Mich.* 8.465–6; M. A. Speidel 2001: 55–6.

⁶¹ Roth 1994: 352–3; Breeze 1971, 1974.

⁶² MacMullen 1963: 65–6, 71–2, 157–8. The separate tracking began in the early third century.

denounced their idleness and cowardice (*ignavia*). But literary authors denouncing *ignavia*, effeminacy, or cowardice single out neither legionaries nor particular occupational specialties, in contrast with mid-twentieth-century derogatory stereotypes of noncombatant support personnel (clerks, cooks, quartermasters, and the like) as unmilitary cowards or homosexuals.⁶³ Ancient authors singled out only the Praetorians for this type of criticism. Based in the city of Rome and less likely to see combat, and favored with higher pay, donatives, and *praemia*, the Praetorians are most frequently depicted as “idle troops spoiled by urban luxury,” unused to training.⁶⁴ Concerning other armies in the provinces, Roman invective focused on geographical milieux and depicted all personnel as potentially demoralized by urban amenities or by “Asiatic” service.⁶⁵

THE PRODUCTION OF *IMPETUS* AND THE RISK OF *FEROCIA*

Accounts of Roman combat stress not only steadfast courage in the face of the enemy, but also *impetus* and *animus*: onslaught and enthusiasm. Commanders sought to instill individual motivation and to form an individual *habitus* that internalized courage and aggression against the enemy. Generals’ speeches before battle, a popular theme in ancient authors, represent the authors’ own historical views and rhetorical techniques, but probably reflect the actual practice of making speeches.⁶⁶ Nonetheless, soldiers were motivated not so much by commanders’ battle speeches as by more intrinsic eagerness for combat.

This enthusiasm for combat had ambiguous connotations. *Impetus* (onslaught) could be motivated by *virtus* (courage) and *animus* (spirit) or by *ira* (anger) and *ferocia* (madness, rage). *Disciplina militaris* sought to elicit *virtus* and to check *ferocia*. *Virtus* was elicited through combat training and direct coercion in battle and through punishment and reward; as later chapters will show, *virtus* was also elicited through the imposition of *labores* and austerity. However, the nature of *impetus* in battle and the aggressive nature of *virtus* made impossible the total repression of *ferocia*.

⁶³ Bérubé 1990: 61–5.

⁶⁴ HA *Did.* 5.9; cf. Plut. *Otho* 5.4; Tac. *Hist.* 2.19, 2.21; Dio 74.16.3, 79.28.9; HA *Pert.* 5.7; Sev. 23.3.

⁶⁵ Wheeler 1996.

⁶⁶ E.g., Polyb. 10.6.2–7; Livy 26.41.1–25 (Scipio Africanus); Sall. *Cat.* 58; Tac. *Agric.* 33–4 (Agricola); Dio 50.16–22 (Antony before Actium), 50.23–31 (Octavian); Tac. *Hist.* 4.73–4 (Cerialis). Speeches by non-Roman leaders are probably imaginary, Tac. *Agric.* 30–32; Dio 62.5. The commander’s voice could not carry far, so he moved up and down the line: Goldsworthy 1996: 144–7.

The ideal soldier was motivated by public honor, desiring the approval of his peers and superiors; in their sight he would not flee or otherwise succumb to cowardice.⁶⁷ Those who did flee were shamed publicly. Soldiers' honorable wounds and scars proved their military *virtus*; ideally, a Roman fighter ignored the pain of his wounds in combat. Politicians displayed these scars as signs of legitimacy in the Republic's political contests. Conversely, the allegation that one had avoided wounds was damning.⁶⁸ The underside of this ideology was a lack of realism in depicting battle wounds. In literary texts heroes (such as Alexander the Great or Caesar's soldiers) display their courage and toughness through their sometimes superhuman endurance of wounds.⁶⁹ Literary authors chose not to depict unheroic infected wounds and disability or death from infection.

Caesar's troops were motivated by competitive *virtus*, the jealous desire to prove their superiority and to compete for renown and reward from their leader.⁷⁰ Their enthusiasm manifested as *impetus*, onslaught against the enemy. Caesar describes *impetus* as "a certain keenness and impetuosity implanted by nature in all men which is kindled by the desire for battle," which all generals should foster.⁷¹ A general should direct his soldiers' *impetus* by his choice of sites for battle and should encourage their *animus* or fighting spirit. At the battle of Pharsalus, Caesar encouraged his men's *impetus* while Pompey's army remained stationary, perhaps out of timidity, failing to develop *impetus*.⁷²

Animus, "spirit" or "enthusiasm," was required of Roman soldiers in combat, but a thin line separated *animus* and *impetus* from *ira* (anger) or *ferocia* (rage). Greek authors in the mid-Republic noted the ferocity of the Romans to their foreign enemies. From the late Republic onward, the *ira* or *ferocia* of soldiers was associated with mutiny, civil strife, and civil war.⁷³ *Ferocia* was a stereotypical trait of "enemies

⁶⁷ Darkness hid soldiers from the sight of generals and comrades, enabling soldiers' cowardice, insubordination, or plundering: Caes. *BC* 2.31, Tac. *Hist.* 1.80, 3.19–20.

⁶⁸ Leigh 1995: 195–205; cf. Salazar 2000: 218–20.

⁶⁹ Salazar 2000: 218–21, 222–4; Lee 1996: 201. E.g., Cic. *Tusc.* 2.38, 2.58–9; Suet. *Iul.* 68.4; Sen. *Cons. ad Helv.* 3.1, *Const.* 19.4, *Prov.* 4.4–5; in epic Verg. *Aen.* 12.387ff; in Homer, Grmek 1989: 33.

⁷⁰ E.g., Caes. *BG* 1.50, 3.14, 5.44, 7.52, 8.42; MacMullen 1984 (reprinted in 1990: 232); Lendon 1997: 243–5, 1999: 279–81, 286–7, 2005: 178–81 (manipular period), 185–9 (cohort period), 200, 208, 218, 228; Harris 2006a: 302; McDonnell 2006b: 294, 301–4, 310–11.

⁷¹ Caes. *BC* 3.92; however, *BG* 7.52 and [Caes.] *B. Afr.* 82–3 discourage it.

⁷² Caes. *BC* 3.92; lack of confidence, Plut. *Pomp.* 69.4; due to lack of training, Goldsworthy 2003: 254.

⁷³ E.g., Hor. *Odes* 4.15.17–20; Tac. *Hist.* 2.38. Harris 2001: 214ff. Polyb. 1.37 and 6.52 depict Roman soldiers as violent and motivated by anger; Harris 2001: 197, 2006a.

of the Roman order,” such as barbarians; subject peoples in revolt; conspirators against the throne; usurpers; and in the pages of Tacitus, the potential rivals of jealous emperors.⁷⁴

For the sake of political stability, the aggressiveness of imperial soldiers had to be dissociated from *furor*, *ferocia*, *feritas* and like terms. Roman Stoic authors claim that true *virtus* in combat is not motivated by anger or wrath, *ira*.⁷⁵ They argue against a long tradition of Roman soldiers’ irascibility, emphasized in civil war narratives where military *furor* is presented as a cause of strife. In peacetime, a wide range of sources also describe soldiers as quick-tempered and violent. Apparently as long as soldiers displayed sufficient *virtus* and *animus* in combat and practice, their leaders probably excused the side effect of *ira*.⁷⁶

In the *Tusculan Disputations*, a Stoic treatise, Cicero condemns the idea that *impetus*, whether in combat or in oratory, requires *iracundia* (wrath). He also insists that prowess and courage do not require *ira*.⁷⁷ Possibly he was arguing against a popular Roman notion that they did.⁷⁸ Seneca’s treatise *On Anger* develops the same point, stating the popular view that anger “rouses and incites the spirit” and is necessary for bravery in war, where anger “acts as a goad to spur on brave men and send them into danger.”⁷⁹ Seneca then refutes this. He argues that brave deeds do not require anger; angry soldiers do not obey their leaders. He further argues that anger is not a source of *virtus*, but merely its substitute. Barbarian fighters, such as the Germans and Scythians, are motivated by anger.⁸⁰ Seneca develops a model of combat motivation that does not require anger.

Whenever there is need of violent effort, the mind does not become angry,
but it gathers itself together and is aroused or relaxed according to the

⁷⁴ Néraudau 1979 and Brizzi 1990 depict *furor* vs. *disciplina* as an archaic binary opposition; cf. Lendon 2005: 188. Oakley 1985: 104–5 associates *furor* and *ferocia* with recent mutiny and civil war, e.g., at Sucre, Livy 28.24.10–12, 28.25.12, 28.26.12–13, 28.27.6, Michel 1981; in civil wars, Lucan *Phars.* 6.195–262, 7.557; in the Principate, Traub 1953; M. Roller 2001: 30–54. Instances of *ferocia* in mutiny, civil war, revolt, and potential usurpation, Tac. *Hist.* 2.66, *Ann.* 1.3, 1.45, 2.43, 2.72, 2.78, 3.40, 4.60, 13.2. The SC de Cn. Pisone *pater* ascribes *feritas* to Cn. Piso.

⁷⁵ Sen. *Ira* 1.9.2–4; 1.11.1.

⁷⁶ Juv. *Sat.* 16.8–12, 22–3 (a satire); Tac. *Hist.* 2.88, 3.81; Apul. *Met.* 39 (fictional); Hdn. 2.2.5, 2.4.1, 2.4.4, 2.5.1; Dio 79(78).1.1–3, 75.2.6; Campbell 1984: 243–54; Wesch-Klein 1998: 135–8.

⁷⁷ Cic. *Tusc.* 4.43: [*iracundiam*] *cotem fortitudinis esse dicunt*, 4.50–54, *virtus* and *fortitudo*.

⁷⁸ Nussbaum 1994: 243, 245.

⁷⁹ Sen. *Ira* 1.7.1.

⁸⁰ Sen. *Ira* 1.9.2–4, 1.13.5, 2.1.5.

estimate of the need, just as when engines of war hurl forth their bolts, it is the operator who controls the tension with which they are hurled.⁸¹

Seneca compares the *habitus* (the disposition of the body and mind) to the twisted sinews that power a catapult, the release being the source of violent effort, as when we speak in English of “winding up.”⁸² As the next chapter will suggest, this *animus* or fighting spirit was fostered by a *habitus* both armored against fear and stretched or tensed (*intentus*) like a bow; *disciplina* promoted this *habitus*.

In any case, soldiers’ *ferocia*, *furor*, or *ira* were repressed by means other than mass drill, in contrast with early modern Europe, when parade-ground drill was employed to tame soldiers recruited from the lowest and most marginal classes.⁸³ In contrast, imperial Roman sources prescribe other forms of discipline, especially generalized *labor*. Castrametation, the building of camps, was regarded as an especially disciplinary form of labor. Mass formation and drill receive relatively little attention.

MASS FORMATIONS: A COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION

In the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, drill and maneuvers produced a familiar, even clichéd military vocabulary: “face left/front/right, about face, wheel left/right, fall out, at ease, rank and file, maintain order, disorder in the ranks, throw into confusion.”⁸⁴ Infantry soldiers were arrayed in equidistant ranks and files in close-order formations. They learned to march in unison to a beat provided by music and to coordinate their movements. They were taught to coordinate loading and firing musket (later, rifle) volleys, retiring and falling back to let the next ranks advance and fire. This drill greatly increased the combat effectiveness of firearms.⁸⁵

Such drill was also used to socialize and control soldiers recruited from the lowest classes and to punish them collectively.⁸⁶ Mechanical drill notoriously

⁸¹ Sen. *Ira* 1.9.1.

⁸² Becker 2004: 267.

⁸³ Myerly 1990, 1996: 76–80.

⁸⁴ Steuben [1794] 1985: 11–14, 120–24. Cf. Asclep. *Tact.* 12.11.3 Arr. *Tact.* 32.

⁸⁵ Keegan 1993: 341–5; Goldsworthy 2003: 429–32; Wintjes 2006: 269–70.

⁸⁶ Myerly 1990: 123–65, 1996: 74–86; Braudy 2003: 127, 131, 231; Moore forthcoming.

stereotyped the military, satirized in Voltaire's *Candide* (1759) and by many other authors:

[T]hey handcuffed [Candide], and carried him away to the regiment. There he was made to wheel about to the right, to the left, to draw his rammer, to return his rammer, to present, to fire, to march, and they gave him thirty blows with a cane; the next day he performed his exercise a little better, and they gave him but twenty; the day following he came off with ten, and was looked upon as a young fellow of surprising genius by all his comrades.⁸⁷

Instilled by drill, close-order formation remained the dominant tactic of Western professional infantry until the increased firepower of rifles and, finally, machine guns made such formations too costly of lives. With the invention of railroads, marching in time was no longer needed to cover long distances on foot. In modern militaries, coordinated drill persists in training and as formal display; it (and the points of uniform) accustoms soldiers to obeying orders and regulations.⁸⁸

Contrary to the modern popular stereotype, and despite stylized rhetorical descriptions in Greek authors, Roman infantry training was not dominated by drill and by coordinated close-order formation.⁸⁹ Combat effectiveness in sword fighting required a looser order, sufficient space surrounding individual soldiers so that they could use their weapons freely. They had to engage individual enemies with initiative and aggression. In battle and on the march, they were still constrained by formation, but such formations would have seemed loose and straggling to an eighteenth-century onlooker.

The problem of mass formation is exacerbated by lost sources and by differences between Greek and Latin authors. Cato the Elder, Polybius, and Frontinus wrote manuals on military affairs or tactics that have been lost. However, the most detailed sources on mass formation and maneuvers were Greek, the tactical manuals of Aelian, Arrian and Asclepiodotus, some employing a highly technical, neologistic vocabulary and diagrams with letters and numbers.⁹⁰ These Greek technical terms were not translated into Latin till the Renaissance; the depiction of formation and maneuvers in Latin is terser and more simplistic. Ancient

⁸⁷ Voltaire [1759] 2003: 15.

⁸⁸ McNeill 1995: 1–3.

⁸⁹ Joseph. *BJ* 3.105; Arishd. *Or.* 26.87; Bishop 1990: 21, 27 n. 2; Keegan 1993: 341–2. On the stereotype of Roman drill, Keegan 1976: 62–3; Goldsworthy 1996: 5–6; Lendon 2005: 170.

⁹⁰ Asclep. *Tact.* 2.5–6, 7.6–10 (cavalry), 10.5–12, 13–17; on march, 11.1–9; Maur. *Strat.* 3.2 diagram reproduced in M. P. Speidel 2000: 474; Rawson 1971: 14; Devine 1995.

authors with any literary pretensions avoided technical vocabulary, diagrams, and numbers.

The Greek term for military discipline, *eutaxia*, emphasizes spatial order as *disciplina militaris* does not. Appian, writing in Greek, coins various phrases for Roman military discipline, avoiding *eutaxia*. *Stratiôtikê didaskalia* or “instruction” comes closest to the sense of *disciplina militaris*; *stratiôtikos nomos* or *stratiôtikê anankê* signifies “military law” or discipline in the sense of punishment, used of decimation; to *stratiôtikon prepon* suggests “etiquette” or custom.⁹¹

The lack of information on Roman mass formations in Latin sources may be because Greek authors emphasized drill technique, whereas the Romans emphasized personal combat and morale factors such as *animus* and *impetus*. In this view, the Romans preferred practical command to Greek technical science and theory.⁹² Aelian, a Greek tactical author of the Trajanic period, claims to lack Roman military experience, though he also flatters Frontinus and describes him as having “no less regard for Greek tactical science.”⁹³ Though the Hellenistic Greeks had a solid tradition of military training and tactical discipline, Roman authors also belittled them as soldiers; Plutarch claims that the Romans regarded Greek gymnasial training as no substitute for war.⁹⁴

This cultural differentiation is rhetorical and may be illusory. Roman commanders had access to the Greek technical literature. The imperial elite from the second century BC onward was educated in both Greek and Latin. By the first and second centuries AD, Greeks from Greece itself and the Hellenized East were assimilated into this elite, in effect a bilingual social class. On subjects other than tactics, Greek authors such as Plutarch, Appian, Cassius Dio, and Herodian display beliefs about the Roman army resembling those of Caesar, Sallust, Livy, Valerius Maximus, and Tacitus, often their sources. Onasander shows a less technical and more moralistic approach to command than the tactical manuals of Aelian and Asclepiodotus; Arrian also uses plainer terms.⁹⁵

⁹¹ App. *BC* 3.7.43, 3.7.53, 2.4.30, 2.12.85, 3.7.44, 3.12.88. Latin would doubtless have used *disciplina militaris* for all of these.

⁹² Campbell 1987: 18–19. Cf. Wiedemann 1996: 97 (arguing against Campbell); Goldsworthy 1998: 194–5.

⁹³ Aelian *Tact.* pr.1–2; Devine 1989: 31–64; Campbell 1987 discusses such authors.

⁹⁴ Cic. *Rep.* 4.4; Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 40.274d; Lucan *Phars.* 7.270–72; Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.26; Petrochilos 1974: 93; C. Williams 1999: 69–71; Gleason 1995: 120. But imperial Greek municipal elites continued ephebic training; Nijf 2003; Lendon 2005: 103–4, 129, 141–2, 151; McDonnell 2003.

⁹⁵ C. Smith 1998: 163, 165; on Roman assimilation of Greek tradition, Lendon 2005: 205–8.

In the absence of Cato's lost *De re militari* and Frontinus' lost manual on tactics, Vegetius is our only Latin treatise (as opposed to historical narrative or abbreviated anecdotes) on mass formations. He shows that Roman formation in the battle line was relatively loose. Vegetius' material on formation may have been taken from Cato and from Frontinus' lost work on tactics.⁹⁶

In their reconstructions of the Roman army, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century humanists and military reformers fused Greek and Latin sources, as well as technical manuals, historiography, and *exempla* literature.⁹⁷ The moderns relied upon Aelian's tactical manual, translated into Latin by Theodore of Gaza; Aelian describes in concrete detail how to perform drill and maneuvers.⁹⁸ Drills originating with classical sources became more and more elaborate, drawing prestige from the classics while bearing less and less resemblance to ancient warfare.⁹⁹

The ancient authors emphasized Roman combat discipline chiefly in contrast with barbarians. Barbarian peoples not only were disorganized in the field, but also lacked more fundamental endurance and emotional stability. In depicting the disorder and internal strife of the rebellious Jews, Josephus stresses their lack of *eutaxia* and lack of self-control.¹⁰⁰ Roman authors depict the Gauls and Germans as ferocious in the first onslaught, but easily exhausted by hot weather and the effort of battle.¹⁰¹ Dio's Caesar exhorts his army by disparaging the Gauls' fighting abilities. They fight unprotected and attack on impulse; though their onslaught is at first formidable, it soon exhausts itself and proves feeble.¹⁰² The Romans valued both order in battle (at least, exceeding that of the barbarians) and a deeper vigor, endurance, and valor.¹⁰³

Emphasis on what has been termed "the soldier's battle" or "the unit's battle" rather than "the general's battle" may also explain Latin sources' lack of information on Roman tactics. In such accounts of battles, an impressionistic ground-level narrative focuses on individual exemplary fighters.¹⁰⁴ The heroism

⁹⁶ G. Webster 1998: 231.

⁹⁷ Goldsworthy 1996: 9–10.

⁹⁸ Hahlweg [1941] 1987: 43, 46, 49–51, 93, 123.

⁹⁹ Goldsworthy 1996: 9; Neill 1998: 500.

¹⁰⁰ Shaw 1995: 373–6; e.g., Joseph. *BJ* 2.580, 3.488, 3.475; lack of self-control, Gleason 2001: 68–70, 71–3.

¹⁰¹ Mattern 1999: 203–5; Isaac 2004: 433 (Germans).

¹⁰² Dio 38.45.4.

¹⁰³ Campbell 1987: 22, 24–6. Cf. Wheeler 1998: 649; Sabin 2000: 3; Rawson 1971: 22, 28. Caes. *BC* 2.38 stresses the Numidians' lack of *ordines*.

¹⁰⁴ Wheeler 1998: 647–8.

and endurance of the men are stressed, not the brilliance of the generals.¹⁰⁵ This emphasis on “the soldier’s battle” may reflect a middle Republican tradition of moderating aristocratic political competition by downplaying the general’s role.¹⁰⁶ In the Empire, this emphasis on “the soldier’s battle” may have been intended to downplay the roles of provincial commanders, who were discouraged from usurpation. Stressing the men’s endurance and *virtus* (attained through *disciplina*) was more suited to the maintenance of imperial stability than was a stress on the general’s genius at deploying and maneuvering troops.

INFANTRY FORMATION: *ACIES* AND *AGMEN*

How the Romans deployed mass formations and maneuvered them remains frustratingly obscure, studied in inverse proportion to the extant ancient evidence.¹⁰⁷ The Romans in the field deployed for battle in one or multiple *acies*, the line or lines of battle.¹⁰⁸ A single battle line was three to four men deep. Three battle lines, the *triplex acies*, were used by Caesar and others.¹⁰⁹ Maniples and later cohorts were divided into centuries, the smallest tactical units, indicated by standards.¹¹⁰

In the mid-Republic, each legion contained thirty maniples; each maniple contained two centuries, each led by a centurion. Three lines of ten maniples each were usually deployed. Within the *acies*, the ranks were divided into age classes: the younger *hastati* stood in front of the *principes*, who stood before the older *triarii*, the rear guard or reserve. The youngest men, the *velites*, were stationed ahead of the main force to skirmish with the enemy.¹¹¹ Livy claims, in a much-debated passage, that maniples were deployed in a checkerboard pattern (*quincunx*), rear maniples moving forward to replace front ones that were weary, which in their turn fell back. This maneuver would have required much drilling, but the passage itself

¹⁰⁵ Wiedemann 1996: 97.

¹⁰⁶ Rosenstein 1990; Wiedemann 1996: 97.

¹⁰⁷ Parker [1928] 1958: 254–80; G. R. Watson 1969: 62, 70–71; Wellesley 1969: 67–9, 72, 74–5, 78, 85–6, 89–92; Horsmann 1991: 172–4; Le Bohec 1994: 109, 111–12, 123–6, 128–9, 141, 143; Rance 2000: 244–5; Daly 2002: 53. Epigraphical: Breeze 1969; M. P. Speidel 1992: 8–14, 20–21. Southern 2007: 89–90.

¹⁰⁸ Goldsworthy 2003: 28–9 (manipular), 299 (cohort), 71 suggests that the drill (wheeling to right) needed to deploy a marching column into an *acies* was elementary and slow; Roth 1994: 25–7.

¹⁰⁹ Goldsworthy 1996: 180–81.

¹¹⁰ Isaac 1995: 28–30.

¹¹¹ Rawlings 2007; Bell 1965; Wheeler 1979: 307; Rosenstein 1990: 95; Lendon 2005: 178–85.

is obscure.¹¹² Writing in the late second century BC and probably adapting Cato's lost *De re militari* from the early second century, Polybius depicts Roman battle formation as more open and flexible than the Macedonian phalanx. According to Polybius, this open order enabled Roman soldiers to "fight both individually and collectively," engaging their immediate attackers individually.¹¹³

By the time of Caesar, Roman legions were organized not as maniples deployed in quincunx formation, but as identical and interchangeable cohorts, the movement of which on the battlefield could be more fluid.¹¹⁴ Each legion now contained ten cohorts; a cohort contained six centuries of 80 men each; in addition, the legion's first cohort was of double size. In his *Commentaries*, Caesar stresses a relatively loose order; if soldiers were crowded together (*conferta*) it was a sign of panic and they were unable to fight effectively.¹¹⁵ However, Caesar also stresses the vertical dimension of movement on the battlefield and the emotional state of his men.¹¹⁶ Roman units sought to occupy favorable ground (*locus aequus*), high in elevation, enabling Roman soldiers to rush down upon the enemy with greater force (*impetus*). Conversely, Roman forces also sought to avoid unfavorable ground (*locus iniquus*), lower in elevation than the enemy, where they could easily be attacked. A *locus aequus* was more defensible, because the enemy was forced to attack uphill, burdened with armor and weapons. Such a description of tactics emphasized *impetus*.

Vegetius describes mass formations briefly, with less explanation than he gives to physical conditioning and weapons training.¹¹⁷ Vegetius suggests a frontage of three feet and a depth of seven feet.¹¹⁸ In contrast, Macedonian phalangites in locked-shield formation were allowed a frontage of 18 inches each, and Napoleonic infantry around 1800 had a frontage of 21 inches and a depth of 32 inches.¹¹⁹ The

¹¹² Livy 8.8.3–18; the term *quincunx* itself is modern. Rawson 1971: 26–9; Rosenstein 1990: 9; Goldsworthy 1996: 138–40; Wheeler 1998: 649; Sabin 2000: 7 suggest that the quincunx formation required extensive drill. Daly 2002: 60 regards the quincunx as a parade-ground formation. However, Livy 8.8.3–18 follows an episode (8.7.1–8.2: Titus Manlius Torquatus and his son) emphasizing fear as enforcing combat discipline.

¹¹³ Polyb. 44.41, 15.14, 18.30.5–8.

¹¹⁴ Goldsworthy 1996: 13–15, 33–4, 2003: 137–8; Campbell 2002: 51–5; Lendon 2005: 227–9; Cagniard 2007: 85; Gilliver 2007: 190–92.

¹¹⁵ Caes. *BC* 4.32 (during the abortive invasion of Britain); cf. 2.25, 5.43; Tac. *Ann.* 2.21, 14.37. Goldsworthy 1996: 186.

¹¹⁶ Lendon 1999: 289.

¹¹⁷ Rance 2000: 244.

¹¹⁸ Polyb. 18.29.1–32.13; Veg. *Mil.* 3.14.6–7, 3.15.1–6; Goldsworthy 1996: 179; Daly 2002: 159–60.

¹¹⁹ Polyb. 2.69; Asclep. *Tact.* 4; Sabin 2000: 21; Goldsworthy 1996: 179.

three-foot frontage described by Vegetius probably represents closer order, similar to the phalanx but wide enough to allow sword combat.¹²⁰ This closer order was a preference of Vegetius' later Empire, displaying archaizing Greek influences.¹²¹

Vegetius states that soldiers should maintain their ranks, neither becoming too close to one another (*constipati*) and unable to fight, nor becoming too far apart (*rariores*), in which case the gaps between men widened, allowing the enemy to break in.¹²² Vegetius depicts the battle line as an orthogonal array, without curves and with individuals standing equidistant from each other.¹²³

The way that ordinary legionary infantry were stationed within their cohorts and centuries remains obscure, based on inscriptions and on the layout of barracks in forts.¹²⁴ Vegetius suggests that soldiers were deployed in the centuries in the order in which they had been enrolled in their units, *secundum matriculae ordinem*.¹²⁵ Casualties and other losses, as well as transfers of centurions, would obviously disorganize such an arrangement, which suggests a more regimented mass formation than attested in literary authors. Centurions' titles displayed their order of battle.¹²⁶ Within each century, they were stationed in the following order, front to rear: *pilus prior*, *pilus posterior*, *princeps prior*, *princeps posterior*, *hastatus prior*, and *hastatus posterior*.

Roman commanders and historians did disapprove of disorder in the *acies* or *agmen* in the field. The Roman army could not fight as a disordered mob of individuals.¹²⁷ Caesar criticizes his subordinate Cotta, who, when ambushed, deployed cohorts at random.¹²⁸ Soldiers were expected to maintain distinct battle lines, when more than one *acies* was employed, and to follow the standards. At Ilerda, Caesar criticizes the Pompeians for adopting "barbarian" (Spanish) ways

¹²⁰ Veg. Mil. 2.17.1–2; cf. Dio 72(71).7.3–4.

¹²¹ Polyb. 18.25–30; Goldsworthy 1996: 179; Lendon 2005: 263–8.

¹²² Veg. Mil. 1.26.2–4, 1.4.7, 2.23.4: on the march, 1.9.1–3, at equal pace, *aequaliter*; cf. [Caes.] BG 8.9; *ordines servare* in Veg. Mil. 1.4.7, 2.23.4.

¹²³ Veg. Mil. 1.26.4: *ut aequali legitimoque spatio miles distet a milite*; cf. Plut. Ant. 39.4.

¹²⁴ M. P. Speidel 1992: 20–21; Gilliver 2007: 191–2.

¹²⁵ Veg. Mil. 1.26.4.

¹²⁶ Breeze 1969; M. P. Speidel 1992: 6–14, 20–21; Goldsworthy 1996: 14, 181 suggests and Isaac 1995: 30 argues that there was no tactical unit smaller than the century; *contubernia* were barracks mates and work squads, not tactical units.

¹²⁷ Emphasized by Wheeler 1998: 644–50 and Sabin 2000: 2, 11–12 criticizing Goldsworthy 1996 despite 121, 244–5; by Moore forthcoming on Caes. BG 4.25–6.

¹²⁸ Caes. BG 5.33.

of fighting as a loose, disorganized mob.¹²⁹ But, as seen earlier, Caesar also reproves the Pompeians at Pharsalus for adopting a rigid, motionless formation.¹³⁰ Caesar thus suggests that the Roman standard for battle order was *relatively* loose.¹³¹ An exception was the special deployment of the Roman legion as a phalanx, mentioned above.¹³² Another exception was the *testudo* or “tortoise” formation, in which soldiers overlapped shields and raised them above their heads to ward off enemy missiles. The *testudo* must have required considerable practice for soldiers to be able to move in unison while holding the shields in place.¹³³

The *agmen* or order of march was arranged according to the status and function of personnel.¹³⁴ It could adopt specific formations. Onasander writes that a long and narrow line of march is more easily attacked by the enemy, and that a shorter, broader line of march is more secure.¹³⁵ Josephus states that the Roman order of march was six abreast. In hostile country, Roman troops marched in a hollow square (*agmen quadratum*) with two columns on each side and the baggage in the center, protecting it from attack; this type of *agmen* was easier to form up for battle, in a triple line, than was a single line of march. According to Vegetius, the cavalry were followed by infantry, then the baggage train, with pack horses, servants, and vehicles, which was followed by light infantry and cavalry.¹³⁶ Commanders reinforcing discipline forbade personnel to change position or fall behind on the march.¹³⁷ Retreating from the Varian disaster, in which the Germans ambushed and destroyed three legions, the Romans were unable to maintain formation and became strung out due to heavy woods and an unwieldy train of baggage and noncombatants.¹³⁸ The Vitellians, leaving Rome after their season of indiscipline

¹²⁹ Caes. BC 1.44.

¹³⁰ Caes. BC 3.92; cf. Veg. Mil. 1.9.4–5.

¹³¹ Sabin 2000: 16.

¹³² Wheeler 1979; at Mons Graupius, Tac. Agric. 35; at Strasbourg, Amm. Marc. 16.12.37, 44, 49–50.

¹³³ Rance 2004: 300–301; Plut. Ant. 45.2; Dio 49.29.4, 75.75; some overlap with the later Roman “shield wall” called *testudo*, Amm. 16.12.36, 44. Arr. Ectaxis 26 is the probable source of Maur. Strat. 12Bt6.30–38. Confusingly, a *testudo* was also a type of siege-shed, Veg. Mil. 4.14.1–4.

¹³⁴ App. Iber. 85–6; Livy Per. 57; Front. Strat. 4.1.1; Flor. 1.34.10. Metellus: Sall. Jug. 45.2; Front. Strat. 4.1.2; Val. Max. 2.7.2. Other instances, Caes. BG 2.19.2; Joseph. BJ 3.115–20, 5.47–50, 5.348–55; Tac. Ann. 2.16; Arr. Ectaxis. Parker [1928] 1958: 254–7; Horsmann 1991: 172; Goldsworthy 1996: 105–11; Thorne 2007: 215–16. Southern 2007: 187.

¹³⁵ Onas. Strat. 6.2–3, 6.5.

¹³⁶ Joseph. BJ 5.47–50; Veg. Mil. 3.6.11–15; cf. Veg. Mil. 1.26.1.

¹³⁷ Livy 44.33.6; App. Iber. 86; Livy Per. 57; Tac. Ann. 11.18; *campidoctores*, tribunes, and *vicani* enforce marching order in Veg. Mil. 3.6.23.

¹³⁸ Dio 56.20.1–5.

in the city, displayed a straggling order of march due to their lack of vigor and training.¹³⁹

Modern authors have often stated that Roman soldiers often drilled in formation.¹⁴⁰ In their view, the Roman authors neglected to describe mass drill due to their familiarity with the practice.¹⁴¹ They argue that the Romans needed such a standardized drill so that detachments of legionaries or cavalry from different parts of the empire could cooperate.¹⁴² However, the absence of marching music and corresponding entrainment, and the need for the commander and other officers to exert coercive control in battle, suggest a lack of internalized drill.

Latin authors may have regarded specifics of drill and deployment as elementary knowledge, unflattering to the soldiers and to the generals who emphasized them.¹⁴³ During his campaign against the Pompeians in Africa, after his men were routed by Numidian light cavalry, Caesar had to instruct the demoralized men “not as a general does veterans who have fought many successful campaigns, but as a trainer does inexperienced gladiators,” how many feet to retire, how to turn and attack the enemy, how to fight in a limited space, how to advance and retire, and indeed where and how to aim their weapons.¹⁴⁴ The comparison to gladiatorial training may suggest individual combat, but teams of gladiators also fought mock battles; the passage suggests that because Caesar’s men still knew how to use their weapons, he instructed them in group tactics. Ammianus describes Julian as bored by the “rudiments” (*proludia*) of military training, including rhythmic marching.¹⁴⁵ Vegetius also indicates that recruits were trained not to desert the *ordines* or disorder ranks; they learned to maintain a pace on the march of 4 mph (*militaris gradus*) or 4.8 mph (*plenus gradus*); and they learned not to disorder the *acies* or *agmen* by thinning out or drawing too close together, instead maintaining “an equal and regular space between soldier and soldier.”¹⁴⁶ Nonetheless, other

¹³⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 2.99.

¹⁴⁰ Richmond 1935: 10, 34 (assuming that soldiers on Trajan’s Column stand and march “at ease”); Stout 1920–21: 427; Delbrück 1975: 293; McNeill 1995: 120; Lee 1996: 207–8; Weitz 1998: 270–71, 275; Wheeler 1998: 647–9; S. James 1999: 16–17.

¹⁴¹ Keppie 1998: 96; Goldsworthy 1996: 171.

¹⁴² Wheeler 1998: 649.

¹⁴³ Neumann 1948: 157. An available Greek author was Onas. *Strat* 10.2.

¹⁴⁴ [Caes.] *B.Afr.* 71; discussed, Moore *forthcoming*.

¹⁴⁵ Amm. 16.5.10.

¹⁴⁶ Veg. *Mil.* 1.4.7, 1.9.1–2, 1.26.1–4.

depictions of remedial training stress not the practice of mass formations, but physical fitness, individual combat training, and generalized labor.¹⁴⁷

Training excursions and reviews, *ambulatura*, *exercitationes*, or *decursiones*, featured marches and mock battles in which mass formations could be practiced.¹⁴⁸ Vegetius indicates that soldiers learned to maneuver en masse; according to Dio, Trajan led his soldiers sometimes in one order and then in another, giving attention to the order and disposition of his troops, and Hadrian also “drilled his men for any kind of battle, honoring some and reproofing others.”¹⁴⁹ However, *decursiones* appear to have been not just formations and evolutions, but simulations of the total battle and campaign experience, including marching while carrying full gear, building camps, sleeping in tents even in bitter weather, and also deployment, attack, defense, and pursuit.¹⁵⁰ Many accounts of *decursiones* stress these hardships or the display of prowess in simulated battles.¹⁵¹

Scipio Africanus’ display of military training at Syracuse included *exercitationes* and *decursiones*, including a mock sea battle; Octavian displayed his control of two legions that had defected to him from Antony by staging a mock battle.¹⁵² In his youth the future emperor Galba conducted a *decursio* while Caligula watched.¹⁵³ Plancina, the wife of Cn. Piso, committed an impropriety by watching *decursiones* and *exercitationes* of soldiers; however, the impropriety was probably because of their display of prowess with weapons, resembling that of gladiators, whom it was somewhat improper for women to watch.¹⁵⁴

FORMATION AS SPECTACLE AND AS DISCIPLINE

Though Greek authors praised Roman *eutaxia* and Latin authors noted that Roman troops were taught to maintain ranks (*ordines servare*), the Romans did not impose

¹⁴⁷ App. *Iber.* 86; Sall. *Jug.* 45; Tac. *Ann.* 11.18, 13.35.

¹⁴⁸ Rance 2000: 245, 248 on Veg. *Mil.* 1.27.1–4.

¹⁴⁹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.26.1–4; 1.27.1–4; Dio 68.23.1–2, 69.9.3.

¹⁵⁰ Davies 1969c (reprinted in 1989: 112–15); Horsmann 1991: 175–86. Bad weather: satirized as Ovid’s *militia amoris* and in HA *Hadr.* 16.3–4.

¹⁵¹ Hardship stressed at Numantia, App. *Iber.* 86; parodied, Suet. *Calig.* 43–8.

¹⁵² Livy 29.22; App. *BC* 3.7.48; cf. Dio 61.9.5 (naval battle and land battles as spectacle in arena); 66.25.2–3 (Titus stages naval battle in Colosseum).

¹⁵³ Suet. *Galba* 6.3.

¹⁵⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 2.55, 3.33; the charge was also made against Cornelia, the wife of Calvisius Sabinus, in Dio 59.18.4 (the woman in Tac. *Hist.* 1.48). Gladiators: Wiedemann 1992: 131. On the context of Tac. *Ann.* 3.33, including deliberate archaism, Phang 2001: 366–72.

close-order drill and mass formation as a form of social control, for punishment, restoring morale, displaying *esprit de corps*, impressing the emperor, or intimidating the enemy or civilians. If this had been the case, we would know much more about Roman mass formations and drill.

Literary accounts of parades stress the splendor of soldiers' armor and decorations. Tacitus describes the Vitellians' entry into Rome, parading in full armor, "an army worthy of an emperor other than Vitellius." He describes the army as keeping the order of march, *composito agmine*, in which the officers led their centuries.¹⁵⁵ Descriptions of marching order show that the status groups or ranks in the *agmen* proceeded in a regular sequence.¹⁵⁶ That personnel marched *in step* to a cadence is not clearly depicted; to parallel the modern practice, the ancient authors would have to describe this phenomenon in detail.¹⁵⁷ Vegetius hints that Roman soldiers marched in a regular formation, *celeriter et aequaliter*.¹⁵⁸

When Roman soldiers were "called to order," to use a modern term, soldiers grouped themselves by their centuries and standards. Thus Germanicus, seeing that the Rhine mutineers were disordered (*permixta*), ordered them to separate into their centuries, grouping themselves in cohorts by their standards.¹⁵⁹ Nothing can be inferred about their standing in dressed ranks within their centuries, and in any case, the "calling to order" failed to make them obedient. In his account of the Danubian mutiny, when the troops receive Drusus, Tacitus emphasizes their dirtiness and defiance, lacking the good cheer and splendid decorations displayed by an obedient army to greet their commander.¹⁶⁰ As will be seen in Chapter Three on etiquette, soldiers were expected to greet their commander in a parallel of civilian *salutatio*, the morning ritual of the Roman aristocracy. The negative attitude of the Danubian legionaries is expressed more as individual *habitus* than as collective spatial disorder. Tacitus is most fond of depicting the collective

¹⁵⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 2.89; cf. *Ann.* 15.29.

¹⁵⁶ Amm. 14.6.17: A Roman aristocratic household proceeds through the streets like an *agmen*, grouped by status and function, the eunuchs last. Military parades stress the splendor of armor, Joseph. *BJ* 5.348–55 (Jerusalem), though also *eutaxia* (5.353); Tac. *Ann.* 15.29, *Hist.* 2.89; Amm. 16.10.6–8. Only the emperor Constantius II displays a particularly rigid bearing, Amm. 16.10.10.

¹⁵⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.27.3–4, 1.27.2: *militari gradu ire ac redire*; at a faster pace, *cursu alacriore*. Goldsworthy 1996: 110 warns that this applied to *expediti*; *agmina* with baggage traveled at the animals' speed. However, specialists (Alexander's *bématistai* or Roman *mensores*) may have paced off distances. Plin. *HN* 6.61; Whittaker 2004: 69, 74.

¹⁵⁸ Veg. *Mil.* 1.9.1–2: *ut omnes milites incedendi ordinem servent*.

¹⁵⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.34.

¹⁶⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 1.24.

miles as a *vulgus* (mob), but he emphasizes the social and moral, rather than spatial, qualities of the mob. The *miles* as *vulgus* displays insubordination, disregard of hierarchy, and irrational and impulsive behavior.¹⁶¹

Ancient authors' descriptions of Roman reviews in which many soldiers performed military exercises stress individual skills in weapons use and riding. Mass exercises usually took the form of mock battles in which combat skills are displayed.¹⁶² In addition, the more emphasis on coordinated movement, the more the review approached a spectacle in the *arena* or other entertainment.¹⁶³ For example, Livy describes the formation of a sloping *testudo* in order to mount the wall of the city of Heracleum during the Third Macedonian War (169 BC). He describes the coordinated formation as "more showy than the military and closer to the style of gladiatorial combats."¹⁶⁴ The circus trick also was put to good military use, but Livy clearly thinks that the more "spectacular" the feats of coordinated activity, the less military they are.¹⁶⁵

Three accounts of formal cavalry reviews stress individual riding and weapons skills as well as coordination.¹⁶⁶ The *hippika gymnasia* described in Arrian's *Tactica* was a festive spectacle; its elaborate and undoubtedly costly accoutrements, such as gilded face-mask helmets and brightly dyed embroidered tunics, were not intended for combat.¹⁶⁷ Its purpose was ceremonial and archaizing, representing mythological battles of centaurs and Amazons.¹⁶⁸ The *ludus Troiae* or cavalry exercises staged by young aristocrats at Rome, revived by Caesar, Augustus, and Agrippa, were also a formal and decorative exercise.¹⁶⁹ In his description of the *ludus Troiae*, transferred to a legendary period, Vergil stresses the charm and decorative appearance of the boy riders. Formation is suggested; the young riders drew up in ranks and performed maneuvers.¹⁷⁰ They also performed a mock battle, displaying weapons

¹⁶¹ Kajanto 1970: 707–8.

¹⁶² Horsmann 1991: 101–2, 172–4, 186; Rance 2000: 249 on Veg. *Mil.* 3.9; *armatura* included mass maneuvers and tactical drill as well as weapons skills.

¹⁶³ Wheeler 1978: 357–9; Southern and Dixon 1992: 126ff.

¹⁶⁴ Livy 44.9.5–9; Neumann 1948: 164.

¹⁶⁵ Another instance of the tortoise used to mount a city wall: Tac. *Hist.* 3.28 (unsuccessfully).

¹⁶⁶ Arr. *Tact.* 37, 40–41, 42–3. Wheeler 1978: 360; Davies 1968c (reprinted in 1989: 98–9); Goldsworthy 1996: 233.

¹⁶⁷ Wheeler 1978: 359.

¹⁶⁸ Lendon 2005: 268–75.

¹⁶⁹ *Op. cit.* Chapter One n. 15; Verg. *Aen.* 5.545–622.

¹⁷⁰ Verg. *Aen.* 5.548–9, 5.560–2.

skills.¹⁷¹ In contrast, a serious Roman military review or *exercitatio* that Hadrian presided over at Lambaesis in North Africa in AD 128 should not be termed a “parade,” because the emperor praises units’ individual prowess with weapons rather than mass coordination.¹⁷² Hadrian praises combat skills, such as agility, vigor, and speed, and criticizes the disorder of only one unit, *cob. II H(ispanorum)*.

KEEPING TOGETHER IN TIME: THE QUESTION OF MILITARY MUSIC

Though close-order drill ceased to be tactically useful in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, mass drill is still taught as part of military training and discipline. The experience of moving in unison, “keeping together in time,” bonds individual members with the whole, helping to create cohesion. Cohesion is the tendency of members of a unit to behave as a unit and cooperate in battle, though they may be much more spatially dispersed than in close-order drill. The experience of coordinated drill in military service promoted nineteenth- and twentieth-century nationalism.¹⁷³

Coordinated drill, as well as dance, generates entrainment, a sense of unity or “muscular bonding,” in which the sensation of individual exertion dissipates in the coordinated mass activity.¹⁷⁴ Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European armies, before the construction of railways, marched in step to fife and drum over long distances. In ancient China (402–221 BC), the period of Sun Tzu’s *Art of War*, soldiers marched in step to the drum, at the risk of execution if they fell out of rank.¹⁷⁵ From the Renaissance onward, composers invented music for the Roman army, and historians sometimes assume that Roman soldiers practiced rhythmic marching.¹⁷⁶ Nonetheless, evidence is lacking that the Romans used music as early modern and modern armies did, to set a pace. There is no evidence for instrumental marching music. It is possible that soldiers sang or chanted, but if such music was used, elite authors’ biases have suppressed it.

¹⁷¹ Verg. *Aen.* 5:579–87.

¹⁷² *ILS* 2487; Le Glay 1977: 154; Davies 1968c (reprinted in 1989: 107–11); Stäcker 2003: 137–42; re-edited by M. P. Speidel 2006.

¹⁷³ McNeill 1995; Ehrenreich 1997: 184–5, 198–9; Lee 1996: 207. Cohesion: Shils and Janowitz [1948] 1998.

¹⁷⁴ McNeill 1995: 2, 8; Weitz 1998: 281–6.

¹⁷⁵ McNeill 1995: 108; ancient China, 110. Sun Tzu 6.496 BC.

¹⁷⁶ McNeill 1995: 112, 120–21; S. James 1999: 16–17 suggests drilling to music.

The Romans employed various kinds of trumpets and horns to frighten the enemy or to give one-time signals: to begin and end marches, to break camp, to greet the commander or emperor, and to commence battle and give signals in battle.¹⁷⁷ The *tuba* was a straight horn bearing no resemblance to the modern instrument used for marching music; the *cornu* and *bucina* were curved horns. The Romans did not use drums; when they encountered the drums of the Parthians, Crassus' soldiers were terrified.¹⁷⁸

One anecdote suggests the use of flute music to set a pace; however, it is late and Greek-inflected. The classical Spartan hoplite phalanx marched in unison to the sound of the flute, greatly impressing other Greeks.¹⁷⁹ In the mid-fourth century AD – some 800 years later – Ammianus relates that Julian used to call upon the philosopher Plato to give him endurance when “forced to practice the rudiments of military training and to learn the art of marching rhythmically in pyrrhic measure to the harmony of flutes.”¹⁸⁰ Possibly, as with mass formation itself, earlier Roman authors had regarded this as elementary and not worth mentioning. However, the tone of this passage is antiquarian and Hellenizing: Julian alludes to the pyrrhic dance in armor, a Greek tradition, and the flutes probably allude to the classical Spartan armies' use of the pipes. Julian's Hellenism and antiquarianism were notable even by classical standards.¹⁸¹

There are very few direct descriptions of entrainment in classical antiquity. *Eutaxia* was an ideal in hoplite and fourth-century BC Greek infantry warfare. The Macedonian phalanx, wielding long pikes (*sarissae*), must have drilled extensively in coordination to maneuver with the pikes without entangling the shafts.¹⁸² Certainly trireme and other galley rowers experienced entrainment, keeping in time at the oars, which may have contributed to the social and political unity of

¹⁷⁷ To scare the enemy: Caes. *BC* 3.92; Goldsworthy 1996: 195–6. Signals: Joseph. *BJ* 2.579, 3.89–91; Veg. *Mil.* 2.22.1–6, 3.5.3, 3.5.6–7. Richmond 1935: 10–11 on Trajan's Column. On instruments M. P. Speidel 1976; Meucci 1989; Le Bohec 1994: 49–50; cf. Asclepiodotus *Tact.* 12.10–11. (Greek). Roman soldiers also clashed weapons, Cowan 2007; Southern 2007: 158–9.

¹⁷⁸ Plut. *Crass.* 23.6; Montagu 2002: 10.

¹⁷⁹ Thuc. *Hist.* 5.69–70; Plut. *Lyc.* 21–2; *Moralia* 458e; cf. Gell. 1.11.1–18, esp. 1–5; Plut. *Mor.* 210f–211b. Lendon 2005: 63.

¹⁸⁰ Amm. 16.5.10.

¹⁸¹ On Julian, Lendon 2005: 292–7; on the pyrrhic dance, Wheeler 1982: 230–32; also Wheeler 1983: 1–2 on Veg. *Mil.* 1.8.9 and 3.pr.1–5.

¹⁸² McNeill 1995: 119.

the Athenian *dêmos*.¹⁸³ But there is no other way to row a trireme, whereas Roman armies could fight in looser order.

Roman soldiers may have used singing or chanting in order to march in time. Suetonius relates that at Julius Caesar's triumph his soldiers paraded while singing, mocking Caesar's conquests and his sexual reputation.¹⁸⁴ Though this song may have served a ritual purpose, apotropaically deflecting harm from the triumphant general, Suetonius calls the song *vulgatissimus*, the probable reason that such singing is not represented elsewhere.¹⁸⁵ In early modern and modern times, mass singing attended social movements and popular unrest. When Roman authors depict soldiers chanting, their music is sanctioned by *labor*, as when Varro likens the humming of bees preparing to swarm to the sound of soldiers breaking camp.¹⁸⁶

Suppressing this rough music, elite authors depict the "ancient" Roman army as marching in silence.¹⁸⁷ Soldiers might raise a shout as they closed with the enemy. Cicero opens his discussion of Roman military training with a parenthetical contrast with the ancient Spartan army:

Military service in fact – I mean our own and not that of the Spartans who marched to a measure accompanied by the flute, and in which no word of encouragement was given except with the beat of anapests – as for our army [*exercitus*], you can see first what it gets its name from; then the toil, the great toil of the march. . . .¹⁸⁸

Cicero opposes the "keeping together in time" of the Spartan hoplites, coordinated by flute music, to the Roman reliance on *labor* and *exercitatio* as a source of military vigor and victory.

Aulus Gellius also describes the Spartans' marching to flute music, which they used to moderate and slow their advance; in contrast, the ancient Romans advanced in silence.¹⁸⁹ Gellius assumes that such music reduced *impetus*, a desirable trait in

¹⁸³ McNeill 1995: 118.

¹⁸⁴ Suet. *Iul.* 49.3: *Gallias Caesar subegit, Nicomedes Caesarem: ecce Caesar nunc triumphat qui subegit Gallias, Nicomedes non triumphat qui subegit Caesarem.*

¹⁸⁵ Barton 1993: 145–75 on the purposes of such mockery.

¹⁸⁶ Varro *Rust.* 3.16.30: *consonant vehementer, proinde ut miles faciunt, cum castra movent.*

¹⁸⁷ Emphasized by Daly 2002: 77, 185.

¹⁸⁸ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.37. Cf. Arr. *Ectaxis* 25; Maur. *Strat.* 12.14; Goldsworthy 1996: 193.

¹⁸⁹ Gell.1.11.1–4: the Spartans used flute music to coordinate their pace (*ut moderatiores modulatores fierent*), slowing their onslaught; the Romans advanced in silence before closing with a shout (1.11.9). Cf. Plut. *Ant.* 39.4; Cowan 2007.

Roman combat.¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, the Roman moral tradition may have disapproved of movement in time to music, regarding dancing (outside certain ritual contexts) as unseemly and effeminate in a respectable man or youth; soldiers' singing and dancing was usually regarded as a form of indiscipline.¹⁹¹

THE CONTROL OF SOLDIERS IN BATTLE

The main concerns for formation in battle were pragmatic: soldiers should not attack the enemy without orders (emphasized by Livy in legends of the mid-Republic), the main battle lines should remain distinct, and soldiers should not lag behind or flee out of cowardice.¹⁹² Most of all, soldiers should not become too closely packed together. In contrast with early modern close-order formation, which made musket weapons more effective, sword combat was hindered by too dense a formation because then the men could not use their weapons freely. Such seeking the comfort of proximity displayed the men's fear. When he saw his men crowding together, a good general would order them to disperse by moving the standards farther apart.¹⁹³ In the Second Battle of Cremona, the Vitellian line contracted and extended at random due to lack of leadership.¹⁹⁴

Envisioning the infantry battlefield suggests the tension between mass order and individual combat. Roman infantry tactics required that soldiers keep their places within a relatively dispersed formation. Spaces between centuries and between cohorts and cavalry units allowed reserves to move up or officers to ride here and there directing the action.¹⁹⁵ Within his allotted space, each soldier could move freely, individually attacking or fending off members of the enemy; these combats were transient and lacked the formality of the individual duels that are attested in the Roman Republic.¹⁹⁶ A legionary infantryman also had to move

¹⁹⁰ Gell. 1.11.10–15; Gaius Gracchus used flute music to restrain his *impetus* as an orator.

¹⁹¹ E.g. Macrobi. *Sat.* 3.14.6–7; Richlin 1992: 92, 100; Corbeill 1997: 104–7; Gleason 1999: 77; C. A. Williams 1999: 175; Corbeill 2004: 70–71, 121; Rosenstein 2006: 629. Sen. *Tranq. anim.* 17.4 insists that Scipio preserved his martial and masculine *habitus* while moving rhythmically (*triumphale illud ac militare corpus movebat ad numeros*), perhaps a dance like the Salian priests'. Soldiers: HA *Pesc.* 3.9–10; Amm. 22.4.6; cf. Lact. *Mort. Pers.* 18.12.

¹⁹² Caes. *BC* 2.41–2; Plut. *Crass.* 27.6.

¹⁹³ Caes. *BC* 2.25; cf. Caes. *BG* 4.26.

¹⁹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 3.25; Goldsworthy 1996: 178, 223.

¹⁹⁵ Goldsworthy 1996: 176; Lee 1996: 210; e.g., Caes. *BG* 2.25.

¹⁹⁶ Rance 2000: 244.

with the advancing or retreating battle lines. He oriented himself in relation to his comrades by looking at the standards.¹⁹⁷ Soldiers lacked the psychological comfort of a closer-order formation, in which personnel were in close proximity, unless the commander chose to deploy them as a phalanx or *testudo*.¹⁹⁸ In addition, open order made it difficult to maintain mass formations on the battlefield, especially on rough or uneven ground with marshes, trees, vine-stocks, and obstructions deliberately created by the enemy, such as fences and ditches.¹⁹⁹ However, time spent clearing away these impediments might be time lost in the midst of a battle; authors emphasized the Roman legion's ability to cope with uneven ground, in contrast with the Macedonian phalanx.²⁰⁰

Control of soldiers in battle was pragmatic, encouraging prowess and preventing or punishing flight.²⁰¹ Roman soldiers appear to have been prone to panic and flight.²⁰² They were also prone to the impulsive desire to attack the enemy, as the legend of T. Manlius Torquatus and soldiers' remarks before battle show. A close-order, coordinated formation, from which it is much harder for the individual to break away, would have made them less likely to flee or fight prematurely.²⁰³ Commanders personally directed and policed their troops on the battlefield and controlled them with fear of severe punishments.²⁰⁴ As Chapter Four will show, even in the Severan period capital punishment was prescribed for desertion in the field, flight from the battle line, starting a rout, throwing away or losing weapons, and violence against superiors. Commanders also employed shaming punishments.

The terms usually translated as "thrown into confusion" refer as often to the soldiers' emotional panic (*perterriti*) as to spatial disorder (*perturbati*) in combat. The good general addressed these problems directly. Because the *acies* was not maintained rigidly by internalized drill, the general and his officers had to constantly move about, ordering their men to maintain their places or advance or

¹⁹⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 2.23.4, 3.5.8–10; Isaac 1995: 29.

¹⁹⁸ Sabin 2000: 6; Rawlings 2007: 57; Thorne 2007: 219–20.

¹⁹⁹ Caes. *BG* 5.21, 2.9, *BC* 1.27; Tac. *Hist.* 3.21.

²⁰⁰ Tac. *Hist.* 2.25; Gilliver 1996a: 56.

²⁰¹ Lee 1996: 207–8; Goldsworthy 1998: 210. Reward: Wiedemann 1996: 95; Goldsworthy 1996: 119, 269–70, 276–9; Daly 2002: 113.

²⁰² On soldiers' fear C. A. Smith 1998: 160, 165; Lendon 1999: 299, 301–2.

²⁰³ Goldsworthy 1996: 244–5.

²⁰⁴ Lendon 2005: 249; Mattern 1999: 119–22; contra, Rosenstein 1990: 108–9. On Caesar's emphasis on *virtus*, Lendon 1999: 306, 325. Coercion: D. 49.16.3, 5, 13, 16; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.13, 23, 29, 34–5 (see Chapter Four).

retreat as needed, encouraging their men, and threatening to punish those who held back.²⁰⁵ Centurions also forced their men to remain with their standards; the *optio* of each century was stationed at the rear and wielded a bladeless spear shaft to beat back into position any soldier who tried to lag behind or flee.²⁰⁶ In a persistent *topos*, the general seized a standard bearer and directed him toward the enemy; the general might leap into the fray with one of the standards, forcing his men to follow him or be shamed; he might even threaten to kill his fleeing men.²⁰⁷ The length of Roman battles suggests that keeping one's place in the *acies* was proof of endurance.²⁰⁸

Keeping one's place in the *acies* in battle might indicate *virtus*: in the battle of Pistoria, the Catilinarians proved their boldness and courage – almost no man gave ground to the enemy. However, Catiline's body lay far *ahead* of his men, surrounded by the enemy, demonstrating his courage.²⁰⁹ Breaking ranks to attack the enemy was sometimes tolerated.²¹⁰ In earlier times, soldiers swore not to flee the battlefield or abandon the *acies* unless to recover or fetch a weapon, to save a friend, or to strike down a foe.²¹¹ In the older period of manipular tactics, the *velites* or light-armed troops consisted of young men who skirmished ahead of the main force, seeking out the enemy in order to display their *virtus*; this was the context of many episodes of single combat.²¹²

Well-trained soldiers could fight without adopting a regular formation according to the standards. The army, usually due to surprise or the enemy's ambush, might be unable to deploy in regular order. Nevertheless, the soldiers could display *virtus*, which could save a situation that was spatially unfavorable.²¹³ Thus,

²⁰⁵ Goldsworthy 1996: 156–63, 223; Lendon 2005: 185–6. Daly 2002: 195 notes the tendency of the battle line in loose order to straggle.

²⁰⁶ Centurions: Goldsworthy 2003: 102–3. *Optio*: Maur. *Strat.* 12B16; M. P. Speidel 1992: 24–6; Goldsworthy 1996: 182; Lendon 2005: 185; cf. Cato, *Livy* 34.15.4.

²⁰⁷ E.g., Val. Max. 2.7.10; Front. *Strat.* 2.8.8–9, 11, 14; Goldsworthy 1996: 163–4, 2003: 250. Less severe coercion, Lee 1996: 103–4.

²⁰⁸ Battles could last five hours (Herda: Caes. *BC* 1.45–7), though fighting was discontinuous, Goldsworthy 1996: 224–6; Sabin 2000: 10–11; Hoyos 2007: 71. On time sense, Ch. 6 nn. 75–6.

²⁰⁹ Sall. *Cat.* 61.2, 61.4.

²¹⁰ The “Manlian legends,” earlier in setting and with a different moralistic purpose, are the main exception.

²¹¹ Lendon 2005: 189; Rawlings 2007.

²¹² Daly 2002: 178; Lendon 2005: 187–8; Oakley 1985; Wiedemann 1996; McDonnell 2006 stresses limitations on single combats.

²¹³ Lendon 1999: 315.

Caesar describes part of the battle of the Sambre, where his men took up positions without falling into the usual order.²¹⁴ In this description Caesar stresses that the army is not ordered according to *rei militaris ratio atque ordo*.²¹⁵

Officers also enforced order of march. Leaving the *agmen* signified a more fundamental physical weakness, cowardice, or intention to desert. The general kept order in the *agmen* through direct coercion, as in Metellus Numidicus' restoration of *disciplina* in Africa, in which he rode back and forth along the line of march, ensuring that no one left the order of march and that they kept up with their standards.²¹⁶ Retraining the army at Numantia, Scipio Aemilianus also rode along the line of march, punishing stragglers. Vegetius recommends that lower-ranking officers keep order in the line of march by coercion.²¹⁷ However, soldiers were conditioned to obey orders and coercion in combat through the imposition of *labor* – work, such as construction, the production of the army's requirements, and castrametation.²¹⁸

CASTRAMETATION

Ancient authors viewed castrametation (the building of camps, *castra*) as essential to military discipline. Castrametation served the purpose of modern close-order drill for the Roman army, as a highly coordinated, standardized, and ordered activity that imposed social control. The traditional marching camp had a ditch and a rampart built from turf and stakes. Within the rampart, orthogonal streets were laid out and tents were raised. In the Principate, permanent camps were erected, with stone or half-timbered inner buildings, but soldiers continued to build temporary camps from turf on campaign and as training.

The authors represent castrametation as a disciplinary activity, regimenting soldiers as organized labor and projecting both material and symbolic power, demonstrating the Roman control of nature.²¹⁹ Vegetius states that recruits should

²¹⁴ Caes. *BG* 2.21.

²¹⁵ Caes. *BG* 2.22.

²¹⁶ Sall. *Jug.* 45.2; cf. App. *Iber.* 86; Veg. *Mil.* 3.6.23 Veg. *Mil.* 3.5.

²¹⁷ App. *Iber.* 86: Scipio also kept order by marching in a hollow square, probably the *agmen quadratum*; Veg. *Mil.* 3.6.8.

²¹⁸ Lendon 2005: 250–52.

²¹⁹ Neumann 1948: 170, 1965: 150; G. Watson 1969: 60–67; Davies 1968b (reprinted in 1989); Horsmann 1991: 164–71; Cagniat 1992; Le Bohec 1994: 131–3; Goldsworthy 1996: 111–13; G. Webster 1998: 169–73;

learn to build camps, for a camp provides an army with security when the enemy is nearby. The construction of camps demonstrated the work-discipline of the soldiers.²²⁰

Vegetius describes the laying out and building of a camp. Vegetius claims that the proportions of camps were adjusted to their situation, with a ditch 9 feet wide by 7 feet deep and a wall 3 feet high in peaceful country, compared to a ditch 12 feet wide by 9 feet deep and a wall 4 feet high in hostile country.²²¹ He specifies the size of turf blocks and claims that it was uniform, though archaeological evidence shows otherwise.²²² Centurions measured the construction with 10-foot rods, “checking that no one’s laziness has resulted in digging too little or in making mistakes.”²²³ The tribunes also monitored the work. The size of the camp, furthermore, was adjusted to the size of the force occupying it. A common military stratagem was to enlarge or reduce the size of the camp in order to intimidate the enemy with the prospect of a larger force or to encourage the enemy to underestimate the force.²²⁴

Camps had a practical, disciplinary effect. In the field, constructing the marching camp reinforced morale by protecting soldiers from the enemy and from wild animals. Nonetheless, the palisade, ditch, and wall of the marching camp were insufficient to keep out determined besiegers.²²⁵ Camps were often attacked and broken into, though rarely were they totally overrun.²²⁶ The marching camp also kept Roman soldiers from deserting.²²⁷ Roman punishments for climbing over the *vallum* were very harsh, even in Severan times. Desertion was the most likely motive for a soldier to climb over the wall instead of leaving by the guarded gates.²²⁸ Furthermore, the streets of the camp and the assignment of soldiers to

Hanel 2007. Southern 2007, 190–4 Polyb. 6.26.10–32.8, 6.41–2, 18.18; Livy 33.5.5–12, 44.39.2–5; Joseph. *BJ* 3.76–102; Onas. *Strat.* 8–9; Pseudo-Hyginus *De munitionibus castrorum*; Veg. *Mil.* 1.22.1–25.3, 3.8.1–13; on Trajan’s Column, Cichorius xix–xx, lxx, cxxviii–cxxix. Le Bohec 1994: p. xi–xxii.

²²⁰ Veg. *Mil.* 1.25.1–5.

²²¹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.24.1–2.

²²² Veg. *Mil.* 3.8.8. Davies 1968b (reprinted in 1989: 136). The North African, Egyptian, and Near Eastern desert frontiers made turf impractical, so sandbags filled with local sand were used: Veg. *Mil.* 3.10.15.

²²³ Veg. *Mil.* 3.8.13; cf. 1.25.2–3 (inspection of the ditch).

²²⁴ Cagniard 1992: 227; Caes. *BG* 5.49.7; Frontinus, *Strat.* 3.17.6; Hierarchy: Polyb. 6.32.6–8, 33; M. P. Speidel 1992: 7–10; Gilliver 1996a: 55. Contrasted with hierarchy displayed in modern parade-ground drill, Steuben [1794] 1985: 7–10.

²²⁵ G. Webster 1998: 173; Luttwak 1976: 55–7.

²²⁶ Tac. *Agric.* 26, *Hist.* 4.77.

²²⁷ Goldsworthy 1996: 113.

²²⁸ D. 49.16.3, 17 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); cf. Livy 1.7.1–2.

fixed areas (corresponding to their order of battle) enabled a legion to deploy rapidly from the camp without confusion or panic. The wall and gates enabled the keeping of watches with a minimum number of men, while the others were able to sleep peacefully and thus be more effective the next day.²²⁹

Building a camp was thus believed to maintain morale. The camp was, in the terms of a modern strategist, “a powerful psychological device.”²³⁰ For these reasons, imperial commanders continued to impose the building of marching camps on campaign and during training exercises.²³¹ Livy even claims that when the Romans were trapped in the Caudine Forks, they began building a camp; this may be regarded as an automatic action to maintain morale, relieving the shame and disgrace of being trapped by the enemy.²³²

The camp served as disciplinary space, much like the parade ground in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century armies; soldiers needed to reside in camps to maintain their military identity. Hence a sign and symbol of poor discipline was the straying of soldiers from the camp, as during the Jugurthine War from Postumius Albinus's camp before Metellus Numidicus took command, or the billeting of soldiers in cities, where they mingled with the civilians and deteriorated into civilian ways.²³³ This was the case with legionaries in Syria and the Vitellians in Rome in AD 69.²³⁴ Thus, in anecdotes of Roman discipline, generals frequently imposed castrametation as punitive and reparative labor, restoring obedience and the capacity for valor.²³⁵

Most of all, camps were symbolic of Roman imperial power. The construction of marching camps may have intimidated the enemy, demonstrating the relentless advance of the Roman army.²³⁶ Camps were not perfectly standardized all over the Empire; the architectural remains of stone-built forts show variations, especially in the internal buildings. But Roman camps nonetheless impressed foreign observers such as Polybius and Josephus with the rationality of the Romans, who imposed

²²⁹ Delbrück 1990: 285; Luttwak 1976: 56–7.

²³⁰ Luttwak 1976: 56; e.g., Veg. *Mil.* 1.21.4–5, 3.8.1–3.

²³¹ Neumann 1965: col. 150.

²³² Livy 9.2.12–14; Barton 2001: 81. Contrast Theweleit 1987: 429–31, 1989: 153–62.

²³³ Tac. *Hist.* 1.53, *Ann.* 1.31; Veg. *Mil.* 1.3.1–2. On deterioration of soldiers in cities, Wheeler 1996: 238–9 on Livy 23.18.10–14; Suet. *Tib.* 37.1; later Roman, MacMullen 1988: 209–17.

²³⁴ Sall. *Jug.* 44.4–5; Tac. *Ann.* 13.35, *Hist.* 2.93; HA, *Avid.* 5.5–12 fictional letter.

²³⁵ E.g. App. *Iber* 86, 85–6; Sall. *Jug.* 45.2. Cagniard 1992: 220; Horsmann 1991: 164–5; Moore forthcoming.

²³⁶ Cagniard 1992: 220; Goldsworthy 1996: 113.

order upon nature. In his excursus on Roman camps, Polybius couples the rational deployment of labor with the domination of nature and the implied Roman domination of the world, in contrast with the Greeks whose camps merely adapt to nature.²³⁷

The production, and also description, of a camp was a discursive practice constituting Roman power, analogous to the enclosure and regimentation of space in early modern and modern barracks, workshops, schools, and prisons.²³⁸ Other such modern practices, regimenting the body in space and time, were precisely choreographed marching and firing drill.²³⁹ Rather than the imposition of drill, the Roman building of camps served these purposes.

The Roman *castrum* was compared to a beehive – another geometrically and seemingly rationally ordered space inhabited by an authoritarian utopia, whose identical members labored for the good of all. Though Greek and Roman authors admired bees as an ideal society, these authors did not know how bees reproduce and believed the queen bee to be a king.²⁴⁰ The comparison of Roman soldiers to insects reflects the literary elite's lofty distance, resembling Greek authors' Platonic images of the Roman army. Plutarch, in his biography of the emperor Galba, applies a Platonic model of society to the Roman army: soldiers should obey their commander as the limbs of a human body obey the head.²⁴¹ The ideology that soldiers, like bees, should be constantly at work is discussed in Chapter Six.

CONCLUSION

The Romans placed great emphasis on combat training and physical training. However, such training did not suffice for *disciplina militaris* in its late Republican and imperial form; it did not guarantee social control. Early modern and modern

²³⁷ Polyb. 6.42.1–5; cf. Joseph. *Bj* 3.76–102; but irregular forts at Numantia, Goldsworthy 2003: 124.

²³⁸ Foucault 1977: 143. Cf. Shaw 1995: 372.

²³⁹ Foucault 1977: 150–51; e.g., Steuben [1794] 1985: 16–30.

²⁴⁰ Xen. *Oec.* 7.33–4, *Cyr.* 5.1.24; Aelian *Nat. anim.* 5.11; Sen. *Clem.* 1.19.2–3; on Verg. *Georg.* 4.198–99, cf. Caes. *BC* 3.110; Phang 2001: 361–6 (elite attitudes). On swarms as mutinies Aelian *Nat. anim.* 5.10–13; Verg. *Georg.* 4.67–87; Mynors 1990: 272; Varro *Rust.* 3.16.9. On qualities of recruits, Verg. *Mil.* 1.6.3 quotes Verg. *Georg.* 4.92–4. The king bee, however, does not toil, in contrast with the ideal Roman general.

²⁴¹ Plut. *Galba* 1.1.

armies could be subjected to social control through constant drill in close-order mass formation, undergoing entrainment that subjected the individual to the collectivity. In contrast, Roman combat formations were looser and more open, allowing individual soldiers to engage individual members of the enemy in hand-to-hand combat. No entrainment seems to have occurred. The generals and officers imposed the maintenance of formation on the battlefield by force and through reward and punishment.

Furthermore, combat *virtus* and *animus* (high “morale”) shaded into *ira* (anger) and *ferocia* or *furor* (madness). Roman soldiers’ combat training promoted aggression, with the side effect of ferocity. It follows that effective combat training and combat discipline could not avert the repetition of civil warfare, in which soldiers displayed *virtus* in conquering fellow citizens. In an anecdote attributed to various leaders, a civil war general or emperor is asked how he intends to obtain supreme power, money, or land to reward his followers. “This shall give it to me,” he says, pointing to the sword at his side.²⁴² Individual combat training produced a *habitus* that was prone to violence.

Suetonius contrasts the approaches to *disciplina militaris* of the greatest civil war general and the first emperor. Writing during Hadrian’s reign, Suetonius represents over a century of elite tradition on the fall of the Republic. Suetonius’ Julius Caesar imposes an instrumental, combat-oriented discipline that makes his soldiers effective fighters, but ignores social and moral discipline that regulated the army’s relation to civilian society. When his soldiers won a victory, Caesar allowed them to revel. He boasted that “my soldiers can fight just as well when they are drenched in perfume” and gave them elaborate armor chased with silver and gold to motivate them to fight more boldly.²⁴³ This representation is probably based on senatorial propaganda.²⁴⁴ In contrast, Suetonius’ Augustus “imposed the most severe military discipline.” Augustus refused to call his soldiers *commilitones*, awarded decorations sparingly, and revived antique punishments.²⁴⁵ Another “good emperor” rejected a perfumed officer candidate, as will be seen in Chapter [Three](#).

²⁴² App. *BC* 2.4.25; Dio 46.43.4 (Caesar); Plut. *Caes.* 29.5 (a centurion in Caesar’s army); Dio 75(74).6.2a (Pescennius Niger); Dio 78(77).10.4 (Caracalla).

²⁴³ Suet. *Iul.* 65 (general discipline), 67 (perfume).

²⁴⁴ Other instances of invectives on soldiers’ indiscipline and luxury: *Caes. BC* 3.96 (Pompeians at Pharsalus), 3.110 (Romans in Egypt).

²⁴⁵ Suet. *Aug.* 24.

The increasing use of a phalanx-like or “shield wall” infantry formation in the second century AD and later Empire may have served the purposes of social control. This phalanx formation was influenced by the archaizing and classicizing Hellenism of the Second Sophistic and was a useful tactic against barbarian cavalry such as the Alani and Parthians.²⁴⁶ However, the use of the phalanx may also reflect elite Greek authors’ disapproval of the indiscipline of the Roman army in the late second and early third centuries. In the later Empire, the “shield wall” and possible marching in time may represent the greater rationalization and the recruitment problems of the later Roman army, adopting this formation to control less well trained and less willing recruits.

The mainstream tradition of *disciplina militaris* depicted social control as inculcated by other means than combat training. Possible methods discussed in the [next chapter](#) include the imposition of *modestia* or respect for superiors, the wearing of uniform or armor, the role of religion, and above all the inculcation of a *habitus* disposed to obedience and able to resist impulses. As later chapters show, the Romans emphasized that *labor* of all kinds maintained soldiers’ vigor and maintained or restored discipline. *Labor* took the cultural place of modern drill in the Roman army, as did austerity, as methods of increasing the *virtus* of soldiers. This *virtus* was redefined as attainable through *labor* as well as through combat, approaching the Stoic definition of virtue.

²⁴⁶ Lendon 2005: 266–8, 285–9.

3 VIRI MILITARES: HABITUS AND DISCIPLINE



INTRODUCTION

The inculcation of combat *virtus* through physical training produced a highly aggressive, competitive disposition in Roman soldiers. This disposition was acceptable in the followers of civil war leaders but required moderation in the professional soldiers of a stable empire. A practically Homeric *virtus* was inconsistent with social control, which required *modestia* (obedience, respect for authority) in soldiers.

Military *modestia* could not be imposed in an abstract, legal-rational or objective fashion, in the manner of Kant's categorical imperative; it had to be conditioned. *Disciplina militaris* sought to impose such control through the inculcation of appropriate *habitus*. As will be seen in later chapters, *disciplina* sought, through practices consistent with social control, to monopolize and even redefine the production of *virtus*.

This chapter focuses on *hexis*, the physical and emotional disposition of soldiers' bodies, manner of dress, deportment, and stance, and their social, religious, and ethnic identities. Modern Western armed forces inculcate military bearing through the wearing of military uniforms and the observance of etiquette, as well as through screening processes at induction and through some form of civic religion or patriotism. Military etiquette includes observance of correct salutes and the proper handling of the flag. Honors paid to those who die in combat may be classified under civic religion.

Not all of these modern features were present in the Roman army. The control of recruitment remained an ideal; in practice, the army sought to keep out slaves and criminals or infamous persons, but did not always succeed. Prescriptive recommendations for recruitment were based on social stratum or occupation and on ethnicity. These prescriptions attempted to maintain the occupational status of soldiers and to maintain or create "Roman" qualities.

In addition, Roman soldiers lacked a definite uniform in the modern sense. A Roman soldier's identity was displayed by his armor or at least by his sword, belt,

and boots, the *gladius*, *cingulum*, and *caligae*, which he was never without, at least while awake. Military etiquette was also relatively poorly developed. The Roman army's etiquette was adapted from civilian practices. Honors paid to leaders, the emperors, and the dead in funerary monuments and triumphal and official art are a vast iconographic subject that will not be treated here.

Military, imperial, and local religious cults and rituals served some of the functions of etiquette: they structured the year and focused loyalty upon the emperor. However, in the ancient authors' accounts of discipline and indiscipline, religion scarcely appears; the ancient authors did not complain that military religion was being neglected. The bodily *hexis* and emotional *habitus* associated with discipline were Stoic-influenced and stressed masculinity and a "tense" bodily stance resistant to weakening influences.

MODESTIA

The *habitus* expected of lower-ranking soldiers (*milites gregales*) can be described in one word as *modestia*, "respect or obedience to authority."¹ The popular image of the Roman army in modern Western culture stresses soldiers' categorical and automatic obedience to authority.² The nineteenth-century Prussian army knew this type of obedience as *Kadavergehorsamkeit* (corpse-like obedience), either because Prussian soldiers were expected to obey as unthinkingly as reanimated corpses or because they were expected to obey "unto death."³ Roman soldiers were far from obedient in this manner. They frequently argued with their commanders, demanding combat with the enemy or demanding promised payments and benefits. As seen in the [previous chapter](#), their personal enthusiasm and aggression in combat were sought.

The image of absolute obedience is based primarily on two panegyric descriptions of the Roman army, in Polybius and Josephus.⁴ Polybius was an Achaean Greek politician who defected to the Romans in the mid-second century BC; Josephus was a Hellenized Jew who surrendered to Vespasian and Titus during the Jewish War. Other panegyric texts, such as Aelius Aristides' *To Rome*, present

¹ Simpson 1959: 376 s.v. *modestia*; of soldiers, Caes. *BC* 7.52; Tac. *Ann.* 1.19, 1.28, 1.35, 4.4; *Hist.* 1.60, 1.83, 2.12, 2.27; Livy 28.24.8; Horsmann 1991: 192–3.

² Weber 1946: 253; Keegan 1976: 63.

³ Also termed *blinder Gehorsam*, deriving from the Jesuits' *perinde ac cadaver*.

⁴ Polyb. 6.41.1–12, 6.37.7–13; Joseph. *Bf* 3.85–94, 103–4.

the same ideal.⁵ Polybius and Josephus idealize the Roman army, but their historical narratives contradict the idealizations of the Roman army in these excurses.⁶ Roman sources close to the army, or that follow such sources, also show a more disorderly army. These authors show that Roman generals frequently had to state very basic principles of hierarchical obedience and to reprove their soldiers for speaking or acting out of order. The commander's control of his soldiers often depended on his own personality.⁷

Roman methods of combat generated the problem of obedience. Because fighting with sword and spear required the men's initiative and spirit, *impetus* or *animus*, Roman fighters could not be reined in with the degree of mechanical discipline of the early modern army.⁸ A Roman commander could even depict his soldiers' verbal insubordination (urging him to attack the enemy against his wishes) in order to show their enthusiasm for combat, as Caesar does in the *Bellum Gallicum* and *Bellum Civile*, though Caesar also indicates when his soldiers have gone too far.⁹ Caesar would not have shown his men behaving this way if such behavior were considered altogether reprehensible; panicked whining, especially in officers, earned a much sterner reproof from Caesar.¹⁰ During his campaign against the Cimbri, Marius was pleased to hear his soldiers express desire for combat even against his wishes, though he also demanded their obedience.¹¹

Nonetheless, the *modestia* of soldiers was ideological, symbolizing the restoration of order after the end of the civil wars. Imperial authors were nostalgic for the severe punishments of the early and mid-Republic, when commanders put their sons or their subordinate officers to death for fighting the enemy contrary to

⁵ Aelius Aristides *To Rome* (Or. 26.87).

⁶ Polyb. 11.25–30; Livy 28.24–6; App. *Iber.* 34–6; Joseph. *BJ* 5.125–30, 6.361–2. Messer 1920: 169; Chrissanthos 1997, 2004; M. F. Williams 2001. On soldiers' behavior Isaac 1992: 82–3; blind obedience not a habit of Roman elite, Lendon 1997: 180, 2005: 221, 240–41, 257; Moore *forthcoming*.

⁷ Basic principles: Caes. *BG* 7.52; Livy 28.27–8 (Scipio), 44.33.6–7, 44.34.2–5 (Paullus); Tac. *Ann.* 11.18 (Corbulo), *Hist.* 1.83–4 (Otho), 3.20 (Antonius Primus); Dio 41.33.3–5 (Caesar); Livy 8.8.16–19 (Torquatus) and 8.34.7–10 (Papirius Cursor). Personalities: Plut. *Luc.* 33; Veyne 1990: 217 (Brutus vs. Cassius). On Paullus Lendon 2005: 197.

⁸ Modern use of formation to discipline: Foucault 1977: 151, 153–4, 158, 162–4, 188; Myerly 1992: 115.

⁹ Caes. *BG* 5.44, 7.19, *BC* 1.64, 1.71–2, 3.74.

¹⁰ Enthusiasm: Plut. *Mar.* 16.3–5, *Sulla* 16.6, *Sert.* 16; App. *BC* 4.16.123–5 (Brutus' soldiers urge him on at Philippi); Caes. *BC* 2.33 (soldiers interrupt Curio's speech); Tac. *Hist.* 3.19 (soldiers urge on Antonius Primus). Lendon 2005: 221. Whining: Caes. *BG* 1.39–40; cf. Suet. *Iul.* 66 (Caesar's mockery of the frightened).

¹¹ Plut. *Mar.* 17; cf. 16.

orders.¹² The *modestia* of good soldiers contrasted with the arrogant boasting of barbarians, the shamelessness of the urban *plebs* or of slaves, and the effrontery of brigands, to whom Dio Cassius compares the soldiers of his own day.¹³ The *modestia* of good soldiers also contrasted with their *insolentia* when they mutinied or robbed and abused urban and provincial subjects. Maintaining the *modestia* and *continentia* of the soldiers and repressing their avarice and insolence helped legitimate the imperial power.¹⁴ Augustus stressed the severe discipline of the army.¹⁵

The aristocratic view of the army became tinged with Stoicism or Platonism, in which obedience took on an absolute and categorical quality; “obedience itself was an honorable quality.”¹⁶ In his account of the civil war of AD 69, Plutarch moralizes that the army is like a human body, which ought to have no will of its own, but which obeys its commander the head.¹⁷ The Stoic or Platonic ideal of categorical obedience was reactionary, not in the sense of restoring an actual past, but as the elite *reaction* to periods of civil war and insubordination. This reaction reduced further the elite’s likelihood of controlling the men. Platonic ideology is unhelpful for understanding the nature of Roman command.¹⁸ The commanders had to legitimate themselves to the soldiers and persuade them that they were competent leaders and fellow soldiers (*commilitones*). Tacitus regarded Stoic instruction as impractical for the discipline of the army. In AD 69, the Stoic Musonius Rufus went as an envoy to the Flavian troops to discuss peace with the Vitellians. Musonius attempted to lecture the Flavians on the good of peace and evil of civil war, but some of the soldiers mocked this sermon, most were bored by it, and some would have driven him out and kicked him, had he not beaten a hasty retreat.¹⁹

¹² Livy 8.8.1–2; Val. Max. 2.7.6; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.40–41; discussion and other references in Chapter Four.

¹³ Dio 52.2.7–5; cf. Dio 52.14.3 (transmitted by Campbell 2002: 33).

¹⁴ Livy 28.24.7–9: at Sucro soldiers demanded pay, contrary to *modestia*; Chrissanthos 1997. Suet. *Aug.* 24.2: Augustus disbanded a legion for demanding its pensions too insistently, *immodeste*. Chapter Five discusses these economic themes.

¹⁵ Suet. *Aug.* 24.1.

¹⁶ Lendon 1997: 248. Plut. *Sulla* 12.7–8, *Galba* 1.2; App. *BC* 3.8.55–8, 5.2.17; Maximus of Tyre, *Or.* 40.5; Aristid. *To Rome* (*Or.* 26) 87; Dio 41.29.1–4, 41.33.3–4. However, categorical severity might display impotence, as in Antony’s decimation (App. *BC* 3.8.53) or Galba’s “who ordered you?” (Tac. *Hist.* 1.35; Plut. *Galba* 26.2)

¹⁷ Plut. *Galba* 1.1.

¹⁸ Carrié 1993: 103–5; Mattern 1999: 199; G. Morgan 2006: 5–7.

¹⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 3.81.

RECRUITING ROMAN SOLDIERS

As imperial authors and Vegetius show, Roman leaders wished to maintain the honorable occupational status of soldiers, promote *modestia*, and discourage the recruitment of social undesirables. The Roman elite preferred to train and control recruits of respectable status who were not demoralized by urban life and degrading trades. Tacitus blames the mutinies of AD 14 on the recruitment of the urban *plebs*.²⁰ A few years later, the emperor Tiberius was displeased with the quality of volunteers. Either they failed to appear, or if they did sign up, they were poor vagrants (*inopes ac vagi*) who lacked the *virtus* and *modestia* of traditional Roman soldiers.²¹ Though Tacitus focuses on the negative impact of voluntary recruitment, soldiers were still recruited by conscription in the Empire, especially in emergencies.²² Dio expresses a similar view, regarding the soldiers, including the Praetorians, as recruited from a stratum that would otherwise take up brigandage.²³

At a basic level, recruitment sought to exclude criminals and slaves, and even freedmen and those of ambiguous free or slave status.²⁴ As Chapter Five shows, the poverty of recruits was an ideological issue, because such poverty was associated, perhaps erroneously, with the “mercenary” armies of the late Republic. These were armies of poor men dependent on their commanders for pay and benefits. To recruit from a somewhat wealthier social stratum that was consistent with the traditional prestige of the military might produce more loyal and obedient recruits. However, Vegetius approves of recruiting poor men when their poverty resembles the rustic poverty of archaic Rome. Vegetius advises the Roman state to recruit rural youths, who are most suited to work; young men of athletic physique, highly masculine in appearance and behavior; and men who practice respectable trades.²⁵ Vegetius’ exclusion of fishermen, fowlers, and bakers is echoed by a late

²⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 1.16 (Percennius); the *vernacula* in Tac. *Ann.* 1.31 signify urban plebs rather than freedmen, as Suet. *Aug.* 25.2 states that Augustus drafted the latter into separate cohorts; Goldsworthy 2003: 278.

²¹ Tac. *Ann.* 4.4.

²² Brunt 1974: 90–115.

²³ Dio 52.27.4–5, 75.2.5.

²⁴ Jung 1982: 889–905; Phang 2001: 289–91 on exclusion of slaves. Plin. *Ep.* 10.29–30; D. 49.16.11 (Marcian Reg. 2). D. 48.19.14 (Macer *Re mil.* 2) forbade soldiers to sell themselves into slavery. Conscription of freedmen: Vell. Pat. 2.111.1 (Illyrian revolt); Dio 55.31.1, 56.23.1–2, Suet. *Aug.* 25.2; Tac. *Ann.* 1.31 (Varian disaster); HA *Marc.* 21.6 (Marcomannic war). Conscription of gladiators: Tac. *Hist.* 2.11, 2.23; HA *Marc.* 21.7.

²⁵ Veg. *Mil.* 1.3.1–5, 1.6.3–5, 1.7.1–2.

fourth-century AD law and resembles Cicero's disapproval of all trades "that conduce to the pleasures."²⁶

These criteria emphasized social status, as well as gender and morality. Aside from criticism of the "barbarism" of civil war armies, the literary authors do not show specific concern for the ethnic origins of recruits.²⁷ Recruitment underwent major shifts from Italy in the early first century AD to the frontier provinces in the later first and early second centuries and the frontier zone itself by the third century. These transitions went almost unremarked. In provincial societies a somewhat more prosperous social stratum volunteered or was conscripted for legionary service than in Roman Italy, providing a rationale for provincial recruitment.²⁸ The local middle classes and even Romanized indigenous aristocrats thus sought affiliation with the imperial power through military service.

Soldiers belonged to the Greco-Roman dominant culture, at least at the level of onomastics and spoken and written language. Epigraphy shows that recruits were often townsmen, not *rustici* in the sense of indigenous peasants who knew neither Latin or Greek.²⁹ In military documents, inscriptions, and most private letters, the names of personnel are Latin and Greek, with the exception of some auxiliaries. The military bureaucracy probably did not confer Latin and Greek names on native recruits just for the sake of appearances. Many soldiers' Latin names were "old" *nomina*, such as *Iulius* and *Claudius* in the second century AD, suggesting descent from recipients of the citizenship in the Julio-Claudian period.³⁰ Soldiers' private documents and letters suggest literacy or at least familiarity with Latin and Greek letters and documents. To recruit from the native strata would have

²⁶ Cic. *Off.* 1.150–51. D. 50.6.7 (Tarutius Paternus), a list of military specialists, includes some despised occupations. *CTh* 7.13.8 (AD 380) forbade recruitment of slaves, innkeepers, brothel employees, cooks, bakers, or practitioners of degraded occupations. On exclusion of *infames*, McGinn 1998: 40, 44; Phang 2001: 290.

²⁷ Only Veg. *Epit.* 1.2.1–5 explicitly advises recruitment based on geography. Despite frequent negative stereotypes of "Syrian" legions (Wheeler 1996), there was no ban on recruiting Asiatics. On geographical shifts in recruitment, Parker [1928] 1958: 169–84; G. R. Watson 1969: 22–4; Campbell 2002: 25–32; Forni 1953: 82–99; Forni 1979: 216–19; Mann 1983: 49–66; Le Bohec 1989; Le Bohec 1994: 75–6, 79–87, 93–7; Later Empire, Whittaker 2004.

²⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 4.4. Parker [1928] 1958: 220–21; Le Bohec 1994: 76–7, 89–93, 97–9 discuss soldiers' variable wealth and social origins. Second-century AD legionaries and auxiliaries had similar social origins. Campbell 1984: 9–11 and 2002: 32–4 still views the status of soldiers as low, accepting Dio Cassius' views on their lack of culture.

²⁹ Le Bohec 1994: 89–90; Carrié 1993: 106–8.

³⁰ Forni 1974: 227–8.

made it difficult for the military command and administration to communicate with their men.³¹ In military posts in the East, Greek was the daily language of spoken communication and some written documents, but Latin remained the formal language of power. Important military documents were in Latin and the Eastern troops were exposed to the symbolic use of Latin in military titles, military religion and the imperial cult, watchwords, and command terms used in combat.³²

Contrasting with the documentary evidence that soldiers were neither *inopes ac vagi* nor primitive tribesmen, literary authors viewed soldiers' social and ethnic origins through the lens of discipline. Even ethnicity, an essential and objective trait in conventional modern culture, was constructed by discipline. Strict training, work, and social control produced "Roman" soldiers regardless of their original ethnicity and social level. However, authors depicted poorly trained and disorderly soldiers as "barbarian." When the soldiers were well trained and kept in good order, any non-Roman ethnic identity disappeared and they were regarded as Roman soldiers. This use of ethnic traits as symbolic descriptors explains a certain static and literary quality to such *topoi*. The Greeks and Romans characterized the Celts (Gauls and Britons) and Germans in approximately the same terms for several hundred years, while the Celts and Germanic subjects within the empire were acquiring Roman culture.

Imperial literary authors depicted Greek and Gallic or Germanic barbarian fighters as inferior to the Romans. The Romans represented military discipline as ensuring their conquest and subjection of other ethnicities, whom they depicted as incapable of discipline.³³ Tacitus in his *Germania* stresses that, of the German peoples, only the Chatti have anything like military discipline, displaying obedience and organization on campaign.³⁴ The Roman authors depict Gauls and Germans as impulsive in combat, incapable of following orders or restraining themselves.³⁵ The Gauls and Germans also lacked other traits of Roman *disciplina*: incapable of sustained effort, they easily succumbed to exhaustion despite their initial

³¹ The Roman elite were disinclined to learn foreign languages, except Greek from the second century BC onward.

³² Adams 2003: 394–5, 602; on Latin as a language of power, 299, 406; cf. Bowman 1994b; literate soldiers, M. A. Speidel 2001: 57.

³³ Mattern 1999: 203–5.

³⁴ Tac. *Germ.* 30.

³⁵ E.g., Tac. *Ann.* 1.68, 4.25 (Numidians), 14.34–6 (Britons), *Hist.* 4.29–30 (Gauls), *Germ.* 14, 15.1.

enthusiasm.³⁶ The Greeks and Asiatics could maintain mass formations in combat, but were effeminate, even when the Greeks practiced athletic training in the nude in gymnasia, a traditionally un-Roman custom.³⁷ Roman authors depicted this effeminacy as contagious, infecting the Roman armies that campaigned in Asia.³⁸ Gauls and Germans and Asiatics thus lacked the rigidity or resistance that typified the Roman military *habitus*, discussed later in this chapter.

These ethnicized characteristics were influenced by Greco-Roman theories of geographical determinism, in which climate and geography determined the physical and mental qualities of peoples: according to Herodotus, “soft lands produce soft men.”³⁹ According to this theory, the Gauls and Germans, accustomed to cold and moisture and possessing abundant blood as a result, were brave in their native climate, but wilted in hotter, drier climates such as that of Italy. In contrast, southerners were intelligent but cowardly, because the hot climate dried up their blood, which they were afraid to shed. The Asiatics were effeminized by their mild climate and ease of life. Italy enjoyed an intermediate climate, producing men who were fit to rule the world from its center, Rome.⁴⁰ Vegetius adapts this theory to military recruitment: recruits should be selected from a temperate climate, one that is cool enough to produce sufficient blood so that soldiers do not fear its loss, and that is warm and dry enough to promote intelligence.⁴¹ However, these ecological theories of ethnicity were emphasized less than cultural factors.

Authors express their disapproval of civil war armies by depicting them as “barbarians.” Tacitus barbarizes the Vitellians, legionaries and auxiliaries recruited from the Rhine region, and Cassius Dio barbarizes the Danubians whom Septimius Severus recruited to replace the Praetorians dismissed in AD 193; Dio disapproves as well of the barbarism of the Pannonians, whom he governed as legate.⁴² However, these authors drew on traditional ethnic *topoi* and literary echoes of the Gallic invasion of early Rome to suggest the uncivilized and destructive nature of these armies led by civil war commanders.⁴³

³⁶ Caes. *BG* 3.19, 7.30; Livy 10.28.4, 34.47.5.

³⁷ *Op. cit.* Chapter Two n. 94.

³⁸ Livy 38.17.5–13; in 18–20 Cn. Manlius Vulso exhorts his soldiers to avoid this fate.

³⁹ Isaac 2004: 56–74, 82–101.

⁴⁰ Vitruv. 6.1.3–4; cf. Joseph. *BJ* 6.55. Wheeler 1996: 241–3; Sassi 2001: 125–6; Isaac 2004: 90–91, 307.

⁴¹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.2.5; Isaac 2004: 87.

⁴² Tac. *Hist.* 2.88; Dio 75.2.5, 80.1.3, 49.36.2–4.

⁴³ Ash 1999: 39–47.

Soldiers whose poor discipline manifested not as violence but as slackness – lack of training, indulgence in the fabled triad of wine, women, and baths – were assimilated to the Asiatic civilians whom traditional Romans despised.⁴⁴ However, these traits were also urban. In literary representations of Syrian legionaries as inferior soldiers, the Syrians appear excessively urbanized, with the vices of the big city (in this case Antioch): they attend theatres, lounge in baths, drink in taverns, and dance. These practices were not tied to Greek or Asiatic ethnicity. Similar urban vices could be found in late Republican and imperial soldiers wherever the leadership failed to discipline them, including the city of Rome, Gaul, Spain and North Africa in the late Republic, and the British frontier.⁴⁵ Authors such as Tacitus and Dio thus characterized soldiers in terms of a generalized urban versus rural contrast in imperial Roman culture.⁴⁶ Their contempt for the soldiers reflected elite contempt for the peasant, the *rusticus* or *agroikos*, but they also idealized the rustic peasant when he was a soldier, as in the old Republic. Vegetius prefers the recruitment of rural youths as opposed to urban *plebs*, which was regarded as insolent, incapable of the military virtue of *modestia*.⁴⁷ Living in cities was thought to ruin soldiers.⁴⁸ Ironically, Vegetius' confidence in the power of training and discipline to produce Roman soldiers means that he says nothing of the most drastic shift in recruitment in his day: Theodosius I's employment of barbarian federates.

NOT UNIFORM BUT ARMOR MAKES THE MAN

One of the chief ways that modern military *habitus* is produced is through military uniform. Since their introduction in the first modern professional armies in seventeenth-century Europe, uniforms have been associated with military service. Bright colors and standardization differentiated ranks and regiments in the

⁴⁴ Wheeler 1996; Mattern 1999: 205–6; Isaac 2004: 85, 304–23. Revolt: Tac. *Hist.* 2.80.

⁴⁵ Val. Max. 9.1.5 locates Metellus Pius' banquet *non in Graecia neque in Asia . . . sed in horrida et bellicosa provincia*; cf. Mart. 10.65 on reputation of Spain. L. Quinctius Flamininus beheaded a captive to amuse a prostitute in Gaul: Livy 39.42.8–43.5; Plut. *Cato Maior* 17.1–4, *Flam.* 18.2–5; *Vir. ill.* 47.4; Sen. *Contr.* 9.2.1–29. Luxury in Britain is introduced by Roman officers in Dio 62.6.4; Tac. *Agric.* 21.

⁴⁶ On rural/urban stereotypes and elite idealization of rustic frugality, MacMullen 1974: 28–32, 57–8; Dench 1995: 138; Purcell 2003: 332–6; Isaac 2004: 406–10. Cf. Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39.26–8.

⁴⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.3.1–5; Tac. *Ann.* 1.16, 1.31.

⁴⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 1.53.

smoke of black-powder artillery. Uniform played a large part in modern military spectacle. Through uniform, soldiers displayed *esprit de corps*; maintained a sense of tradition; and *en masse*, in parades and reviews, provided an impressive display of state power.⁴⁹

The modern soldier's uniform also created the impression of an alert, athletic, disciplined, and self-controlled subject.⁵⁰ Modern soldiers, furthermore, must conform to rigid regulations about what, when, and how items of military uniform should be worn.⁵¹ They are subject to frequent inspections of uniform and are penalized for infractions of the code. The wearing of military uniform thereby provides scope for discipline. In the uniform-obsessed nineteenth-century British regiments, the very fit of the soldier's uniform might be disciplinary: its close fit imposed an erect posture and gait and, in fact, made more casual and spontaneous forms of motion difficult or impossible.⁵² On a more positive note, the tight fit of harness and strap elements of twentieth-century combat uniform may have contributed to soldiers' feeling of confidence.⁵³

The Roman army is usually regarded as a professional army. Hence, modern authors often assume, based on later Roman evidence, that Roman soldiers wore uniforms.⁵⁴ In the late Republic and early Empire, civilian Roman dress, for the most part loose and draped, was not well suited to produce the physical and psychological effects of military uniform.⁵⁵ Soldiers' clothing was not especially distinctive from lower-class and provincial civilian men's clothing. Soldiers' tunics were constructed loosely and resembled civilian working men's tunics. A short-sleeved, above-knee tunic worn in the Trajanic period and earlier was Italianate in form, worn with knee breeches in the second century, whereas the later long-sleeved tunic and long trousers worn in the third century AD were Northern in origin.⁵⁶ The *sagum*, a heavy cloak, was associated with military service, but it was not solely military. Soldiers might also wear other styles of cloaks, depending on

⁴⁹ Fussell 2002: 11; Myerly 1996: 67–78.

⁵⁰ Fussell 2002: 14.

⁵¹ Bonn 2005: 472–542; Rush 2006: 182–204 survey such regulations in the U.S. Army.

⁵² Myerly 1990: 143; Myerly 1996: 77–8.

⁵³ Fussell 1989: 151.

⁵⁴ MacMullen 1963: 170–72 and App. 179–80; MacMullen 1964 (1990: 95–102); James 1999: 16 (third century AD).

⁵⁵ Croom 2002: 16; Roman art stylizes and exaggerates drapery.

⁵⁶ Fuentes 1987: 46–8; Sheridan 1998: 73; James 1999: 21; Thorne 2007: 227; Southern 2007: 152–4.

region.⁵⁷ Soldiers could also obtain their clothing from private sources; individual soldiers' papyrus letters to family members contain requests for clothing.⁵⁸

Documents show that the Roman army supplied clothing to soldiers, requisitioning clothing from civilian sources and deducting from soldiers' pay for items of clothing. The tunics and blankets might even be of standard dimensions.⁵⁹ But this provision of clothing was not equivalent to military uniform, which identifies and separates soldiers from civilians, which is obligatory, and which is enforced by military discipline. Damaging, wearing inappropriately, not wearing, or losing elements of the uniform result in punishment.

That Roman soldiers' tunics were a distinctive bright red, an image endorsed by Hollywood and by many reenactors, seems to be a modern myth. Bright red was an expensive color in antiquity, a privilege of rank, and would probably have been too costly for common soldiers' tunics. Instead it was used for the general's cloak (*paludamentum*).⁶⁰ That common soldiers wore red tunics may derive from the apocryphal letters in the *Historia Augusta* in which mid-third-century AD officers receive dull red tunics as gifts from the emperor; these officers, future emperors, received signal honors. Centurions may have worn red tunics to distinguish them in battle.⁶¹

Common soldiers' tunics were probably white, itself a prestigious color but obtainable at lower cost. The prestige of white results from its being easily dirtied; the U.S. Navy still wears dress whites. In classical antiquity, white was also an auspicious color for religious rituals, associated with purity.⁶² Ironically, when Severus disbanded the Italian Praetorians for murdering Pertinax, he ordered

⁵⁷ Heskel 1994: 142–3; Cicero especially uses *sagum sumere* as metonymic for military service.

⁵⁸ Soldiers presumably could wear "civilian" clothing. In *P. Mich.* 8.467, the new recruit Claudius Terentianus requests tunic, trousers, and a cloak from his family. Sheridan 1998: 81; Julius Apollinarius requests loose-woven clothes (against the desert heat) in *P. Mich.* 8.465–6.

⁵⁹ Soldiers' pay accounts show deductions for boots, socks, and *vestimenta*: *P. Gen. Lat.* 1 = *CPL* 106 = *ChLA* 7 = Fink 1971: no. 68 = Campbell 1994: no. 24. A military order for clothing, *BGU* 1564 = *Sel. Pap.* 2.395 (AD 138) = Campbell 1994: no. 239, specifies dimensions and weights for tunics, cloaks, and blankets. On the later Roman army's supply of military clothing Sheridan 1998 re-edits *P. Col. inv.* 544.1–332 = *SB XX* 14661, an assessment of garments for the *vestis militaris* tax in the early fourth century AD.

⁶⁰ Plin. *HN* 22.3.3. Sebesta 1994 (in Sebesta and Bonfante 1994: 65ff.).

⁶¹ *HA Claud.* 14.5; *Aurel.* 13.3; *Probus* 4.5.

⁶² Fuentes 1987: 60–61; James 1999: 17; Tac. *Hist.* 2.89; Stoll 1998: 142. Later Roman personnel added decorative stripes and patches also worn by civilians: MacMullen 1988: 62. In Arr. *Tact.* 34–5 the riders' scarlet and dark blue tunics are foreign ("Cimmerian") and intended for spectacle, Wheeler 1978: 358.

them to appear before him without their armor, in festive dress (*kosmêtikais esthêsi*), which was probably this white clothing.⁶³

Based on the literary tradition, Roman soldiers' weapons and armor, rather than their clothes, served the purposes of uniform.⁶⁴ Soldiers who did not wear their arms and armor or who let them deteriorate were punished. Domitius Corbulo executed soldiers who did not wear their swords and daggers, presumably with belts, in the field.⁶⁵ Military display and spectacle took the form of parades or combat exercises in armor, the brilliance of which is stressed.⁶⁶ Vitellius' soldiers entered Rome resplendent not in their *uniform*, as translations have it, but wearing their armor and their decorations.⁶⁷ Commanders might present soldiers with ornate armor to raise their morale, or conversely might abstain from decorated arms themselves. This self-fashioning resembles some modern generals' affectation of plainer uniform than their immediate subordinates.⁶⁸ An army in full armor could be spectacularly terrifying. Josephus describes the Jews as terror-stricken by Titus' parade of the Roman army in full equipment past the walls of Jerusalem.⁶⁹ Vegetius states that "the brilliance of armor inspires much terror in the enemy."⁷⁰

Armor, however, was heavy, and soldiers probably did not wear all of it outside combat and formal occasions. The minimum "uniform" of the soldier consisted of his sword belt, sword, dagger, and hobnailed military boots (*caligae*).⁷¹ The little boy Gaius, the future emperor, got his nickname Caligula (Little Boot) because he wore a soldier's costume, suggesting that the boots were the most characteristic element of military dress.⁷² The sword belt (*cingulum*) was also characteristic

⁶³ Hdn. 2.13.3, 2.13.8. Whittaker translates "in uniform" in the Loeb edition *ad loc.*

⁶⁴ Sander 1963: 149.

⁶⁵ Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; Tac. *Ann.* 13.35, 11.18; cf. D. 49.16.3.13 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); D. 49.16.14.1 (Paul *Poen. mil.*). Tac. *Ann.* 13.35 and Veg. *Mil.* 1.20.3–6 condemn nonwearing of armor.

⁶⁶ Bishop 1990: 23–4; Goldsworthy 1996: 17; Cagniard 2007: 89–90. Southern 2007: 156–8.

⁶⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 2.89. Cf. Joseph. *BJ* 5348–52; Dio 62(63).3.2 (Tiridates' coronation), 75.1.3–4 (Severus' *adventus*); Amm. 16.10.8 (Constantius). The decorations are discussed in Chapter Five.

⁶⁸ Ornate arms, allegedly so they would not lose them in battle: Plut. *Sert.* 14; Suet. *Iul.* 67.2; Plut. *Brut.* 38.3. Emperors' plain gear, Tac. *Hist.* 2.5 (Vespasian); Plin. *Pan.* 13.1 (Trajan); HA *Hadr.* 10.5. (Hadrian); Dio 78.13.1 (Caracalla); cf. Fussell 2002: 40–47 on some modern generals' appearance.

⁶⁹ Joseph. *BJ* 5.351. On such occasions soldiers removed leather or cloth shield covers.

⁷⁰ Veg. *Mil.* 2.14.8. Cf. Onas. *Strat.* 28.

⁷¹ Sander 1963: 149; *Caligae*: Goldman 1994: 121–2; Croom 2002: 67; Coulston 1987: 141 on weapons, more rarely armor, depicted on soldiers' tombstones.

⁷² Suet. *Calig.* 9.1; Sen. *Const.* 18.4; Tac. *Ann.* 1.41 mentions the shoes (*tegmine pedum*), but Tac. *Ann.* 1.69 refers to his overall dress (*gregali habitu*).

of military costume.⁷³ To be *discinctus* (with unbelted tunic) was shameful for a Roman man; it was associated with effeminacy and the soft life.⁷⁴ *Discingere* (stripping the sword belt) was carried out as a deliberate shaming punishment of soldiers, described in Chapter Four.

Anecdotal glimpses of soldiers suggest that the boots, sword belt, and weapons distinguished a soldier not wearing armor from civilians.⁷⁵ In the *Satyrica* of Petronius, a picaresque novel, the narrator Encolpius, quarreling with his friend, buckles on a sword and dashes outside, only to be stopped by a soldier who threateningly demands to know his legion and century. When Encolpius fabricates a reply, the soldier asks him, “Are the soldiers of your army walking around in white slippers?”⁷⁶ Apparently Encolpius’ other clothes did not necessarily give away his civilian identity. Slippers, especially white ones, were worn by women.⁷⁷ Similarly, no uniform seems to have marked Vitellius’ admittedly undisciplined soldiers in Rome from civilians. After capturing the city of Rome, the Flavian soldiers hunted down the Vitellians, killing any tall young man they found.⁷⁸

Though Tacitus suggests that legionaries, Praetorians, and auxiliaries were distinguished by their armor, archaeological finds suggest that Roman armor was not uniform in the sense of standardized in appearance and decoration.⁷⁹ Older pieces were worn in the same time period as newer styles; chain mail was replaced by the segmented cuirass in the late first century AD, but still appears in provincial art and archeological finds. In addition, soldiers bought or decorated armor to suit individual tastes. No doubt, if a soldier’s purchase was utterly inadequate or extremely ostentatious, his officers would reprove it. Privatization of soldiers’ rations and equipment is a feature, however, of the second century AD.⁸⁰ It was the

⁷³ Croom 2002: 33. In the later Empire, the *cingulum* rather than *caligae* typified both military and civil service: MacMullen 1963: 171–2; MacMullen 1988: 62, 148.

⁷⁴ C. A. Williams 1999: 147–8; Sen. *Ep.* 114.4–6 on Maecenas’ *discinctus* personal style.

⁷⁵ Apul. *Met.* 9.39; at *Met.* 10.1, he loads his armor on Lucius the ass rather than wear it.

⁷⁶ Petr. *Sat.* 82. Encolpius’ interlocutor presumes him a soldier because in the Principate, the *lex Iulia de vi publica* discouraged civilians from hoarding (or wearing) weapons except for hunting or travel by land or sea, D. 48.6.1; Dion. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 4.48.1; Nippel 1995: 54–5; doubted by Brunt 1975a.

⁷⁷ Croom 2002: 110 on white shoes as feminine; e.g., Ovid *Ars amat.* 3.271.

⁷⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 4.1. When in Rome, the Praetorians wore togas and concealed their weapons; Nippel 1995: 91–2.

⁷⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 1.38. G. Webster 1998: 123; Coulston 1998: 173; cf. Charles 2002: 675; the Praetorians may have had more standardized armor, but Trajan’s Column’s stylization renders generalization from it unsafe.

⁸⁰ Privatization is discussed in Chapter Five. Higher-ranking officers’ extreme ostentation might endanger them: Plin. *Ep.* 6.25.3–4: Pliny gave one Metilius Crispus, a centurion (probably equestrian), 40,000

wearing of the armor itself, not so much its standard appearance, that produced Roman soldiers' ideal *habitus*, as a later section of this chapter shows.

ETIQUETTE

In contrast with some modern European and Anglo-American militaries, the Roman army's etiquette was relatively informal and undeveloped, featuring practices borrowed from or adapted from civilian social customs such as *salutatio* and acclamations.

Josephus states that every morning at dawn soldiers reported to their centurions, the centurions greeted their tribunes, and the tribunes greeted their superior officers at headquarters, where the commander gave the watchword and orders of the day.⁸¹ Nearly two centuries later, a similar ceremony appears in the Dura papyri "morning reports," including the giving of the watchword and orders of the day; the guards of the camp and *signa* were appointed and promotions and transfers of personnel might be announced; the soldiers recited an oath attesting their readiness for any orders. The morning assembly was a military adaptation of the civilian *salutatio*, in which Roman clients and dependents greeted their patrons.⁸² In contrast with clients at the civilian *salutatio*, soldiers did not receive small gratuities (*sportulae*) from their commanders. These gifts by patrons to clients were usually mere tokens, but as Chapter Five will show, military discipline sought to repress patronage; discouraging fraternization (socialization between ranks) was a lesser concern.

Did the soldiers greet their officers with the "Roman salute"? This gesture, promoted by modern Fascism and popularized by Hollywood's Roman films, may be based on a passage of Josephus in which Roman soldiers, breaking camp, raised their right arms in the air with a shout to express enthusiasm. However, an upraised arm derives also from the conventions of oratory, used to address a god or a social superior, or to address an orator's audience. The difficulty of studying

sesterces to buy equipment, probably household goods as well as arms; Crispus vanished before he reached his destined unit, perhaps ambushed by robbers.

⁸¹ Joseph. *BJ* 3,86–8; cf. *RMR* 47. Shalit 1988: 121, 135 notes that the Israeli military (IDF) is more informal than traditional European militaries, as are guerrilla forces.

⁸² Lendon 1997: 246–7, 265; on civilian *salutatio*, Hug 1920; Saller 1982: 128–9, 1989: 57; MacMullen 1988: 65–7; Lendon 1997: 76, 86–7, 90, 161, 170; Newbold 2000: 116–17; Roller 2006: 20–1. *Salutare* means "to greet formally"; a nonverbal gesture is not implied.

nonverbal gestures in Roman culture, about which ancient authors disagreed, makes generalization unsafe.⁸³

Perhaps the best known and most politicized aspects of Roman military etiquette were that soldiers were termed *milites*, not *Quirites* (citizens), and that, in pro-senatorial ideology, the emperor should address his soldiers as *milites*, not as *commilitones* (fellow-soldiers, comrades). Augustus regarded *commilito* as “too flattering for the requirements of discipline, the present peace, and the stability of the imperial house.”⁸⁴ The opposition of *milites* and *Quirites* traditionally distinguished soldiers from civilians; Caesar shamed his soldiers by addressing them as *Quirites*, indicating that he dismissed them from his service. In the senatorial view, the emperors’ refusal to call soldiers *commilitones* put the soldiers in their place, not raising them (as the civil war leaders had done) to undeserved equality. However, *commilito* later became conventional; as later chapters show, the emperor’s posture as *commilito* was made consistent with discipline.

Documents show that soldiers addressed superiors, at least their commanders, as *domine*, Latin for “master, lord” in the vocative case.⁸⁵ *Domine* was a common address to social superiors in civilian society and did not imply that the speaker was the slave of the man so addressed. The Emperor was usually called *dominus*, though Domitian added the unprecedented *et deus* (“Lord and God”) and sealed his unpopularity with the Senate.⁸⁶ It was more important that commanders not treat soldiers like slaves through brutal corporal punishment or sexual molestation. In a fictionalized biography in the *Historia Augusta*, the emperor Aurelian (r. 270–75 AD) decreed that a *miles* should obey his superior “as a soldier, not as a slave.”⁸⁷ The *habitus* of the good slave was probably too submissive to be compatible with military *virtus*; that of the bad slave was insolent, explicitly incompatible with military *modestia*.

⁸³ Joseph. *BJ* 3.92. Greeting a superior or deity, Miles 1995: 165; Corbeill 2004: 62; exhorting an audience, Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.103, 119; disagreement, Gunderson 2000: 75; Corbeill 2004: 47. Fascist: Falasca-Zamponi 1997: 110–13; inspired by the Prima Porta Augustus, Miles 1995: 165 n. 42. On modern U.S. military etiquette, including salutes, Bonn 2005: 8–9, 15–18, 20–25.

⁸⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 25.1; on *milites* vs. *Quirites*, Dio 42.53.3–4; Suet. *Iul.* 70; App. *BC* 2.13.93; Plut. *Caes.* 51; Caesar imitated by the HA’s Alexander Severus, HA *Alex.* 52.3, 53.10–54.5. *Commilito* acceptable to later “good” emperors, Trajan in Plin. *Ep.* 10.20, 53, 101, 103; MacMullen 1984 (in MacMullen 1990: 227); Campbell 1984: 32–9.

⁸⁵ E.g., 82 times in Plin. *Ep.* 10; in petitions for *conmeatus*, T. *Vindol.* 2.166–177. M. Roller 2001: 255–6.

⁸⁶ Suet. *Dom.* 13.

⁸⁷ HA *Aurel.* 7.8.

A soldier was expected to stand in the presence of his superior, as Appian tells us in relating the story of Pompey's death. After Pompey's defeat at Pharsalus, he fled to Egypt. A small boat brought Pompey incognito from his ship to Alexandria. By chance, one of his veterans was in the boat and stood in reflex, "because a Roman soldier always stands in the presence of his commander." Pompey noted this and said, "Do I not know you, comrade?" As a result Pompey was detected and assassinated.⁸⁸

Whether soldiers of certain lower ranks were forbidden to speak first to those of higher rank is uncertain. An anecdote about Sulpicius Similis, a praetorian prefect in Hadrian's reign, suggests that the higher ranks took precedence. When still a centurion, Similis was summoned by Trajan and entered the imperial presence ahead of the prefects, and said, "It is a shame, Caesar, that you should be talking to a centurion while the prefects stand outside."⁸⁹ Appian thinks it wrong that centurions should be allowed to address the Senate directly. In 43 BC, when 400 of Octavian's centurions petitioned the Senate to grant him the consulship at the mere age of 19 (most consuls were men of 40 or more), the senators, "who could not endure that centurions should have such freedom of speech (*parrhêsia*), scolded them for violating military etiquette (*to stratiôtai's prepon*)."⁹⁰ However, this incident was obviously unusual. In many cases, soldiers did take the initiative in addressing superiors. The ritual acclamation, distinct from soldiers' formal acclamation of new emperors, was an accepted social context for this practice.

Ritual acclamations of praise (often chanted in rhythm or unison) were probably viewed as good etiquette in soldiers, as in the civilian populace.⁹¹ A law from AD 320 or 326, preserved in the Theodosian Code, shows how soldiers directed acclamations to the emperor. When Constantine entered the camp, he was greeted by the soldiers and veterans with "Augustus Constantine! May the gods preserve you for us. Your salvation is our salvation. In truth we speak, on our oath we speak."⁹² These words were probably uttered in unison by those present, both officers and men. Such acclamations were chanted by the civilian populace of

⁸⁸ App. *BC* 2.12.84; cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 78–9.

⁸⁹ Dio 69.19.1; in *HA Alex.* 52.4 soldiers precede officers in imitation of lictors. On civilian precedence, Lendon 1997: 21.

⁹⁰ App. *BC* 3.12.88.

⁹¹ MacMullen 1988: 65–8; Potter 1996: 132–41, esp. 138–41; Lendon 1997: 76, 86–90, 217–18. On acclamations by soldiers, Lendon 1997: 265; Rowe 2002: 156–7; *HA Diad.* 1.6–8.

⁹² *CTb* 7.20.2.pr. Campbell 1984: 423. In Vell. Pat. 2.104.4 the emperor Tiberius' veterans call out to him individually, reminding him where they served.

towns and major cities, by spectators at the circus, and by the Roman Senate greeting the emperors.

But this method of communication also lent itself to mass protest or complaint. In the law just cited, Constantine's veterans addressed him *en masse* with complaints about their pensions and privileges; individuals also presented pleas. Tacitus' depiction of Percennius, the ringleader of the Pannonian mutiny, emphasizes the role of acclamations in military etiquette. Percennius was a former applause leader, similar to the *claqueurs* later employed by Nero to applaud and acclaim his performances.⁹³ Percennius converts the soldiers' ritual praises of their leaders to the kind of protest often used by the urban *plebs*, with which the mutinous soldiers greet Drusus, Tiberius' son, on his arrival. At Rome in AD 69, when officers at a spectacle invoked the emperor Galba's health and long life, the troops attending cried out in response, "If he deserves them."⁹⁴

DISCIPLINA AND RELIGIO

Despite Livy's claim that the early Roman king Numa invented religion (*religio*) to discipline the Roman *plebs* when they were not serving in the army, late Republican and imperial *disciplina militaris* was dissociated from religious practices. Ancient Roman warfare had been embedded in the religious year and rites of the City. However, service abroad weakened these associations. Commanders in the Late Republic, furthermore, exploited religion and portents as a source of charisma, which early imperial authors rejected. The imperial cult and other officially sanctioned cults were a routinized form of military religion that maintained the imperial order. *Disciplina* even received its own (small and unpopular) cult. However, most of *disciplina* had nothing to do with religion.

The archaic Roman practice of warfare, when the Romans still campaigned in Italy, was embedded in the Roman religious year. The campaign season opened with the dance of the *Salii* or priests of Mars on March 1; the *Quinquatria* on March 19, with purification of the sacred shields of Mars; and the *Tubilustrium* on March 23, a purification of the war trumpets or *tubae*.⁹⁵ In October, the army returned to Rome and closed the campaign season with the October

⁹³ Tac. *Ann.* 1.16: *dux olim theatralium operarum*; Nero's *claqueurs*, Suet. *Nero* 20.3; Potter 1996: 142–4. When legate of Upper Germany, Galba forbade soldiers to applaud at shows: Suet. *Galba* 6.2.

⁹⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 1.24–25; Plut. *Galba* 18.4.

⁹⁵ Scullard 1981: 94; on these, Rüpke 1990: 24–6.

Horse ceremony on October 15, followed by the *Armilustrum* or purification of weapons on October 19.⁹⁶ These ceremonies ritually separated Roman soldiers (*militēs*) from civilians (*Quirites*) and purged them of the blood-guilt of enemy deaths.⁹⁷

These annual urban rites had little meaning once the Roman army began to campaign throughout the year and beyond Italy, and certainly when troops were stationed on the frontiers far from Rome.⁹⁸ In the *Feriale Duranum*, a papyrus calendar of military festivals from Dura-Europos in Syria in the early third century AD, the March ceremonies continued to be held in some form. However, the papyrus section that would show the *Armilustrum* and October Horse festivals, if still held, is not preserved.⁹⁹ The *Quinquatria* may have retained little ritual meaning and provided soldiers with a spring festival.¹⁰⁰ Animal sacrifices and *lustrationes* were still held in the imperial army; a scene on Trajan's Column shows the traditional *suovetaurilia*, a sacrifice of a pig, a sheep, and a bull.¹⁰¹ However, in the older festivals, animal offerings tended to be replaced with *supplicationes*, cheaper offerings of incense and wine.¹⁰²

From Scipio Africanus' claims to be favored by Neptune and Jupiter to Octavian's deification of Caesar and adoption of the title *divi filius*, commanders in the late Republic associated themselves with good omens and divine favor. The late Republican general Sertorius, fighting in Spain, tamed a white doe that he claimed was a gift from Diana. In the Empire, generals who claimed divine favor were not conducive to imperial stability; furthermore, soldiers' superstition could be a source of insubordination and panic.¹⁰³ *Feriae* themselves were occasions for feasting on sacrificial meat and drinking.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁶ Scullard 1981: 193–4.

⁹⁷ Scullard 1981; Rüpke 1990: 176ff.

⁹⁸ The camp was not a replica of the *Urbs*; Rüpke 1990: 170.

⁹⁹ Fink, Hoey, and Snyder 1940 = *P. Dura* 54 = *CPL* 324 = *RMR* 117 = Campbell 1994, no. 207. Discussion, Nock [1952] 1972; cf. Irby-Massie 1999: 15; on lacunae, Fink et al. 1940: 163; Rüpke 1990: 176–81; Irby-Massie 1999: 37–8. Southern 2007: 160–1.

¹⁰⁰ Nock [1952] 1972: 743.

¹⁰¹ Le Bohec 1994: 238.

¹⁰² Fink et al. 1940: 201.

¹⁰³ Charisma: Polyb. 10.9.2–3 and Livy 26.41 (Scipio); Plut. *Sert.* 11; Front. *Strat.* 1.11.13. Superstition: Goodman and Holladay 1986: 160–64; Front. *Strat.* 1.12; in the empire, e.g., Tac. *Hist.* 1.62. A good general dispels such fears, as in the handling of the lunar eclipses in Livy 44.37.6–9 vs. Tac. *Ann.* 1.28; on this stratagem, Moore forthcoming.

¹⁰⁴ Amm. 2.2.12.6.

Early imperial authorities argued that celebration of the *feriae* should be subordinated to military necessity.¹⁰⁵ According to the later Roman florilegist Macrobius, Varro argued that “concerning military affairs it does not matter whether a day is *fastus* or *nefastus*.” According to Ulpian, the emperor Trajan ruled that all activities required by military discipline should be carried out even on festival days.¹⁰⁶ At least on campaign, the army may thus have ignored the traditional religious calendar’s lucky and unlucky days.

In the Principate, army religion emphasized the cult of the standards (*signa*) and the Imperial cult, which inculcated loyalty, tradition, and respect for imperial authority. The holidays of the imperial cult were celebrated. Many scholars stress the disciplinary role of official cults as providing a structure and rituals that promoted the social and cultural reproduction of the army.¹⁰⁷ The imperial cult inculcated loyalty to the emperor, internal community, and a sense of affiliation with the hierarchy of the Roman empire, an “imperial consciousness.”¹⁰⁸ Military religion, especially public cult, promoted the social integration and Romanization of soldiers.¹⁰⁹ The practices of imperial and other cults involved sacrifices, dedications, and vows, often memorialized in stone inscriptions; these were a form of showy public display that reinforced the social hierarchy of the army.

The evidence for the cult of *Disciplina* itself as a personification is notably limited, promoted in Africa and Britain by Hadrian and Severus; coins of Hadrian and Pius invoked *Disciplina*.¹¹⁰ *Virtus* and *Victoria* received considerably more cultic attention as personifications; however, *disciplina militaris* stressed secular and rational means of attaining them. When members of the Roman elite complained about military indiscipline, they did not mention the neglect of religious cults and observances. With respect to discipline, military service was primarily a secular activity. Furthermore, officers and specialist soldiers probably carried out

¹⁰⁵ Fink et al. 1940: 166.

¹⁰⁶ Macrobius, *Sat.* 1.16.27; cf. 1.16.20; D. 2.12.9 (Ulpian *Off. procos.* 7).

¹⁰⁷ Althusser [1971] 2001: 120–26. Ando 2000: 21–2 discusses Althusser and Habermas. On Roman army religion as a “total” ideology Helgeland 1978: 1488; Stoll 1995: 35–6; generally, Campbell 2002: 42–3; Herz 2002; Whittaker 2004: 127; Stoll 2007.

¹⁰⁸ Stoll 1995: 36.

¹⁰⁹ Stoll 1995: 36.

¹¹⁰ Domaszewski [1895] 1972: 124; E. Birley 1978: 1509–11; Nock [1952] 1972: 753, *Disciplina*; Richmond 1943; M. Ziolkowski 1990 and 1990–92; *RIC* III (Hadrian) no. 232, 746, 800; (Pius) no. 604. On imperial cult Lendon 1997: 160–70.

most routine cult activity.¹¹¹ The proper observance of pagan military religion became an issue only when Christian soldiers refused to participate; an armywide purge of Christians was instituted around 299 as a prelude to the persecution of 303–11.

More cogently, religious cult had relatively little impact on what soldiers actually *did*. An exception is the cult of the standards, which reinforced combat discipline and morale by treating the standards as sacred objects that must be revered and protected, not abandoned or captured by the enemy.¹¹² The performance of offerings of incense and wine would not help soldiers learn to fight. Even the performance of animal sacrifices, though it might accustom soldiers to the sight of bloodshed, was scarcely practice for combat. The soldier at work, training, at leisure, or being punished does not appear in an account of military religion; the next chapter will argue that by the late Republic and Empire, punishments were secular.¹¹³

DISCIPLINA AND MASCULINE HABITUS

The *virtus* associated with combat was highly volatile, aggressive, and competitive; in a general, such *virtus* might endanger the republic. *Virtus* had to be routinized, achieved through other means than combat, in peacetime. It could be fashioned through masculine *habitus*, shown by separation from women, rough dress and grooming, an austere lifestyle, and a mental and physical disposition appropriate to *militia*. The ban on legitimate marriage while in service applied to common soldiers (including centurions) and lasted from Augustus' reorganization of conditions of service in 13 BC until AD 197, when Septimius Severus permitted soldiers to "live with their wives." This ban did not prevent soldiers from forming *de facto* relationships with women and raising children. Most soldiers did not have families in the first century AD, due less to the ban than to their relative lack of income and lack of social connections in frontier provinces. Nonetheless, the ban safeguarded the masculine *habitus* of soldiers; Caesar wrote that at Alexandria many Roman soldiers had married native women and "unlearned the name and discipline of the Roman

¹¹¹ Stoll 1998: 134–8; Tert. *Idol.* 19.1.

¹¹² The cults of Mithras and of heroes such as Hercules may have prepared soldiers emotionally for combat. On the cult of the standards Stoll 1995; Ando 2000: 259–69.

¹¹³ Tert. *Cor.* 1.1 depicts wearing a wreath at a donative ceremony as participation in the imperial cult, but non-Christian personnel may not have perceived a cultic element.

people.”¹¹⁴ Some thought that senatorial and equestrian officers on campaign should also be separated from women. Due to Augustus’ marriage legislation, these men (and their civilian peers) were required to have wives. However, the senator Severus Caecina proposed a celibate lifestyle for elite officers when he argued that no governor should take his wife with him to his province. Caecina suggested luridly that officers’ wives would corrupt governance and subvert the military hierarchy; nonetheless, the Senate voted down this proposal. Nearly two centuries later, the jurist Ulpian alluded to this episode, stating in his treatise on the duties of proconsular governors that “while it is indeed better that a proconsul go out to his province without his wife, he can also do so with her.”¹¹⁵ Women, even the empresses, lacked formal public roles in *militia*.¹¹⁶

Gender and sexuality studies present Roman masculinity as at least partly produced through sexual practices. In modern Western societies a male becomes a man by adopting a heterosexual identity and rejecting homosexuality. In ancient Greece and Rome, a male became a man by practicing the active sexual role (penetrating women, boys, or slaves) and avoiding the passive sexual role (being penetrated, which assimilated the male to a woman, prostitute, or slave).¹¹⁷ Accordingly, Roman soldiers asserted their masculinity via active penetration, as suggested by accounts of soldiers’ *raptus* (seizure, rape) or enslavement of female captives. Sexual domination was associated with imperialism. In triumphal art, emperors physically subjected captives and female personifications of provinces; on a relief from Aphrodisias, a heroic emperor Claudius subjugated a partially nude personification of Britannia.¹¹⁸

Soldiers maintained their masculinity by maintaining their *pudicitia*, male “chastity” or avoidance of the passive sexual role. Trebonius, called the *miles Marianus*, a young recruit in Marius’ army, killed the officer who attempted to rape him. Trebonius was tried in camp for this act of severe insubordination. When he

¹¹⁴ Phang 2001: 181–7; quoted, Caes. *BC* 3.110; Whittaker 2004: 129, 130–33.

¹¹⁵ Phang 2001: 366–8; Tac. *Ann.* 3.33–4; D. 1.16.4.2 (Ulpian *Sab.* 38).

¹¹⁶ Exceptions are empresses’ holidays in the *Feriale Duranum* and the representations of Faustina (wife of Marcus) and Julia Domna (wife of Septimius Severus) as *mater castrorum*, Campbell 1984: 95–6 (with inscriptions); *RIC* III no. 567, 860, 880; IV.2 no. 690–91. Informally, wives probably reinforced officers’ social connections, as in *T. Vindol.* 2.291 (an invitation to a birthday party).

¹¹⁷ For Rome, Richlin 1992; Edwards 1993: 63–97; Richlin 1993: 533–6; Skinner 1997: 3; Walters 1997a: 30–31; Corbeill 1997: 116–17; C. A. Williams 1999: 160–229; Fredrick 2002b.

¹¹⁸ Phang 2001: 251–60, 2004: 211–16, 217–20, 223–4; Whittaker 2004: 115–43.

demonstrated that he had not consented to sexual relations, Marius spared him and even rewarded him with a crown.¹¹⁹ Killing an officer would usually result in capital punishment. According to one author, Roman soldiers, like slaves, were subject to corporal punishment; soldiers were spared the humiliation of sexual penetration so as not to be assimilated further to slaves.¹²⁰ More cogently, rape was the fate of captives and slaves of either sex, including adult males. Rape signified defeat, a fate worse than death to a soldier.¹²¹ At the time of Marius' campaigns, the social status of common soldiers was at a low point; Marius reinforced the loyalty of his men by defending their interests against the officers, even though the would-be rapist, Lusius, was his relative.

After this period, despite much concern for discipline, the elite showed little concern for the actual sexual roles of military personnel.¹²² Suetonius relates that Domitian exonerated a laticlavian tribune and a centurion of a conspiracy against himself, because they showed that they had been *impudici*. They had lost their *pudicitia* or male "chastity" by submitting to penetration, and thus could have had no influence whatever with the soldiers. Conversely, the tribune Subrius Flavus attempted to exonerate himself of a conspiracy against Nero by claiming that he would never associate with such effeminate civilians.¹²³ Both episodes suggests soldiers' contempt for sexual passivity and/or effeminacy. The active sexual role was presumably a minimum element in the masculine conduct of officers. Other sexual improprieties were also disapproved of. Military personnel were disgraced for committing adultery (especially with the wives of their superior officers).¹²⁴ Apart from this, depictions of soldiers' effeminate behavior focus not on their sexual practices, but on their consumption of urbanized luxuries and the weakening of their total *habitus*.

Masculinity was not determined solely by active or passive sexual roles, but also by men's general deportment and conduct.¹²⁵ A fable of Phaedrus sketches an

¹¹⁹ Val. Max. 6.1.12; Cic. *Mil.* 4.9; Plut. *Mar.* 14.4–5, *Mor.* 202c; Quint. *Inst.* 3.11.14, *Decl. Min.* 33; cf. Val. Max. 6.1.10–11.

¹²⁰ Walters 1997a: 40; also Walters 1997b; Fredrick 2002a: 237.

¹²¹ On sexual exploitation of slaves, Phang 2004: 211–16; C. A. Williams 1999: 77–86.

¹²² Phang 2001: 285–94.

¹²³ Richlin 1993: 531, 540; C. A. Williams 1999: 173–4; Suet. *Dom.* 10.5; Dio 67.11.4; Tac. *Ann.* 15.67. Cf. soldiers' alleged contempt for the effeminate Elagabalus, HA *Elag.* 5.1–2, 10.1. Lendon 2005: 271.

¹²⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 1.48 (a laticlavian tribune's adultery with his legate's wife); Plin. *Ep.* 6.31.4–6 (a centurion with his tribune's wife). Phang 2001: 369–71.

¹²⁵ C. A. Williams 1999: 125–7, 142–3, 153.

oxymoronic *miles cinaedus*, a soldier-effeminate: though large and strong, he lisps and minces in a stereotypically effeminate manner.¹²⁶ The fable does not describe his sexual behavior; a *cinaedus* may not have always assumed the sexually receptive role.¹²⁷

More important to *virtus* was the avoidance of luxurious behavior, a package in which sexual behavior of any kind was only a minor aspect. Elite masculine *habitus* in Greco-Roman society was produced through the discipline of the body in deportment and oratory, including gait, gesture, posture, the orator's tone of voice, direction of gaze, and facial expression – as well as more blatant signifiers of gender such as dress and grooming.¹²⁸ To be a man, a male had to “walk the walk and talk the talk.” His bearing and deportment revealed his masculinity or effeminacy. Studies of such behavior, however, have focused almost entirely upon the civilian sphere. Wearing silken or colorful clothes, wearing perfume, depilating, and dancing could mark a man as effeminate.¹²⁹ The life of luxury and dissipation was in general associated with effeminacy.¹³⁰ The specific practices of military service, training, *labor*, and austerity reinforced masculinity, as did the discouragement of avarice, discussed in Chapter Five. Military *virtus* was maintained by physical effort and austerity, the subjects of Chapters Six and Seven.

VIRI MILITARES

The Roman military *habitus* aided senatorial and equestrian officers to legitimate their commands. Most of these officers were senatorial or equestrian by birth. Ideally, elite officers' performance of military masculinity bridged the gulf between them and the soldiers, maintaining the former's prestige and providing a common standard of behavior. As later chapters show, elite officers shared in the labors and austerities that they imposed on the common soldiers, thus demonstrating their *virtus* and the legitimacy of their commands.

¹²⁶ Phaedrus *App.* 10.1–3; C. A. Williams 1999: 188–93.

¹²⁷ C. A. Williams 1999: 142, 177–8, 209–18.

¹²⁸ Gleason 1995: Introduction; Connolly 1998: 135; Corbeill 2002: 188–9.

¹²⁹ Edwards 1993: 68–9, 77, linking these practices to sexual passivity; Gleason 1999: 75–8; C. A. Williams 1999: 129–32. Wyke 1994 describes gender as expressed by the surface of the body (hairstyle, skin, dress).

¹³⁰ Corbeill 1997: 99–128; Fredrick 2002a: 255–6.

Aristocratic officers needed to project military masculinity to help legitimate their commands. They held positions of great authority with relatively little experience. Though their aristocratic status conferred traditional authority, and they possessed legal authority, these officers faced a literally tough audience. Common soldiers are represented as possessing the natural masculinity of rough, untutored peasants, made more formidable by combat training. The contrast appears during the Rhine mutiny in AD 14, when Germanicus, attempting to quell the revolt, in desperation threatened to commit suicide unless the soldiers returned to obedience. A soldier named Calusidius offered his own sword, saying that it was sharper.¹³¹

The moral aspects of *disciplina* were not necessarily connected with *virtus*. Paradoxically, luxurious individuals, fighters in civil wars, and even terrorists such as Catiline and his followers could display combat *virtus* (prowess and courage).¹³² This was another secret of civil war. Caesar boasted that his soldiers could fight well even when reeking of perfume, implying that their *virtus* was so great that it was unaffected by effeminate self-fashioning.¹³³ Imperial *disciplina* attempted to remoralize the production of *virtus* by associating it with obedience, parsimony, labor, and austerity.

Masculinity was a common tongue in the Roman army, a quality that both elite officers and common soldiers could display, despite the great differences in their wealth and social status. Masculine performance also may have compensated for some officers' lack of imposing stature and strength.¹³⁴ The performance of masculinity provided an illusion of continuity in the Roman army from the time of Polybius to that of Vegetius, despite changes in tactics, organization, the social status and ethnicity of soldiers and commanders, and the political apparatus. The continuity, which enabled some imperial commanders to imitate practices from the traditional Republic, was all the more necessary because the Roman aristocracy lost actual power in the Principate: they sought to maintain their *dignitas* by the redefinition of *virtus* as achievement in activities other than war.¹³⁵

¹³¹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.35.

¹³² E.g., Sall. *Cat.* 5.2, 61; Suet. *Iul.* 67 below; the Pompeian *miles cinaedus* in Phaedrus *App.* 10.

¹³³ Suet. *Iul.* 67.

¹³⁴ Tall commanders: Tac. *Hist.* 2.30 (Caecina), *Ann.* 13.8 (Corbulo); officers, Veg. *Mil.* 2.14.3. Historians or biographers might apologize for a leader's shortness (Scipio Africanus, Livy 28.35.5–7; Aemilianus, App. *Iber.* 53; Agricola, Tac. *Agric.* 44; Julian, *Amm.* 22.2.5, 25.4.22). Contrast *Amm.* 18.6.7's contempt for the elderly, short, and narrow-minded Sabinianus.

¹³⁵ Veyne 1978: 40; M. Roller 2001: 84–8, 94, 104.

Roman senatorial officers faced the additional challenge that they might be older or younger than the professional soldiers (aged roughly 20–45) and thus also, in Roman constructions of gender, less masculine.¹³⁶ Senior senatorial commanders might be elderly men, such as the old, arthritic Hordeonius Flaccus, legate in Upper Germany in AD 69–70, whose soldiers mutinied against him, or the emperor Galba himself, also disabled by arthritis, whose failed attempt to impose harsh old-fashioned discipline on the army led to his assassination.¹³⁷ There was no mandatory retirement age (as for British colonial officials at age 55) to hide the decrepitude of the Empire's rulers from its subjects.¹³⁸ Not all old men, however, had lost the martial *habitus*. A *topos* of the still formidable aged commander appears in both Greek and Roman literature, and in practice, centurions were often middle-aged or older.¹³⁹

The broad-striped tribunate (*tribunus laticlavius*) was the Roman aristocrat of senatorial birth's first military post, preceding even his admission to the Senate at age 25. Usually in his early twenties, the *tribunus laticlavius* could be as young as 16 or 17. The too-young officer's authority was also insecure, due to the gender-ambiguous sexual attractiveness of the adolescent boy.¹⁴⁰ At the very least, the young officer should avoid effeminate self-fashioning, as when Vespasian refused a military post to a young man who was wearing perfume, growling, "I would have preferred that you smelled of garlic." Juvenal advised a young man seeking a centurionate to leave his hair uncombed and his nostril and underarm hair untrimmed.¹⁴¹ Still, some young officers wasted their *militia* in dissipation; the too-young officer might be implicated in a scandal. As laticlavian tribune, Titus Vinius committed adultery with the wife of his commanding officer.¹⁴² At the

¹³⁶ Parkin 2003: 77, 95, 242–3, 247–51. The Republic's levies did not usually recruit men older than 46, Parkin 2003: 95. The elderly soldiers retained past their discharge date in Tac. *Ann.* 1.17, 34–5 evoke pathos. Plut. *Galba* 19.1; Dio 63(64).3.4; Galba was ridiculed for wearing a large sword on the march, "old and weak of sinew as he was." Arist. *Rhet.* 2.12–14 (1388b31–1390b13) depicts old men as cowardly and weak, requiring leisure. In Greek medical theory, a lack of vital heat caused their debility.

¹³⁷ Hordeonius: Tac. *Hist.* 1.9, 4.36; Lendon 1997: 13, 241; Galba, Tac. *Hist.* 1.18, 49; Cassius Chaerea in Suet. *Calig.* 56.2.

¹³⁸ Said 1978: 42.

¹³⁹ E.g., Cic. *Sen.* 5.16, 10.32. Spurius Ligustinus in Livy 42.34.2–12. Breeze 1971: 276, 288–91.

¹⁴⁰ Campbell 1975: 18–19, 1984: 320. E.g., the 16-year-old in Stat. *Silv.* 5.2.164–80; on Titus Vinius (below), Phang 2001: 369–70. Distinction in the laticlavian tribunate was not expected, Plin. *Ep.* 8.14.7; Tac. *Agric.* 5. Gender ambiguity: C. A. Williams 1999: 183–8.

¹⁴¹ Suet. *Vesp.* 8.3; nose hairs, Juv. *Sat.* 14.194–5; C. A. Williams 1999: 130. Garlic was associated with the lower classes, archaic Romans, and anger, Purcell 2003: 338; Gowers 1993: 280–310 on Hor. *Epod.* 3.

¹⁴² Tac. *Agric.* 5. Titus Vinius: *Hist.* 1.48 emphasizes the wife's agency, feminizing the young officer further.

battle of Pharsalus, Caesar instructed his men to strike at the faces of Pompey's young aristocratic officers, suggesting that these officers would retreat to protect their youthful good looks from wounds.¹⁴³

Masculine conduct in *militia* was part of a broader code of conduct for Roman commanders and administrators, stressing the avoidance of anger, avarice, and other tyrannical vices.¹⁴⁴ Luxury, broadly hinting of gender inversion, was also a trait of tyrants, paired with cruelty. In one *exemplum*, Cato the Elder, censor in 184 BC, prosecuted L. Quinctius Flaminius because, as governor of Gaul, Flaminius beheaded a Gallic prisoner on a whim in order to please a prostitute at a banquet. Debating exercises on the anecdote stressed Flaminius' luxury as well as cruelty.¹⁴⁵ In another *exemplum* from the Republic, Gaius Gracchus denounced a young noble for riding in a litter when returning to Rome from Asia. When an Italian herdsman mocked him by asking the bearers if they were carrying a corpse, the young man had the herdsman flogged to death.¹⁴⁶ The luxury of riding in a litter and disproportionate cruelty were both traits attributed to women.

The emperor Otho, as civil war leader in AD 69, exploited the signifiers of masculine appearance and conduct. Otho's appearance in civil life, well-groomed and even depilated, suggested *mollitia* (softness or effeminacy).¹⁴⁷ He had been a favorite associate of Nero. However, Tacitus acknowledges that Otho's soul was not *mollis* like his body: he dared to usurp the empire. In a similar spirit, officers whom emperors slandered with effeminacy might assassinate these rulers, as Cassius Chaerea did to Caligula and Macrinus (then praetorian prefect) to Caracalla.¹⁴⁸

But in leading his army to fight the Vitellians, Otho took care to be seen as a masculine commander. He did not travel slowly or in luxury, but marched on foot before the standards, wearing an iron cuirass and – most contrary to his reputation – going unshaven.¹⁴⁹ Otho's suicide upon his defeat can be viewed as an extreme display of masculine *habitus*. Otho displays remarkable self-control

¹⁴³ Plut. *Caes.* 45.2–3; *Pomp.* 69.3.

¹⁴⁴ D. Braund 1998: 16–18.

¹⁴⁵ Livy 39.42.8–12 and others; D. Braund 1998: 13–15.

¹⁴⁶ Gell. 10.3.5–6. D. Braund 1998: 13.

¹⁴⁷ Suet. *Otho* 12.1; cf. Tac. *Hist.* 1.30; C. A. Williams 1999: 152–3.

¹⁴⁸ Otho: Tac. *Hist.* 1.22. Cassius Chaerea: Suet. *Calig.* 56; Sen. *Const.* 18.3–6; Dio 59.29.2. Macrinus: Hdn. 5.2.3–4.

¹⁴⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 2.11.

and courage, preparing tranquilly for his death and dying by stabbing himself.¹⁵⁰ Juvenal the satirist, however, mocks this rather self-conscious manipulation of image. He represents Otho as a *pathicus* (a habitual sexual passive, resembling the *cinaedus*) armed for war but gazing at himself in a mirror, a stereotypically feminine accoutrement.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, senatorial officers' military masculinity was often limited to appearances. Some emperors objected to senatorial commanders' pursuit of *virtus* and *gloria* through active conquest, even though the emperors had given them these commands. The commander might fill his martial role more safely through maintaining discipline, imposing austerity and hard work on his soldiers. How fine a line could be drawn is shown by Domitius Corbulo's career. Appointed legate in Lower Germany, Corbulo launched a campaign across the Rhine against the Chauzi, a Germanic people. Senatorial commanders were not encouraged to display such initiative; the emperor Claudius recalled Corbulo.¹⁵² To prevent *otium* in his soldiers, Corbulo proceeded to construct a canal between the Meuse and the Rhine; military building might be a substitute for imperialism. However, when a later governor of Upper Germany began a canal from the Meuse to the Saône that would create a continuous waterway from the Mediterranean to the North Sea, a jealous rival scotched it as a potential threat to the emperor.¹⁵³

As Chapter Six shows, imperial discipline redefined the *virtus* of the elite commanders and officers as endurance, granting them authority without exerting the autonomy or the influence over the soldiers that might threaten a jealous emperor. Such a redefinition may have transferred the civilian philosophic ideal of *enkrateia* (self-control, austerity) to *militia*; accordingly, philosophical stylizations of the Roman army proliferate in this period. *Virtus* as endurance of effort and austerity also invoked the idealized Roman past.

The most consistent representatives of the military *habitus* to the common soldiers were not the elite officers, but centurions and decurions, highly experienced soldiers usually promoted from the ranks. Vegetius describes ideal centurions and decurions in terms of masculine *habitus*. They must be good fighters and riders, set

¹⁵⁰ Tac. *Hist.* 2.46–50, 2.49.

¹⁵¹ Juv. *Sat.* 2.99–109; C. A. Williams 1999: 152–3 argues that Otho was not a *pathicus*.

¹⁵² Tac. *Ann.* 11.19–20; Goldsworthy 2003: 302–4.

¹⁵³ Tac. *Ann.* 13.53. On centuriation and road-building in the middle Republic as expressions of Roman imperialism, Purcell 1990.

an example for their men in these skills, and look impressive in armor.¹⁵⁴ The prestige of masculinity suggests that charismatic authority (vested in the personality rather than in social status or legal powers) persisted in Roman command.

UPRIGHT *HABITUS*

The Roman upper orders thought of military and, indeed, ideal elite philosophical *habitus* as a tensing of the mind and body. This tension resisted the incursion of sensations and emotions, Stoic *adfectus*, that might motivate personnel to relax their *habitus* and abandon their duties. A modern analogy would be the total armoring of the body against all such incursions in the manner of a medieval knight. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European militaries imitated such armor with elaborate close-fitting uniform and the rigid posture and movements of soldiers on guard and at drill. Modern cultural theorists interpret military training as converting the soldier's body into a "stereometric figure"¹⁵⁵ or "muscle physis."¹⁵⁶ In theory, inculcation of the martial *habitus* produces a "social body," the surface of which is inscribed and shaped by discipline.¹⁵⁷ The social body of the modern soldier, well into the early twentieth century, was a rigid, "armored" body, resembling a rifle or the shell of a bomb.¹⁵⁸

In contrast, Roman soldiers also became weapons, but neither their physical nor their social bodies were enclosed in this rigid total armor. Instead their bodies were *tensed*, as muscles are tensed, the strings of bows drawn taut, and catapult cables wound up for release. This tensed body powered the actual weapons the soldier wielded, such as javelins and swords. It was a highly aggressive body, as the *furor* or *ferocia* of soldiers shows, but it was also endangered by dissolution, the relaxation of this tensed state.

This dissolution could come either from inside, through the generation of demoralizing emotions in the self, or from outside, through external influences and practices such as luxury. Military training and Stoic *askêsis* suppressed the tendency of the body and mind to give way to what Stoic theory termed impulses and passions, including fear, desires, pleasures, and other embodied emotions,

¹⁵⁴ Veg. Mil. 2.14.3–8; e.g., *vigilans sobrius agilis*, 2.14.4.

¹⁵⁵ Canetti 1962: 312.

¹⁵⁶ Theweleit 1989: 150–51, 159, 162.

¹⁵⁷ S. Griffin 1992: 238. Foucault 1977: 29–30 theorizes this inscription.

¹⁵⁸ Theweleit 1989: 178–82.

conceived as “flows” that dissolved the military or Stoic *habitus*.¹⁵⁹ The body/self that was resistant to pleasure and desire could also resist distress (*aegritudo*) and fear. In another Stoic image, the rational part of the soul imposes discipline in military fashion on the weak and womanish part.¹⁶⁰

This resistance to impulses could be inculcated consciously by Stoic (and, despite the Stoics, Epicurean) cognitive training. But the educated elite regarded common soldiers, uneducated individuals of low social status, as incapable of this self-discipline or even of listening to Stoic instruction, as shown in Tacitus’ depiction of Musonius Rufus’ mission.¹⁶¹ Hence, resistance to impulses was inculcated in soldiers from outside by the imposition of disciplinary practices, especially *labores* and austerity.

In the *Tusculan Disputations*, Cicero describes this state of *intentio* (tension or straining) as a virile *habitus* necessary for all vigorous effort:¹⁶²

For the soul has certain analogies to the body: weights are more easily carried by straining every nerve of the body: relax the strain and the weights are too heavy; quite similarly the soul by its intense effort throws off all the pressure of burdens, but by relaxation of effort is so weighed down that it cannot recover itself.

Cicero regards this disposition as essential both to military and to civilian life. It includes the endurance of pain and other misfortunes and the mastery of disciplines such as oratory.¹⁶³ Many Latin authors employ *intentus* and similar words to describe the desirable military bearing. Sallust described the ancient Romans, before moral decline set in, as *domi militiaeque intenti*, striving for their aims at home and in the field.¹⁶⁴ Tacitus describes *intentio* as a state appropriate to military discipline: soldiers, imitating the example of their superiors, display

¹⁵⁹ Sorabji 2004: 104–5 and Lagrée 2004: 150. Becker 2004: 250 and Harris 2001: 107 regard the emotionless, “virtually affectless” Stoic sage as a caricature, still held by Nussbaum 1994: 389. Sherman 2005 discusses the modern American military experience in light of Stoicism.

¹⁶⁰ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.47: *Est in animis omnium fere natura molle quiddam, demissum, humile, enervatum quodam modo et languidum.* C. A. Williams 1999: 133–4.

¹⁶¹ Tac. *Hist.* 3.81.

¹⁶² Cic. *Tusc.* 2.54. In Val. Max. 2.6.1 those who relax the effort will be overwhelmed.

¹⁶³ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.57ff.

¹⁶⁴ Sall. *Cat.* 6.5: *Romani domi militiaeque intenti*; Livy 44.18.1 describes Aemilius Paullus as *intentus* upon his command; Memmius, Sall. *Jug.* 30; Marius, Sall. *Jug.* 100.4; Agricola, Tac. *Agric.* 5.

attention to duty or run wild.¹⁶⁵ Being *intentus* implied combat readiness. Caesar maintained his men in this state, not announcing when he would begin a march or a battle, but keeping the men ready and alert to be led forth at once.¹⁶⁶ As seen in Chapter Two, *intentio* enabled *impetus* in combat, releasing the potential energy of this state of tension: “the mind gathers itself together and is aroused or relaxed . . . just as when engines of war hurl forth their bolts.”¹⁶⁷

Opposed to these images of rigor and tension, luxury relaxes the masculine and especially martial *habitus*, causing it to dissolve in “floods” of pleasure.¹⁶⁸ This language appears in Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations*, a Stoic tract attacking the Epicurean view of pleasure as a good.¹⁶⁹ Due to luxury, the present-day Roman aristocrat is unable to bear pain, which (in Cicero’s first person plural) “makes our self-control melt and stream away through weakness, and so we cannot endure a bee sting without crying out.”¹⁷⁰ Here the surface of the body is hypersensitive to even small pains, let alone battle wounds. Sensations enter the body too readily and cause dissolution of the *habitus*. This is even more true of pleasurable sensations: in Seneca’s *De vita beata*, pleasure “flows around us on every side and seeps through every opening,” softening the mind and not only effeminizing, but also dehumanizing the man who opens himself to it.¹⁷¹ Though these images of the body resemble the psychic armoring or “nostalgia for impermeability” seen in modern fascist literature, Roman images of military bodies emphasize not modern armoring, but instead the effort and tension of the bodies that wear armor.¹⁷² Pleasure, conceived as a fluid, unstrings this *habitus* the way that a bowstring relaxes when it is wet, an image familiar to the ancients.

¹⁶⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 2.68: *miles intentus aut licenter agit*. Pliny *Pan.* 16.3 (on military activity under Trajan) opposes *intendere* to *torpere*.

¹⁶⁶ Suet. *Jul.* 65. *Intenti* signified an army ready to attack, Caes. *BG* 3.26, 7.80; Livy 30.10.8; Sall. *Cat.* 27.2, *Jug.* 49, 53, 60, 76, 93–4; Tac. *Hist.* 3.63, 84, *Ann.* 2.16, 4.40.

¹⁶⁷ Sen. *Ira* 1.9.1.

¹⁶⁸ Edwards 1993: 175; Joshel 1992a: 117–20.

¹⁶⁹ Cic. *Tusc.* 2 denounces the Epicureans.

¹⁷⁰ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.52.

¹⁷¹ Sen. *Vita beata* 5.4. On such imagery of fluidity Edwards 1993: 175, 186–90; Joshel 1997: 242–3. Used of Rome’s enemies the Gauls, who wilt in battle, Livy 10.28.4, 34.47.5, 38.17.7, of Antony’s infatuation with Cleopatra, Plut. *Ant.* 53.11.

¹⁷² Joshel 1992a: 118–19; Theweleit 1987: 244, 253, 288, 388, 395, 414, 1989: 223, 225. Theweleit’s *Freikorps* heroes fear the slackening or disintegration of a rigid armor-like *habitus* created by military discipline, uniform, drill, and work. Cf. Edwards 1993: 79, 81 on the *mollis* (effeminate) male as incapable of *labor*, Sen. *Contr.* 1.pr.8–9; Sen. *Prov.* 2.5–6. “Nostalgia”: Sartre [1946] 1999: 98.

Otium and *luxus* caused soldiers to desire the continuation of the permissive situation, and made them more prone to fear and more likely to desert or mutiny.¹⁷³ When discipline broke down and there was no authoritative command, soldiers were prone to wild mood swings and impulses, indulging their rages and desires at whim.¹⁷⁴ Often the discourse compresses these affective processes without describing them in detail: Dio Cassius claims of his own day that the Roman troops “enjoy such luxury, license, and irresponsibility that those in Mesopotamia have even dared to kill their own commander, Flavius Heracleo, and the Praetorians even accused me before Ulpianus because I governed the soldiers in Pannonia strictly.”¹⁷⁵ Ammianus Marcellinus describes in graphic and satirical terms the luxury of the palace troops at Constantinople. They sleep on featherbeds and drink from cups heavier than their swords, and as a result are “brutal and rapacious to their own people, cowardly towards the enemy.”¹⁷⁶

As seen earlier, soldiers were expected to stand in the presence of their commanders. During his campaign against Perseus of Macedon in 168 BC Aemilius Paullus warned against a sentry's falling asleep on duty. He should not carry a shield, because when he becomes tired, he rests his head on the shield and falls asleep.¹⁷⁷ Triumphal art such as Trajan's Column and the Column of Marcus Aurelius and their provincial versions, influencing soldiers' tombstones, represents the ideal of standing. In triumphal art, Roman soldiers maintain upright postures and calm expressions, while barbarians most often are prostrate, dead or dying in combat scenes, bound and seated, or cringing or groveling on their knees.¹⁷⁸

Tacitus' description of Domitius Corbulo's retraining of Syrian troops in the Armenian winter invokes the symbolism of rigor. The soft Syrians literally harden

¹⁷³ Livy 28.24.6; Tac. *Ann.* 1.16, 1.31; Veg. *Mil.* 3.4.10.

¹⁷⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17–45 *passim*, the Rhine and Pannonian mutinies, especially their reactions to the eclipse and to Agrippina with her children, 1.28–9, 1.40–1, *Hist.* 1.38, 63, 69, 80, 2.29, 88, 3.10. Plut. *Galba* 1.3 emphasizes the “untrained and unreasoning impulses” (*apaideutos chrōmenēs kai alogois bormais*) of soldiers. Alston 1998: 211, 216–17.

¹⁷⁵ Dio 80.4.2; Mattern 1999: 207.

¹⁷⁶ Amm 22.4.6–7.

¹⁷⁷ Livy 44.33.8–9; cf. 44.36.5.

¹⁷⁸ Brilliant 1963: 41–2, 74, 116; Kampen 1995: 60–61; Pirson 1996: 150–52, 158–68, 173; Ferris 2000: 75, 77, 98, 105, 113; Phang 2004: 219–20. Bourdieu 2001: 17, 24, 27, 30, 71–4 analyzes standing as masculine *habitus* in the Algerian Kabyle and in modern Western society; a bent posture was appropriate to women; on Roman gendered *habitus* Corbeil 2004: 70–72. Roman soldiers kneel as *triarii* or in the first rank of a *testudo* formation only to prepare to attack, Livy 8.8.10; Plut. *Ant.* 45.2–3.

in the cold by turning to ice, as many freeze to death on watch; as a soldier carries a bundle of sticks, his hands freeze to the bundle and break off from his arms.¹⁷⁹ The passage resembles the symbolic episode of the snakes in Lucan's *Pharsalia*, with an opposite significance. Cato the Younger, campaigning in Africa during the civil wars, entered a region with lethally poisonous snakes. The bites of the snakes cause Cato's soldiers' bodies to melt, exsanguinate, or swell monstrously, losing their proper boundaries. In the *Pharsalia*, the bodies of soldiers are ruptured and fragmented in every possible way, symbolizing the dissolution of the body politic in civil war.¹⁸⁰ The frozen soldiers in Armenia represent an opposite image of absolute rigor. In the Roman moral economy, it was better for Syrian legionaries to freeze to death than to become dissolute through excessive use of wine and hot baths. Presumably they freeze to death because their bodies have become excessively liquid from such luxuries; the "drier" and more vigorous body of Corbulo is unaffected by the cold.

The ideal posture of Romans, both *domi* and *militiae*, resembled the military *habitus*. In the Republic the Romans cast their votes standing, in the structure known as the *saepita*; Cicero claimed that standing kept Roman voters alert and focused, whereas the seated Greeks dozed off.¹⁸¹ *Exempla* are told of individuals who preferred to die standing. Vespasian, when dying, struggled to his feet, declaring that an emperor should die on his feet. Dio tells a similar story of the praetorian prefect Turbo, who continued his duties when he was ill; when Hadrian advised him to rest, Turbo replied that the prefect ought to die on his feet.¹⁸² These representations of the upright stance of *negotium* (business) depend on the association of its opposite, *otium* (leisure), with reclining, the posture of the Roman citizen male at dinner.¹⁸³ As Chapter Seven shows, reclining for dinner in *militia* was a dubious activity. However, even *otium* might be taken standing. In 151 BC Scipio Nasica Corculum advocated the destruction of a permanent Greek-style theater with seating, built three years earlier at Rome, arguing that permanent theater

¹⁷⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.3.

¹⁸⁰ Lucan *Phars.* 9.700–838; Bartsch 1997: 33.

¹⁸¹ Cic. *Flacc.* 15–17; L. R. Taylor [1966] 1990: 29–30, 107–8.

¹⁸² Suet. *Vesp.* 24: *imperatorem ait stantem mori oportere*; Turbo, Dio 69.18.4; cf. Suet. *Tib.* 72.3; Newbold 2000: 105–6. However, Suet. *Vesp.* 20 relates that a Roman wit ridiculed Vespasian's "straining" (*siquidem petenti*) expression (perhaps intended to convey *intentio*), saying that the emperor looked as if he was straining to relieve himself (*ventrem exonerare*).

¹⁸³ M. Roller 2003: 380–83; 2006; Corbeill 2002a: 202.

seating would debilitate the national character and that Romans should stand to watch.¹⁸⁴

The maintenance of a martial and imperial *habitus* through discipline also applies to the collectivity or body politic.¹⁸⁵ Valerius Maximus uses the image of muscular tension to describe the ancient Spartans as “men who rejoiced in toil and endurance [and] did not want the tough muscles of their fatherland to be loosened and dulled by foreign ways.” Valerius depicts the passage from *virtus* to *luxuria* as much easier than the reverse.¹⁸⁶ The Romans spoke of the “standing” of the empire through ancient ways or military discipline.¹⁸⁷ The *metus hostilis* doctrine, that Rome remained strong and virtuous so long as she had enemies (such as Carthage), also presented this view. Once the discipline of warfare with their old enemies was abandoned, the Romans would adopt foreign ways and decline.¹⁸⁸

ARMOR AND THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE

However, the constitution of an *intentus*, combat-ready, upright *habitus* did not complete the *vir militaris*: he also had to be armed, donning armor and bearing weapons. The wearing of armor was part of the discomfort and effort, *labores*, expected of soldiers in Roman discipline ideology. A passage of Cicero’s *Tusculan Disputations* praises military *labor*, including the wearing of arms:

For shield, sword, helmet are reckoned a burden by our soldiers as little as their shoulders, arms, and hands; for weapons they say are the soldier’s limbs, and these they carry handy so that, should need arise, they fling aside their burdens and have their weapons as free for use as their limbs.¹⁸⁹

In this passage the brave soldier is created by his armor; he gains courage and endurance through the *labor* of wearing his armor and carrying loads. Indeed, his arms fuse with his body (*arma enim membra militis esse dicunt*) and he becomes, as

¹⁸⁴ Livy *Per.* 48; Val. Max. 2.4.2; App. *BC* 1.28. Gruen 1992: 205–9 interprets the episode as political infighting, not explaining why standing should be a source of cultural authority.

¹⁸⁵ Joshel 1992a: 120; Woodman 1988: 132–7; cf. Gleason 2001: 56–8 on body politic images in Josephus.

¹⁸⁶ Val. Max. 2.6.1.

¹⁸⁷ Ennius (quoted in HA *Avid.* 5.7); Livy 8.7.16, *disciplinam militarem, qua stetit ad hanc diem Romana res.*

¹⁸⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 10–11, *Jug.* 41; Diod. Sic. 34/5.33.5–6; Flor. 1.47. Vell. Pat. 2.1.1.

¹⁸⁹ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.37.

it were, a human weapon.¹⁹⁰ The representations of well-trained soldiers figured the soldier's body as a weapon, or more accurately as a part of the weapons system powered by his muscles and guided by his brain. The modern terrorist also becomes a human weapon.¹⁹¹

Such images recall the mystical prestige of the heroes' armor in Homer.¹⁹² The heroes owe much of their formidable quality to armor, its brilliance and clangor emphasized in famous arming scenes.¹⁹³ The hero without his armor was profoundly vulnerable, like a tortoise stripped of its shell.¹⁹⁴ The slain hero, divested of his armor, died a second and true death.¹⁹⁵ The enemy's ultimate demise occurred when his stripped and decapitated corpse was eaten by animals.¹⁹⁶

Homer stresses the weight and size of his heroes' armor and arms to display the heroes' superhuman strength and prowess.¹⁹⁷ The attitude persisted in anecdotes of Roman emperors who walked or ran for many miles in armor.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, soldiers who did not wear armor were civilianized and effeminized, unable to bear the weight of their armor and even practicing depilation.¹⁹⁹ In an anecdote from the mid-second century AD, the officer Pontius Laelianus rips up the Syrian soldiers' armor, which they had let deteriorate. Fronto alleges that Laelianus scolded the men for using padded saddles and ordered these to be cut open and the goose-down stuffing removed.²⁰⁰ Pontius could rip apart the armor because Fronto is probably speaking of the *lorica segmentata*, a cuirass of metal plates held together by leather strips, which presumably had perished through lack of care. Chain-mail (the *lorica hamata*) might also be ripped apart if it had rusted through. But the symbolism is Homeric: the soldier whose armor could be ripped apart was no longer a *soldier*. His *habitus* had perished along with his armor. The soldiers

¹⁹⁰ Longo 1996. On Homeric influence on Greek and Roman warfare, Lendon 2005.

¹⁹¹ R. Morgan 2001: 176.

¹⁹² Longo 1996: 28.

¹⁹³ Hom. *Il.* 11.15–46 Agamemnon; 16.130–144 Patroklos in Achilles' armor; 19.367–91.

¹⁹⁴ Longo 1996: 32.

¹⁹⁵ Longo 1996: 35.

¹⁹⁶ Longo 1996: 43, 49.

¹⁹⁷ E.g., Achilles' shield, Nestor's shield, and Hector's seven-cubit [5-meter] spear, Hom. *Il.* 18.474–609, 20.268–72; *Il.* 8.192–3; *Il.* 6.319–20; Wees 1992: 21. Arming increases the charisma of the heroes: Hom. *Il.* 11.17–45, 19.367–91, 17.210–12.

¹⁹⁸ Suet. *Galba* 6.3; Galba, then about 40, kept up with Caligula's chariot for 20 miles; cf. HA *Hadr.* 10.4.

¹⁹⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; Fronto, *Princ. Hist.* 12 paired with Fronto, *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19.

²⁰⁰ Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19.

without armor might even be dehumanized: Vegetius lamented that the soldiers of the later Empire went without armor and as a result they were slaughtered like sheep.²⁰¹

The practice of wearing armor might further differentiate Roman soldiers from non-Romans. Livy contrasts the ornate armor of the Samnites with the plain armor of a traditional Roman soldier: “a soldier should be rough to look upon, not ornamented.”²⁰² Even the Sabines, later a byword for austerity, were once associated with luxury, wearing rings and bracelets.²⁰³ Livy’s emphasis on the “rough” soldier is probably an invented tradition projected into the old Roman past, an ideological response to the mercenary troops of the late Republic. Suetonius’ Julius Caesar gave his troops armor chased with gold and silver.²⁰⁴

However, the *virtus* of Roman soldiers was also produced through practices inscribing the body more deeply than armor: training and austerity. The appearance of soldiers in armor did not guarantee the other elements of military *habitus*; furthermore, Roman armor did not cover the entire body in the manner of a medieval knight’s armor, and soldiers had to be inured to wounds to the arms and legs. This “hardening” took place through the imposition of *labores* and austerity; Cicero emphasizes that military training and experience taught soldiers to endure wounds. Most of all, the wearing of armor required effort or *intentio* to move and wield weapons.

The language of decline and collapse may be applied to more extensive, metaphorical bodies such as the Roman state in Livy’s famous passage that the empire had grown until it could scarcely support its weight.²⁰⁵ In his preface he states that “with the relaxation of discipline” (after the defeat of Carthage) “morals first gave way, as it were, then sank lower and lower, then plunged downward.” Livy employs the language of *habitus*, depicting the state as a body.²⁰⁶ The imagery of subsidence and collapse is applied to the entire state, as a society lacking the rigor or vigor to sustain good moral qualities.

²⁰¹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.20.10.

²⁰² Livy 10. 39.13; 9.40.4–5 *horridum militem esse debere, non caelatum*; Rouveret 1986: 117–18; on *horridus*, Cloud 1993: 127, 132–3. Chapter Five discusses the dissociation of soldiers from wealth and ornament.

²⁰³ Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 2.38.3 = Fabius Pictor fr.8.

²⁰⁴ Suet. *Jul.* 67.

²⁰⁵ Livy pr.4.

²⁰⁶ Livy pr.9.

Armor symbolized the emperor's burden of empire. Hadrian himself demonstrated this ability to bear the burden of empire by walking twenty miles on foot in armor.²⁰⁷ On observing that his chosen heir, L. Aelius Caesar, was too weak to fence with a somewhat heavy shield, Hadrian lamented that he had wasted the 300 million sesterces that he had given to the army and people on Aelius' adoption. "We have indeed leaned against a tottering wall, one which can hardly support even us, let alone the state."²⁰⁸ The author of the *Historia Augusta* displays Hadrian's credible (though probably fictional) reaction to Aelius' physical debility. By showing that his own body could not bear the weight of armor, the emperor's heir showed that he could not bear the burden of the state; he could not even bear the effort of oratory. Aelius died soon afterwards, and Hadrian chose another heir, Antoninus Pius, an elderly man who never appeared as a military emperor.

The symbolism is also found in Dio's indignation that at Antioch Caracalla wore linen armor, counterfeiting metal: "he could no longer bear great heat or the weight of armor, and therefore wore sleeved tunics fashioned more or less like a breastplate, so that, by creating an impression of armor without its weight, he could be safe from plots and at the same time rouse admiration."²⁰⁹ Dio thus suggests that Caracalla himself was a counterfeit ruler, hoping to legitimate himself on false pretenses. In the period of Hadrian and Caracalla, the emperor was not expected to participate in hand-to-hand combat. His wearing of armor was a demonstration of *habitus*, symbolic of his accepting the burdens of empire. The importance of effort in *disciplina militaris* is explored further in Chapter Six.

CONCLUSION

In the Principate, the emperor's personal leadership and his imposition of military discipline maintained the military *habitus* that resisted the decadence of the empire. Leaders adopted this highly moralized model of discipline of their own will, but imposed it on soldiers. The *habitus* and status of soldiers were generated in part by recruitment of desired social strata and ethnicity, the wearing of armor, and the imposition of an ethic of obedience and *modestia*. But the selection of recruits, the wearing of armor, etiquette and ritual, and ideal stance were somewhat

²⁰⁷ HA *Hadr.* 10.4.

²⁰⁸ HA *Ael.* 6.2–3. Cf. HA *Hadr.* 23.14–15.

²⁰⁹ Dio 79(78).3.2.

superficial and static forms of discipline, not addressing the essential social and economic conflicts of the imperial army. To address these conflicts, *disciplina militaris* imposed *habitus* more closely controlling economic and social practices, such as *labor*, remuneration, consumption, and punishment.

The emotional disposition desired of soldiers was *modestia*, implying compliance and obedience. However, an ethic of automatic obedience existed more in Stoic philosophizing than in actual military society. Punishment, *labor militaris*, and the repression of avarice were regarded as producing *modestia* and obedience. But, far from relying on categorical obedience, a Roman commander usually had to legitimate himself to his soldiers by a performance of military *habitus*, undertaking the same practices, *labores* and austerity, at least in symbolic fashion.

The officers sought to display masculinity in military service in order to maintain social control of the soldiers. It follows that soldier masculinity was a *subordinate* masculinity consistent with *modestia* and with respect for superiors. As will be seen, this subordinate masculinity was produced through the redefinition of *virtus* as produced through austerity and *labor*.

4 DISCIPLINA AND PUNISHMENT



INTRODUCTION

The modern or popular image of the Roman army stresses its brutal punishments, such as decimation, in which one out of ten soldiers, selected by lot, were beaten to death by their fellows. In another famous instance, Titus Manlius Torquatus, consul in 340 BC, executed his son, also named Titus Manlius Torquatus, for engaging in combat against his orders. These punishments and other such incidents became an important part of Roman elite cultural tradition, but they beg the question of how Roman military punishment functioned in social terms during the late Republic and Empire. Even punishment requires legitimation, as opposed to pure domination (the imposition of authority by force), which is inefficient.¹

Roman military punishment required legitimacy in the eyes of the aristocracy, who favored severity, and required legitimacy in the eyes of the soldiers, who had the ultimate recourse of mutiny. In contrast with a fully legal-rational social organization, a traditional system often grants the dominated some customary form of resistance. That the obedience of soldiers should be categorical and absolute was an elite ideal rather than reality.²

In the sources discussed here, three divergent modes or strategies of punishment appear. One tradition emphasizes absolute obedience and extreme severity, invoking incidents from the remote past and religious and moral tradition. Though *clementia* (mercy) was an imperial virtue, the authors of *exempla* praise lack of *clementia* toward the army and depict severity as restoring the *mos maiorum* (ancestral ways). This severe punishment was technically possible, because the commander in *militia* was unrestricted in his choice of penalties. Religious tradition also vaguely endorsed severity. In addition, the empire's civilian subjects, who resented soldiers' abusive behavior and legal privileges, favored the repression of the army. Even in the Severan period, an age of supposedly lax military discipline, the jurists'

¹ Weber 1978: 31, 33–4, 214, 953–4. On Roman military punishment, Th. Mommsen [1899] 1955: 27–34; Taubenschlag 1932; Sander 1958, 1960; Jung 1982: 963–73 (Republic), 973–1008 (Empire); Wesch-Klein 1998: 147–56; Campbell 1984: 300–314, 2002: 39; Herz 2007: 307; Southern 2007: 145–9.

² Veyne 1990: 218–19 and 247.

manuals on military affairs uphold severity, at least in the field. Both senatorial tradition and the provincials' complaints appear in the *Historia Augusta's* representations of martinets, though these biographies draw heavily on Republican *exempla*. In the later Empire, furthermore, emperors may actually have imitated these *exempla*.

The ideology that such severe punishments maintained Roman imperial domination was belied by events: when emperors and commanders imposed this degree of *severitas*, soldiers might perceive it as illegitimate *saevitia* (cruelty). They and the public increasingly perceived decimation as *saevitia*, motivating the Praetorians' revolt against Galba. Soldiers might also regard corporal punishment as *saevitia*, especially because their position in the social hierarchy of punishment was ambiguous. Corporal punishment of senatorial and equestrian officers became obsolete by the late Republic. Elite officers belonged to the *honestiores* ("more honorable"), a group defined in second-century AD law as exempt from most capital and corporal penalties. The lower social strata or *humiliores* ("more lowly") were subject to these penalties. Though soldiers were protected from the torture and exacerbated forms of execution inflicted on the *humiliores*, they were not among the *honestiores* and were still subject to corporal and capital punishment.

As another strategy of punishment, a general might shame and disgrace offenders. The structure of these shaming ceremonies suggests that they were modifications of decimation and of corporal punishments such as flogging. Such modifications compromised with tradition, invoking tradition without inflicting violent punishment. An example is the stripping of soldiers as if for traditional flogging, but merely to inflict public humiliation. Shaming punishments, furthermore, implied that soldiers had an honorable social status to lose. Shaming punishment was formalized as demotion or dishonorable discharge. The latter conferred *infamia*, a social and legal stigma.

In imperial sources, and some historical *exempla*, punishment through shaming is depicted as more effective than the imposition of extreme severity. The soldiers' shame and repentance, imposing collective self-punishment or even asking to be punished, displayed their internalization of military *habitus*. Especially in cases of cowardice, they might be granted a chance to rehabilitate themselves through the display of *virtus* in combat. Shaming punishments relied on the prior inculcation of military *habitus* through the practices discussed in other chapters of this book. In short, *disciplina* had to be maintained in other aspects of military life for shaming to be effective.

A third strategy of punishment interested the literary authors less, but appears in the jurists' excerpts and in surviving military documents. This strategy of punishment displays administrative rationality, employing documents, witnesses, and the service records of personnel. Such punishment resembled civilian *cognitio*. Bureaucratic process may have helped legitimate punishment in soldiers' eyes.

The Severan jurists, for the most part elite administrators, discussed the punishment of desertion according to this rational standard and displayed another compromise between the ideal of severe discipline and the practice. Though the jurists treated outright desertion, especially to the enemy, very harshly, they were more lenient in cases of *emansio* or absence without leave, at least in peacetime. From the late second century onward, though the offenses of soldiers were treated with more or less severity depending on the individual commanders and jurists, the penalties decreed for low-status civilians tended to become more severe.

Despite the aristocratic nostalgia for severe discipline, a countervailing model of personal leadership existed. Though the elite admired the imitation of severe *exempla* from the past, this practice could enrage the soldiers. The most successful Roman generals in the late Republic led by example rather than by fear of punishment and motivated their soldiers with honor and shame. Sallust emphasizes that it is better to reform one's soldiers by example than to punish them after the fact, and praises Metellus for doing the former. "Rather by keeping the [soldiers] from doing wrong than by punishing them, he soon restored the temper of his army."³ Sallust praises Marius because he "controlled his army rather by appealing to their sense of shame than by punishment," and Marius himself allegedly said, "For to live in luxury yourself but control your army by punishments is to be a master of slaves, not a commander."⁴ Caesar was able to settle a mutiny merely by shaming his soldiers, calling them not *milites*, but *Quirites*, civilians. Nonetheless, these anecdotes pertain mainly to the late Republican generals; the Augustan restoration displayed a return to severity.

THE PRESTIGE OF ARCHAIC *SEVERITAS*

The Roman elite praised the severe penalties of the past, such as decimation, prolonged execution by flogging with rods (*virgis caedi*), beheading, and even more brutal execution of deserters, who might be thrown to wild beasts. The ideal

³ Sall. *Jug.* 45.3.

⁴ Sall. *Jug.* 100.5, 85.35.

general's severity toward his soldiers "made him more terrible to the enemy than to his own men."⁵ In some instances, commanders deliberately imitated bygone punishments, as emperors also did in judging civilians. Suetonius praised the emperor Tiberius for reviving "bygone methods of punishment and ignominy."⁶ Jurists also alluded to or recommended archaic punishments of soldiers.

Though these roots cannot be explored here, the prestige of severe punishment may have arisen as patrician ideology during the early and middle Republic's Struggle of the Orders. When the patricians and wealthy plebeians merged into a new nobility by the third century BC, this nobility adopted aspects of patrician ideology, employed against the lower orders and popular leaders. *Severitas* merely became more visible in the High and Later Empires, due to the Christian martyr acts, the extension of citizenship to all inhabitants of the empire, and the survival of the Theodosian Code and the Digest. Criticism of such punishment took the form of claims of innocence, not arguments that cruelty was immoral.⁷

Besides invoking archaic and aristocratic tradition, the emperors and jurists, however, had another motive to punish soldiers: the need to address the provincials' complaints of military abuse of civilians. Some of these petitions and imperial responses concerning military abuses have survived as inscriptions erected by the municipalities involved.⁸ The civilians, furthermore, may have resented the legal privileges of soldiers. The satirist Juvenal says that trials concerning soldiers were held in the camp, which created, he alleges, an intimidating and unfair venue for civilians abused by soldiers.⁹ In imperial law soldiers were *absentes rei publicae causa*, away on public business, and were protected from summons to civilian courts.¹⁰ Abuses by soldiers might trigger provincial revolts; the author

⁵ On this archaism Lendon 2005: 191–2, 258, 313; G. R. Watson 1969: 117. E.g., Livy 8.8.1, Val. Max. 2.7.6, and Front. *Strat.* 4.1.40–41 (Torquatus and his son); Livy 8.31.1–35.9 and Val. Max. 2.7.8 (Papirius Cursor and Fabius Rullianus); Livy 9.16.17–19 (Papirius Cursor and a Praenestine officer). Deserters: Val. Max. 2.7.13–14. Generals: Plut. *Mar.* 14.2–3; said also of Corbulo: Tac. *Ann.* 11.18.

⁶ Suet. *Tib.* 19.

⁷ Harries 1999: 137, 144–50. Public crucifixion or hanging of criminals a deterrent, [Quint.] *Decl. min.* 274; D. 48.19.28.15 (Callistratus *Cogn.* 6).

⁸ Mitchell 1976: text, 107–9; others, 111–12; Campbell 1984: 243–54; Isaac 1992: 282–304; Wesch-Klein 1998: 135–9; Hauken 1998 (texts); Campbell 2002: 87–8. Most are from Asia Minor.

⁹ Juv. *Sat.* 16.15–17 probably applies to the Praetorians, the most visible and most privileged troops in the city of Rome.

¹⁰ Campbell 1984: 236–42. Soldiers should rarely be called away from the standards: Hadrian in D. 22.5.3.6 (Callistratus *Cogn.* 4). However, men should also not enlist to evade prosecution or otherwise gain an advantage in a lawsuit, D. 49.16.4.8 (Arr. Menander *Re mil.* 1). Campbell 1984: 254–63.

of the *Historia Augusta* praised emperors who severely repressed soldiers' abuses of civilians.¹¹

Thus, the punishment of the army was an important aspect of imperial ideology – a reason for many authors' advocacy of severity. The repression of extortion and corruption is discussed in Chapter Five. That often little could be done to stop the abuses by military personnel probably popularized what may be termed *Schadenfreude* literature, such as praises of republican and imperial severity and the *Historia Augusta's* lives of Avidius Cassius and Pescennius Niger.

IMPERIUM MILITIAE

In tradition and law, a Roman commander had unrestricted freedom to inflict severe punishment on his soldiers. The commander possessed *imperium militiae* over his soldiers, from which there was no appeal (*provocatio*).¹² When Roman commanders inflicted brutal, humiliating, or sometimes bizarre punishments on soldiers, these anecdotes give no indication that these punishments were illegal.¹³ The transition to the late Republic does not seem to have altered this.¹⁴

In the Principate, the disciplinary powers of senatorial proconsular and propraetorian legates were probably sufficient to punish soldiers, even if the emperor, possessing *maius* (greater) *imperium*, could override their *imperium militiae*.¹⁵ *Imperium militiae* was in part pragmatic, expediting decisions that might often need to be made quickly in an emergency. In remote provinces or beyond the frontiers, a commander would only waste time referring decisions to punish soldiers to the

¹¹ Revolts: e.g., Tac. *Ann.* 14.31 (Britain, AD 60); Joseph. *BJ passim*; Tac. *Hist.* 4.14 (the Batavian revolt in AD 70). Talmudic sources depict soldiers' abuses, Isaac 1992: 115–18, 282–94. Emperors repress soldiers' abuses: Suet. *Aug.* 24, *Vesp.* 8; HA *Hadr.* 10.3–7, *Avid.* 4.2, *Pesc.* 3.6, 10.5–6; Hdn. 2.3.9, 2.4.4. HA *Macr.* 12.4–5, *Alex.* 52.1, 53.2, *Aurel.* 7.4, 7.5–8.

¹² Cic. *Leg.* 3.3.6. Th. Mommsen [1899] 1955: 27; Strachan-Davidson 1912: 100, 103–4; Brand 1968: 39–44; Giuffrè 1974b: 30; Jung 1982: 967–8; Vendrand-Voyer 1983: 60, 165–6; Lintott 1993: 68; Nippel 1995: 6; Giuffrè 1996: 187–96 on *imperium* in the Late Republic; Wesch-Klein 1998: 151.

¹³ Jung 1982: 968.

¹⁴ Jung 1982: 972–3. Against Th. Mommsen [1899] 1955: 31–2 n. 3. According to Mommsen, Roman commanders lost arbitrary powers after 108 BC, when Metellus flogged and executed a Latin officer for cowardice (Sall. *Jug.* 69.4; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 8). However, executions and decimations after this date appear legitimate, e.g., App. *BC* 1.13.109 (Sertorius); App. *BC* 3.8.56 (Piso's defense of Antony's decimation of troops); Plut. *Crass.* 10.2.

¹⁵ Parker [1928] 1958: 282.

emperor.¹⁶ Trajan himself, judging a centurion who had cuckolded his commander, stated that not every case of discipline should be referred to the emperor.¹⁷ When Galba, not yet emperor, starved a soldier to death for selling his rations at an inflated price, or when Lucius Apronius decimated troops who fled the enemy, or when Corbulo put to death soldiers who dug ramparts without wearing their weapons or who left their posts, there is no sign that these punishments were considered unlawful.¹⁸ In the Principate, governors and probably legates of individual legions possessed the right to execute soldiers, and could delegate the power to punish soldiers to the tribunes, whereas centurions usually carried out actual corporal punishment, inflicting beatings with the *vitis* or vine-staff.¹⁹

Relatively little is known of how military crimes were tried by the commander and a probable *consilium* of officers. Except for a discussion of desertion, examined later in this chapter, the jurists were not interested in this process.²⁰ In the jurists' writings, military crimes are separated from civilian crimes.²¹ The jurist Arrius Menander states that a soldier's crimes that were not committed in his capacity as a soldier should be punished as for civilians.²² Hence, in their excerpts in Digest 49.16, the jurists discuss crimes that only soldiers can commit, such as desertion, flight from the battle line, and mutiny. Crimes that civilians could also commit might be tried according to the civil laws even when soldiers committed them.²³ Presumably theft, breach of contract, and other property crimes were also subject to civil law, whereas in the past soldiers had taken an oath to the commander not to steal. Civilian crimes against property and morals may have been punished more harshly when soldiers committed them, as a jurist prescribes.²⁴ A soldier who committed adultery became infamous and was ignominiously discharged; a

¹⁶ D. 1.16.6.2 (Ulpian *Off. procos.* 1). Displayed by emperors' referring punishment of soldiers back to governors, instances in Hauken 1998.

¹⁷ Plin. *Ep.* 6.31.6.

¹⁸ Suet. *Galba* 7.2; Tac. *Ann.* 3.21, 11.18, 13.35, 14.44; Garnsey 1968; Jung 1982: 974–5; Lintott 1993: 121–2; Eck 1996: 169; Peachin 1996: 68–9; Aubert 2002: 98–9.

¹⁹ Brand 1968: 77–9; Jung 1982: 969–70; Wesch-Klein 1998: 148, 151. After Severus, *speculatores, questionarii*, and *beneficiarii* (officers below centurion rank) might inflict corporal punishment on soldiers, D. 49.16.13.4 (Macer *Re mil.* 2). Sander 1954–5: 103.

²⁰ Jung 1982: 1007; Sander 1960: 300–301 stresses similarity to *cognitio*. In the Republic, officers who molested soldiers could be publicly tried: Val. Max. 6.1.10–11.

²¹ Jung 1982: 975–6.

²² D. 49.16.2.pr (Menander *Re mil.* 1).

²³ Jung 1982: 999.

²⁴ D. 48.19.14.pr. (Aemilius Macer *Re mil.* 2), doubted by Bauman 1996: 132 n. 38.

soldier caught stealing in the baths received a dishonorable discharge.²⁵ But violent crimes by soldiers – whether against themselves (suicide attempts), comrades, or civilians – fell under military discipline, as argued in the section “Emperors and jurists” later in this chapter.

SACRAMENTUM MILITIAE

The Roman *sacramentum militiae* (military oath) has been much studied, but is still poorly understood.²⁶ It may have originally been a sacred oath.²⁷ Its breaking supposedly required the expiatory sacrifice of the wrongdoer. Such sacrifices were not required in the late Republic (when many troops deserted or defected *en masse*) and imperial period; generals could apply a range of punishments, even for such grave military offenses as flight and insubordination. Furthermore, the evidence for this expiatory sacrifice derives from Latin antiquarians, many writing centuries later than the supposed practices.

As reconstructed from these sources, the breakers of the *sacramentum* became *sacer*, undergoing *sacratio* or consecration to the gods.²⁸ They, and the breakers of other *leges sacratae* which penalized moving boundary stones, defrauding one’s client, or beating one’s father, were liable to capital punishment in the form of expiatory sacrifice.²⁹ For *perduellio* (treason), the offender was hung upon or bound to an *arbor infelix* (a fruitless or thorny tree) and was flogged to death.³⁰ This was the intended fate of Horatius for murdering his sister.³¹ The penalty of flogging (*virgis caedi*) followed by beheading with the axe (*securi percussio*) may have had a similar expiatory function.³² Archaizing views of Roman military punishment

²⁵ D. 3.2.2.3 (Ulpian *Edict.* 6). Jung 1982: 999–1001. Phang 2001: 251–60 discusses rape and other sexual crimes. Stealing in the baths: D. 47.17.3 (Paul *Poen. mil.*).

²⁶ Strachan-Davidson 1912: 51–2; R. E. Smith 1958: 35; G. R. Watson 1969: 44, 49ff; Brand 1968: 83–98; Jung 1982: 965; Campbell 1984: 19–31; Rüpke 1990: 76–91; Hinard 1993; Lendon 1997: 253, 255, 257–8; Stoll 1998: 139; Rawlings 2007: 51.

²⁷ Barton 1993: 14 n. 12, 15 n. 14; Stoll 1998: 139. According to Hinard 1993, Latin antiquarians (e.g., Oros. 2.5.3) and older modern authors exaggerated the *sacramentum* and conflated it with the *devotio*.

²⁸ Th. Mommsen [1899] 1955: 900–902; Bennett 1930: 5–18; Cantarella 1991: 290–304.

²⁹ Th. Mommsen [1899] 1955: 36, 902; Strachan-Davidson 1912: 51–2; Helgeland 1978: 1478; Rüpke 1990: 79–80; Nippel 1995: 24; less strongly, Campbell 1984: 29. Macrobian *Sat.* 3.7.4 first calls the process *sacratio*.

³⁰ Cantarella 1991: 176; Oldfather 1908; Cic. *Rab. Perd.* 13 defended Rabirius from its revival.

³¹ Livy 1.26.6 and 11.

³² Oldfather 1908: 72; Cantarella 1991: 223.

depict military executions, at least in the early and middle Republic, as expiatory sacrifices.³³

However, by the late fourth century BC, when Papirius Cursor mocked a Praenestine officer by preparing to execute him and then dismissing him, military corporal and capital punishments probably lacked any particular religious connotation.³⁴ The religiosity of the Samnite legion's oath, sealed with human sacrifice, is meant to seem disturbingly alien.³⁵ The punishment of *virgis caedi* was discontinued, at least for officers, by the late Republic. However, soldiers still might be beaten with rods, at least in the opinion of one jurist.³⁶ Some archaic and symbolic executions continued to be inflicted on civilians. Besides better known forms of death such as crucifixion or condemnation to the arena, the punishment of the sack (*culleus*) was imposed on parricides: the condemned was enclosed in a leather sack with a cock, a snake, a dog, and a monkey and thrown into the sea.³⁷

Polybius reports that an officer read the complete oath, and that the men came forward, one at a time, and affirmed it.³⁸ According to the antiquarian Festus, this first, full version was called the *praeiuratio* and the soldiers said *idem in me*, "the same in my case."³⁹ In 216 BC, before Cannae, the tribunes imposed an additional oath, called an *iusiurandum*, "not to flee nor to depart from fear or abandon the battle line unless to take up or seek a weapon or strike down the foe or save a fellow citizen."⁴⁰

The *sacramentum* itself is not directly preserved before Vegetius' version.⁴¹ According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, soldiers swore "to follow the consuls

³³ Sander 1960: 304; Jung 1982: 1003.

³⁴ Rüpke 1990: 80. Caesar's sacrifice of two soldiers to Mars (Dio 43.24.4) was regarded as cruel and bizarre.

³⁵ Livy 10.38.6–13, 10.39.16; on the episode, Rouveret 1986.

³⁶ Strachan-Davidson 1912: 119 views citizen soldiers as exempted from *virgis caedi*, not from the less shaming *vitis* (centurion's vine stock); Brand 1968: 80. In Livy *Per.* 57, Scipio assigns the *vitis* to Roman citizen soldiers, *virgae* to allies. Cf. Front. *Strat.* 4.1.20 (138 BC); possibly Plut. *Sulla* 16.5 in 88 BC. In the high Empire, social status rather than citizenship differentiated punishment: in D. 49.16.3.16 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4) soldiers could be beaten with rods, though D. 48.19.28.2 (Callistratus *Cogn.* 6) shows that *honestiores* could not.

³⁷ Cic. *Rosc. Amer.* 70–72, *Inv.* 2.149, *Rhet. Herenn.* 1.13; Livy *Per.* 68; Oros. 5.16.23; D. 48.9.9.pr–1 (Modestinus *Pand.* 12). Strachan-Davidson 1912: 23–4; Cantarella 1991: 9, 125; Bauman 1996: 30; Robinson 1998: 234–5. Lintott 1999: 38–9 depicts the sack as an invented tradition, based on Livy *Per.* 68; the animals were introduced in the later Empire.

³⁸ Polyb. 6.21.1–4.

³⁹ Festus 250L.

⁴⁰ Livy 22.38.1–6.

⁴¹ Campbell 1984: 19; Veg. *Mil.* 2.5.3–4.

to whatever wars they may be called, and to neither desert the standards nor do anything else contrary to the law.” The commander was empowered by law to put to death whoever deserted the standards.⁴² Servius adds that soldiers swore not to leave until they were dismissed by the consul.⁴³

Special oaths were also administered. Polybius reports an oath to steal nothing from the camp. The early Latin military writer Cincius Alimentus, preserved by the antiquarian Aulus Gellius, recorded an oath prohibiting pillage but listing exceptional items that soldiers were permitted to take: a spear, spear shaft, wood, fruit, fodder, bladder, bag, and torch.⁴⁴ Multiple oaths may have been administered as needed.⁴⁵ During the civil wars, special oaths not to desert were often imposed – for instance, on the Pompeians before the battle of Ilerda.⁴⁶

In the late Republic, the military oath became more and more a personal bond to the individual commander, first imposed by Sulla on his troops.⁴⁷ Despite oaths not to desert, deserters during the civil wars often took oaths to new generals. In the Principate, soldiers swore the *sacramentum* to the emperor at his accession; this oath was regular and more impersonal, not requiring his personal presence.⁴⁸ They renewed their oath every January 3 and on the annual *dies imperii* (accession anniversary) of the emperor. That the *sacramentum* retained some religious force in this period is possible. Conventional authors depict military revolt and assassination of emperors as impieties.⁴⁹ At Dura-Europos, in the early third century AD, the *cohors XX Palmyrenorum* swore every day at the morning muster: “we will perform what has been ordered and are ready for all orders.”⁵⁰

According to some, the *sacramentum militiae* regained its original religious value in the third century in competition with Christian values.⁵¹ Christian martyr acts and polemics contrast the secular *militia* with the *militia Christi*, comparing soldiers and

⁴² Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 10.18.2, 11.43.

⁴³ Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.614.

⁴⁴ Polyb. 6.33.1; Gell. 16.4.2–4.

⁴⁵ E.g., to raise morale in 480 BC, Livy 2.45.13–14; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 9.10.

⁴⁶ Caes. *BC* 1.76.2–3, 3.13.3–4 (48 BC).

⁴⁷ Campbell 1984: 20; Plut. *Sulla* 27.4; by Cinna, App. *BC* 1.8.66; by Petreius, Caes. *BC* 1.76.

⁴⁸ Campbell 1984: 23–32 at 25; Gilliver 2007: 187. Campbell 1984: 26–7 argues that the military *sacramentum* was distinct from oaths sworn by the entire people (to Augustus by *tota Italia* in 32 BC; to Tiberius by the Senate and People in *Annals* 1.7).

⁴⁹ Campbell 1984: 29–31. E.g., Hdn. 2.13.5–8 on the murder of Pertinax.

⁵⁰ RMR 47 (early third century): *quod imperatum fuerit faciemus et ad omnem tesseram parati erimus.*

⁵¹ Helgeland 1978: 1495; Le Bohec 1994: 239; Lendon 1997: 255, 257–8.

martyrs. But these rhetorical and polemical accounts are unreliable as evidence for the significance of the *sacramentum* in the High Empire.⁵² Most Christians serving in the army do not seem to have been persecuted, before the emperors Diocletian and Maximian issued a purge to remove them from the army a few years before the “Great” Persecution.⁵³ By Vegetius’ time, the military oath itself took a Christian form, in which soldiers swore “by God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, and the Imperial Majesty” not to desert or flee the battle line.⁵⁴

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF INDIVIDUALS

In the late Republic and Empire, military discipline continued to impose capital punishment of individuals. It was traditional to execute deserters, especially deserters to the enemy. Deserters posed not just a risk to military manpower, but also a risk to internal security, as they often became brigands, preying upon civilian travelers. Deserters to the enemy brought Roman weapons, armor, and fighting skills with them.

At the ends of wars, some commanders executed deserters in spectacular ways. After the battle of Zama, Scipio Africanus allegedly crucified Roman deserters, beheading Latin ones.⁵⁵ After the destruction of Carthage in 146 BC, Scipio Aemilianus threw allied deserters to wild beasts in the public spectacles he staged at his triumph.⁵⁶ Scipio Aemilianus’ father Aemilius Paullus sentenced allied deserters to be trampled by elephants at such spectacles.⁵⁷ Reflecting on this particularly unpleasant form of execution, Valerius Maximus moralizes,

For military discipline requires a harsh, brusque sort of punishment because strength consists in arms, and when these stray away from the right path they will crush unless they be crushed.⁵⁸

The jurists continued to advocate the capital punishment of deserters and *transfugae*, as will be seen later.

⁵² *Acta Max.* 1.1–5; Musurillo 1972: 250–59; Tert. *Corona*.

⁵³ Helgeland 1978: 1496–7.

⁵⁴ *Veg. Mil.* 2.5.3.

⁵⁵ *Val. Max.* 2.7.12; Lintott 1999: 42–3; Aubert 2002: 118–19; also Livy 30.43.13.

⁵⁶ *Val. Max.* 2.7.13.

⁵⁷ *Val. Max.* 2.7.14.

⁵⁸ *Val. Max.* 2.7.14.

In the archaic period and early Republic, deserters, wherever found, may have been killed out of hand as enemies.⁵⁹ In keeping with this archaism, the jurist Arrius Menander states that a deserter found in Rome suffers capital punishment.⁶⁰ A *controversia* (debating exercise) of Pseudo-Quintilian states as premise “a brave man encounters a deserter and kills him.”⁶¹ However, that this was the premise of a debating exercise suggests that this action was by no means accepted. In addition, the *controversiae* often featured archaic topics. By the Severan period, the jurists treat only deserters to the enemy as *hostes publici* (public enemies) liable to summary execution. Deserters who did not go over to the enemy might be treated more leniently.⁶² The extension of the Roman citizenship also may have motivated this amelioration; by the second century AD many auxiliaries and sailors were Roman citizens. A later section of this chapter examines how emperors and jurists reconciled the severe punishment of desertion with a more moderate attitude toward absence without leave.

However, the emphasis on the capital punishment of deserters in Republican *exempla* is probably due to nostalgia. In the civil wars of the late Republic, commanders might accept deserters from the other side. Frontinus’ anecdotes also feature psychological stratagems to check desertion. Lucullus sent troops to pursue deserters, not to kill them but to force them to fight the enemy.⁶³ In an “external” *exemplum*, Frontinus and Nepos relate that the Persian general Datames pursued deserting troops and, on meeting them, praised them for advancing so far ahead of his main force to fight the enemy; the deserters were overcome with shame and changed their intention.⁶⁴ Those who fled might be excluded from the military community, forbidden to enter the camp, and forced to tent without the walls. This practice occurred in the early Republic as well as in the late.⁶⁵ In AD 47, against usual practice, Corbulo put to death many who deserted for the first time.⁶⁶ In the later Empire, the tattooing of soldiers at enlistment was intended

⁵⁹ Strachan–Davidson 1912: 122.

⁶⁰ D. 49.16.5.3 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

⁶¹ [Quint.] *Decl. min.* 315.

⁶² In battle, commanders might threaten to kill deserters or fleeing soldiers, Front. *Strat.* 2.8.8–9, 11, 14; cf. Val. Max. 2.7.10; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.29, 4.1.33. A soldier who informs Otho of his defeat at Bedriacum kills himself rather than be thought a deserter, Dio 63(64).11.2.

⁶³ Front. *Strat.* 2.7.8.

⁶⁴ Front. *Strat.* 2.7.9; Nepos *Datames* 6; cf. Diodorus 15.91.

⁶⁵ Early, Front. *Strat.* 2.8.6; late, Front. *Strat.* 2.8.7.

⁶⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.5.

to repress desertion, but strident imperial legislation on desertion shows that it continued.⁶⁷

Prestigious *exempla* from the early and middle Republic emphasized that the commander might put to death personnel, even his own son or his immediate subordinate officer, for cowardice or disobedience. Nostalgic imperial authors often retold these stories. The most detailed episodes concern T. Manlius Torquatus, consul in 347, 344, and 340 BC, who in 340 BC put to death his son, also named T. Manlius Torquatus, for fighting a duel with an enemy soldier contrary to orders before the battle of Veseris.⁶⁸ Ironically, Torquatus the father had in his youth fought a single combat, taking the *cognomen* Torquatus from his opponent's metal torque. For putting to death his son, Torquatus obtained another nickname, Imperiosus.

Another much-retold episode occurred fifteen years later. In 325 BC, L. Papirius Cursor, then dictator, attempted to execute his master of the horse, Fabius Rulianus, for fighting the Samnites contrary to orders, even though Fabius had been victorious.⁶⁹ This time, there was an outcry. Fabius and his soldiers appealed to the Senate, and Fabius' father appealed to the plebs, accusing Papirius of arrogance and cruelty in seeking to humiliate and execute a Roman victor. Fabius was spared, but not before he had been stripped in preparation for his flogging and beheading.

These episodes and others are rhetorically presented in Livy and Valerius Maximus. As authors of the new imperial dispensation, they moralize on the necessity of military discipline, represented as requiring absolute obedience; the emphasis is social and moral, not on rigid formation.⁷⁰ In a similar vein, Polybius and Josephus, who admired the Roman army, emphasized its severe punishment of individual offenders, whether they were guilty of flight, theft, disobedience, or "even a slight neglect of duty."⁷¹ Polybius depicts those who fail to keep watch as put to death by cudgeling (*xulokopeitai* or *fustuarium*), a punishment similar to

⁶⁷ G. R. Watson 1969: 50–51; Vallejo Gírvés 1996.

⁶⁸ Livy 8.7.1–8.2; Cic. *Fin.* 1.23–25, 1.35; Val. Max. 2.7.6; Flor. 1.9.2; Gell. 9.13.1–20; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.40–41. A descendant of Torquatus in the late Republic imitated him by putting to death his adoptive son, Cic. *Fin.* 1.24; Val. Max. 5.8.3.

⁶⁹ Livy 8.30.1–35.9; Val. Max. 2.7.8; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.39.

⁷⁰ Nippel 1995: 50–51; e.g., L. Junius Brutus, Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.8; Plut. *Publ.* 6.3; Sp. Cassius, Livy 2.41.10–11; A. Postumius (431 BC) in Livy 4.2.9–5–6; Val. Max. 2.7.6; Gell. 17.21.17; Val. Max. 5.8.5; Dio 37.36.4.

⁷¹ Joseph. *Bj* 3.103. Titus threatens to execute soldiers who engage the enemy without orders or who are captured, but yields to his soldiers' entreaties to spare them: Joseph. *Bj* 5.128–30, 6.361–2.

decimation but with a singular and manifestly guilty victim.⁷² The impression is easily gained that the Roman army executed soldiers for most infractions. In fact, when historical *exempla* and rhetorical or prescriptive texts are set aside, there is little historical evidence for such extreme harshness in the imperial period. The treatises of the Severan jurists also constitute prescriptive evidence, and will be discussed separately. The literary elite, who regarded an insubordinate and greedy soldiery as a major cause of civil warfare, indulged in nostalgic *Schadenfreude* by depicting the execution of disobedient soldiers in the remote past.

The imperial army could not attract large numbers of volunteers if they ran the risk of execution for minor infractions. Severity toward deserters was another matter, consistent with maintaining manpower.⁷³ The elite authors continued to emphasize exceptional severity, such as that of Titus, who put to death a cavalryman who lost his horse.⁷⁴ Domitius Corbulo inflicted capital punishment on soldiers who failed to wear their weapons, both sword and dagger, in the field, even while digging ramparts.⁷⁵ Corbulo also put soldiers to death for leaving the standards, even if they did so for the first time.⁷⁶ These anecdotes appear laudatory. However, when Cn. Calpurnius Piso, governor of Syria in AD 17, crucified a centurion, the Senate and the emperor Tiberius depicted this as “unique cruelty.” The punishment was cruel especially because the offence was merely the absence without leave of the centurion’s subordinate, as Seneca relates in his treatise *On Anger*.⁷⁷ In addition, mutinous soldiers might use the unjust execution of comrades to rouse their peers to anger.⁷⁸

DECIMATION

Decimation was perhaps the most notorious Roman military punishment.⁷⁹ It might be inflicted for mass flight or insubordination. One-tenth of the unit or

⁷² Polyb. 6.37.1–6.

⁷³ Brunt 1974; Campbell 1984: 303.

⁷⁴ Joseph. *BJ* 6.155. The usual penalty was a fine: Herz 2007: 315–16 (a rider made a deposit for a horse, which the army kept if he lost or damaged the animal).

⁷⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 11.18.

⁷⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; usually such a penalty was applied only to second or third offenders.

⁷⁷ *SC de Cn. Pisone patre* II. 49–52; cf. Sen. *Ira* 1.18.3–5; Eck 1996: 168–72; Aubert 2002: 117–18; HA *Avid.* 4.1–2, 6 is probably fantastic.

⁷⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 1.22.

⁷⁹ Fiebiger 1901: col. 2272; Oldfather 1908: 69 n. 2; Currie 1928: 37; Parker [1928] 1958: 283–4; Brand 1968: 74–5; Lintott 1999: 41–2; G. R. Watson 1969: 119–20; Jung 1982: 965, 968; Robinson 1995: 17; Bauman 1996: 81, 144; Lee 1996: 203–4; Gilliver 1996b; Wesch-Klein 1998: 153 and n. 34; Campbell 2002: 39,

group being punished were selected by lot and clubbed to death by their spared comrades. (It was also possible, though even rarer, to put to death an entire unit.)⁸⁰ Polybius is our oldest contemporary source on this practice:

If [desertion, flight, throwing away weapons] . . . ever happens to large units . . . the officers refrain from inflicting *xulokopein* or the death penalty on all, but find a solution of the difficulty which is both salutary and terror-striking (*kataplēktikēn*). The tribune assembles the legion, and brings up those guilty of leaving the ranks, reproaches them sharply, and finally chooses by lot (*stochazomenos*) sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes twenty of the offenders, so adjusting the number thus chosen that they form as near as possible the tenth part of those guilty of cowardice. Those on whom the lot falls are cudged mercilessly in the manner above described, the rest receive rations of barley instead of wheat and are ordered to encamp outside the camp in an unprotected spot. As therefore the danger and dread of drawing the fatal lot affects all equally, as it is uncertain on whom it will fall, and as the public disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike, this practice is the best calculated both to inspire fear (*kataplēxis*) and to correct the wrongdoing.⁸¹

Roman decimation was unusual because it was a collective punishment. Only some of those selected by lot may have been guilty of the offense, so the victims would include both guilty and innocent men.⁸² Decimation thus made the entire unit responsible for the behavior of its individuals. An anecdote in Frontinus' *Stratagems* explains the effect of such collective liability: when some of his soldiers were guilty of insubordination, Pompey assembled for punishment both guilty and innocent men, creating a collective sense of liability, though he did not decimate them.⁸³

Beating was structurally bloodless, because it did not employ a blade, but in practice beating was probably bloody and more brutal to witness (and inflict)

71; Moore *forthcoming*. By the mid-twentieth century, "decimate" became an erroneous synonym for "annihilate," Fowler [1926] 1965: s.v. *decimate*.

⁸⁰ Polyb. 1.7.11–12; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.38; Val. Max. 2.7.15. Jung 1982: 970. App. *BC* 1.13.109; Sertorius executed an entire cohort because one man had attempted to rape a woman.

⁸¹ Polyb. 6.38.1–4.

⁸² Robinson 1995: 17.

⁸³ Front. *Strat.* 1.9.3.

than the quick death provided by the axe or sword.⁸⁴ Roman soldiers carried *fustes*, clubs or nightsticks, differing from the centurion's *vitis* or vine stock, a symbol of his authority and used to punish.⁸⁵ Survivors of decimation sometimes had to camp outside the walls and consume barley rations.⁸⁶ Such temporary expulsion might also be imposed as shaming without decimation.

Decimation might punish a unit for mutiny or mass flight from the enemy. When his troops mutinied and were routed in his war against the Volscians in 471 BC, Appius Claudius subjected to *virgis caedere* (flogging) and execution those who had lost their weapons or standards and centurions who deserted their men, while decimating the rest.⁸⁷ Not every mutiny, of course, resulted in a decimation. Scipio Africanus at Sucro punished his mutinous soldiers merely with public execution of the ringleaders.⁸⁸

Instances of decimation continued into the late Republic and early Principate. Crassus decimated 500 Roman soldiers who fled from Spartacus' slave army.⁸⁹ Plutarch depicts the punishment, carried out before the entire army, as "very savage and repulsive." Appian, however, regards the episode as salutary: Crassus showed his soldiers "that he was more dangerous to them than the enemy" and in consequence his army defeated the slave rebels with only minor losses, "so great was the improvement in their spirit inspired by the recent punishment."⁹⁰ Polybius also seems to regard decimation as a guarantor and source of Roman prowess.⁹¹

However, other sources show that by the period of the triumviral wars, decimation had become controversial. In decimating his troops for cowardice and insubordination, Mark Antony executed a larger fraction than one in ten, "thinking that he would thus quickly strike terror into them."⁹² At Rome, though

⁸⁴ Plut. *Crass.* 10.2 and Amm. Marc. 29.5.22 do not state that beating was used. Y. Thomas 1984b: 509–10; Nippel 1995: 43 view beating's structural bloodlessness as ritually exculpating the men of blood guilt.

⁸⁵ M. P. Speidel 1993.

⁸⁶ Braun 1995; Lee 1996: 203, though Cato *Agr.* 56 assigns slaves wheat. Barley intended as fodder may have been of lower quality than grain prepared for humans.

⁸⁷ Livy 2.59.9–11, 5.6.14; Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 11.42–44; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.34; Dio 5.23.3. Messer 1920: 164–5. Cf. Front. *Strat.* 4.1.35–6.

⁸⁸ Sucro: *op. cit.* Chapter Three n. 6; App. *Iber.* 35–6.

⁸⁹ Plut. *Crass.* 10.2; App. *BC* 1.14.118. Goldsworthy 2003: 182.

⁹⁰ App. *BC* 1.14.118–19.

⁹¹ Rawson 1971: 22.

⁹² App. *BC* 3.7.43, 3.8.53, 56; Cic. *Philip.* 3.14; Plut. *Ant.* 39.7; Dio 49.27.1; Nicolet 1980: 135; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.37: Antony decimated two cohorts for letting the enemy fire siege works, and put the others on barley rations.

some defended the commander's prerogative, Cicero denounced Antony's cruelty in putting to death innocent men not for blatant mutiny, but "for a word or a laugh."⁹³ Octavian's agents distributed handbills to Antony's soldiers that stressed his stinginess and cruelty.⁹⁴

Caesar, in contrast, represents his troops as actually *demanding* to be decimated to expunge the shame of insubordination or cowardice.⁹⁵ At Placentia, when Caesar's soldiers mutinied because he had not paid them a donative promised at Brundisium, Caesar disbanded and threatened to decimate a legion. When its officers begged for mercy, he selected 120 ringleaders and executed 12 selected by lot; he reinstated the rest.⁹⁶ After Pompey inflicted a reverse on Caesar's army at Dyrrachium, Caesar's troops "out of shame" demanded that they be decimated in the traditional manner.⁹⁷ Caesar was unwilling to do this, and reluctantly punished a few, demoting the standard bearers. His men imposed harsher tasks on themselves and were eager to engage the enemy, hoping thus to wipe out their disgrace. After the battle of Pharsalus, on returning to Rome, the Tenth Legion mutinied because Caesar had not paid them a donative or given them their discharge. Caesar merely said that he would "triumph with other soldiers" and addressed his men as *Quirites* (citizens) rather than *milites* (soldiers), thus dismissing them.⁹⁸ The Tenth Legion allegedly begged to be decimated to expunge the shame of this repudiation.⁹⁹

In keeping with Caesar's reputation for *misericordia* (mercy), the tradition thus seeks to exculpate him from the charge of cruelty (*saevitia*) in inflicting decimation, because his soldiers request it. This tradition also glorifies his soldiers as so well trained that they have internalized the disgrace of insubordination to the extent of begging for decimation. Soldiers internalized the shame of insubordination or cowardice as part of the military *habitus*. As a result, soldiers were more prone to insubordination, cowardice, or pillage when fighting at night, when

⁹³ App. *BC* 3.8.53; Piso, 3.8.56.

⁹⁴ App. *BC* 3.7.44.

⁹⁵ Caesar's political propaganda motive is probably uppermost.

⁹⁶ App. *BC* 2.7.47; Suet. *Iul.* 69; Dio 41.35.5. G. R. Watson 1969: 122; Blois 2000: 20; Goldsworthy 2003: 245; Blois 2007: 174–5.

⁹⁷ Caes. *BC* 3.74; App. *BC* 2.10.63; Suet. *Iul.* 68.3.

⁹⁸ App. *BC* 2.13.92–4; Plut. *Caes.* 51; Suet. *Iul.* 70; Dio 42.52.1–55.3; Front. *Strat.* 4.5.2; G. R. Watson 1969: 122; Chrissanthos 2001: 73; Goldsworthy 2003: 265; Blois 2007: 175. Caesar fined the ringleaders a third of their donative and *praemia*.

⁹⁹ App. *BC* 2.13.94.

neither their commanders nor their peers could observe their behavior in the darkness.¹⁰⁰

The aftermaths of other routs and mutinies display other instances of Roman soldiers' collective self-punishment of wrongdoers or requests for punishment.¹⁰¹ At the end of the Pannonian mutiny, Drusus may have had the ringleaders executed in secret, but the remorseful troops turned over other guilty soldiers as proof of their loyalty. On the Rhine, after Germanicus shamed the soldiers by sending away his wife Agrippina and his children, the men of their own accord seized the ringleaders of the mutiny, trying and punishing them themselves.¹⁰² Tacitus says that Germanicus did not take any initiative in this purge, so that, if the soldiers' feelings turned against it, they would not blame him.¹⁰³

In the imperial period, decimation became more and more a rusty and antique, though terrible, penalty. Augustus, in the spirit of archaism that marked some of his other punishments, decimated cohorts that fled in battle, feeding the survivors on barley.¹⁰⁴ In Africa, the Numidian leader Tacfarinas inflicted a rout on the Romans; the new legate Lucius Apronius decimated the survivors, a practice that Tacitus terms "rare at this time but notorious to our ancestors."¹⁰⁵ In AD 40, Caligula wanted to decimate the Rhine legions as punishment for their mutiny under his father Germanicus' command, twenty-six years ago. In this account of Caligula's German campaign, Caligula exaggerates severe military discipline to the point of parody.¹⁰⁶ The soldiers now did not cooperate.¹⁰⁷ Caligula assembled the legionaries without their arms, surrounded by armed horsemen, but when he noticed that some were slipping away to get their weapons, he departed in haste.

¹⁰⁰ Caes. *BC* 2.31; Tac. *Hist.* 1.80; 3.19.

¹⁰¹ Livy 27.13.1–10; App. *BC* 5.2.16; Tac. *Ann.* 1.29.3–4, 1.30.1, 1.44. Sander 1960: 290; Rosenstein 1990: 104; on soldiers' shame also Lendon 1997: 248–9.

¹⁰² Tac. *Ann.* 1.29.3–4, 1.44. Campbell 1984: 371; Lendon 1997: 248–9.

¹⁰³ Tac. *Ann.* 1.44. On this mutiny and self-punishment, M. F. Williams 1997: 51–8, 56, 60; Goldsworthy 2003: 278–80.

¹⁰⁴ Suet. *Aug.* 24.2; Dio 49.38.4, 48.42.2: Domitius Calvus also inflicted a decimation.

¹⁰⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 3.21.

¹⁰⁶ Suet. *Calig.* 48.1–2; parody originating either with Caligula himself or with the source of Suet. *Calig.* 43–8.

¹⁰⁷ G. R. Watson 1969: 120. Parker [1928] 1958: 284 suggests that the sortition element had come to seem unjust.

The senator and jurist C. Cassius Longinus advocated executing the City Prefect Pedanius Secundus' 400 urban slaves because one of them murdered his master.¹⁰⁸ Cassius, arguing that Roman masters cannot control their slaves unless they assert power of life and death over them, recalls with nostalgia the ancient punishment of decimation:

For when in a defeated army every tenth man is struck down with clubs, the brave meet the same fortune. Exemplary punishment always contains an element of injustice, but the public good outweighs the disadvantage of individuals.

The Senate condemned Pedanius' slave household, but the Roman populace demonstrated against and tried to stop the execution.

The emperor Galba, well-known for severity, decimated former sailors whom Nero had made into a legion, the future Legio I Adiutrix.¹⁰⁹ The ex-sailors requested a legionary eagle and standards confirming their new status as a legion. Galba ordered them to return to their former status. When the former sailors resisted this demotion, Galba dispersed them with a cavalry charge, forcing them to flee and thus technically rendering them cowards, meriting the traditional justification for decimation.¹¹⁰ This action, among others, persuaded Otho and the Praetorians to depose and assassinate Galba. The atrocity and impiety now appeared to be not cowardice or insubordination, but decimation as the indiscriminate murder of innocent men.¹¹¹

The *Historia Augusta* claims that the emperor Macrinus "centimated" his soldiers, putting to death one of every hundred men instead of one in ten, as a more merciful punishment – so the cruel Macrinus claimed.¹¹² Decimation became so obsolete a punishment that when some of the emperor Julian's soldiers lost a standard in

¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 14.42–5 (AD 61), 14.44. Nippel 1995: 88–9; Harris 2001: 324–6. The SC *Silanianum* displays the principle: Digest 29.5, especially D. 29.5.1–38 (Ulpian *Edict.* 50). Slaves were obliged to defend their masters and were penalized for not doing so, as were soldiers D. 49.16.3.22 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁰⁹ Suet. *Galba* 12.2; Tac. *Hist.* 1.5–6, 37; Dio 63(64).3.1–2; Plut. *Galba* 15.3–4. G. R. Watson 1969: 120; H. F. Miller 1981: 75–6; Ash 1999: 77; G. Morgan 2006: 43–4.

¹¹⁰ Dio 63(64).3.1–2 and diplomas of Legio I Adiutrix suggest that Galba recognized the sailors as a legion; Morgan suggests that he did so to justify their decimation. But Plut. *Galba* 15.3–4, Suet. *Galba* 12.2, and Tac. *Hist.* 1.37 state that he refused.

¹¹¹ Tac. *Hist.* 1.6, 1.37.

¹¹² HA *Macr.* 12.2.

a rout, the antiquarian Julian, wanting to decimate them, put to death a total of ten soldiers instead of one in ten.¹¹³

Those who imposed decimation, such as Antony and Galba, now appeared gratuitously cruel, displaying pleasure in cruelty (*saevitia* or *crudelitas*, implying gratification) rather than dispassionate *severitas*.¹¹⁴ Even for mass flight and mutiny, shaming punishments, demotion, or disbandment became preferred. As will be seen, these shaming punishments structurally echoed decimation.

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT

Even after decimation went out of use, corporal punishment of common soldiers persisted.¹¹⁵ Centurions typically inflicted it, using a vine stock (*vitis*) or club or nightstick (*fustis*).¹¹⁶ Scipio Aemilianus had soldiers beaten for falling behind on the march.¹¹⁷ The jurists recommend corporal punishment for lighter offenses. Those who abandoned their posts were beaten.¹¹⁸ Those who lagged behind the line of march were punished with beating or transfer to an inferior branch of the service.¹¹⁹ A soldier who lost his greaves or shoulder armor was beaten.¹²⁰

Beating with the tough and gnarled *vitis* was severe enough to leave the scars and wounds that the soldiers displayed to Germanicus in AD 14.¹²¹ One centurion in the Pannonian army named Lucilius was nicknamed “Cedo alteram” (“Give me another”) because he had repeatedly broken his *vitis* over soldiers’ backs, shouting for another vine stock.¹²² In the Rhine mutiny, the soldiers avenged themselves on the centurions’ *saevitia* by beating them (implying that centurions themselves were not usually subject to corporal punishment).¹²³

¹¹³ Amm. 24.3.1–2; Lendon 2005: 295, 309; also Theodosius I in Amm. 29.5.22.

¹¹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 1.37; Lintott 1999: 46–7.

¹¹⁵ Parker [1928] 1958: 285–6; G. R. Watson 1969: 125; Wesch-Klein 1998: 150.

¹¹⁶ G. R. Watson 1969: 125; Garnsey 1970: 137–8, 246–7.

¹¹⁷ Livy *Per.* 57; Sall. *Jug.* 45.

¹¹⁸ D. 49.16.3.5 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4). This punishment is lighter than the *fustuarium* imposed in Polyb. 6.37; Jung 1982: 984.

¹¹⁹ D. 49.16.3.16 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹²⁰ D. 49.16.14.1 (Paul *Poen. mil.*).

¹²¹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.35.

¹²² Tac. *Ann.* 1.23.

¹²³ Tac. *Ann.* 1.32; SC de Cn. Pisone ll. 50–52 also implies that centurions did not usually undergo corporal punishment or *summa supplicia*.

The corporal punishment of common soldiers may have been acceptable because it transpired in the public sphere, yet in his depiction of the AD 14 mutinies, Tacitus uses the rhetoric of beatings to suggest “the breakdown of military discipline and authority.”¹²⁴ Soldiers denounced their cruel beatings, echoing the rhetoric of the earlier Republic’s Struggle of the Orders, in which plebeians defended their rights from patricians, but soldiers explicitly were not allowed the civil right of *provocatio* (appeal against magistratal authority).¹²⁵ Officers’ homosexual molestation of young soldiers added insult to injury in several scandals in the mid and late Republic.¹²⁶ In civilian life, Roman citizens of good birth were not subjected to corporal punishment, and fathers and pedagogical authors disavowed the beating of children as opposed to slaves.¹²⁷ Physical assault and corporal punishment were *iniuriae*, insults to status and honor as well as to the body.¹²⁸ The slave, on the other hand, had no status or honor to lose and was regarded as “eminently beatable.”¹²⁹

Corporal punishment of soldiers was made possible by their ambiguous location in the two-tier penalty system of the second century AD and later.¹³⁰ The upper classes, or *honestiores*, including senators, equestrians, decurions, and veterans, were not subject to the *summa supplicia* or exacerbated death penalties. These penalties included torture, burning alive, crucifixion or hanging upon the *furca*, and condemnation to the beasts in the arena. These upper social strata were also exempted from condemnation to hard labor in mines or quarries (*ad metalla*).¹³¹ In contrast, the lower classes, or *humiliores*, were subject to these exacerbated penalties, to beating and torture, and to hard labor. Soldiers, though recruited from the strata of the *humiliores*, had some of the penal privileges of *honestiores*.¹³² Thus

¹²⁴ Saller 1994: 139–40.

¹²⁵ Nippel 1995: 51; Aubert 2002: 100.

¹²⁶ Walters 1997a: 39–40; *op. cit.* Ch. 3 n. 119.

¹²⁷ Saller 1994: 142–8.

¹²⁸ Saller 1994: 134–7.

¹²⁹ Saller 1994: 137, on Plaut. *Aul.* 633; Lendon 1997: 220.

¹³⁰ Garnsey 1970: 104–51; MacMullen 1986 (in MacMullen 1990: 207–10); Rilinger 1988; Bauman 1996: 124–40, esp. 126–7, 129; Aubert 2002: 100–105, 129–30; Scheidel 2006: 41–3, 46–7. That all persons exempted from *summa supplicia*, torture, and hard labor were *honestiores* was never fully systematized in law; slaves tended to receive harsher punishment than free *humiliores* who were not rebels (Aubert 2002).

¹³¹ Garnsey 1970: 122–30. *Metallum* (131–6) and torture were not supposed to kill, but probably often did.

¹³² Jung 1982: 1003; Garnsey 1970: 142, 245–51: soldiers who deserted were liable to *summa supplicia* and torture, but beating was a lesser punishment, cf. Bauman 1996: 131–2. D. 49.16.3.16 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4) prescribes beating with rods for leaving the *agmen*.

Modestinus says that soldiers are not sentenced to the mines (*in metallum*) or to the *opus metalli*, nor are they tortured.¹³³ Modestinus adds that a man who deserts to the enemy and returns shall be tortured and condemned to the beasts or to the *furca*, although soldiers are exempt from all of these.¹³⁴ However, in contrast with veterans, soldiers were still subject to corporal and capital punishment.¹³⁵

The *honestiores* rarely suffered capital punishment. Instead, they underwent exile, *relegatio* or the more severe *deportatio*, including loss of civil rights and confiscation of property.¹³⁶ If *honestiores* were executed, as they could be for treason, they were decapitated by the sword. In the notorious treason trials of the first century AD, the emperors preferred to “request” prominent aristocrats to commit suicide.¹³⁷ Nonetheless, it is striking that in the first and second centuries AD, the *honestiores* could be executed only for parricide or for treason against the emperor.¹³⁸ Soldiers in the field, as shown in this chapter, were rather more vulnerable to the death penalty. Soldiers thus occupied a “grey area between *honestiores* and *humiliores*.”¹³⁹ In contrast to these personal liabilities, soldiers possessed privileges in property law, discussed in the next chapter.¹⁴⁰ As a later section suggests, shaming punishments and temporary expulsion had the goal of reforming behavior while inflicting a more symbolic form of violence upon the offenders. Permanent expulsion and disgrace inflicted a social death, at least from military life.

EMPERORS AND JURISTS

Perhaps surprisingly, given the usual impression that the emperors were the benefactors of the army and created and upheld soldiers’ legal privileges, the surviving legal sources show that, when not commanding in person, emperors played little role in the punishment of soldiers. The sources on Roman civil law (*ius civile*) and especially property law are far more extensive than those on Roman public and

¹³³ D. 49.16.3.1 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹³⁴ D. 49.16.3.10 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); Aubert 2002: 110–11. *Furca* is a later interpolation in the mid–third century AD Modestinus, as the Christian emperor Constantine substituted it for crucifixion.

¹³⁵ E.g. D. 49.16.3.16 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); veterans. D. 49.18.1 (Memander *re mil.* 3); *P. Wis.* 1, discussed by Aubert 2002: 107.

¹³⁶ Garnsey 1970: 111–22; Crifò 1984.

¹³⁷ Garnsey 1970: 137.

¹³⁸ Garnsey 1970: 111.

¹³⁹ Bauman 1996: 132.

¹⁴⁰ Garnsey 1970: 247.

criminal law. Reflecting this pattern, the emperors, especially Trajan and Hadrian, promoted soldiers' legal right to manage and dispose of property, and granted privileges relating to their prolonged absence from their homes upon military service.¹⁴¹ In the surviving rescripts and jurists' citation of rescripts, the emperors are not always indulgent to soldiers; even the Severans issued reproofs.¹⁴²

A few instances of imperial judgment survive in literary and legal sources. Pliny the Younger mentions a case tried by Trajan at Centumcellae on the Etrurian coast of Italy: a centurion had committed adultery with his tribune's wife, Gallitta. Pliny says that in giving judgment Trajan "made a statement about military discipline: for he did not wish all cases of this kind to be referred to him."¹⁴³ Despite Trajan's remark, there are hardly any imperial rescripts on military punishments. The cuckolded husband had returned from his service to Italy and was about to run for civil office, a candidacy marred by the scandal involving his wife. The *Lex Julia de adulteriis* made adultery a public crime; if adulterous parties were convicted, they were exiled and part of their property was confiscated.¹⁴⁴ The *Lex Julia de adulteriis* probably applied to military personnel, but cases in which all parties remained in the camp were probably tried there, a policy encouraged by Trajan.¹⁴⁵

An imperial rescript on military punishment involves a soldier's suicide attempt. Hadrian ruled that if a soldier attempted suicide or wounded himself, the circumstances should be investigated. If the soldier had attempted to kill himself out of *taedium vitae* (weariness of life, depression), sickness, madness, or shame, he should be dishonorably discharged; if he attempted to kill himself for some other reason (presumably to escape combat or punishment), he should be capitally punished.¹⁴⁶ This case intrigued the jurists, who offered varying views on the suicidal soldier's culpability; similarly, Hadrian allowed a soldier convicted of a military crime to

¹⁴¹ Campbell 1984: 281–8, 295–6; *sub. vid.* Ch. 5 nn. 131–2.

¹⁴² Campbell 1984: 288–99; on civilians' appeal to the emperor, Lintott 1993: 116–17.

¹⁴³ Plin. *Ep.* 6.31.6; Campbell 1984: 277; McGinn 1998: 119; Phang 2001: 370–71.

¹⁴⁴ Treggiari 1991: 277–90; McGinn 1998: 140–47.

¹⁴⁵ McGinn 1998: 116–19; Phang 2001: 106–7. Tribunes were responsible for punishing lesser infractions and settling soldiers' minor disputes, D. 49.16.12.2 (Macer *Re mil.* 1).

¹⁴⁶ Giuffrè 1974b: 95; Jung 1982: 993–4; Campbell 1984: 277–8. D. 28.3.6.6–7 (Ulpian *Sab.* 10); 49.16.6.7 (Menander *re mil.* 3); cf. D. 38.12.1 (Macer *re mil.* 2), 32.1.22.1 (Hermogenian *Iuris Epit.* 4). The last sentence of D. 49.16.6.7, suggesting suicide *per vinum aut lasciviam*, is puzzling. Hooff 1990: 83–4, 172, suggests that Roman soldiers attempted suicide when drunk or bored (cf. Ath. *Deip.* 4.155e, Thracians played at hanging themselves), but *per vinum aut lasciviam*... *irroganda* probably should conclude D. 49.16.6.6, thus referring to a soldier's wounding *another* when drunk or in jest.

make a valid military will. Probably this indulgence reflected the often involuntary and unpremeditated nature of such “military crimes” as flight from the battle line or malingering, discussed by the jurists.¹⁴⁷

When a soldier accidentally killed a civilian, the emperor Caracalla transferred this case from the jurisdiction of civilian homicide to military discipline.¹⁴⁸ The soldier Aurelius Herculianus and his comrades petitioned Caracalla in 215 AD concerning a “brother” (*frater* suggests “comrade” rather than blood relation) who had struck and accidentally killed one Justus. The editors of the Code, inserting the case under *ad legem Corneliam de sicariis*, must have regarded Justus as a civilian; if Justus had been a fellow-soldier, the question of jurisdiction would not have arisen. The perpetrator thus incurred liability under the *Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis*, created by Sulla, which penalized civilian homicide and manslaughter (*sicarii* were bandits, *venefici* poisoners).¹⁴⁹ In Juvenal’s Sixteenth Satire, the narrator denounces the privileges of the Praetorians, including trial in the camp, where a civilian beaten up by the Guardsmen cannot expect a fair trial.¹⁵⁰ Because the military profession required soldiers to commit violence against external and potential internal enemies, their violence against civilians was not subject to civil judgment.

Otherwise, the emperors, when not commanding in person, probably left military punishment to local commanders, enabling these commanders to maintain their authority. The emperors Septimius Severus and Caracalla ruled that soldiers ought to be punished in the places where they committed their crimes.¹⁵¹ The emperors gave rescripts concerning the status of recruits and deserters, who were not yet or no longer under a local commander’s authority. They punished deserters and convicts who volunteered for military service; Trajan punished with deportation a father who mutilated his son to make him unfit for military service.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ D. 29.1.34.pr (Papinian *Quaest.* 14), 48.19.38.12 (Paul *Sent.* 5), 48.21.3.6 (Marcian *Delat.*) is harshest. On involuntary reactions in combat W. I. Miller 2000: 33–6.

¹⁴⁸ C. 9.16.1.pr: *remissa homicidii poena secundum disciplinam militarem sententiam proferet.* Jung 1982: 999; Campbell 1984: 234–5.

¹⁴⁹ Sander 1960: 295 regards soldiers’ capital crimes as tried under civil law. The incident of the *miles Marianus* (*op. cit.* Chapter Three n. 119) displays the commander’s summary judgment.

¹⁵⁰ Juv. *Sat.* 16.7–34.

¹⁵¹ D. 49.16.3.pr. (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁵² D. 49.16.4.12 (Menander *Re mil.* 1). Trajan ruled that a volunteer guilty of a capital crime should suffer capital punishment (D. 49.16.4.5 Menander *Re mil.* 1); another emperor stated that deserters who enlisted are punished (49.16.4.9 *ibid.*); Antoninus Pius judged a deserter turned in by his father

Emperors also pronounced upon deserters who turned themselves in and upon captives of the enemy.¹⁵³

Most imperial rescripts concerning soldiers concern not punishment but the property rights of soldiers, including deserters and the dishonorably discharged.¹⁵⁴ Aside from documents concerning military abuse of requisitions, discussed in Chapter 5 of this book, the jurists provide the most extensive surviving legal sources on military crime and punishment.

Though their area of expertise was civil law, the Roman jurists also wrote treatises and opinions on military affairs. They focused on the punishment of military offenses, the status of recruits and personnel, and the status of their property during service. The jurists belonged to the aristocratic educated classes. Some were Roman senators and may have had some military experience, holding at least one-year posts as laticlavian tribunes as a requirement for membership in the Senate.¹⁵⁵ The mid-first century senator Cassius Longinus, seen above on decimation, was also a leading jurist, founder of a school of legal interpretation called “Cassian” for its severity. Cassius Longinus briefly commanded the Syrian army and imposed strict discipline. Javolenus Priscus, head of the Cassian school in the late first century, commanded legions as governor of Syria and of Upper Germany.¹⁵⁶ However, these men did not write about the Roman army in works that have survived.

In the late second and early third centuries, notable jurists attained the post of praetorian prefect, both commander of the Praetorians and the emperor’s administrative second-in-command, usually held by equestrians. Equestrian and senatorial jurists were educated in oratory, a requirement for public life and advocacy, as well as being experts in Roman law.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the military tradition

(D. 49.16.13.6 Macer *Re mil.* 2); Severus and Caracalla judged a deserter who gave himself up (D. 49.16.13.6 Macer *Re mil.* 2)

¹⁵³ Germanicus Caesar (D. 49.16.4.13 Menander *Re mil.* 1); cf. Hadrian on the status of personnel captured and released by the enemy (D. 49.16.5.6 Menander *Re mil.* 2); Hadrian on a deserter who captured brigands (D. 49.16.5.8 *ibid.*); Severus and Caracalla on a son born while in enemy hands (D. 49.15.9 Ulpian *Lex Iul. et Pap.* 4; cf. 49.15.25 Marcian *Inst.* 14).

¹⁵⁴ Campbell 1984: 273–99; the emperors reproved deserters and dishonorably discharged soldiers who requested back pay and veteran privileges.

¹⁵⁵ Campbell 1975: 27–8; Campbell 1987: 20–22.

¹⁵⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 12.12, 14.42–4; on these men, Honoré 1962: 162–4; Campbell 1975: 14; Honoré 2002: 141, 151.

¹⁵⁷ Millar [1977] 1992: 93–7; Schiavone 1993: 97–8; Honoré 1994: 13–16; Johnston 1999: 5–8; Blois 2001b: 136–8, 142.

upon which the Severan jurists drew was likely to be literary. The excerpts of their treatises on military affairs sometimes allude to Roman historical *exempla*.

The most prolific and respected jurists, Papinian and Ulpian, do not seem to have written treatises on military affairs. They mention the army in their regular commentaries and opinions, usually in connection with the property and status of soldiers. As praetorian prefects or ex-prefects, Papinian and Ulpian met their deaths at the hands of the Praetorians.¹⁵⁸ These events suggest that the jurists' severity toward the army was not merely academic.

In the late second and early third centuries, Taruttienus Paternus, Arrius Menander, and Aemilius Macer wrote treatises on military affairs (*de re militari*). Their treatises are termed "military law" by modern convention only. Prescriptive treatises were not formal law, though jurists' responses to actual cases were admitted as sources of law.¹⁵⁹ Military punishment was a highly customary and informal area of Roman legal practice, similar to provincial *cognitio extra ordinem* but even more subject to tradition and commanders' individual whims.

These authors' works survive as selections and excerpts in the early sixth century Digest, a comprehensive survey of Roman law. The emperor Justinian's own lawyers, who chose the excerpts, were presumably as concerned as in Severan times, if not more so, with desertion and other aspects of military discipline. However, the archaizing and severity of the excerpts were probably already present in the Severan authors; Roman authors at all periods express such views on military discipline.

THE JURISTS AND MILITARY PUNISHMENTS

The Severan jurists may have been influenced by the archaizing that dominated elite education in their period, in which past *exempla* provided support for present policies.¹⁶⁰ For instance, Arrius Menander states that Trajan ruled that a man

¹⁵⁸ Taruttienus Paternus, Papinian, Paul, and Ulpian were praetorian prefects in 177–82, 205–11, 219–20, and 222 to 223/4, respectively. Papinian and Ulpian died at the instigation of the Praetorians in 212 and 223/4. On these jurists Blois 2001b: 139–40. On Ulpian's death date, revised from 228, Dio 80.2.2–4; Zos. 1.11.2–3; Honoré 1994: 80, 86, 2002: 32–6. Bauman 1996: 131 upholds the later date.

¹⁵⁹ Giuffrè 1974a, 1974b: 54–104, 1980a, 1980b; these works are partly republished in Giuffrè 1996; Vendrand-Voyer 1982. On jurists' responses vs. theoretical works, Johnston 1999: 24–6.

¹⁶⁰ Campbell 1984: 276; Lendon 2005: 283; on the jurists Blois 2001b: 142.

with only one testicle could serve in the army, “for the generals Sulla and Cotta are recorded as having been in that condition by nature.”¹⁶¹

The jurists also allude directly to canonical literary *exempla* in military punishment, regarding this quasi-legendary material as appropriate in legal writing.¹⁶² Aemilius Macer states that Antoninus Pius demoted a deserter who was turned in by his father to an inferior branch of the service “so that the father should not be seen as having delivered his son to his death.” This act of imperial *clementia* nonetheless alluded to the stories of archaic and mid-Republican generals who condemned their sons to death.¹⁶³ Echoing the *exempla* of Manlius Torquatus and Fabius Rullianus, Modestinus says that “in wartime anyone who has done something forbidden by his commander or who has not obeyed his orders suffers capital punishment, even if the action was successful.”¹⁶⁴ Paul alludes directly to the Torquatan episode in his remark, “military discipline was, for Roman parents, a more ancient tradition than love of children.” Justifying the denial of *postliminium* (restoration of civil status) to a deserter whose father is alive, Paul’s allusion also echoes the Roman Senate’s rejection of the survivors of Cannae and the story that after the son of M. Aemilius Scaurus suffered a shameful military defeat, Scaurus refused to admit him to his presence.¹⁶⁵ Alluding to a wholly mythical period, Modestinus states that climbing or jumping over the ramparts or wall of a fort results in capital punishment, an allusion to the death of Remus, whom Romulus slew for jumping over the foundations of the wall of Rome.¹⁶⁶

Even when focusing on the present, the jurists prescribe capital penalties for battlefield offenses such as cowardice and insubordination. As will be seen with shaming punishments, a commander also could humiliate, demote, or temporarily or permanently expel soldiers who committed these offenses. The capital penalties in the jurists’ military handbooks and the archaic allusions were limit cases and

¹⁶¹ D. 49.16.4.pr (Menander *Re mil.* 1).

¹⁶² Fantham 1997: 122 and Wallace-Hadrill [1982] 2004: 171–2 stress rhetoric’s influence on judicial proceedings and punishment, especially in *cognitio*, though Wallace-Hadrill emphasizes the ideology of imperial *clementia*.

¹⁶³ D. 49.16.13.6 (Macer *Re mil.* 2). Cf. Livy 8.7.15–22 (Manlius Torquatus).

¹⁶⁴ D. 49.16.3.15 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁶⁵ D. 49.15.19.7 (Paul *Sab.* 16); Fiebiger 1903: col. 1180 and Jung 1982: 995. Marcus Aemilius Scaurus and his son, who committed suicide, Val. Max. 5.8.4; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.13 (102 BC).

¹⁶⁶ D. 49.16.3.17 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); Livy 1.7.2; Jung 1982: 987, 995; on Roman capital punishment’s imitation of wholly mythological deaths, Coleman 1990: 60–62.

ideological statements, suggesting that the Severan emperors and jurists, perceiving a crisis in military discipline, prescribed a “politicized” discipline for the army.¹⁶⁷ Though in the Severan age no Roman fathers put their sons to death, these traditional *exempla* were no doubt intended to inculcate *habitus* in Roman elite officers, encouraging their strict enforcement of discipline. However, in a fractious army with probable manpower shortage, these capital penalties may not have been imposed often in practice.¹⁶⁸

Another instance of a capital penalty that made an ideological statement disproportionate to its implementation was the Augustan adultery legislation’s *ius occidendi*. The father of an adulterous woman had the right to kill her and her lover if he caught them in the act, but the husband was allowed to kill only the lover. These killings seem to have been rare.¹⁶⁹ In the later Empire, furthermore, emperors imposed corporal and capital penalties that sometimes imitated archaic *exempla*.¹⁷⁰

According to Modestinus, a soldier’s *desertion to the enemy* results in capital punishment, in this instance torture and condemnation to the beasts.¹⁷¹ Arrius Menander states that desertion receives more severe punishment in wartime or for a repeat offence.¹⁷² Passing secrets to the enemy also results in capital punishment.¹⁷³ In addition, a soldier caught in the act of deserting to the enemy was to be executed immediately.¹⁷⁴ Furthermore, the jurists indicate that a soldier captured by the enemy, who later returns, needs to prove his capture, lest he be considered a deserter to the enemy.¹⁷⁵ The soldier who returned late from furlough needed to prove that he had not deserted, and if he had deserted, that he had not gone over to the enemy.¹⁷⁶ A bureaucratic mentality is seen in some of this evidence,

¹⁶⁷ On the Torquatus episode as limit case, Y. Thomas 1984b; politicized discipline in the Wehrmacht, Shephard 2001: 301, 304–5.

¹⁶⁸ Saller 1994: 114–16. Equestrian officers, even those from the ranks, were expected to study literary culture and law: Bowman 1994a: 93–4 on culture. On the Severan manpower issue, E. Birley 1969; R. E. Smith 1972.

¹⁶⁹ McGinn 1998: 146–7, 204–6: the *ius occidendi* was intended to be used and was inflicted most on low-status adulterers; actual cases in rescripts, n. 521.

¹⁷⁰ Lendon 2005: 295.

¹⁷¹ D. 49.16.3.10 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); possible allusion to Val. Max. 2.7.12–14.

¹⁷² D. 49.16.5.1 and 3 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

¹⁷³ D. 49.16.6.4 (Menander *Re mil.* 3).

¹⁷⁴ D. 49.16.3.11 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); on the archaism, this chapter *op. cit.* n. 61.

¹⁷⁵ Hadrian in D. 49.16.5.6 (Arrius Menander *Re mil.* 2).

¹⁷⁶ Jung 1982: 988–90.

discussed later in this chapter. The enemy in these instances is foreign; the jurists were more lenient toward desertion in civil war.

Other severe prescriptions in the jurists' writings discouraged flight and cowardice in combat. *Abandoning a reconnaissance or a post* in the face of the enemy receives capital punishment.¹⁷⁷ *The first soldier to cause a rout in battle* also receives capital punishment.¹⁷⁸ In practice it was probably hard to show who began the rout, so that the threat of the public execution of the first to flee served as a collective deterrent.

Malingering to escape combat was also subject to capital punishment.¹⁷⁹ This attitude (that incapacitated soldiers with no obvious physical disabling condition should be punished as malingerers and cowards) persisted into the twentieth century. In a notorious incident from the Second World War, General George S. Patton, Jr. slapped a psychiatric casualty patient.¹⁸⁰

Losing or throwing away one's weapons on the battlefield received capital punishment, as these actions were equated with desertion. However, losing or discarding essential weapons and armor (cuirass, helmet, or sword) was more serious than losing shoulder or shin guards.¹⁸¹ The abandonment of weapons in the field was a traditional sign of cowardice, severely punished in Polybius' time and by Domitius Corbulo on the Rhine frontier.¹⁸²

Forms of severe insubordination also received capital punishment from the jurists. *Physically attacking a superior officer* (*qui manus intulit praeposito*) results in capital punishment, as does resisting corporal punishment by a superior officer, especially if the soldier breaks the centurion's vine stock or lays a hand on him.¹⁸³ This passage shows that centurions usually still inflicted corporal punishment.¹⁸⁴ *Failure to guard*

¹⁷⁷ D. 49.16.3.4 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁷⁸ D. 49.16.6.3 (Menander *Re mil.* 3).

¹⁷⁹ D. 49.16.6.5 (Menander *Re mil.* 3). Wesch-Klein 1998: 149; Jung 1982: 993 doubts whether the soldier received capital punishment, though malingering was difficult to prove.

¹⁸⁰ W. I. Miller 2000: 32–6; Shephard 2001: 219.

¹⁸¹ D. 49.16.3.13 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); equated with desertion in D. 49.16.14.1 (Paul *Poen. mil.*); in peacetime, the punishment for abandoning arms could be commuted to demotion in service. Greaves, rarely worn by imperial soldiers, are here an archaism.

¹⁸² Polyb. 6.37; Plut. *Cato Maior* 20 stresses fear of shame; Corbulo, Tac. *Ann.* 11.18.

¹⁸³ D. 49.16.6.1 (Menander *Re mil.* 3); D. 49.16.13.4 (Macer *Re mil.* 2).

¹⁸⁴ Jung 1982: 992.

a superior officer or failure to defend him from attacks by soldiers result in capital punishment.¹⁸⁵ A soldier who deserts his guard post at the imperial palace receives capital punishment.¹⁸⁶

Causing a mutiny (*qui seditionem atrocem militum concitavit*) results in capital punishment.¹⁸⁷ This may be equated with the civil unrest punished by the *lex Iulia maiestatis*.¹⁸⁸ But causing a lesser degree of insubordination (a *vociferatio* or *levis querella*) results in reduction in rank.¹⁸⁹ If many soldiers conspire together, they are discharged from the army.¹⁹⁰ Insolence and disturbing the peace result in capital punishment.¹⁹¹ As seen in Chapter Two and Three, Roman soldiers frequently urged their generals to attack the enemy; nor were they silent when they thought that they were being mistreated. The emphasis of Arrius Menander and Modestinus on obedience is, like other such prescriptions, an aristocratic response to the coups and civil wars that had broken out afresh in these jurists' lifetimes. In general, Arrius Menander states that "any offence is a military offence which is committed to the detriment of communal discipline, including the faults of laziness, insolence, or idleness," but he does not imply that all of these offenses were capitally punished.¹⁹²

Modestinus states that military punishments may consist of a reprimand, money fine, imposition of duties, a change in branch of the service (usually demotion), demotion in rank for officers, and dishonorable discharge.¹⁹³ Dishonorable discharge (*ignominiosa missio*) seems to have conferred the formal shaming known as *infamia*, with deleterious legal consequences for Roman citizens.¹⁹⁴ This range of penalties was more practical than capital punishment and probably represents the usual state of discipline in this period.

¹⁸⁵ The commander or governor, D. 49.16.3.6 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); any superior if he is killed, D. 49.16.3.22 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), D. 49.16.6.8 (Menander *Re mil.* 3).

¹⁸⁶ D. 49.16.10.pr. (Paul *Reg.*).

¹⁸⁷ D. 49.16.3.19 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁸⁸ Jung 1982: 996.

¹⁸⁹ D. 49.16.3.20 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁹⁰ D. 49.16.3.21 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹⁹¹ D. 49.16.6.2 (Menander *Re mil.* 3); D. 49.16.16.1 (Paul *Sent.* 5).

¹⁹² D. 49.16.6.pr. (Menander *Re mil.* 3).

¹⁹³ D. 49.16.3.1 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); on fines, cf. Gell. 11.1.6, where Cato's *Origines* stated that the commander fined whoever left the *ordines*.

¹⁹⁴ D. 3.2.2.1 (Ulpian *Edict.* 6).

SHAMING PUNISHMENTS

Brute force was not always necessary. Another Republican traditional punishment was the public shaming of offenders, especially soldiers guilty of cowardice. Such shaming was imitated in the imperial period.¹⁹⁵ Shaming by stripping appears to be commutation of corporal punishment, as the offender was stripped of his main military insignia, the sword and sword-belt (*cingulum*), or even stripped naked. In earlier times such stripping would be prefatory to flogging.¹⁹⁶ Instead, the soldier stood ungirt or naked in a public place in the camp in order to humiliate him and to impress his shame upon the onlookers.

The Roman attitude to nudity varied sharply with rank and context. For citizens of free status, public nudity was disgraceful, except in certain settings such as the public baths.¹⁹⁷ The Romans employed public nudity to humiliate and terrorize their enemies. In the Republic and periodically, after major victories, in the Empire, the defeated enemy were enslaved *en masse*. Roman triumphal art conventionally depicted captives as naked and bound.¹⁹⁸ Slaves in the slave market were usually exhibited naked, to expose possible physical defects, but also to degrade them. In the fourth century BC Agesilaus exhibited Persian captives naked in order to disgrace them and raise his own soldiers' morale.¹⁹⁹ The tradition persists when Onasander advises the general to display enemy captives to his soldiers to raise their courage. The general should humiliate the captives further by forcing them to beseech and grovel, thus displaying the enemy's abject cowardice to his troops.²⁰⁰

The public shame of Roman military personnel was potentially much greater, because their ideal *habitus* was more upstanding and honorable, as discussed at the end of Chapter Three. Casting out or expelling personnel, or imposing temporary expulsion or humiliation, made clear statements about who did and did not belong in the military.²⁰¹ Shaming punishments also reinforced communal identity among the nonstigmatized, by emphasizing the honorable status of well-behaved soldiers and the degraded status of wrongdoers.

¹⁹⁵ Parker [1928] 1958: 284–5, 287; G. R. Watson 1969: 125–6; Lendon 1997: 264.

¹⁹⁶ *Op. cit.* Chapter Four n. 30.

¹⁹⁷ Saller 1994: 136.

¹⁹⁸ Ferris 2000; Phang 2004: 217–20.

¹⁹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.19, *Ages.* 28; Plut. *Ages.* 9.5; Polyæn. 2.1.6; Front. *Strat.* 1.11.17; imitated by Julian, *Amm.* 24.8.1; Lendon 2005: 296.

²⁰⁰ Onas. *Strat.* 14.3.

²⁰¹ Category violation was discussed in Chapter One: Douglas [1966] 2002: 44–5.

By the late Republic, it was no longer appropriate to subject senatorial and equestrian officers to corporal punishment and execution. For these ranks, shaming exposure, which once would have prefaced flogging, replaced it.²⁰² The most fully described instance of shaming is that of L. Calpurnius Piso, consul in 133 BC, who made L. Titius, a cavalry prefect who had given way to fugitive slaves, stand partly undressed in the camp headquarters:

He ordered him to stand on duty at headquarters throughout the period of his service from daybreak to nightfall, barefoot and dressed in a toga from which the fringes had been cut and in an ungirt tunic. He also forbade him human society [i.e., *convivia*] and the use of baths. . . . [The men under his command were demoted.]²⁰³

This punishment was imitated by Augustus, who shamed officers who had disgraced themselves by making them stand all day before the *praetorium* (commander's residence), dressed in their tunics without their belts, holding ten-foot poles or pieces of turf.²⁰⁴ As their holding these items suggests, maintaining the same position would after a few hours become quite painful.²⁰⁵ These officers also appeared especially foolish holding these objects used in castrametation, which they normally directed, but which were useless here. Also imitating the Republican *exempla*, Domitius Corbulo punished a cavalry prefect, Aemilius Rufus, who had given way before the enemy, by ordering the lictor to strip the clothes from his back and ordering him to stand at headquarters *foedato habitu*, in a "shameful bodily condition."²⁰⁶ Corbulo's employment of a lictor (the traditional attendant of Roman magistrates) to strip his clothes echoes the stripping prefatory to the ancient *virgis caedi*, flogging with rods, inflicted by the lictors.

Ordinary soldiers might also be subjected to partial or full undressing as a shaming punishment. It is notable that L. Titius is not stripped of a *uniform*. On the battlefield he would be wearing armor, and off the field he wears the clothing of his civilian rank, a bordered toga. The corresponding disgrace for common soldiers was *discingere*, stripping the *cingulum* or military sword-belt. Sulla ordered

²⁰² G. R. Watson 1969: 125; Lendon 1997: 248–9.

²⁰³ Val. Max. 2.7.9 (L. Calpurnius Piso Frugi, RE 96). Cf. Front. Strat. 4.1.26. Cf. the drumming-out ceremony and other instances of undressing as punishment in the 19th c. British army, Myerly 1996: 84–5.

²⁰⁴ Suet. Aug. 24.2. Polyaeus 8.24.3 (bricks).

²⁰⁵ Scarry 1985: 47.

²⁰⁶ Front. Strat. 4.1.28.

a cohort and its centurions through whose defenses the enemy had broken to stand at headquarters *galeatos et discinctos*, with helmets on but unbelted.²⁰⁷ The military tunic was normally tucked up higher than civilian men's tunics by the belt. Unbelted, the tunic would fall down around the lower legs like a woman's dress or effeminate male's tunic.²⁰⁸ Lucullus, after a rout, did not decimate his soldiers. Instead, he made them dig a twelve-foot trench in their unbelted tunics while the others stood and watched.²⁰⁹

The mid-Republic had a tradition of expelling cowardly troops from the camp, forcing them to tent outside the ramparts and ditch, in hostile territory, and consume barley instead of wheat rations.²¹⁰ This shaming punishment was an alternative to decimation, in which the survivors camped outside the fort and consumed barley rations.²¹¹ Barley rations were punitive not because barley was inedible or tasted bad, for the archaic and classical Greeks used barley as their staple grain, but because the Romans preferred wheat. Wheat was symbolic of humanity in the Roman food system. Barley was not even slave rations, but animal fodder.²¹² Being forced to tent outside the camp was not only dangerous, but a symbolic expulsion from military society.²¹³ It might be imposed until the men redeemed themselves by defeating the enemy in combat or bringing in the spoils of two enemies per soldier.²¹⁴ In the imperial period, Corbulo imitated these punishments, making his men winter in tents in Armenia.²¹⁵ He made his officer Paccius Orfitus, a *primus pilus*, who attacked the enemy contrary to orders and was routed, camp outside the ramparts.²¹⁶

²⁰⁷ Front. *Strat.* 4.1.27.

²⁰⁸ Tunic: Goldsworthy 2003: 269. Effeminate: Isaac 2004: 93; Richlin 1993: 542; C. Williams 1999: 129, 146–8, e.g., Verg. *Aen.* 9.614–20; Sen. *Ep.* 114.4–6 (Maecenas). Julian dressed two soldiers as women to punish them: Lendon 1997: 241.

²⁰⁹ Plut. *Luc.* 15.7. Cf. HA *Avid.* 6.1.

²¹⁰ Livy 10.4.4; Val. Max. 2.7.15b and Front. *Strat.* 4.1.18 (280 BC); Front. *Strat.* 4.1.19 (263/1 or 246 BC); Livy 24.18 (216 BC); Front. *Strat.* 4.1.23 and Val. Max. 2.7.10 (143 BC); Front. *Strat.* 4.1.26 and Val. Max. 2.7.9 (133 BC).

²¹¹ Polyb. 6.38.3–4; Suet. *Aug.* 24.2. Barley imposed without decimation, Livy 27.13.9; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.25; Plut. *Marc.* 25.6; imposed on soldiers out of training, Veg. *Mil.* 1.13.3.

²¹² Dupont 1999: 126–7; Wiedemann 1992: 116 (food for gladiators); on barley as punishment: *op. cit.* Chapter Four n. 86.

²¹³ Helgeland 1978: 1493.

²¹⁴ Front. *Strat.* 4.1.19, 4.1.23; spoils of enemy, Front. *Strat.* 4.1.18; Val. Max. 2.7.15b.

²¹⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35–6.

²¹⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 13.36.5; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.21.

These forms of punishment assumed that soldiers were internally motivated by honor and shame, by the esteem of their peers and superiors. Fear of being regarded as cowardly motivated soldiers to display *virtus* in combat.²¹⁷ In the Principate, however, shaming ceremonies were often replaced with formal demotion or dishonorable discharge.

DEMOTION, DISCHARGE, AND DISBANDMENT

An exemplary case of the ejection of cowardly soldiers from the Roman army was the fate of the survivors of Cannae in 216 BC.²¹⁸ Those who returned from this great defeat were expelled from the army by the Senate and exiled to Sicily. Despite the shortage of manpower after Cannae, the Senate was reluctant to reuse them as soldiers.²¹⁹ The defeated were equated with Hannibal's actual prisoners of war, whom the Senate refused to ransom.²²⁰ Valerius Maximus relates that Marcellus, during the Hannibalic War, asked the Senate to let him recruit the survivors of Cannae to help besiege Syracuse. The Senate replied that the *Cannenses* were unworthy to be admitted into a camp: "thus does courage hate flaccid souls."²²¹

Disobedient soldiers might also be dismissed from service. To shame his mutinous soldiers, Caesar addressed his men as *Quirites* (citizens, civilians), not as *militēs*.²²² He threatened to dismiss them from his service, saying that he would triumph with other soldiers. However, due to the relatively short service, uncertain benefits, and lack of a rigid promotion hierarchy in the late Republic, demotion and expulsion from the service lacked the force that they later acquired. Demotion in rank, dishonorable discharge without veteran benefits, and disbandment of entire units became increasingly formalized means of punishment in the imperial period, as military service and benefits became more rationalized.²²³

²¹⁷ E.g. Caes. *BG* 4.25; App. *BC* 3.8.67–8; the battle of Antony and Pansa; Plut. *Mar.* 16.4–5; Marius' soldiers are ashamed to be held back from combat.

²¹⁸ Rosenstein 1990: 101–3.

²¹⁹ Livy 23.25.7–8, 24.18.9, 25.7.3–4, 27.11.14.

²²⁰ Livy 22.60.6–61.3.

²²¹ Val. Max. 2.7.15c.

²²² Suet. *Iul.* 70; App. *BC* 2.13.92. Caesar also fined them one-third of their booty and *praemia*.

²²³ Giuffrè 1974b: 242–9, 250–63 emphasizes this rationalization.

Demotion might involve demotion in rank or transfer to an inferior branch of the service. In descending order, Praetorians outranked legionaries, auxiliaries, and fleet soldiers; within the legions and auxilia, cavalry outranked infantry.²²⁴ During the Cantabrian war, Augustus demoted soldiers for allowing themselves to be besieged by the enemy; after the Rhine mutiny in AD 14, Germanicus dismissed the centurions who had taken bribes from soldiers; and Tiberius degraded a legionary legate for allowing soldiers to accompany his freedmen on a hunting party across the river.²²⁵ After threatening to execute a cavalryman who was captured by the Jews and escaped, Titus dismissed him in disgrace, "a punishment that for one with a sense of shame was worse than death."²²⁶ Conversely, for a commander to reinstate demotions indiscriminately, as Vitellius did, displayed poor discipline.²²⁷ Short of sacking a soldier from the army, a commander could reduce his pay, assign unpleasant chores, demote his rank, or transfer him to an inferior service.²²⁸

The dishonorable discharge of individuals also punished them by depriving them of their pensions. During his German campaign of AD 40, Caligula, demonstrating his severity and vigilance, dismissed in disgrace the officers who were late bringing auxiliary troops to the expedition. He also discharged many elderly *primipili* (chief centurions), depriving them of their pensions on the grounds that they were old and infirm.²²⁹ Because chief centurions usually attained that rank in late middle age, dismissing them for this reason was ludicrous. Caligula is also said to have reduced pensions across the board, but nothing more is known of this; the representation of his entire campaign is a parody of exemplary severity.

The ultimate shaming was the disbandment of an entire legion. Augustus disbanded Legio X in disgrace because of its insubordination: the soldiers demanded their discharge too insolently.²³⁰ Legions XVII, XVIII, and XIX, which were lost

²²⁴ Campbell 1984: 311–12. Front. *Strat.* 4.1.18, 31; Suet. *Tib.* 19, *Vesp.* 8.3; Amm. 29.5.20; demotion in the Digest, D. 49.16.3.1 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4); for abandoning a post, D. 49.16.3.5 (ibid.); for en masse desertion, D. 49.16.3.9 (ibid.); for stealing another's weapons, D. 49.16.3.14 (ibid.); for leaving the *agmen*, D. 49.16.3.16 (ibid.); for causing a moderate disturbance, D. 49.16.3.20 (ibid.); for desertion in peacetime, D. 49.16.5.1 (Menander *Re mil.* 2); for harming a comrade while drunk or in jest, D. 49.16.6.7 (Menander *Re mil.* 3); for resisting a centurion, seizing his *vitis*, D. 49.16.13.4 (Macer *Re mil.* 2).

²²⁵ Dio 54.11.5; Tac. *Ann.* 1.44; Suet. *Tib.* 19; cf. Front. *Strat.* 4.1.37; for cowardice, Amm. 24.3.2.

²²⁶ Joseph. *BJ* 6.362.

²²⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 1.52; Suet. *Vit.* 8.1.

²²⁸ D. 49.16.3.1 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

²²⁹ Suet. *Calig.* 44.1; on Caligula's persecution of this highly respected rank, *Calig.* 38.2; Lendon 1997: 159.

²³⁰ Suet. *Aug.* 24.2; Caesar and Avienus, [Caes.] *B.Afr.* 54.

in the Varian disaster of AD 9, and others that suffered crushing defeats were deliberately disbanded and not replaced.²³¹ After the Gallic revolt of AD 70 and in the third century, legions that had supported revolts or surrendered to rebels were temporarily or permanently disbanded as a punishment.²³² The soldiers who might once have been decimated now underwent a social death, losing their status, income, and benefits, and bearing the disgrace of disbandment.

Septimius Severus' discharge of the Italian Praetorians for the murder of Per- tinax in 193 AD resembled the preparation for a decimation. He had them assemble wearing only their clothes, without armor or weapons. His own soldiers, with weapons ready, surrounded them.²³³ Severus upbraided the Praetorians for "shamefully and dishonorably selling the empire," but he merely discharged them, stripping them of rank, and banished them from the city of Rome and 100 miles around it.²³⁴ This fate resembles elite *relegatio* and the prescription of *infamia* for dishonorably discharged soldiers. It was perhaps more severe a punishment than it seems, as the disbanded Praetorians were recruited from Italy, and thus many could not return to their homes.²³⁵

However, by this time, expulsion from the military was also formalized legally as *ignominiosa missio*, conferring *infamia*, a sociolegal status of dishonor.

LEGAL STATUS AND FORMAL DISGRACE

Expulsion and disgrace were to some degree codified in Roman law as the *infamia* that dishonorably discharged soldiers acquired.²³⁶ The soldier who underwent *ignominiosa missio* became *infamis*, a "disgraceful" person. The *infamis* did not undergo so extreme a status-death as the captive. He was still a Roman citizen, but was

²³¹ G. R. Watson 1969: 121; Southern 2007: 98.

²³² G. R. Watson 1969: 121–2. As punishment for surrendering to Civilis, Legio IV Macedonica, XV Primigenia and XVI Gallica were disbanded; Vespasian reconstituted the last as XVI Flavia; in 218–19 and 238, Legio III Gallica and III Augusta were disbanded to punish them for revolts. Third-century inscriptions, Wesch-Klein 1998: 169–72.

²³³ Hdn. 2.13.2–12; for this staging cf. Livy 28.29.9–11 and App. *Iber.* 35 (Sucro); Suet. *Calig.* 48; Dio 75(74).1.1 (Severus).

²³⁴ Hdn. 2.13.6, 2.13.8–9.

²³⁵ R. E. Smith 1972: 494–6; Campbell 1984: 401–19 on Septimius Severus and the Praetorians.

²³⁶ D. 49.16.13.3 (Macer *Re mil.* 2), D. 3.2.1.pr (Iulianus *Edict.* 1), 3.2.2.pr–4 (Ulpian *Edict.* 6). On *infamia* Greenidge 1894: 70–73, 123, 157 pertains to soldiers, but is more sweeping than Kaser 1956; Gardner 1993: 110–54; McGinn 1998: 44–69; Phang 2001: 289–90 and notes.

stigmatized and excluded from important forms of legal process.²³⁷ Because soldiers in good standing and veterans enjoyed privileges in Roman law, dishonorable discharge and becoming *infamis* had a considerable impact, in addition to loss of veteran's benefits and privileges.

In social terms, the dishonorably discharged soldier merged with those identities excluded from the army. Socially, *infames* included convicts, both upper-class exiles and deportees, and lower-class convicts condemned *ad bestias* or *ad metalla* who escaped. These men were excluded from the army to begin with.²³⁸ Practitioners of disgraceful trades were also *infames*: prostitutes, pimps, actors, and gladiators. The camp followers (*lixae*), ejected like bilge water from the camp by disciplinarians, were probably *infames*.

To maintain military *habitus*, Aemilius Macer prescribes that a soldier should be put to death for appearing on the stage or allowing himself to be sold into slavery.²³⁹ Being sold into slavery not only made the soldier "ineligible for service," it also represented the fate of the prisoner of war, which he should strive at all costs to avoid.²⁴⁰ As for appearing on the stage, the Roman elite regarded acting and actors as disgraceful.²⁴¹ Such severity, intended to reproduce ideal social hierarchies, proliferated in the later Roman Empire, when, as has been suggested, traditional military penalties were increasingly applied to civilians. In the later Empire the cutting of hands, a military punishment for enemy captives, was also imposed on thieves.²⁴²

In general, the usefulness of shaming punishments assumed and depended on a high degree of self-conscious honor in soldiers. The honor invoked might be that of *milites Romani* as a class, as Valerius Maximus assumes, or that of the troops of Rome's most successful general, as Caesar implies, or that of the long-term, professional soldiers of the imperial army.

²³⁷ The procedural disabilities of *infamia* affected mainly elite males. Women's legal capacity was restricted to begin with. Deprived of his pension as the main material penalty, a dishonorably discharged soldier might have little property to defend.

²³⁸ Wesch-Klein 1998: 156–9; Phang 2001: 289–91. D. 49.16.4.1 (Menander *Re mil.* 1); deportees D. 49.16.4.2 (*ibid.*); a temporary exile who enlists is condemned to permanent exile, D. 49.16.4.3 (*ibid.*); deserters D. 49.16.4.9 (*ibid.*); *infames*, D. 49.16.4.4 (*ibid.*), 49.16.4.7 (*ibid.*).

²³⁹ D. 48.19.14 (Macer *Re mil.* 2).

²⁴⁰ Bauman 1996: 132.

²⁴¹ Edwards 1993: 123–6; McGinn 1998: 41.

²⁴² MacMullen 1986 [in MacMullen 1990: 211–12]; Wesch-Klein 1998: 193. Occasionally earlier: Suet. *Galba* 9.1.

ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY

Discussions of desertion by the Severan jurists show a *formal* legal-rational approach to military punishment, one that was bureaucratic rather than morally exemplaristic or based on honor and shame. It was also more moderate. The Severan jurists still prescribe severe punishment for desertion or flight in the field of battle.²⁴³ Arrius Menander pronounces that a cavalryman who deserts in peacetime is demoted in rank; if he is an infantryman, he is demoted in service. In wartime, capital punishment may ensue for these offenses.²⁴⁴

Civil war, however, rendered it more difficult to treat deserters as enemies. Most of the customary sanctions against desertion, mutiny, and insubordination broke down in the civil wars of the late Republic. Desertion to the other side was extremely common; the treatment of deserters as public enemies was not possible.²⁴⁵ Ulpian says that in civil war, deserters who join the other side are not counted as true enemies, because “the contest is not fought for the destruction of the state.”²⁴⁶

Even in regular warfare or peacetime, it was neither practical nor just to treat all cases of absence without leave as full-blown desertion, as the case of Cn. Piso in Seneca’s *On Anger* suggests.²⁴⁷ When a soldier returned from his leave without his comrade, instead of waiting and investigating, Piso became enraged, assumed that the soldier had murdered his comrade, and ordered a centurion to execute him. Then the missing soldier appeared. The camp cheered, thinking that the first man would be spared, and the centurion stayed his execution. Instead, Piso became more enraged and ordered all three to be executed: the first soldier, the one who was late, and the centurion for disobeying his orders.²⁴⁸ The anecdote illustrates a tendency of Roman administrators to confuse anger with what Plutarch calls *misoponêria* (hatred of wrongdoing).²⁴⁹ Arrius Menander endorses a greater degree of rationality and moderation in punishing desertion:

²⁴³ Campbell 1984: 303–5. Desertion: Jung 1982: 977–87. Vallejo Girvés 1996; Southern 2007, 148.

²⁴⁴ D. 49.16.5.1 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

²⁴⁵ Messer 1920: 169–71.

²⁴⁶ D. 49.15.21.1 (Ulpian *Opinions* 5). A commander might even punish those who *refused* to defect to him, starving officers to death in App. BC 1.5.42; Blois 2000: 15.

²⁴⁷ Sen. *Ira* 1.18.3–6.

²⁴⁸ The SC de Cn. *Pisone patre* accuses Piso of *crudelitate unica* in putting to death many soldiers and crucifying a centurion (II. 50–2).

²⁴⁹ Plut. *On the control of anger* 14 = *Moralia* 462e. Harris 2001: 118, 368, 241–2.

Not all deserters are to be punished in the same way, but account is taken of their rank, their campaigns, their military grade, or where they are stationed, the duty they have deserted, and their previous life; there is also the number, whether one person deserted alone or with another or with several others, or whether he added any other crime to that of desertion. Again, [account is taken of] the time for which he was in desertion, and of what was done subsequently. Again, if someone returns of his own free will, and not under compulsion, his fate will not be the same.²⁵⁰

The general record of a soldier was taken into account.

In peacetime, if a soldier was late returning from leave, the Severan jurists recommend a distinction between the soldier who overstays his leave due to circumstances beyond his control; the *emansor* who is absent without leave of his own will but returns spontaneously; and the *desertor* who is absent for a longer time without the intent of returning and who is brought back by force.²⁵¹ An *emansor* exceeds his furlough or is absent without leave on purpose, but intends to return and does so; his intention of returning lightens his punishment.²⁵² Extenuating circumstances apply to the *emansor* if he was unavoidably delayed by circumstances beyond his control, such as illness or being detained by robbers or by the enemy, or “personal” reasons.²⁵³ Special concessions are made to the new recruit unused to military life.²⁵⁴ Even the *desertor* who freely gives himself up (*si se optulerit*) may be punished more lightly, with deportation.²⁵⁵

Displaying a bureaucratic consciousness, Paul rules that to prove that he was unavoidably delayed, the soldier should be able to show the duration of his journey,

²⁵⁰ D. 49.16.5.pr. (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

²⁵¹ *Emansor*, D. 49.16.3.2 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4): *qui diu vagatus ad castra regreditur*; D. 49.16.14.pr (Paul *Poen. mil.*). Distinguished from *desertor*, D. 49.16.3.3 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4): *qui per prolixum tempus vagatus reducitur*. On *emansio* vs. desertion Sander 1958: 174–9; Giuffrè 1974b: 91–2; Campbell 1984: 307–9; Jung 1982: 978–87; Wesch-Klein 1998: 96–8, 163–8. Soldiers should follow prescribed itineraries, HA *Alex.* 51.6; Ambrose *Exp. Ps.CXVIII* 5.2; their divergence was a frequent complaint in petitions in Hauken 1998; Whittaker 2004: 71.

²⁵² D. 49.16.3.7 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), 49.16.4.13–14 (Menander *Re mil.* 1), 49.16.5.pr (Menander *Re mil.* 2), 49.16.14.pr (Paul *Poen. mil.*).

²⁵³ D. 49.16.3.7 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), D. 49.16.14.pr (Paul *Poen. mil.*), D. 49.16.3.12 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), D. 49.16.5.5 (Menander *Re mil.* 2), D. 49.16.4.15 (Menander *Re mil.* 1).

²⁵⁴ D. 49.16.3.9 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), 49.16.4.15 (Menander *Re mil.* 1).

²⁵⁵ D. 49.16.5.4 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

when he set out, and how many days he was late, showing that he had not set out so late that he could not be expected to arrive on time.²⁵⁶ How late he might be seems to have depended on the distance he had to travel.²⁵⁷ However, Paul makes no mention of the specific paper records of *commeatus* that are attested. The soldier's general record was also taken into account, even in cases of desertion, though it is uncertain if evidence took the form of a file or of personal testimonies.²⁵⁸ Recidivism and exacerbating crimes were also taken into account.²⁵⁹

Arrius Menander states that in evaluating absence without leave "forbearance should be displayed [toward the *emansor*] if he was sick or if he was held by affection for his parents or relations, or if he pursued a fugitive slave, or if there was any other reason of this nature for his absence."²⁶⁰ The jurist displays a "remarkable . . . concern" for the soldier's private family relationships and business.²⁶¹ Given these concessions, the punishment of desertion does not appear to have been severe in peacetime.²⁶² The jurists rule that in peacetime a deserter may be demoted in rank or transferred to an inferior branch of the service.²⁶³ However, Papinian ruled that the deserter should not be paid for the time during which he had been in desertion, though Paul ruled that he might petition the emperor for this privilege in extraordinary circumstances.²⁶⁴

Evidently the traditional motive to severely punish desertion conflicted with the frequent incidence of absence without leave (AWOL) due to the loopholes created by the slowness and uncertainties of ancient travel and communications. The need for soldiers to travel frequently on military errands compounded this problem.²⁶⁵ The jurists did not wish to cripple the army by executing all AWOL cases as deserters, preferring legal interpretation in favor of *emansio*. Emperors and jurists also needed to compromise so that soldiers who were absent without leave

²⁵⁶ D. 49.16.14.pr (Paul *Poen. mil.*).

²⁵⁷ Jung 1982: 980; Giuffrè 1974b: 90–91.

²⁵⁸ D. 49.16.5.pr and 49.16.5.6 (Menander *Re mil.* 2); Jung 1982: 986. Record: cf. App. BC 3.7.43; Tac. *Ann.* 1.44.

²⁵⁹ D. 49.16.5.2 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

²⁶⁰ D. 49.16.4.15 (Menander *Re mil.* 1); Jung 1982: 982–4: self-sacrifice was not required.

²⁶¹ Campbell 1984: 308.

²⁶² Campbell 1984: 309.

²⁶³ D. 49.16.3.9 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4), D. 49.16.5.1 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

²⁶⁴ D. 49.16.15 (Papinian *Resp.* 19); C. 12.35.1 (Caracalla); Paul (D. 49.16.10.1 Paul *Reg.*).

²⁶⁵ E.g., *RMR* 10 (AD 80–87), *RMR* 63 (AD 105–6), *RMR* 47 (AD 223–5).

would not be frightened into desertion out of fear of the punishments prescribed for deserters.²⁶⁶ A preferable mode of discipline was to limit absences with leave, discussed in Chapter Six.

Nonetheless, the emperors and jurists could not prohibit capital punishment for soldiers without abrogating tradition. They continued to endorse capital punishments for flight, insubordination, and proven desertion in the field, invoking Roman tradition. Lest their concessions to soldiers absent without leave appear soft, the jurists took a traditionally severe approach to offenses in combat itself.

CONCLUSION

In Weberian terms, military punishment was never fully rationalized; it remained subject to the individual commander's or emperor's personal whims, though the severity of Galba or Corbulo may have been rare in the Principate, and the severity of Avidius Cassius was both fictional, imitating Republican *exempla*, and influenced by late fourth century AD standards.²⁶⁷ Military punishment remained value-rational, often influenced by historical *exempla* centuries old. Even in modern times, long after analogous civilian penalties became obsolete, severe military punishments such as flogging and execution persisted. The death penalty for offences such as flight and failure to follow orders in combat persists as a limit case and ideological statement in the U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice.²⁶⁸ The Romans justified such penalties as defenses against the threat of external enemies and against the internal threat of a rebellious army.

The emperors, unless commanding in person, involved themselves little with the punishment of soldiers. Almost no imperial rescripts deal with the punishment of soldiers (as opposed to the soldiers' property and legal privileges), suggesting that the local commander's *imperium militiae* (or its descendant) gave sufficient authority to punish, and that punishments were rarely referred to the emperor unless he commanded in person. Trajan's remarks at Centumcellae – that he did not wish all cases of this kind to be referred to him – are misleading. The reasons for this policy are obvious. As quasi-patrons of the army, most emperors did

²⁶⁶ Wesch-Klein 1998: 168.

²⁶⁷ HA *Avid.* 1.4, 4.1–2, 4.5, 5.2, 6.2, 9.12; highly unreliable, probable fiction of uncertain aim.

²⁶⁸ W. I. Miller 2000: 27–8; UCMJ Art. 99 prescribes the death penalty “or other such punishment as a court-martial may direct,” usually imprisonment or dishonorable discharge; on the desuetude of the death penalty, Shephard 2001: 141.

not want to undermine the soldiers' loyalty with personal severity; Galba was an exception, and shortly was the victim of the soldiers' anger. On the other hand, to maintain military discipline, emperors did not encourage soldiers' appeal to them for *clementia* in the manner of civilians. Traditionally there was no appeal from the Republican commander's *imperium militiae*. Such appeal would have undermined the local commander's authority.

Modern combat discipline upholds inner leadership as opposed to Prussianism, because the modern battlefield requires soldiers' intrinsic motivation and initiative.²⁶⁹ Roman sword combat also required initiative and aggression. Because the imperial elite feared soldiers' aggression, and because harsh punishments were more easily admired in exemplary literature than imposed in real life, achieving social control through the imposition of *labor* and work discipline was preferable, as Chapter Six will show. Ideally, shame motivated soldiers to obey orders and shun insubordination and cowardice; shaming punishments (formalized in the Principate) inculcated a *habitus* of obedience.

The motivation of soldiers by material rewards (pay and donatives) conflicted with the elite view that *disciplina militaris* should restrain the avarice of soldiers. This conflict is the subject of the next chapter, in which material payments to soldiers raised the problem of patronage relationships, which *disciplina militaris* discouraged. Discipline imposed the routinization and partial rationalization of payments and how they were given, legitimating emperors and local commanders.

²⁶⁹ Marshall [1947] 2000: 64, 173–4. Cf. Currie 1928: 47.

5 DISCIPLINING WEALTH: THE IDEOLOGIES OF *STIPENDIA* AND *DONATIVA*



INTRODUCTION

This chapter focuses on *disciplina's* control of the income of soldiers, including *stipendia* (wages or salaries), *praemia* (pensions and other benefits), extrainstitutional income, and *donativa*.¹ *Donativa* were occasional gifts in cash, usually given by emperors on the occasion of a triumph, imperial accession, or other dynastic or political event. Disciplinary ideology and practice sought control over soldiers' acquisition of wealth from these sources. The imperial aristocracy regarded soldiers' access to wealth as at best unmerited, at worst illegitimate.

In more specific terms, the discipline of soldiers' income sought to routinize the remuneration of soldiers, stabilizing the imperial power by discouraging ambitious individuals' patronage of the army. The warlords of the late Republic were to some degree patrons of their soldiers, who were dependent on their leaders for pay, distribution of booty, and irregular pensions. Remuneration in this period had a charismatic and irregular quality, dependent on the general's success and ruthlessness. With the establishment of the Principate, the emperors needed to routinize and make legitimate the pay and benefits of soldiers, who could no longer be compensated by dispossessing other social groups in Italy.

The discipline of soldiers' remuneration was partly achieved through formally rational, bureaucratic means. Thus, Augustus regularized terms of service and established a special military treasury funded by new taxation in order to pay soldiers' pensions. Surviving documents and literary testimonia suggest that military

¹ M. A. Speidel 1992 and 2000, Alston 1994, and Wesch-Klein 1998: 48–54 focus on documentary sources. Duncan-Jones 1994, Harl 1996: 207–49, and Mattern 1999: 123–61 stress imperial finances. Fiebiger 1905, Veyne 1990: 334–41, Lendon 1997: 252–64, M. Roller 2001, and Stäcker 2003: 49–71, 369–403 focus on donatives and other gifts. G. R. Watson 1969: 89–108, Nicolet 1980: 129–48, 177–86, and Campbell 1984: 157–203 and 2002: 84–6 remain basic. Sander 1958: 187–91 and Jung 1982: 914–21 provide a legal standpoint. M. A. Speidel 2000 and Phang 2001: 181–7 discuss soldiers' living standards.

stipendia were subject to formally rational accounting. Extraintitutional forms of income were repressed, or, where repression was not possible, routinized (as when soldiers paid bribes to centurions for furlough).

However, the control of soldiers' access to wealth was also value-rational, inseparable from social, political, and moral concerns. The repression of military corruption and extortion, as well as the restraint of plunder during civil conflicts, was a major element of imperial legitimation, maintaining the loyalty of the provincial subjects. Soldiers' agitation for higher pay or pursuit of extraintitutional income compromised their occupational prestige, making them resemble (in elite eyes) despised petty traders or brigands.

By the second century AD onward, when soldiers received more cash from their *stipendia*, documents show soldiers buying, selling, lending, and making other financial transactions. The emperors created new legal forms to enable soldiers to make wills and to bequeath and protect their property. These privileges are usually seen as *beneficia*, a form of imperial patronage, but they also subjected soldiers' acquisition and disposal of wealth to juristic and imperial surveillance. The emperors and jurists who interpreted soldiers' material and legal privileges subjected them to discipline, associating privileges with good conduct, reinforcing property transmission within the ranks, and discouraging its transmission to unworthy persons.

Due to their symbolic role, the *donativa* were least amenable to rationalization. Modern scholars have depicted the *donativa* as a form of patronage, in which the emperor bound the soldiers to himself with gifts. However, this gift economy required dissimulation of the material nature of the transaction. Ideally, the emperor did not "buy" his soldiers. They did not belong to him as slaves belonged to a master.² Before the early second century AD, most Roman soldiers probably never saw the emperor in person. They were obedient to their local commanders. The Praetorians, resident in the capital, were elite troops with more contact with the emperor.

Despite their bad reputation, the *donativa* as patronage gifts also underwent routinization.³ Emperors could routinize *donativa* in value-rational terms, associating them with the symbolic order of honors rather than the material order of sordid gain. *Donativa* might be routinized by awarding them at imperial accessions, as the

² Contrast Weber 1978: 1015–20.

³ Brunt 1962: 76–7; Campbell 1984: 197–8.

legacies of predecessors, at anniversaries, and at other ceremonies that marked the continuity of the regime. The emperor might also represent the *donativa* as honorable rewards. These were most convincing when, as did Hadrian, the emperor maintained or increased the severity of other aspects of discipline. Hierarchy was maintained.

In contrast, when emperors and would-be emperors too blatantly traded *donativa* for military support, hierarchy was not maintained. If the emperor refused to give a donative, thus drawing attention to the material basis of his patronage of the army, the soldiers regarded it as an insult. But the Praetorians and other troops also held in contempt emperors who bought or attempted to buy their support with donatives and other material favors, as did Claudius, Otho, Vitellius, Didius Julianus, and Alexander Severus, and after initial parsimony Galba and Macrinus.

To a certain extent, the imperial coinage invoked this symbolic order, both as precious metal and through specific images and legends. However, coin messages directed toward the army were probably diluted by the volume of circulating coinage. The most symbolic form of wealth given to soldiers was *dona militaria*, military decorations of precious metal not to be confused with *donativa*.

SOLDIERS AND WEALTH

As has been mentioned, the aristocracy disapproved of common soldiers' undeserved acquisition of wealth.⁴ Due to their historical memory of proscriptions and confiscations in the late Republic, senators regarded the soldiers as gaining social and economic status at their expense. In elite eyes, common soldiers were rapacious; they gained wealth by force. Furthermore, soldiers lacked the prudence, decorum, and education to use their wealth in a civilized way. Soldiers abused wealth through excessive eating and drinking, discussed in Chapter Seven. For example, Dio relates that on campaign, two of Caracalla's soldiers found a wineskin and asked the emperor how they could share it. He told them to divide it equally, whence they drew their swords and cut the wineskin in half, spilling all the wine.⁵ The anecdote presents soldiers as greedy, ignorant, impulsive, and violent.

⁴ Mattern 1999: 141. Centurions were an exception, receiving fifteen times legionary base pay in the Principate, doubtless to retain their loyalty.

⁵ Dio 79.1.3.

According to Cicero and Sallust, Sulla's veterans exemplified this abuse of wealth.⁶ Sulla had accustomed his soldiers to an extravagant lifestyle while on campaign in Asia Minor. He later discharged them with land grants acquired from confiscations, and the veterans, unused to farming, mismanaged these grants. Cicero claims that they squandered their wealth on inappropriate luxuries beyond their means. The Sullan veterans accordingly became indebted and were won over by Catiline, who promised his supporters riches. The elite horror of soldiers' rapacity reached nightmare proportions in accounts of the triumviral proscriptions.⁷

The imperial aristocracy retained these attitudes, reinforced by the civil wars and coups of AD 68–9 and 193–7 and the early third century. Tacitus frequently terms common soldiers a *vulgus*, a mob prone to irrationality as well as avarice and violence. Cassius Dio, who wrote in the second quarter of the third century AD, has the harshest view of the army. In a fictional speech, Dio's Maecenas advises Augustus that he should recruit his army from "those who are strongest and most in need of a livelihood," who would otherwise turn to brigandage.⁸ In his account of Severus' disbanding the Praetorians for murdering Pertinax and elevating Didius Julianus, Dio reiterates this idea. Severus discontinued the recruitment of the guard from Italy; for lack of employment, the young men of Italy became brigands and gladiators.⁹ Dio's description of the new Praetorians, selected from Danubian troops, emphasizes their barbarism.¹⁰

Disciplina militaris sought the production of rational or at least controlled economic *habitus* in soldiers. Both excess wealth and poverty were dangerous in soldiers, for, as with the Sullan veterans, they might support usurpers who promised them money. Discipline sought to reduce the possibility of this kind of patronage and, in general, to reduce other illegitimate forms of gain. The emperor ensured that soldiers had a rational source of income as wages and benefits. Ideally, *disciplina* promoted saving and discouraged spending. However, the privatization of military supply in the second century AD conflicted with this aim.

⁶ Sall. *Cat.* 11.5–6. His veterans, Cic. *Cat.* 2.2.10, cf. Sall. *Cat.* 16.4, 21.5, 37.6. Shaw 1975; Hollander 2005: 231–2; cf. Eckstein 1997: 180.

⁷ Osgood 2006: 44ff, 62ff.

⁸ Dio 52.14.3, 52.27.5.

⁹ Dio 75.2.5–6.

¹⁰ Dio 75.2.6 (endorsed by Campbell 2002: 33).

RESTRAINING PLUNDER

The Romans acquired immense wealth in their conquest of the Mediterranean, much of it as plunder (*praeda*) from the sack of cities and native communities.¹¹ In the Roman triumph ceremony, held by the victorious general upon his return, captives, gold and silver, and costly, precious, or sacred objects were paraded as a measure of the victor's renown (*gloria*).¹²

More problematic was whether individual Romans could legitimately acquire this plunder. Soldiers' plundering may have been subjected to rational control. According to Polybius, the main source for this control, no plundering began before a signal was given, and all soldiers turned over their finds to the officers for sale. The proceeds of the booty were then distributed equally among the troops.¹³ However, other descriptions of Roman city sacks show soldiers carrying off plunder at will. Relatively poor soldiers could not be prevented from appropriating plunder.¹⁴ The refusal of booty was a gesture that only aristocratic officers could afford, if indeed any but a few did so.

Roman commanders may have been legally allowed to possess *manubiae*, the part of the *praeda* that fell to them.¹⁵ However, generals obtained more glory by refusing to take plunder. Famous commanders – Scipio Africanus, Cato the Censor, Aemilius Paullus, and Scipio Aemilianus – were also famous for not accepting plunder.¹⁶ Their military glory was thus dissociated from personal gain. Curtius Rufus' Alexander the Great displays this attitude in pure form: when Darius the king of Persia offered him a peaceful settlement of 30,000 talents of gold, Alexander replied, "I am not a merchant but a king." Alexander refused to treat Darius' female relatives and concubines as booty or to accept the

¹¹ Harris 1979: 74–6, 102–3; Rich 1993 moderates Harris. Momigliano 1958 (in Momigliano 1966: 118–20) and Finley 1986 discuss ancient warfare's economic motives.

¹² Versnel 1970: 93–6.

¹³ Polybius 10.15.4–16.9; A. Ziolkowski 1993: 74–8 argues that despite idealizations, soldiers were allowed to keep booty; Gilliver 1996b: 225–6. Whitewash: Lintott 1972: 630; Garlan 1975: 76.

¹⁴ A. Ziolkowski 1993: 90; Rawlings 2007: 47–8.

¹⁵ Gell. 13.25.pr.–32. Shatzman 1971: 188, 202–5; Harris 1979: 75; Millar [1963] 2004b: 33. Bona 1960 and Churchill 1999: 109–15 argue that *manubiae* remained public property.

¹⁶ Harris 1979: 57, 65–6, 79 and Note XI 264–5. Plut. *Cato Maior* 10.4 (Cato the Elder); Polyb. 18.35.4–5 and 31.22 (Aemilius Paullus); Polyb. 18.35.9–12 (Scipio Aemilianus); Plut. *C. Gracch.* 2.5; Gell. 15.12.1–4 = ORF³ fr. 23, 28 (Gaius Gracchus). In Plut. *Mar.* 21.2 Marius' soldiers give him their plunder.

30,000 talents as ransom; he returned the women unmolested, a gesture later imitated by Scipio Africanus with a Celtiberian noblewoman.¹⁷

The general who took plunder might spend it on public building rather than personal luxury, obtaining additional fame from his generosity (*liberalitas*), which depended on it his material profit but converted to symbolic capital. In the second century BC, “new men,” consuls with no consular ancestors, especially gained prestige from expending *manubiae* on public benefactions, as did emperors in the Principate.¹⁸

Troops who sought wealth might be depicted as cowardly toward the enemy or rapacious toward their own people.¹⁹ Commanders gained prestige by repressing excessive plundering, which could incapacitate military operations.²⁰ Returning from Asia in 189 BC, Manlius Vulso’s army could barely travel five miles a day due to the rich plunder they had taken.²¹ Soldiers might be distracted by plunder in the midst of battle or on the march. Taking Carthage by storm in the Third Punic War, Scipio Aemilianus’ soldiers stopped to hack to pieces and plunder a golden statue of Apollo.²² In the next century, Lucullus’ soldiers failed to catch Mithridates due to their *philoploutia de kai mikrologia stratiôtikê*, “greed and petty military avarice,” when they caught one of the king’s baggage mules loaded with treasure and started quarreling over it.²³ During Pompey’s campaign in Libya against Sulla’s opponents, his soldiers discovered a buried hoard. Pompey could not distract them from searching for buried treasure, digging in the ground for days on end.²⁴ This story appears light-hearted, but the *avaritia militaris* could be associated with shameful defeat, as in the case of Crassus.²⁵ When the Senate

¹⁷ Curt. 4.11.14. Africanus: Polyb. 10.19.6; Livy 26.50.1–12. A. Ziolkowski 1993: 88.

¹⁸ Pietilä-Castrén 1982–3: 142–3; cf. Shatzman 1971: 202–5; Churchill 1999: 109; McDonnell 2006a; Welch 2006. Caesar took only what he gave his soldiers, Plut. *Caes.* 17.1. Emperors (Augustus, Trajan): Millar [1991] 2004a: 50; Gell. 13.25.1 and 28; Hekster 2007: 342–3.

¹⁹ Amm. 22.4.7.

²⁰ Maxfield 1981: 58; Cagniart 2007: 184. App. *Iber.* 51.2, 54, 60. *Caes.* BG 6.34, 7.28, 7.45–8, BC 2.12–13, 3.97.1. Ones. *Strat.* 10.7–8; Plut. *Luc.* 17.5–6; 19.3–5. However, in BC 3.80–81 Caesar justifies his soldiers’ plundering Gomphi (discussed further in Chapter Seven). McDonnell 1990.

²¹ Luce 1977: 258–9 on Livy 38.15.14; cf. Livy 38.40.4–14. Cf. Dio 56.20.2–5 (retreat from Varian disaster impeded by baggage).

²² App. *Pun.* 127.

²³ Cic. *Lég. Man.* 22; Plut. *Luc.* 17.4–6; App. *Mith.* 12.82 (71 BC). Rivalry: Plut. *Luc.* 24.3.

²⁴ Plut. *Pomp.* 11.3–4.

²⁵ Vell. Pat. 2.46.2; Plin. *HN* 33.134; Plut. *Crass.* 2.1–8, cf. 14, 17.5–6; Flor. 1.46.2; App. BC 2.3.18.

forced Lucullus to resign command, his soldiers left him rather than have their plunder confiscated.²⁶

Plundering could also lead to brutal treatment of civilians. Sulla's army looted temple treasures in Greece. Roman soldiers who were sacking the cities of Rhodes and Lycia in 43 BC tortured civilians to force them to reveal hoards of coins and treasure. At the siege of Jerusalem in AD 70, when Roman auxiliaries discovered that Jewish deserters from the city were smuggling out gold by swallowing it and later recovering it from their excrement, the Roman auxiliaries started disemboweling Jewish deserters to obtain the gold.²⁷

In the West, the question of plunder shifted somewhat. The peoples of Germany and Britain had relatively little wealth to plunder in comparison with those of the Mediterranean and the East. In civil warfare, plunder became morally objectionable.²⁸ During the Flavian sack of the North Italian city of Cremona in AD 69, forty thousand armed men broke into the city, "mingling rape and slaughter," seizing young women and boys, killing the old, and pillaging wealth from both private homes and temples.²⁹ When the soldiers found that nobody would buy Italian captives as slaves, the soldiers started killing the captives to force their relatives into offering ransoms. Imperial ideology emphasized preventing soldiers' extortion and robbery of the subjects of the empire as if they were the enemy; provincial loyalty or revolt might depend on the soldiers' conduct.³⁰

The jurist Modestinus further condemned plunder, arguing that soldiers who took booty did not own plunder, which belonged to the state. However, this was a matter of controversy. Other jurists regarded plunder in warfare as belonging to the person who seized it, at least in *ius gentium*, the law of nations or common custom. This ambiguity made the repression of plunder a disciplinary matter, not a legal

²⁶ Plut. *Luc.* 33–35; App. *Mith.* 90; Cagniat 2007: 84.

²⁷ App. *BC* 4.73, 81–2; Plut. *Sulla* 12; Joseph. *BJ* 5.551. Appian depicts Brutus and Cassius as retaining control of their soldiers.

²⁸ Caesar's conquest of Gaul and Trajan's of Dacia brought wealth, Mattern 1999: 153; M. A. Speidel 2000: 74 n. 60. Plunder in civil war: Campbell 1984: 366–7, 2002: 80–81; Caes. *BC* 2.12–13 (Massilia); Tac. *Hist.* 3.19.6, 3.33–4 (Italian towns in AD 69), *Agric.* 7.

²⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 3.33–34.

³⁰ Civilians might term military requisitions, extortion, and violence "plunder": e.g., Plut. *Luc.* 20.1–3 (Lucullus' soldiers); Dio 59.21.4 (Caligula), 76.14.1–2 (Plautianus); Plin. *Pan.* 17.1. (Domitian's soldiers). Soldiers' abuses: Mitchell 1976: 111–12; Campbell 1984: 248–51; Wesch-Klein 1998: 135–9. MacMullen 1988: 129–32 focuses on the later Empire. The imperial court's exactions, Rostovtzeff 1957: ch. 8, with warnings by Mattern 1999: 146–7; Mitchell 1976: 130, 1983. Ando 2000: 193–6.

one.³¹ In these anecdotes concerning plunder, a symbolic order was thus created, opposed to the material order, dissociating military service from personal gain. An army motivated only by material gain lost its legitimacy and was represented as cowardly or as plundering its own people. Poverty was appropriate to soldiers, as long as it did not motivate them to pillage, rob, or extort.

THE LATE REPUBLIC IN IMPERIAL TRADITION

In Roman cultural memory, the late Republic's politicians and soldiers were corrupted by the syndrome of *avaritia*.³² Those running for office provided *ambitus*, "bribery" or benefactions for the electorate, ranging from banquets for their peers, to spectacles and handouts for the public. *Ambitus* became increasingly expensive, with the result that the aristocracy became increasingly indebted.³³ Caesar went into massive debt to finance his career up to the consulship, recovered by his extensive plunder in Gaul.

Politicians regularly represented their political opponents as dispensing *largitio*, handouts or bribery.³⁴ A scholar of the late Republic suggests that in late Republican Rome, the verb "to bribe" was "an irregular verb: 'I take appropriate care of my friends, you are recklessly generous, he bribes.'"³⁵ It has been argued that Roman nobles always gave from a position of social superiority so that their gifts

³¹ D. 48.13.15(13) (Modestinus *Poen.* 2): theft of booty incurred prosecution for embezzlement under the *lex Iulia* on *peculatus*. Second century BC Roman nobles prosecuted each other over alleged peculation of booty. In favor of ownership: D. 41.1.5.7 (Gaius *Rer. Cott.* 2), 41.2.1.1 (Paul *Edict* 54), 41.2.3.21 (*ibid.*), 41.1.51.1 (Celsus *Dig.* 2); Gaius *Inst.* 2.69. According to the law of *postliminium* (D. 49.15), things or people captured in warfare become the captor's property. Against ownership, Sander 1958: 184–7; Bona 1960; Jung 1982: 924–39; Churchill 1999: 93–5.

³² Rosenstein 1999: 205–10; Brunt 1962: 75–9; Garlan 1975: 104–5; Nicolet 1980: 129–48; Ste. Croix 1981: 357–8; Raafaub 1980: 1007–8; R. E. Smith 1958: 13, 42. Also on the Late Rep. army Gabba 1976; Brunt 1971 [1987]; Alföldy 1988: 77–8; Blois 1987; Shotter 1994: 13; Keppie 1998: 61–3, 146; Blois 2000; Goldsworthy 2003: 260–62; Cagniat 2007: 81–3; Ligt 2007: 124–6; Blois 2007: 134. Southern 2007: 54–9, 94. M. F. Williams 2000 explicates the theme in Polybius VI. Brunt 1971 [1987]: 228, 256–7, 308–10, 325, 347, 351–3, 365, 373, 375, 406, 410 modifies, and Rosenstein 2004: 9–15 disproves, the traditional view that the Hannibalic War caused small farmers to lose their land and become proletarian volunteers; Phang 2006 and Ligt 2007: 121 review Rosenstein 2004.

³³ Frederiksen 1966; Veyne 1990: 249.

³⁴ Quint. *Inst.* 4.2.77.

³⁵ Lintott 1990: 11. On the overlaps of patronage and bribery, Wallace-Hadrill 1989a: 70–71; Braund 1989: 145.

were not a mutual exchange of benefits as in the Greek cities, where magistrates purchased their offices with promises to give. However, the Roman authors readily depicted rivals as purchasing their supporters; the relationship of late Republican generals and soldiers is depicted as mutual.³⁶

In the imperial period, the downfall of the Roman Republic was attributed to warfare motivated by material gain. Civil war generals and emperors practiced *largitio* toward the army, buying the soldiers' loyalty with excessive gifts.³⁷ These discourses shape the ideological frame of the pay and benefits of imperial soldiers. In a passage condemning Sulla's appropriation of the sacred treasures of Greece, Plutarch moralizes that generals and soldiers of the past refrained from such plundering and kept their troops' avarice in check, never indulging the wishes of their soldiers. In contrast,

the generals of this later period were men who had risen to the top by violence rather than by merit; they needed armies to fight against one another rather than against the public enemy; and so they were forced to combine the arts of the politician with the authority of the general. They spent money on making life easy for their soldiers and then, after purchasing their labor in this way, failed to observe that they had made their whole country a thing for sale and had put themselves in a position where they had become the slaves of the worst sort of people in order to become the masters of the better.³⁸

In factual terms Plutarch is wrong – the Roman nobility had long waged war for material gain and wrangled over plunder, booty, and triumphs. Nonetheless Plutarch's moral is part of a tradition *about* the late Republic that affected elite attitudes toward the imperial army.

³⁶ Veyne 1990: 204, 215–16.

³⁷ McDonnell 1990: 61–5; Caesar omits his own bribery; the lacunose *Caes. BC* 1.39 refers not to Caesar but to another.

³⁸ Plut. *Sulla* 12.7–8; cf. Dio 42.49.3–5. Appian emphasizes that leaders bribed their opponents' troops to defect to them, sometimes with the Senate's backing, App. *BC* 3.8.51, 3.9.64, 3.10.74, 4.12.89, 4.12.96, 4.12.99–100. Leaders bound soldiers to them with gifts, App. *BC* 2.4.30 (Caesar); cf. Suet. *Iul.* 68.1; App. *BC* 3.7.48 (Octavian), 4.12.89 (Brutus and Cassius). But in App. *BC* 3.12.88, in order not to demoralize his troops, Octavian diverted a convoy bringing money.

These representations stress material benefits at the expense of the symbolic order and stress the mutual exchange between the generals and soldiers, disrupting the reproduction of hierarchy.³⁹ Both generals and armies were dependent on each other, because generals secured money to pay soldiers from their victories in civil warfare.⁴⁰ This symbiosis existed at society's expense. In the accounts of the triumviral proscriptions, soldiers carried out the triumvirs' orders and benefited directly from the proscriptions.⁴¹ In a *topos* derived from the triumviral wars, bad emperors inflicted new and extortionate taxes, and especially confiscated the property of unjustly condemned aristocrats, in order to give it to the army.⁴²

The aristocratic fear of civil war at times seems either irrational or rhetorically elaborated. The mutinies on the Danube and Rhine in AD 14 were markedly leaderless, lacking candidates for the throne, the soldiers acting collectively. Germanicus, sent to the Rhine to suppress the mutiny there, strenuously refused an offer of the imperial power. Yet Tacitus hints that the mutineers hoped for "the rewards of civil war."⁴³ Though Tacitus stresses their decrepit old age, very few of the legionaries then serving could have remembered the period of the civil wars, before Actium, forty-five years ago.⁴⁴

During most of the Principate, these stereotypes and fears of military avarice and civil warfare lay dormant due to the successful routinization of soldiers' *stipendia*, their discharge pensions, and even routine *donativa*, such as those given at accessions and imperial anniversaries. However, even in the administration of soldiers' accounts these concerns can be detected. The more political *donativa* were more difficult to rationalize and make consistent with discipline.

³⁹ Dio 33 fr. 108 (Sulla), 36.16.1–3 (Lucullus), 37.30.1–5 (Catiline), 42.50.1–5 (Caesar), 40.26 and 42.52 (Caesarians mutiny), 45.5.1–4 (Caesarians), 43.24.2–4 (Caesarians), 43.30.3–4 (Sextus Pompey), 45.13.1–2 (Antonians mutiny), 45.12.1–3 (Octavian), 46.46.5–7 (Octavian), 47.14.3–5, 47.17.5–6 (triumvirs distribute confiscations), 49.13.1–3 (Octavian's soldiers mutiny), 51.4.1–8, 51.17.6–8 (Octavian).

⁴⁰ Harris 1979: 102–3; Nicolet 1980: 146; Ste. Croix 1981: 15. After about 235, soldiers' plundering went unchecked because of the depreciation of their pay, Blois 2002: 105.

⁴¹ Dio 42.49.3–5, App. BC 4.1.3, 4.5.35; soldiers execute aristocrats, 4.3.12, 4.4.17–20, 22, 25–28, 4.5.31, 4.6.40, 42, 43–4, 47–8. On these representations Osgood 2006.

⁴² Cic. *Philipp.* 8.7–9; Dio 47.6.5; App. BC 5.12; Cf. Suet. *Aug.* 15; Octavian's confiscations to pay his soldiers. On this period, Nicolet 1980: 180–84; Ste. Croix 1981: 361–2; Millar [1977] 1992: 165.

⁴³ Tac. *Ann.* 1.16.

⁴⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 1.34–5; Germanicus paid them money in Tiberius' name, 1.37; Campbell 1984: 371.

THE AERARIUM MILITARE AND PRAEMIA

The total costs of the army were the largest single element in the imperial budget.⁴⁵ Given the scale of these payments, and the narrow margins or indeed exigency of the imperial budget, modern historians following the Roman elite authors have often blamed the greed of the soldiers. The imperial budget for military payments consisted of the *aerarium militare*, which provided veterans' pensions (*praemia*) from taxation; the *stipendia*, which were paid from provincial taxation; and the *donativa*, most subject to fluctuation, paid from the emperor's treasury or *fiscus*.⁴⁶

The emperor Augustus established and capitalized a military treasury, the *aerarium militare*, to fund veteran *praemia*. It was funded by new taxes, a sales tax and the *vicesima hereditarium* or five percent tax on inheritances.⁴⁷ This taxation imposed formal rationality on the provision of *praemia*, ending the irregular confiscations and veteran settlements that had so alienated the aristocracy. Suetonius states that the creation of the *aerarium militare* discouraged soldiers from being tempted to support a coup through poverty or a helpless old age.⁴⁸ Fixed *praemia* were assigned to soldiers when they completed a fixed length of service. Praetorians served twelve years, shortly changed to sixteen years, and received 20,000 HS at the end of Augustus' reign; legionaries served sixteen years, shortly changed to twenty years, and received 12,000 HS.⁴⁹

The new system did not function smoothly at first. In 30 and 14 BC, Augustus demobilized 30,000 soldiers and paid their pensions from his personal wealth; in AD 6, he also established the *aerarium militare* and stocked it with 170 million sesterces of his own money.⁵⁰ By the last years of his reign, this capitalization

⁴⁵ For estimates see Duncan-Jones 1994: 33–7, 45–6; Harl 1996: 212–20; Mattern 1999: 130; Erdkamp 2007a: 2; Herz 2007: 314–19.

⁴⁶ Mattern 1999: 129; Brunt 1966; Kloft 1970: 125; Millar [1977] 1992:133–201; Veyne 1990: 321–5; Duncan-Jones 1994; Millar [1963] 2004b: 67–8.

⁴⁷ Parker [1928] 1958: 72ff; Brunt 1950: 61–4; Forni 1953: 29–31; R. E. Smith 1958: 71; Brunt and Moore 1967: comm. ad loc.; G. R. Watson 1969: 11; Blois 1987: 52–4; Corbier 1977: 197–200; Campbell 1984: 163–5, 2002: 85–6; Raaflaub 1980: 1013; Carrié 1993: 120–1; Keppie 1998: 146–8; Wesch-Klein 1998: 48–54; Mattern 1999: 126; M. A. Speidel 2000: 66; M. Roller 2001: 202–3; Stäcker 2003: 64–71; Gilliver 2007: 185–6; Herz 2007: 317–18; A. R. Birley 2007: 380. Southern 2007: 73, 166–8.

⁴⁸ Suet. *Aug.* 49.2; Dio 54.25.6.

⁴⁹ Dio 54.25.5–6, 55.24.9–25.6. Corbier 1977: 200–201; M. A. Speidel 2000: 67; Herz 2007: 317–18; Wesch-Klein 2007: 444–5. Dio 78(77).24.1.

⁵⁰ Aug. *RGDA* 17.2; Suet. *Aug.* 49.2; Dio 55.24.9–55.25.6, 56.28.4–6. Others forbidden: Dio 55.25.3.

was exhausted, not yet supplemented by the new taxes. Soldiers were retained in service past their normalized discharge dates to avoid paying their pensions. The *praemia* they received were in the form of marginal land. This was one of the causes of the AD 14 mutinies in Pannonia and on the Rhine.⁵¹ As a concession to these mutinies, Tiberius granted shorter service and discharged soldiers with pensions, but soon revoked these concessions. As had Augustus, Tiberius was able to reduce payments of *praemia* to veterans by keeping them in service past their discharge dates.⁵² The older soldiers were at their discharge, the fewer their numbers were, due to natural death.

Nonetheless, after the establishment of the *aerarium militare*, the payment of cash *praemia* to soldiers did not arouse the intense aristocratic opposition caused by confiscation of and redistribution of land to soldiers in the late Republic. Except for early complaints about the new taxes, the elite did not vilify imperial *praemia* as they later did *donativa*.⁵³ After the Augustan period, soldiers preferred to take their pensions in cash, and by Nero's reign they usually settled in the provinces where they had served.⁵⁴ The emperors did not alter the *praemia*, with which soldiers seem to have been content, until Caracalla increased legionary and praetorian *praemia* from 12,000 and 20,000 HS respectively to 20,000 HS and some higher amount.⁵⁵

In the absence of other funds, *stipendia* might be paid from a general's personal wealth, but usually derived from *tributum*, the direct land tax from which Roman citizens in Italy were exempt.⁵⁶ *Stipendia* also were not controversial before the pay raises by Domitian, Severus, and Caracalla. The funding of *donativa* remained somewhat irrational, based on the emperor's fluctuating personal treasury, the *fiscus*. In the past, generals had given triumphal donatives directly from booty. During the Principate, donatives were drawn from the *fiscus*, rather than the *aerarium* or public treasury. The dividing line between the *fiscus* and the imperial property per se, *patrimonium* or *res privata*, was rather vague, but both were at the emperor's disposal. He did not need the Senate to grant him monies from the old public

⁵¹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.

⁵² Corbier 1977: 202; Duncan-Jones 1994: 11; Suet. *Tib.* 48.2. Demographic shrinkage: Scheidel 1996a: 132–8.

⁵³ Brunt 1950: 82. Complaints: Tac. *Ann.* 1.78, 2.42; Dio 56.28.4–6.

⁵⁴ Tac. *Ann.* 14.27.

⁵⁵ Suet. *Calig.* 44.1: Caligula attempted to revoke the pensions of *primipili*, an action rescinded by Claudius (Suet. *Claud.* 11.3). M. A. Speidel 1992: 105; Campbell 1984: 160.

⁵⁶ Millar [1977] 1992: 197–8, 200–201.

aerarium.⁵⁷ In casual usage, the emperor was said to spend his own money on benefactions; his *impensa* were *de suo*, “from his own property.”⁵⁸ The nature of benefaction as a symbolic exchange necessitated such a usage. The emperor had to give of himself, not from an abstract institution, to establish a personal bond with his recipients. When he did not give, the soldiers might regard it as a personal insult.

Imperial funds fluctuated depending on the mining of gold and silver, the availability of war booty, and the personal disposition of emperors toward taxation and spending. Much gold and silver came from gold mines in northern Spain and Dalmatia and silver mines in southern and eastern Spain.⁵⁹ Large sums of money and uncoined wealth were acquired from the sack of Jerusalem in AD 70 and from Trajan’s conquest of Dacia in the early second century AD; Dacia contained gold mines.⁶⁰ Both the mines and plunder began to run short in the late second and early third centuries AD, whence Roman warfare produced expenses rather than profits, though Septimius Severus allowed his men to plunder Seleuceia and Ctesiphon.⁶¹

The imperial finances were often depleted and filled by irregular means. Caligula, Nero, Vitellius, and Commodus allegedly squandered enormous sums of money on personal caprices. At times, exigency forced emperors to auction the palace furnishings, which included many costly ornaments and works of art, to raise money for military donatives.⁶² Gold and silver palace furnishings were not coined directly.⁶³ At imperial accessions, at adoptions, or after victories, emperors might request *aurum coronarium* – ceremonial golden crowns, regarded as an irregular tax – from cities and communities.⁶⁴ Presumably the emperors usually had stocks of gold and silver coinage on hand, but remarkably little is known about this from an administrative perspective.⁶⁵ The most financially prudent

⁵⁷ Millar [1977] 1992: 147; cf. Kloft 1970: 125, 128–30; Eck 1996: 179–80; against, Veyne 1990: 256, 324–34 (*fiscus* as state property).

⁵⁸ E.g. *RGDA* 16.2; 17.

⁵⁹ Howgego 1992: 6; Mattern 1999: 132–7.

⁶⁰ Harl 1996: 39; Hopkins 1978a: 38–9 (table).

⁶¹ Harl 1996: 78, 83.

⁶² Suet. *Calig.* 39.1; Dio 68.2.2, 72(71).fr; HA *Marc.* 17.4; Dio 74.5.4–5; HA *Pert.* 7.8–10. Millar [1977] 1992: 148; Duncan-Jones 1994: 11. Caligula ran a brothel in the Palace: Suet. *Calig.* 41; Dio 59.28.9.

⁶³ Millar [1977] 1992: 148.

⁶⁴ Millar [1977] 1992: 140–42; Ando 2000: 175–82.

⁶⁵ Millar [1977] 1992: 133–201, esp. 149; Millar [1991] 2004a. Veyne 1990: 353 and Duncan-Jones 1994: 3–5 stress formal irrationality of imperial finances.

emperors, such as Tiberius, Vespasian, and Pertinax, were regarded as stingy, as the discussion of the ideology of benefaction will show.⁶⁶

Though Augustus' establishment of the *aerarium militare* was supposed to discourage such actions, later emperors also resorted to confiscations.⁶⁷ Before the Severan period, confiscations were motivated by imperial extravagance rather than payments to the soldiers. To pay the army, Severus confiscated the property of the supporters of his defeated rivals Pescennius Niger and Clodius Albinus.⁶⁸ Maximinus Thrax also made confiscations from senators to pay the army.⁶⁹

Maecenas' fictional advice to Augustus reflects the elite attitude toward the army. Payments to the soldiers are a necessary evil: the emperor levies taxes in order to fund the pay and pensions of soldiers.⁷⁰ Augustus supposedly wrote to the Senate: "Maintain the soldiers adequately, so that they may not on account of poverty desire anything that belongs to others; keep them in hand and under discipline, so that they are not tempted to do harm."⁷¹ Soldiers should not be impoverished, which might lead them to extortion or brigandage or to support usurpers out of need; nor should soldiers receive excessive handouts, which might stimulate *luxuria* and lead them to support usurpers out of greed.⁷² The soldiers' *stipendia*, rarely increased before the third century, were considered to be maintenance, providing soldiers' necessities.

STIPENDIA

Roman soldiers' pay (*stipendium*, plural *stipendia*) connotes "maintenance" rather than "wage."⁷³ Because the bodily needs of Roman soldiers for food, clothing, and equipment did not significantly change, *stipendia* were raised infrequently and barely kept pace with inflation.⁷⁴ In the Pannonian mutiny in AD 14, the legionaries

⁶⁶ Duncan-Jones 1994: 11.

⁶⁷ Millar [1977] 1992: 172; Duncan-Jones 1994: 5–7.

⁶⁸ Dio 75(74).8.4–5, 75(74).14.3, 76.14.1–2; Hdn. 3.8.7; HA Sev. 12.1–3.

⁶⁹ Maximinus' confiscations, Hdn. 73.2–5; Commodus, Hdn. 1.17.2. Dio 78(77).9.1–5; Caracalla exacted not confiscations but additional taxes from *aurum coronarium* and the grant of Roman citizenship to most inhabitants of the empire.

⁷⁰ Dio 52.28.1.

⁷¹ Dio 53.10.6; cf. 52.27.4–5.

⁷² Cf. HA Alex. 52.3.

⁷³ Brunt 1950: 50; Boren 1983: 432; Rawlings 2007: 49.

⁷⁴ Garlan 1975: 114; Duncan-Jones 1994: 29; Severus' and Caracalla's pay raises did not increase soldiers' purchasing power. Against this inflation, Potter 2004: 129–30.

complained that for their labors they earned a mere ten *asses* (a low-value coin) a day. This statement equates them with wage laborers, but Tacitus adds a negative tone by attributing it to Percennius the rabble-rouser.⁷⁵ For soldiers to regard their pay as a wage (*merces*) equated them with *mercennarii*, not mercenaries but low-status wage-earning civilians.⁷⁶

Stipendia were made consistent with discipline through their rational accounting.⁷⁷ Military documents show that each soldier, identified by his full name and place of birth, received his *stipendium* for the given third or quarter of the year. In these records, the soldier's deductions were itemized and summed; then his net balance was calculated and recorded as deposited to his account. This balance was summed with his previous balance to give the total. An extant document follows two individuals through the year; other surviving documents list the *stipendia*, deductions, and balances of several personnel at one pay date.⁷⁸ The aristocracy's and many emperors' anxiety concerning military corruption and extravagance probably motivated efforts to maintain accurate pay records. The pay documents, at various levels, were intended to communicate the honesty and transparency of the army's finances.⁷⁹ At the highest level, Augustus' staff compiled a work known as the *breviarium totius imperii*, a handbook of the entire empire, which included the numbers of soldiers, the contents of the *aerarium* and *fiscus*, and public revenues and expenses, surely including army expenses.⁸⁰ The management of the *stipendia* at least was rational, in contrast with the *donativa*, as will be seen.

During the first century AD, the main part of soldiers' *stipendia* remained in their unit's bank and accounts. After ceremonially receiving their pay or donatives, soldiers were required to deposit them *ad signa*, in a coffer kept in the headquarters

⁷⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.6; Herz 2007: 307 emphasizes that this pay rate attracted poor recruits.

⁷⁶ Finley 1973: 41–2, 60; Veyne 1990: 52–3, and Giardina 1993a: 250–56, 259–60 stress elite anti-commercial attitudes, revised by D'Arms 1981: 1–6, 20–31 and more recent authors, Ch. 1 n. 56. Veyne 1979 and Joshel 1992b: 67–8 suggest that by expressing contempt for commerce, aristocrats subordinated petty traders and hucksters, while not despising *larger-scale* trade such as overseas commerce, e.g., Cic. *Off.* 1.150–51; aristocrats often used intermediaries (*institores*), Aubert 1994. Trade on Roman frontiers, Whittaker 1983, 2004: 87, 93–8; Wierschowski 2002.

⁷⁷ *P. Gen. Lat.* 1 = *ChLA* 7 = *CPL* 106 = *RMR* 68 = Campbell 1994, no. 24 (AD 81); *P. Gen. Lat.* 4 = *ChLA* 9 = *CPL* 107 = *RMR* 69; *P. Berol.* 6866 + *P. Aberd.* 133 = *CPL* 122 = *RMR* 70 = *ChLA* 410 (AD 192); *P. Berl.* 14100 = *ChLA* 446 (third century); *P. Hamb.* 310 = *ChLA* 495 (third century). Herz 2007: 308–10.

⁷⁸ *RMR* 68 (*op. cit.* n. 77); however, the sums disbursed to the soldier in *P. Yadin* 722 do not correspond with known *stipendia*.

⁷⁹ Cf. HA *Alex.* 21.6. On imperial bureaucratic documents as ideological communication, Kelly 1994: 164; Mattern 1999: 128–9; Ando 2000: 75–8; legal documents, Meyer 2004.

⁸⁰ Ando 2000: 149–51; Suet. *Aug.* 101.4; Dio 56.33.1–3.

shrine.⁸¹ Vegetius says that in the olden days soldiers were required to save half of each donative *ad signa* so that they would not squander it on luxuries and unnecessary purchases; these forced savings were called *seposita*, which soldiers could not withdraw.⁸² This practice also protected soldiers' savings. A soldier with a relatively large sum of cash in hand might desert with it, or he might be robbed, though he was armed and could defend himself.⁸³ A coffer in the legionary shrine was also far more secure than the soldiers' barracks or a civilian banker's shop in the *canabae*.⁸⁴ The *deposita ad signa* were defended not only by religious awe or taboo, but by also by the soldiers who stood watch at the standards; *signiferi* (standard bearers) kept the accounts. However, Domitian instituted a cap on soldiers' savings of not more than 1,000 HS (250 denarii) per man, to prevent commanders from seizing the *deposita ad signa* to fund a revolt.⁸⁵ In the interests of discipline, donatives may also have been paid out in installments, as when Pliny praises Trajan for giving the soldiers half of their *donativa* but civilians their entire *congaria*.⁸⁶

New recruits received a *viaticum*, a sum of 75 denarii, paid as three *aurei*, to cover the expenses of travel to their units.⁸⁷ They received this sum on their arrival, probably to discourage their deserting with it. The *viaticum* was not changed during the Principate and may have been a traditional inducement for recruitment. The 75-denarius *viaticum* represented a third of the first-century legionary's yearly *stipendium* and still a considerable proportion of his salary before the Severan period. It represented a still larger sum for auxiliaries and fleet soldiers. The fleet recruit Apion writes that he has received *biatikon para Kaisaros chrusous treis*, a gift formally "from Caesar."⁸⁸ He received the *viaticum* on arriving at Misenum, so that the sum became technically a reimbursement of his traveling expenses, one that he might have seen only briefly (if at all) if it was automatically deposited in his military savings account.

⁸¹ Ceremony: Joseph. *Bj* 5.349. G. R. Watson 1969: 51–2. Wesch-Klein 1998: 61–2.

⁸² Veg. *Mil.* 2.20.1–2. G. R. Watson 1969: 105; some pay documents show exactly 100 *denarii* in *deposito*, which may reflect this compulsory deposit.

⁸³ HA *Pesc.* 10.2–3.

⁸⁴ Polyb. 6.37.9–13; severe punishments for theft in camp.

⁸⁵ Suet. *Dom.* 7.3. According to G. R. Watson 1969: 150–51, Veg. *Mil.* 2.20 suggests that Domitian's measure was temporary.

⁸⁶ Plin. *Pan.* 25.2.

⁸⁷ G. R. Watson 1969: 44; Herz 2007: 310. Southern 2007: 133.

⁸⁸ BGU 423 = *Sel. Pap.* 1.112 = Campbell 1994, no. 10.

In a receipt of deposit issued by the *signiferi* of the six centuries of the Coh. I Lusitanorum to the centurion Tituleius Longinus in AD 117, new recruits' *viaticum* were deposited *ad signa* as lump sums, probably decreased by the recruits' actual travel expenses.⁸⁹ In a document from the late second century, *viaticum* was recorded as deposited in the soldiers' accounts.⁹⁰ By this period, when provincial and local recruitment became usual, the new recruits' travel expenses were smaller. Naval recruits such as Apion, traveling from Egypt to Misenum in Italy, were exceptional. But their paymasters still saw to it that their *viaticum* was safely deposited *ad signa*.

The pay rates of legionary and auxiliary soldiers and of legionary centurions between Augustus and Alexander Severus, reconstructed from surviving documents and literary sources, are summarized in Table 5.1. Cavalrymen received higher pay to maintain their horses and grooms as well as themselves. Officers below the rank of centurion (*principales*), received pay-and-a-half or double pay, giving them the titles *sesquiplicarii* or *duplicarii*. The Praetorians and urban cohorts received higher pay than legionaries and auxiliaries and the fleet soldiers received less, but documentary evidence of their pay does not survive. A legionary centurion, however, received fifteen times the salary of a legionary infantry *miles*; such high pay was intended to ensure the retention and loyalty of centurions.

It is notable that before the third century, the pay of soldiers was rarely raised, despite the incidence of military extortion and the political conflicts caused by the *donativa*.⁹¹ These problems might have been averted by raising military *stipendia* more frequently. But doing so would have forced emperors and elite to acknowledge soldiers' permanent right to additional wealth, which the imperial aristocracy was unwilling to concede as legitimate. The emperors had some control over the occasion and magnitude of donatives, and in theory could choose not to give them, whereas the *stipendium* was a permanent entitlement.

This attitude explains literary authors' disapproval of pay raises. In Dio's view, Domitian both raised soldiers' pay by a third and reduced their numbers, "both

⁸⁹ *PSI* 1063 = *Sel. Pap.* 2.368 = *Daris* 33 = *RMR* 74 = Campbell 1994, no. 11.

⁹⁰ *RMR* 70 (*op. cit.* n. 77).

⁹¹ Pay increased by Caesar: *Suet. Iul.* 26.3, Augustus: *Tac. Ann.* 1.17.6. Domitian: *Suet. Dom.* 7.3, Severus: *Hdn.* 3.8.5. Caracalla: *Dio* 79.12.6; *Hdn.* 4.4.7. In *Dio* 79.34.2 and 79.36.2–5, Macrinus give the Praetorians 4000 HS, then attempted to lower pay: *Dio* 79(78). 34.2. Maximinus doubled pay: *Hdn.* 6.8.8. On these raises, Mattern 1999: 139–40; Potter 2004: 129–30; Herz 2007: 308–10.

Table 1. *Pay Scales in the Imperial Army*

	Augustus-Domitian (27 BC–AD 84)	Domitian-Severus (AD 84–197)	Severus-Caracalla (AD 197–212)	Caracalla-Maximinus (AD 212–235)
<i>Primus pilus</i>	54,000 HS	72,000 HS	144,000 HS	216,000 HS
<i>Primi ordines</i>	27,000 HS	36,000 HS	72,000 HS	108,000 HS
Centurion	13,500 HS	18,000 HS	36,000 HS	54,000 HS
<i>Eques alae/legionis</i>	1,050 HS	1,400 HS	2,800 HS	4,200 HS
<i>Miles legionis</i>	900 HS	1,200 HS	2,400 HS	3,600 HS
<i>Eques cohortis</i>	900 HS	1,200 HS	2,400 HS	3,600 HS
<i>Miles cohortis</i>	750 HS	1,000 HS	2,000 HS	3,000 HS

Annual pay rates of Roman military personnel below senatorial and equestrian rank.

In sesterces (HS).

From M. A. Speidel 1992: 2000.

weakening the army and making it more expensive.”⁹² A statement of Herodian’s suggests that Dio was not merely referring to manpower strength; an increase in pay was debilitating in itself. Herodian accuses Septimius Severus of corrupting the army in 197 with his pay raise, donative, and grant of gold rings (probably to centurions and *principales*) and of the right to legally marry.⁹³ According to Herodian, Severus thus undermined the soldiers’ toughness and austere diet, their willingness to labor, and their respect for their superiors, making them avaricious and desirous of luxury. Herodian regards as a package the disciplinary *habitus* of the soldiers – the imposition of restricted wages and donatives, hard work, austere lifestyle, formal celibacy, and deference to superiors. If any one of these is corrupted, the others soon follow.

The authorities disapproved of soldiers’ demands for additional funds, even for necessities. Troops who had marched a long distance to join the civil wars in Italy in AD 69 demanded *clavarium*, “nail-money,” presumably to replace footwear. Military boots (*caligae*) had soles studded with nails (*clavi*). These soldiers were also short of food. However, their demand for *clavarium* was regarded as a euphemism for a donative.⁹⁴ Vespasian refused the request of the fleet soldiers for *calciarium*, money for shoes for their journey from Ostia to Rome, and ordered them to go barefoot.⁹⁵ The fleet was regarded as the lowliest branch of the service, except for the night watch at Rome.

DEDUCTIONS FROM *STIPENDIA*

In keeping with the *stipendium*’s purpose of maintenance, the army made deductions from soldiers’ pay for food, clothing, footwear, fodder, equipment, and other purposes.⁹⁶ These deductions appear mainly in first-century pay documents. Arms and armor may have been a one-time expense, deducted soon after enlistment. Their cost would be high; debts or deposits for arms and armor may have served as

⁹² Dio 67.3.5.

⁹³ Hdn. 3.8.5. Southern 2007: 76, 106–8.

⁹⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 3.50. It seems to have been refused, since the soldiers proceeded to pillage.

⁹⁵ Suet. *Vesp.* 8.3. The sailors went barefoot aboard ship.

⁹⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17; examples of accounts showing stoppages for food, clothing, etc., *RMR* 68 (*op. cit.* n. 77) (Egypt, AD 81); *P. Yadin* p. 722 = Campbell 1994: no. 25. G. R. Watson 1969: 102–4; M. A. Speidel 1992: 93–5, 2000: 74–6; Herz 2007: 311–12.

a form of social control, discouraging desertion.⁹⁷ Arms and armor were administered or maintained by the *custodes armorum*. If a soldier died or was discharged, the army might buy back his armor and tent.⁹⁸

The cost of food was relatively high, whereas that of horses was held down for soldiers.⁹⁹ Small deductions were made for ritual purposes such as *saturnaliciū k(astrense)*, a fund for the camp Saturnalia, about which little is known, and *ad signa*, possibly a fund for maintaining the cult of the standards.¹⁰⁰ A deduction of one percent probably represented bookkeeping, as might the small deductions that persisted in the second century AD, termed variously *collatio*, *contulit publica*, or *sublatio*.¹⁰¹

The mutinous legionaries in AD 14 complained of the deduction system. Out of the ten *asses* which they received a day, clothing, equipment, and tents were subtracted, to say nothing of extralegal bribes to centurions.¹⁰² The less well-paid soldiers may have lost from forty percent to more than three-fourths of their *stipendia* to deductions.¹⁰³ In the first century AD, though soldiers were assured of a basic living, they had little money left over to support dependents. In this period, epitaphs indicate that few personnel at any location had *de facto* wives or children.¹⁰⁴

The deductions were largely abandoned in the second century. They no longer appear in pay records, except for the small routine fees mentioned above. The termination of deductions may have been a concession to the soldiers, or the

⁹⁷ Brunt 1950: 61. A deposit for arms may appear in *RMR* 70 in the formula *lorictitis in dep[osito]*[100 denarii], but Fink 1971: 257 suggests that *lorictitis* refers to the guard of the *deposita*.

⁹⁸ Gilliam 1967: 237–9 shows 21 denarii 27 1/2 obols *in armis* and 20 denarii for a *papilio* (tent). Armor might be more expensive: 103 denarii for the equipment of an auxiliary cavalryman in *P. Fay*. 105 = *CPL* 124 = *ChLA* 3.208. In *ChLA* 466 (late third century), a cuirass and helmet incur a charge of 1 *s(emis)*, a higher-value gold coin.

⁹⁹ Davies 1969b (in Davies 1989); Herz 2007: 315–16. The army bred and bought horses from civilian suppliers; soldiers paid a deposit to the army for each horse. *RMR* 75, 83, and 99 show that it was held to about 125 denarii from AD 139 to 251.

¹⁰⁰ *RMR* 68 (op. cit. n. 77). The *Acta S. Dasii* (c. 303–5) is set during the camp Saturnalia.

¹⁰¹ *RMR* 68, 69, 70, *ChLA* 446 and 495; in *RMR* 70, *ChLA* 495, and *ChLA* 446 and 473, *collatio*, *contulit publica*, and *sublatio* probably represent bookkeeping, M. A. Speidel 1992: 93, 97.

¹⁰² Tac. *Ann.* 1.17. They were probably not paid daily in small coins, but received lump *stipendia* as later; the 10 *asses per diem* rhetorically equates them with wage laborers.

¹⁰³ Herz 2007: 311 suggests two-thirds.

¹⁰⁴ Phang 2001: 81–7.

previous system of military procurement of necessities may have broken down or become corrupt.¹⁰⁵ Modern analogies might suggest that logistic officers engaged in speculation by authorizing more expensive goods in supply contracts while substituting cheaper goods. In repressing such corruption, the emperor would check the appearance of luxury and improve soldiers' equipment, as Hadrian is said to have done.¹⁰⁶

Thus in the second century, minus small sums for administrative purposes, nearly entire *stipendia* were disbursed to soldiers so that they could purchase food, clothing, and equipment themselves, in effect privatizing military supply. This policy may have reduced institutional corruption and waste. But it was unlikely to have improved discipline as the Roman elite conceived it. Soldiers' equipment was likely to become still less standardized. Furthermore, soldiers may have been tempted to economize on their probable largest expense, armor. Earlier anecdotes display the stereotype that Roman soldiers in Syria did not bother to wear armor, which was heavy and hot.¹⁰⁷ Soldiers also failed to wear armor in cooler climates. Corbulo punished soldiers in lower Germany for not wearing swords and daggers, and Vegetius lamented that soldiers of his own time did not wear armor.¹⁰⁸

Both before and after the termination of deductions, soldiers often seemed short of money; as their regular pay accustomed them to a cash economy, they developed an "astonishing consumption mentality." Soldiers from relatively well-to-do backgrounds asked their families to buy them clothing and equipment, even swords.¹⁰⁹ Other individuals with fewer resources took out extensive loans, too large to be repaid from any one *stipendium* installment. One of these loans, between auxiliaries, attests that the borrower of 600 drachmae pledged as a surety expensive and ornate armor adorned with silver.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁵ Wesch-Klein 1998: 60; Roth 1999: 262–3, 275; Herz 2007: 311–13; M. A. Speidel 2000: 76 suggests that Hadrian was responsible for ending them.

¹⁰⁶ Dio 69.9.2. HA *Hadr.* 10.7, 11.1. Cf. Tac. *Agric.* 19; HA *Pesc.* 10.1–4.

¹⁰⁷ Sall. *Jug.* 66.3 (Vaga in Numidia); Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19. On Syrians Wheeler 1996.

¹⁰⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 11.18; Veg. *Mil.* 1.20.3–5.

¹⁰⁹ Mentality: Carrié 1993: 123–4; letters, e.g., *P. Mich.* 8.466–8; in 468, the young soldier apologizes that he plans to live *frugaliter*. Sociology offered by Hollander 2005: 233–4. M. A. Speidel 2000: 85–94 argues that soldiers were more prosperous in this later period.

¹¹⁰ *P. Vindob.* 50.135 = SB 16.12609 = *ChLA* 45.1340 (AD 27). Wesch-Klein 1998: 64; M. A. Speidel 1992: 96. *P. Mich.* 7.438 = *CPL* 188 (around AD 140) records a similar imprudent loan. Current military personnel are urged to avoid excessive consumer debt; e.g., Bonn 2005: 87.

Nevertheless, ending the deductions may have impaired discipline. Privatization of logistics is bad for discipline and morale. Private suppliers are not subject to military discipline and may not follow troops into dangerous areas. Within the same ranks, privatization favors well-to-do personnel and places the less well-off at a disadvantage; when ranks and services are compared, privatization favors the higher ranks and better funded services.¹¹¹ As a result, Roman soldiers with less money or who were more financially imprudent may have resorted to loans, extramural work, and extortion from provincials, discussed in the next section. Eventually, from the third century onward, the army ceased to pay soldiers in increasingly debased cash for their maintenance and instead issued food, drink, clothing, and other supplies, collected directly from the civilians; this form of taxation and redistribution was known as the *annona militaris*.¹¹²

EXTRAMURAL AND ILLEGITIMATE INCOME

Roman soldiers frequently earned or extorted extramural and illegitimate sources of income. Literary and legal sources and documents show that soldiers extorted money, goods, or services from provincials. Such abuses were a particular risk because the soldiers performed policing and logistic functions assigned to civilians in modern societies, including the collection of taxes and the requisitioning of goods and transport for the army and government.¹¹³

Most common was the extortion of *angareia* (requisitioned transport, such as animals and wagons) or of *hospitium* (bed and board, including food, oil, and baths) by traveling military personnel. Provincial townsfolk petitioned the emperor or provincial governors to repress these abuses; they commemorated these petitions and responses in monumental inscriptions, as *testimonia* to imperial justice and as a warning to other predatory personnel. Imperial and provincial edicts also survive

¹¹¹ On private suppliers (usually termed *lixae*), Roth 1999: 96–101. On impact of privatization on the modern military, Singer 2003: 217–29. MacMullen 1988 emphasizes corruption.

¹¹² On *annona militaris* (beginning with wheat rations), Whittaker 2004: 105; Potter 2004: 130; Southern 2007: 114. Nero gave a free wheat ration to the Praetorians, Tac. *Ann.* 15.72.

¹¹³ Apul. *Met.* 9.39–40; D. 1.18.6.5–6 (Ulpian *Opin.* 1); D. 19.2.13.7 (Ulpian *Edict.* 32). MacMullen 1963: 61–2, 86–9; Mitchell 1976: 111–12; Campbell 1984: 246–54; MacMullen 1988: 129–32; Wesch-Klein 1998: 135–9; Whittaker 2004: 104, 125; Ando 2007: 374–5; Southern 2007: 80–2, 107. Soldiers themselves were exempt from *angareia*, D. 50.5.10.2 (Paul *Sent.* 1). On soldiers as police and tax collectors, Alston 1995: 81–96; Nippel 1995: 100–103; Campbell 2002: 80–81, 87–8.

on papyri.¹¹⁴ Legal writings also attest attempts to repress extortion.¹¹⁵ These edicts and rescripts moralize against the abuses, but often do not state a punishment for the culprits; punishment is left to the governor's discretion. The emperor or provincial governor may inform the towns and populace that they have a right to refuse abusive requisitions. Emperors' punishment of military corruption and abuses was an important feature of imperial ideology.¹¹⁶ Soldiers' extortion from civilians seems to have increased from the mid-second century onward, perhaps because of the discontinuation of deduction for food and clothing and later because the *annona militaris* and inflation decreased soldiers' cash income.¹¹⁷

An anecdote from a provincial command that Galba held before he became emperor illustrates severe punishment of extortion and the ideology behind such punishment.¹¹⁸ When grain was scarce, a soldier sold his grain ration for 100 denarii. Galba punished him by making him starve to death, forbidding his comrades to give him food. Galba's soldier sought personal gain, an extortionate profit from selling his grain ration, at the expense of his fulfillment of his role as a soldier, for which he was expected to maintain his physical strength by consuming his rations. A passage of Libanius denouncing corruption in the later Roman army

¹¹⁴ Inscriptions and papyri: Mitchell 1976: 111–12; Herrmann 1990; Hauken 1998; Wesch-Klein 1998: 135–8; Kehoe 2007: 81–9. E.g., *Sel. Pap.* 2.211 (AD 29); *P. Oxy.* 240 (37); *CIL* 3.7251; *BGU* 1171 (reign of Claudius); *PSI* 446 = *Sel. Pap.* 2.221 (133–7); *IGR* 3.1119 = *OGIS* 609 (185); *CIL* 3.12336 (238); *CIL* 3.14191 (244–7). Cf. Plin. *Ep.* 10.77–8.

¹¹⁵ Mitchell 1976: 115. However, many of the abusers were officers: Mitchell 1976: 130. Legal texts, e.g., D 1.18.6.1–9 (Ulpian *Opin.* 1); *CTb* 7.4.12, 7.9.3.

¹¹⁶ In imperial ideology, good emperors repress corrupt soldiers: HA *Hadr.* 10.3 and 7, *Avid.* 4.2–3, *Pesc.* 3.6–8, 10.5, *Sev.* 7.6, *Alex.* 12.5, 25.2, 50.1, 51.6, 52–4, 55.7; 62.1; *Tyr.* 18.5–8, *Aurel.* 7.5–8, *Probus* 20.3–6, 23.2–3. Soldiers' abuses cause revolts: Dio 56.16.3 (Dalmatians); Tac. *Hist.* 4.14 (Batavians), *Ann.* 14.31–35, *Agric.* 15.2; Dio 62.2.1–2, 62.3.1–3 (Britons); on the British revolt Dio stresses Roman financial exactions rather than soldiers' abuses. Tac. *Ann.* 1.17, 1.35, *Hist.* 1.46 and 1.58 depict corruption within the army as promoting disaffection and revolts.

¹¹⁷ MacMullen 1988: 136, 144, 149–50, 159–60.

¹¹⁸ Suet. *Galba* 7.2. The soldier's offense was not simply conversion of rations to cash, which the military allowed, perhaps for convenience while traveling, e.g., *P. Hamb.* 39 = *RMR* 76; M. A. Speidel 1992: 90–91; Hertz 2007: 312. Duncan-Jones 1976: 249 argues that the normal price of wheat was 1 to 4 HS per modius. Contrast Galba's soldier's 100 denarii or 400 HS. The punishment alludes to the punishment of Midas, who starved when everything he touched turned to gold; e.g., Arist. *Pol.* 1257b16, condemning profit; Ovid *Met.* 11.100–145; L. Roller 1983. Coleman 1990 describes the staging of mythological punishments in the arena. On Aristotle and profit, Meikle 1995; profit as *iniustum pretium*, Veyne 1990: 152–3; Giardina 1993a: 250–53. On Galba's economic archaism also Tac. *Hist.* 1.5. As a young senator, Galba urged the punishment of tradespeople who usurped equestrian status: Plin. *HN* 33.8.32; Aubert 1994: 25–6.

also depicts personal gain at the expense of the institution, as officers skim off soldiers' pay for themselves, causing the soldiers to starve. This passage also notes that, as soldiers freely enter marriages with women, they impoverish themselves in order to support their wives and children.¹¹⁹

Soldiers took on outside work to pay bribes to low-ranking officers for *commectus* (furlough) or *vacatio munerum* (exemption from fatigues).¹²⁰ Tacitus provides, as it were, an editorial on the dangers of extramural work and income. In his view, political stability and the army's efficiency require keeping soldiers with the standards and at work in their units. Instead the centurions and their soldiers succumb to individual desires. In return for grants of furlough or relief from fatigues and harsh treatment, the centurions demand bribes, and the soldiers seek money to pay them from banditry, robbery, and "servile tasks," probably extrainstitutional work. Furthermore, the soldiers' time off from physical training, whether on furlough or moonlighting, weakens them as fighters. Tacitus claims that this process of impoverishment motivated soldiers to support usurpers who promised them money. The emperor Otho sought to halt this cycle of corruption by providing the soldiers with money for these bribes as an imperial grant, but the *Historia Augusta* suggests that the practice continued until Hadrian repressed it.¹²¹ Fees for furlough thus became institutionalized, a precursor of the extensive schedules of fees for administrative and legal services in the later Roman bureaucracy.¹²²

The jurists also disapproved of soldiers' extrainstitutional work. The jurist Aemilius Macer cites a regulation of Augustus that prohibited governors to employ soldiers as craftsmen; the jurist Paternus added that soldiers should also not hunt or fish for their commander's table.¹²³ However, imperial edicts and rescripts did not prevent soldiers from engaging in trade.¹²⁴ As in modern armies, many opportunities for extraofficial profit were probably connected with official logistics. The Vindolanda tablets suggest a broad gray zone between the supply of the army and

¹¹⁹ Lib. Or. 2.37–9.

¹²⁰ Tac. Hist. 1.46, 1.58; cf. Ann. 1.17.

¹²¹ HA Hadr. 10.3, cf. Pesc. 3.7–8.

¹²² Kelly 2004: 65–7, 74–5. Bribes for promotion in the early Empire, Tac. Hist. 1.56 (Vitellius' predecessor Fonteius Capito).

¹²³ D. 49.16.12.1 (Macer *Re mil.* 1).

¹²⁴ Campbell 1984: 280.

civilian trade. In these tablets, it is not always clear whether the persons involved are soldiers, camp servants, or civilians.¹²⁵ Soldiers also made money by loaning at interest, more frequently in the second century and later, when they had more of their *stipendia* at their free disposal.¹²⁶

The boundary of legitimate and illegitimate exactions was somewhat vague, shown by Otho's institutionalizing the payments to centurions for soldiers' furloughs. When bribery impaired the prosecution of justice, it was forbidden. Soldiers who accepted payment to free prisoners or let them escape might face capital punishment.¹²⁷ Ulpian states that soldiers, or other personnel such as torturers, are forbidden to appropriate the personal effects of the condemned, such as clothes, jewels, or cash (up to five aurei). However, Ulpian permits the military unit or bureau involved to appropriate such effects as a slush fund for the unit.¹²⁸ Furthermore, though a passage of the *Digest* forbids officials to accept cash in return for military or civilian appointments or promotions, a number of other passages in the *Digest* show that *militiae* might themselves be bought, sold, and bequeathed or left as *fideicommissa*.¹²⁹ Because the legatees receiving *militiae* are sometimes slaves, the commissions involved might be either military (excluding slaves) or civilian bureaucratic posts, often held by imperial slaves. These policies do not attain the stringency of the modern legal-rational Weberian bureaucracy, in which members earn only their salaries and forego all other income, obtaining office by seniority or merit, not by pay.

The emperors and jurists do state clearly that soldiers, "due to their honorable status," are forbidden to delate (bring accusations for pay).¹³⁰ This policy invoked the aristocratic memory of the triumviral proscriptions and confiscations, in which soldiers had been delators. But the wording of the prohibition flattered the soldiers by suggesting the equivalent of the modern "conduct becoming an officer and a gentleman."

¹²⁵ Such as *T. Vindol.* 2.343.

¹²⁶ Wierschowski 1984: 17–30.

¹²⁷ D. 48.3.14.2–3 (Modestinus *Poen.* 4).

¹²⁸ D. 48.20.6 (Ulpian *Off. procos.* 10).

¹²⁹ D. 48.11.6.2 (Saturninus *Publ. Iudic.* 2). *Militiae* bequeathed or sold: D. 31.1.22 (Celsus *Dig.* 21), 31.1.49.1 (Paul *Lex. Iul. et Pap.* 5), 32.1.11.16 (Ulpian *Fideic.* 2), 34.1.18.2 (Scaevola *Dig.* 20); Saller 1982: 132–4; Veyne 1990: 245; MacMullen 1988: 150. Cf. *P. Mich.* 8.468: "nothing here happens without money."

¹³⁰ D. 49.14.18.5–6 (Marcian *Delat.*); *propter honorem*.

RECOGNIZING SOLDIERS' WEALTH IN LAW

Though Julius Caesar allowed his soldiers to make informal wills, Nerva, Trajan, and Hadrian supported the creation of the *testamentum militare* or soldier's will, exempting soldiers from the stringent formal requirements of Roman civilian wills. They also created the institution of *peculium castrense*. While his father was still alive, a Roman citizen male owned no property of his own; anything he might acquire was the legal property of his father. A soldier whose father was still alive (the *filius familias miles*) was now allowed a *peculium castrense*, a private fund that he might manage without his father's authorization.

These policies had practical aspects, simplifying the administration of soldiers' property. Soldiers might die suddenly, whether in combat or by illness spread in close quarters. Advocates and notaries might not be available on the frontiers. Though senatorial and equestrian officers were familiar with Roman law, drafting wills for their men invited patronage and corruption. Soldiers who were *fili filiarum* might be far from home and unable to consult their fathers. Soldiers might be ignorant of or unable to conform to legal formalities.¹³¹ Domitian's pay raise and the discontinuation of deductions gave soldiers more disposable income in the early second century, making more necessary and desirable the legal privileges of the *testamentum militare* and *peculium castrense*.¹³²

Soldiers' wills and *peculium castrense* have been represented as imperial *beneficia* carrying favor with the soldiers.¹³³ By creating the legal privileges of the soldier's will and *peculium castrense*, Trajan and Hadrian granted soldiers *beneficia* without the controversial measure of increasing payments, which was thought to corrupt discipline.¹³⁴ Unrestricted grants of furlough or *vacatio munerum* also were thought to demoralize soldiers.¹³⁵ Through the jurists' summaries, the imperial grants of the military will and *peculium castrense* not only emphasized philanthropy, but also reinforced hierarchy, emphasizing and maintaining soldiers' ignorance (*imperitia*) of the law. The emperor was the source of law; the soldiers could not reciprocate.

¹³¹ Campbell 1984: 227; D. 29.1.1. pr. (Ulpian *Edict.* 45); C. 6.21.3.pr. On *peculium castrense* and will, Lehmann 1982; Campbell 1984: 210–36; Wesch-Klein 1998: 47, 139–46.

¹³² M. A. Speidel 2000: 89. The details in Severan jurists reflect conditions in the early third century.

¹³³ Campbell 1984: 208, 216, 218, 235–6.

¹³⁴ D. 29.1.26 (Macer *Re mil.* 2) expresses the compromise. Similarly, an edict of Hadrian's (*BGU* 140) granted soldiers' illegitimate children intestate inheritance rights.

¹³⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 2.55; Suet. *Vit.* 8.1; Tac. *Hist.* 1.46; 2.93.

As will be seen, in true patronage the patron dispenses irreciprocable *beneficia* in order to produce *obsequium* (obedience and loyalty) in the client.

Furthermore, the jurists' legal interpretation of the *peculium castrense* and soldier's will reinforced discipline in the sense of occupational identity.¹³⁶ Soldiers whose good standing lapsed, whether they were deserters or traitors or dishonorably discharged, lost the right to make a soldier's will.¹³⁷ Soldiers might not leave bequests to unsuitable persons, such as slaves or women of dubious virtue.¹³⁸ In their discussion of *peculium castrense*, the jurists state that only the property of persons "known to a soldier through his military service" should enter his *peculium castrense*. The property of members of a soldier's birth family or his wife in a *de facto* or (after 197) legal marriage may not belong in the *peculium castrense*.¹³⁹ Thus, the soldier's will and the *peculium castrense* promoted bequests and legacies to comrades and discouraged the transfer of wealth out of the military, for example, to wives and children.¹⁴⁰ As we have seen, extrainstitutional income was also discouraged. Notably, Papinian stated that the *peculium castrense* should not contain dowry. Dowry often took the form of women's jewelry, which had no place in *militia*.¹⁴¹

DONATIVA: THE POLITICS OF GENEROSITY

The other payments to soldiers that needed to be subjected to discipline and social control and to conform to the symbolic order were the *donativa*.¹⁴² These gifts are usually interpreted as emphasizing the emperor's patrimonial relationship to his soldiers.¹⁴³ Senatorial commanders were not allowed to dispense such patronage, lest they be accused of plotting usurpation. The *SC de Cn. Pisone* claims that Piso

¹³⁶ Phang 2001: 112–13, 221–3.

¹³⁷ D. 29.1.26 (Macer *Re mil.* 2); Wesch-Klein 1998: 144 on D. 29.1.21 (Africanus *Quaest.* 4), though it held even if he was executed, D. 38.12.1 (Macer *Re mil.* 2), 24.1.32.8 (Ulpian *Sab.* 33); C. 6.21.3.

¹³⁸ D. 29.1.13.2–3 (Ulpian *Edict.* 45), 29.1.41.1 (Tryphoninus *Disp.* 18).

¹³⁹ D. 49.17.8 (Ulpian *Edict.* 45) states that even a blood relation is not *ex castris notus*. A wife is *ei non propter militiam nota esset* in D. 49.17.6 (Ulpian *Sab.* 32). Inheritance from a mother does not enter the *peculium castrense* in C. 12.36.1.3 (Alex. Sev.). Cf. 49.17.5 (Ulpian *Sab.* 6) *Castr. pec.*. However, the emperor might excuse individuals, D. 49.17.13 (Papinian *Quaest.* 16) and C. 12.36.4 (Gordian).

¹⁴⁰ Even after the end of the marriage ban, in C. 3.28.9 Alexander Severus denied soldiers' wives and children the "right of undutiful will" contesting a will that left them nothing, Phang 2001: 112–13, 390.

¹⁴¹ D. 49.17.16.pr. (Papinian *Resp.* 19). Phang 2001: 113. In practice, women's jewelry was a common form of liquid wealth.

¹⁴² Mattern 1999: 141, 191–2.

¹⁴³ Maintained by Campbell 1984: 187, 383 and *passim*; moderated, 2002: 115–19.

corrupted the soldiers with donatives given in his own name; he also bestowed excess privileges on his troops and was called “father of the army.”¹⁴⁴ Nonetheless, in elite ideology, the emperor was not free to give *ad libitum* to the army, as when Caracalla said, “Nobody but me should have any money, and I want to give it all to the soldiers.”¹⁴⁵ Both the social construction of patronage in Roman society and the interests of political stability, not to mention the jealousy of the senatorial aristocracy, subjected *donativa* to routinization.

Donativa can be understood as symbolic gifts within the framework of classical patronage and euergetism.¹⁴⁶ The Republican magistrate or emperor’s bestowal of largesse upon the people demonstrated his prestige and affirmed his social power. This act of generosity linked his recipients with him in a patron-client relationship less rigid than the bond of patrimonial sultan and slave or feudal lord and vassal.¹⁴⁷

Ideally, the binding relationship of patronage was distinct from mutual material exchange. Even among social equals, the recipient of a *beneficium* owed his benefactor *gratia*, an emotion connoting gratitude and respect, tactfully veiling the material return which the recipient owed, whether concrete services or political loyalty.¹⁴⁸ Above all, giving subordinated the recipients when the gifts were too large or the recipients too low in status to reciprocate in material kind.¹⁴⁹ Such one-sided giving constituted patronage, making the giver a *patronus* and his recipients *clientes* who owed immaterial devotion and loyalty. Patronal gifts enforced hierarchy, inflicting symbolic violence. For soldiers, this subordination was appropriate, reinforcing *modestia*.¹⁵⁰ Low-status persons displayed *insolentia* in demanding gifts from their superiors. Augustus reproved the *turpitudinem* and *impudentia* (shameless

¹⁴⁴ *SC de Cn. Pisone patre* ll. 54–7: *etiam donativa suo nomine ex fisco principi nostri dando, quo facto milites alios Pisonianos alios Caesarianos dici laetatus sit, honorando etiam eos qui post talis nominis usurpationem ipsi paruisse* <n>1. Tac. *Ann.* 2.55: *largitione, ambitu, infimos manipularium iuvando . . . ut sermone vulgi parens legionum haberetur*; cf. 3.13. Eck 1996: 172–9; Potter 1999; Rowe 2002: 21, 162–9.

¹⁴⁵ *Sub. vid.* n. 197.

¹⁴⁶ Veyne 1990: 217, 247, 260; Saller 1982: 17–21, 33–4, Lendon 1997: 56–8, 64–8, 84–6 examine honor and reciprocity. Lendon 1997: 149–54, 154–60, 254–5 and M. Roller 2001: 130–4, 174, 194 examine imperial gifts and the sentiments involved.

¹⁴⁷ Saller 1982: 32–5.

¹⁴⁸ Saller 1982: 17–21, 21–2, 1989: 59; Wallace-Hadrill 1989a: 66–7; M. Griffin 2003. *Sen. Ben.* 1.2.3, 2.17.7, 2.21.1–2, 2.31.2: *aut non fuit beneficium, sed negotiatio*; cf. Bourdieu 1977: 194–5.

¹⁴⁹ Bourdieu 1977: 171–2, 191–7 (symbolic violence); Veyne 1990: 207, 216; Mauss [1925] 1990: 65; Lendon 1997: 67, 69.

¹⁵⁰ Lendon 1997: 253–4, 258–61.

impudence) of the urban *plebs* when they demanded a *congariū* that he had not promised. He actually disbanded a legion for demanding their discharge payments too insolently.¹⁵¹

In contrast, the late Republican generals' "patronage" of their soldiers, in which leaders and soldiers were mutually dependent and the material exchange of pay for support was explicit, was not true patronage because it failed to impose subordination. In the early Empire, such relations of exchange – between the Praetorians and Claudius, Otho, or Didius Julianus, or between the Rhine troops and Vitellius – dissipated the respect that imperial soldiers usually felt for their rulers. The emperor should not *need* them or beg for their support. These episodes suggest the contempt that the Praetorians felt for leaders who lacked *virtus* and whose gifts corrupted the *habitus* of the troops. On the other hand, if the emperor refused to give a routine donative, the Praetorians were insulted; they regarded the donatives as symbolic gifts (honors).

Appropriate giving, furthermore, maintained the social order.¹⁵² The ideal benefactor gave "to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right times, and in the right way."¹⁵³ If he gave in excess, he was prodigal, practicing not the virtue of *liberalitas* but the vice of *largitio*, pouring out material benefits and especially ephemeral ones, such as food and drink, upon the mob.¹⁵⁴ The prodigal man was tempted to obtain money for his *largitiones* by robbery and confiscations.¹⁵⁵ *Largitio* was associated with political competition and ambition.¹⁵⁶ In the middle and late Republic, it contrasted with an older native tradition of *parsimonia*.¹⁵⁷

The ideology of imperial *liberalitas* shifted: the emperor was expected to give lavishly, ideally giving to all and taking from none.¹⁵⁸ Pliny the Younger praises

¹⁵¹ Suet. *Aug.* 42.2. Kloft 1987: 369; cf. Livy 28.24.8 (Sucro).

¹⁵² Kloft 1987: 369.

¹⁵³ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.1.12–18; Kloft 1970: 8ff. on Aristotle.

¹⁵⁴ Edwards 1993: 178–90; Zuiderhoek 2007. Cic. *Off.* 2.16.55; Sen. *Ben.* 1.2.1; 2.1.54–5.

¹⁵⁵ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.1.34, cf. Cic. *Off.* 2.15.54; Plut. *Praec. reip. ger.* 29–30 = *Mor.* 821f–822a; D. 50.8.6 (Valens *Fideic.* 2), 50.10.3, pr-2 (Macer *Off. procos.* 2).

¹⁵⁶ Veyne 1990: 216; Kloft 1970; Manning 1985: 75–8: the connotation of *liberalitas* rose in the Principate as political competition declined. However, the aristocracy continued to disapprove of handouts to the army.

¹⁵⁷ Kloft 1970: 35–8. Polyb. 31.26.9 exaggerates traditional Roman parsimony in order to glorify Scipio's generosity.

¹⁵⁸ Kloft 1970: 136; Veyne 1990: 359; Whittaker, *Herodian* (Loeb, vol. I, 161 n. 3 ad loc. 2.4.6), on Pertinax's grants of tax immunities.

Trajan for giving donatives and *congiaria*, forgiving debts, and remitting and reducing taxes, even though the reduction or remission of taxes would seem to conflict with the handouts.¹⁵⁹ Benefaction was embedded in the political economy of the Roman Empire. The soldiers expected to share in imperial benefactions; often *donativa* and *congiaria* were given together.

THE ROUTINIZATION OF *DONATIVA*

Donativa were appropriate when given formally and at dynastic events, such as imperial accessions, imperial birthdays, marriages, or the adoption of heirs. *Donativa* and *congiaria* also required a dignified manner on the part of the emperor.¹⁶⁰ When the symbolism discussed above was maintained, the gift inflicted the hierarchical subordination implied in the recipient's sense of *gratia*.¹⁶¹ Thus Roman emperors gave donatives to soldiers, not as payments in return for political and military support, but as symbolic expressions of good will and honor, in return for the soldiers' immaterial gratitude and loyalty. The soldiers, in their turn, did not suggest that their loyalty could be bought. The symbolic relation was best preserved by a long reign, such as those of Augustus, Tiberius, Trajan, or Hadrian, and by stable transitions from one reign to the next.

Furthermore, the *donativa* were traditional rewards for military achievement, given along with decorations at triumphs. This tradition was adapted to peaceful contexts, such as the presentation of *donativa* at a military review. In his famous address to various auxiliary units at Lambaesis in North Africa, Hadrian promises the *ala I Pannoniorum* a *congiarium*, possibly for traveling expenses, but clearly a sign of his approval of their performance.¹⁶² Hadrian uses the term *congiarium*, a handout for civilians, because auxiliaries did not receive *donativa*, and also perhaps to avoid the moral ambiguity of *donativum*. Even the donatives given by Caligula at the opening of the bridge across the Bay of Naples and after his troops'

¹⁵⁹ Plin. *Pan.* 41.1.

¹⁶⁰ Millar [1977] 1992: 136.

¹⁶¹ Subordination by Caesar's mercy and generosity: Cic. *Att.* 9.7c.

¹⁶² *CIL* 8.2532 + 18042 = *ILS* 2487 and 9133–5; Le Glay 1977; Campbell 1984: 77–80; Stäcker 2003: 137–42; M. P. Speidel 2006. Called *congiarium* because auxiliaries did not receive *donativa*, Veyne 1990: 438 n. 35. Octavian also gave donatives at a military review featuring a mock battle, App. *BC* 3.748.

“battle” against the Ocean parodied the traditional occasion of a military review or triumph.¹⁶³

Donativa were also routinized as accession gifts and through their presentation with civilian *congiaria*. At their accessions, emperors distributed as gifts their predecessors’ legacies to the army and the people of the city of Rome.¹⁶⁴ The simultaneous giving of *congiaria* to civilians (in practice the urban *plebs*) emphasized the emperor’s *liberalitas* to all his subjects, not his special indulgence of the army.¹⁶⁵ Dio relates that after his accession, Caligula, accompanied by the Senate, inspected the Praetorians at exercises and gave and doubled the bequests left by Tiberius.¹⁶⁶

Emperors usually gave donatives on additional dynastic occasions, such as the adoption of an heir or a marriage.¹⁶⁷ Augustus first gave a donative to the army “not as to victors . . . but because then for the first time Gaius [Augustus’ adopted heir, not Caligula] took part in their exercises.”¹⁶⁸ Tradition was invoked because Augustus’ heir attended the soldiers’ training. Eventually donatives to legionaries on imperial accession anniversaries (*quinquennalia* and *decennalia*, five- and ten-year anniversaries) became completely routinized and automatic.¹⁶⁹

In instances of correct giving, the emperor maintained discipline in other respects and did not prefer the army over the senate or the people. Thus Hadrian justified his bestowal of gifts and decorations on his troops by his great personal attention to military discipline, training, and readiness. He gave gifts and honors

¹⁶³ Bridge: Suet. *Calig.* 19; Dio 59.17.8; *Epit. de Caes.* 3.9. Ocean: Suet. *Calig.* 46; Dio 59.25.1–3; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 3.11. Davies 1966; Bicknell 1968; Phillips 1970; Woods 2000. Triumph: Suet. *Calig.* 47; Dio 59.25.1–3. Domitian: Dio 67.4.1; cf. Suet. *Dom.* 6; Dio 67.7.3–4, 67.8.1.

¹⁶⁴ G. R. Watson 1969: 108–14; Veyne 1990: 338. Tac. *Ann.* 1.8; Suet. *Aug.* 101.2: Augustus left 250 denarii each to the Praetorians, 125 to urban cohorts, 75 to legionaries, and *congiaria* to the Roman people. Tiberius gave similar legacies, Suet. *Tib.* 48.2; Dio 59.2.1. Rowe 2002: 159. In Tac. *Ann.* 12.41 and Suet. *Nero* 7.2 Claudius gave both a *congiarium* to the plebs and a *donativum* to the Praetorians to mark Nero’s coming of age. Nero at his accession, Tac. *Ann.* 12.69.

¹⁶⁵ E.g., Plin. *Pan.* 25.2 (discussed below). On *congiaria*, Berchem 1975; Veyne 1990: 391–7; Duncan-Jones 1994: 78–81, 86–8, 248–9; Rowe 2002: 87–8 (Augustan and Tiberian).

¹⁶⁶ Dio 59.2.1. They received 1000 HS each.

¹⁶⁷ HA *Hadr.* 23.14, *Aelius* 3.3, 6.1; HA *Pius* 10.2: Pius marries daughter Faustina to Marcus Aurelius; HA *Marc.* 7.9, Marcus elinctor Lucullus Versus. Hadrian adopts Aelius Campbell 1984: 163–5, 182–4.

¹⁶⁸ Dio 55.6.4; Raaflaub 1980: 101.

¹⁶⁹ Veyne 1990: 328, 336–41, 343; Bastien 1988. Dio 77(76).1.1–2 by Severus. These *donativa* were called *stipendia* in the later Empire, perhaps another attempt to dissociate them from moral disapproval.

to accustom the soldiers to his stricter discipline in other respects, imposing austerities and repressing corruption.¹⁷⁰ Hadrian gave a slave to an impoverished veteran who, not owning a slave to help him wash, was rubbing his back against the marble wall in the public baths. A veteran was a respectable member of civilian society; his body servant was a sign of privilege, not a threat to discipline as were the slaves of serving soldiers.¹⁷¹ Then, to maintain the social hierarchy, Hadrian then repressed the inevitable copycats, old men who were not veterans but who rubbed their backs against the wall of the baths in hope of attracting the emperor's *liberalitas*.¹⁷²

The emperor did not need to repress the army, merely to seem not to favor it. When Trajan gave a *congiarium* in full to the civilian populace and a *donativum* in part to the soldiers, Pliny describes this as based on *ratio aequalitatis*. Civilians and soldiers received the same amount on this occasion; the soldiers ultimately received more, but they would get their second part later.¹⁷³ Thus, Trajan maintained the appearance of the equality of the army and the civilian *plebs*. He did not appear to favor the army as he would have if he gave the soldiers twice as much as the civilians on the same occasion.

The soldiers' most appropriate use of their donatives, in this ideology, was to return the symbolic gift by erecting dedicatory inscriptions in honor of the emperors. At Lambaesis, low-ranking officers of Legio III Augusta erected a dedication to Severus and Caracalla that explicitly states that they used the emperor's pay increases and *liberalitates* to fund the inscription.¹⁷⁴ Similar commemoration of payments appears elsewhere.¹⁷⁵ For the most part, soldiers do not state where they acquired the funds for their epigraphy. But the military inscriptions proliferate in the Severan period, including many other dedications to the imperial house. Soldiers and low-ranking officers also formed *collegia*, voluntary associations that

¹⁷⁰ HA *Hadr.* 10.3–7; Dio 69.9.1–6.

¹⁷¹ HA *Hadr.* 17.6. Contrast App. *Iber.* 85: Scipio Aemilianus expelled soldiers' bath slaves, saying that "only mules, having no hands, need others to rub them."

¹⁷² HA *Hadr.* 17.6–7.

¹⁷³ Plin. *Pan.* 25.2. Kloft 1970: 57–8 interprets *ratio aequalitatis* otherwise, as distribution according to status, similar to the "geometrical equality" in Ste. Croix 1981: 309, 413–14: those of higher status receive more.

¹⁷⁴ CIL 8.2554 = ILS 2445: *Pro salute Augg. optiones scholam suam cum statutis et imaginibus domus [di]vinae item diis conservatorib[us] eorum, ex largissimis stipend[i]s et liberalitatibus quae in eos conferunt; veterans refer to commoda (i.e. praemia)*, M. P. Speidel 1983 on AE 1910, 155 = ILT 872 and CIL 8.12241.

¹⁷⁵ ILS 9099 and 9100; in Dacia, CIL 3.1378 and AE (1958), 231. Kloft 1970: 107–10.

served as social clubs. These *collegia* are commemorated in inscriptions that present an honorable military communal identity.¹⁷⁶ The soldiers and lower-ranking officers thus participated on a lesser scale in the public culture of the empire, in which notables, such as their commanders, displayed status through building, benefactions, and dedications, commemorated in inscriptions.¹⁷⁷ Such spending also was harder to confuse with personal luxury, in contrast with extravagant eating and drinking or ornate armor.¹⁷⁸

DONATIVA AS MUTUAL EXCHANGES

In contrast to the routine *donativa* that signified imperial continuity, gifts to the army given by emperors or would-be rulers in return for the army's material support and assistance emphasized mutual exchange and are represented as illegitimate, damaging the *habitus* of leaders and soldiers. Emperors gave donatives to assure the soldiers' (usually Praetorians') support upon their elimination of a subordinate or even a blood relative. Tiberius first gave 10 aurei each to the Praetorians after the downfall of Sejanus.¹⁷⁹ After executing Lepidus, the husband of his sister Drusilla, Caligula gave the soldiers a donative "as if he had defeated some enemy."¹⁸⁰ Nero gave similar donatives to the Praetorians after suppressing the Pisonian conspiracy and after assassinating his mother Agrippina.¹⁸¹ After the murder of his brother Geta, Caracalla gave his soldiers a pay raise and donatives, saying, "Rejoice, fellow-soldiers, for now I am in a position to do you favors."¹⁸² These gifts resembled triumphal donatives, but the triumph was over an imperial relative.¹⁸³ In Tacitus' *Histories*, a Flavian soldier claimed a reward for killing his brother at the Second Battle of Cremona in AD 69.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁶ E.g., the *schola* of the *optiones* in *CIL* 8.2554; Ginsburg 1940; Pegler 2000; on civilian *collegia* MacMullen 1974: 77–82.

¹⁷⁷ The degree of display varied locally; the public epigraphy of Roman Africa was very lavish, that of Britain relatively meager: Blagg 1991.

¹⁷⁸ *Collegia*, however, were banned from camps: D. 47.22.1.pr (Marcian *Inst.* 3)

¹⁷⁹ Suet. *Tib.* 48.2.

¹⁸⁰ Dio 59.22.7.

¹⁸¹ Tac. *Ann.* 15.72; Dio 62(61).14.3.

¹⁸² Dio 78(77).3.1; Hdn. 4.4.7, 4.5.2–5; HA *Carac.* 2.7–8, *Geta* 6.1–2; Potter 2004: 136–7.

¹⁸³ Campbell 1984: 188.

¹⁸⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 3.51. Cf. 1.44: soldiers claimed rewards for the assassination of Galba. Even Vitellius rejected these.

In such instances, in which *donativa* were a “purchase,” the leader or emperor displayed a manner or *habitus* that lowered his dignity. Suetonius links Claudius’ immense donative (15,000 HS) to the Praetorians, which set a precedent, with his abject lack of dignity. When the Praetorians found Claudius hiding behind a curtain and acclaimed him emperor, he fell at their feet in terror. His abject emotional state converted the benefaction into a bribe, “the first of the Caesars to buy the loyalty of the troops.”¹⁸⁵

In Tacitus’ *Histories*, Otho gives too much and in the wrong way, lacking *dignitas*. Mistakenly fearing a conspiracy against the emperor, the Praetorians burst in upon Otho’s imperial dinner party, panicking the guests. Otho, impairing the imperial dignity, stood upon a couch and tearfully implored the soldiers to desist.¹⁸⁶ The next day Otho offered the men 5,000 sesterces each. He masked the gift with a lecture on discipline, a gesture at the symbolic order.¹⁸⁷ In Tacitus’ representation, Otho, as a usurper, was too dependent on the Praetorians’ loyalty and political support and thus lost the ability to give appropriately. His apparent effeminacy will be recalled from Chapter Three.

Vitellius also gave excessively to the soldiers. Because he had little money to spare, he gave unearned privileges and a relaxation of discipline. He gave to the wrong people, an already insubordinate soldiery and disreputable civilians, including actors, eunuchs, and other favorites of Nero.¹⁸⁸ He also displayed the wrong manner, too informal for the imperial dignity, handing out cooked food to his soldiers, “as if fattening gladiators.” Normally the emperors did not distribute even money, *congiaria* and *donativa*, with their own hands.¹⁸⁹ In contrast, Vitellius leveled himself with the soldiers and even with soldiers’ servants, greeting heartily the very low-status *muliones*, the army’s baggage handlers, asking whether they had breakfasted and belching to show that he himself had done so.¹⁹⁰

As modern scholars have argued, the auction of the empire in 193, in which the imperial candidates, Didius Julianus and his rival Sulpicianus, bid for the

¹⁸⁵ Suet. *Claud.* 10.4. He also gave the Guard 100 HS every year on his *dies imperii*, Dio. 60.12.4.

¹⁸⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 1.82.

¹⁸⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 1.83–4. Campbell 1984: 369–70.

¹⁸⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 1.52, 2.94.

¹⁸⁹ Tac. *Hist.* 2.88.1; Millar [1977] 1992: 136–7.

¹⁹⁰ Suet. *Vit.* 7.1–2.

Praetorians' support, did not actually involve egregious sums.¹⁹¹ What mattered was how they were given. The contenders offered their bids blatantly in public to the Praetorians, in the manner of an auction, converting the relationship of patronage, in which the emperor gave gifts and his recipients offered symbolic loyalty, into a sordid commercial transaction. The Roman upper class regarded with contempt auctions and auctioneers (*praecones*), as they did pimps and prostitutes; to auction off the empire resembled Caligula's brothel in the palace.¹⁹² Furthermore, Didius Julianus failed to arouse a sense of obligation in the Praetorians; he merely earned their contempt. "In their opinion he was only paying off a debt (*opblēma apotinein*) instead of giving a gift (*dōreon dianemein*)."¹⁹³ Didius Julianus depended on their support, yet he failed to deliver on his promise of 25,000 HS. He also lacked the personal charisma to subordinate the soldiers. Assassinated by the Praetorians, Didius was in Herodian's view a "cowardly, wretched old man who had purchased the army."¹⁹⁴

Cassius Dio depicts the Severan emperors' benefactions to the army in the worst possible light. Septimius Severus is alleged to have instructed his sons, "Live in harmony, enrich the troops, and despise everyone else."¹⁹⁵ Dio associates the new Danubian Praetorians' demand of a donative of 10,000 HS with the late Republic's civil wars, when Octavian gave a similar donative to his soldiers in 43 BC. In fact, Severus did not give this sum, and the new Praetorians accepted a mere 1,000 HS.¹⁹⁶

Caracalla allegedly said, "Nobody but me should have any money, and I want to give it all to the soldiers," showing that, in Aristotelian terms, he both took from the wrong sources and gave to the wrong people.¹⁹⁷ Caracalla's giving failed

¹⁹¹ Dio 74.11.1–5; Hdn. 2.6.8–13; HA *Did.* 3.2. G. R. Watson 1969: 111–13; Campbell 1984: 170, 193; Veyne 1990: 216–17, 336–7; Lendon 1997: 122, 256–7; Potter 2004: 97–8.

¹⁹² Caligula's brothel: McGinn 1998: 254–5; Suet. *Calig.* 41.1.

¹⁹³ Hdn. 2.11.8; Lendon 1997: 256.

¹⁹⁴ Hdn. 2.12.7.

¹⁹⁵ Dio 77(76).15.2. On Severus see Rostovtzeff, *op. cit.* Chapter One n. 1; E. Birley 1969: 67–70; R. E. Smith 1972: 491–5; A. R. Birley 1976: 272–3; Campbell 1984: 401–14, 2002: 115–19; Blois 1984: 364–8, 2002; Potter 2004: 101–24. . Birley, Smith, and Blois emphasize Severus' rational military policy; Blois, aristocratic bias against him.

¹⁹⁶ Dio 46.46.4–7; HA *Sev.* 7.6. G. R. Watson 1969: 113.

¹⁹⁷ Dio 78(77).10.4. Shown to be false by Duncan-Jones 1994: 39–41, Table 3.6, comparing *congiaria* and *donativa*. Caracalla also nearly doubled his civilian *congiaria*, though his *donativa* for soldiers cost about twice as much.

to subordinate the soldiers as imperial benefaction was supposed to. Instead, he leveled himself with his soldiers, as *commilito* or *sustratiôtês*. According to Dio Cassius, he even subordinated the imperial dignity to them, mixing and pouring wine for his soldiers at the feasts he gave them, thus acting like their servant.¹⁹⁸ Caracalla was smitten with the military life, enduring all the soldiers' hardships on campaign, but did not earn their respect.¹⁹⁹

Emperors made bids for the army's support at the eleventh hour. According to Suetonius, Galba in his final moments changed his mind and offered the Praetorians the donative he had refused.²⁰⁰ He cried, "But I am yours, you are mine!" invoking the mutual exchange he had hitherto rejected. Macrinus at first reduced the pay raise and privileges that Caracalla had granted, but after Elagabalus' revolt, he gave his troops 4,000 denarii each and restored Caracalla's pay rates.²⁰¹ Alexander Severus, who was losing the support of his army, gave a large donative in order to appease them.²⁰² These frantic measures failed to arouse loyalty in the soldiers; the emperor's abject dependence on the soldiers' support seems to have increased their contempt.

The most inappropriate imperial gift in a military context was the grant of subsidies to barbarians in return for peace. Rarely is this represented without reproof. An exception was Hadrian, whose sterner military discipline enabled this policy to be tolerated.²⁰³ Elsewhere such subsidies draw invective; Herodian claims that the soldiers despised Alexander Severus for paying subsidies to the Parthians.²⁰⁴

¹⁹⁸ Dio 78(77).17.4. Campbell 1984: 195–6, 412–13.

¹⁹⁹ Potter 2004: 136–40. Hdn. 4.3.4 depicts Caracalla's love of the military life as an affectation. Cf. Hdn. 4.7.4–7; Dio 78(77).3.2. According to Hdn. 4.7.7, Caracalla was very short; Dio 79(78).9.3 nicknames him "Tarautas" after a short and vicious gladiator. The Praetorians and *equites singulares* and imperial guards were tall; Caracalla (23 in 211) resembled their servant boy.

²⁰⁰ Suet. *Galba* 20.1.

²⁰¹ Dio 79(78).34.2; at 79(78).36.3 Macrinus lamented in a letter to the Senate that "it was impossible to give the troops their full pay in addition to the donatives . . . and, on the other hand, impossible not to give it." He had, however, over 3,000 HS at his accusation.

²⁰² Alexander: Hdn. 6.6.4.

²⁰³ Dio 69.9.5–6; Mattern 1999: 181.

²⁰⁴ Mattern 1999: 137–8; Howgego 1992: 5–6. Subsidies paid by Commodus, Caracalla, Macrinus, and Alexander: Hdn. 1.6.9; Dio 78.14.2–4, 79.17.3–4, 79.27.1; Hdn. 6.7.9–10. Contrast App. *Mith.* 104 (Tigranes paid Pompey).

DISCIPLINA RATHER THAN BENEFICIA

Countering imperial patronage of the army, and expressing the aristocracy's disapproval of blatant "purchases" of the army, was a concept of impersonal and objective discipline, requiring categorical obedience, whether or not soldiers received any material token of loyalty. Such a model of discipline resembles Weberian bureaucratic rationality. These two models of behavior, patrimonial and bureaucratic, coexisted and competed with one another.²⁰⁵ The senatorial and equestrian commanders were not allowed to be patrons of the army, and they applied the same standard to the emperors.²⁰⁶ Even the emperor might wish to avoid the language of *beneficia* (material rewards for loyalty), because he might be degraded by the acknowledgment that he depended on the loyalty of the army and of its commanders.²⁰⁷ Emperors with a strict view of discipline stated the categorical model and rejected a patronal relationship, as in Galba's statement that he levied his soldiers rather than buying them.²⁰⁸

In flattering imperial biographies, good emperors showed a fatalistic severity toward the soldiers and toward potential usurpers.²⁰⁹ After Lucius Verus' Parthian campaign, Marcus Aurelius refused to give a donative to the soldiers, "declaring that whatever they obtained over and above the regular amount would be wrung from the blood of their parents and kinsmen; as for the fate of the sovereignty, Heaven alone could determine that."²¹⁰ Marcus may have escaped with such a

²⁰⁵ Premerstein 1937 and Campbell 1984: 25, 58–9, 122–8, 187, 383 stress imperial patronage of the army. On imperial patronage Millar [1977] 1992: 133–9, 469 citing Suet. *Titus* 8.1, 477–526; Saller 1982: 13–14; Veyne 1990: 192–4, 299, 321; Lendon 1997: esp. 149–60. A more impersonal discipline, Veyne 1990: 218–19, 345–8; M. Roller 2001: 174 on Veyne; Lendon 1997: 18, 22, 69. Ambiguous overlap, Johnson and Dandekar 1989: 231. On Stoicism as imperial ideology, Brunt 1975b; Shaw 1985.

²⁰⁶ Shown by the *SC de Cn. Pisone patre*, with Tac. *Ann.* 2.55. On the didacticism of the *SC de Cn. Pisone*, posted in military camps, Eck 1996: 171–3; Cooley 1998: 199–212; Rowe 2002: 162–3, 165–9, 172.

²⁰⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 4.18. Saller 1982: 70, 127.

²⁰⁸ Stoic view of Galba: Veyne 1990: 218–19.

²⁰⁹ Dio 68.15.4–6, 68.16.1, and Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 13.9 (Trajan); Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 10.3–4 and *Epit. de Caes.* 10.10 (Titus); Dio 68.3.2 (Nerva); Dio 72(71).24.1–26.4 and HA *Avid.* 8.2–3 (Marcus); HA *Avid.* 4.7–9 (Avidius Cassius); HA *Alex.* 53.1–54.6 (Alexander Severus, imitating Caesar). *Alex.* 12.5, 25.2, 62.1. The HA praises the *rei publicae necessarii*, soldier-emperors who imposed severe military discipline: HA *Avid.* 2.8, *Pesc.* 3.5, *Tyr.* 9.2, *Aurel.* 37.1, *Carus* 10.1.

²¹⁰ Dio 72(71).3.3–4.

statement only because he was known to be an austere Stoic and because he and Lucius Verus had earlier given a large donative.²¹¹

But this categorical model of authority clashed with *beneficium* ideology. An anecdote relates that a veteran of Actium asked Augustus to represent him in a lawsuit. Augustus said that he would appoint an advocate, to which the veteran replied, "At Actium when you were in danger, I did not seek another to fight for me; I fought for you myself," baring his scars. Shamed and wishing to seem neither arrogant nor ungrateful, Augustus agreed to be his advocate in person.²¹² Augustus thus returned the gift of loyalty in person rather than granting an impersonal benefit. However, when a Praetorian caught an owl that was disturbing the first *princeps's* sleep and requested a reward, Augustus gave him 1,000 *nummi*. Expecting a larger or more personal reward, the disappointed soldier released the owl and quit his service.²¹³

Tiberius also preferred a somewhat impersonal relationship with his soldiers. A Praetorian, Marius Nepos, appealed to the emperor Tiberius for help with his debts. Ordering Nepos to give him the names of his creditors, Tiberius wrote to Nepos that he had ordered the money to be paid, concluding the letter with "some offensive admonition."²¹⁴ "The result," Seneca says, "was that Nepos had neither a debt nor a benefit; Tiberius freed him from his creditors, but failed to attach him to himself."²¹⁵ Tiberius probably reproved Nepos to maintain military discipline, or at least, as Seneca suggests, to discourage other debtors from applying to him. But Tiberius' severe manner made the deed "not an act of generosity, but an act of censure," illustrating Seneca's prescription that a gift should not be given with "the impression of austerity and sternness."²¹⁶ Seneca adopts the perspective of the soldier, rather than the traditional senatorial stance in which giving irregular handouts to soldiers was undesirable and in which good emperors lost no occasion to reinforce severe military discipline. In Tiberius's reign the Praetorians had not yet come to expect large donatives from the emperors, a precedent set by Claudius at his accession.

²¹¹ Cf. HA *Marc.* 22.5.

²¹² Dio 55.4.2; Macrobian *Sat.* 2.4.27; M. Roller 2001: 207–8; a veteran of Caesar, Sen. *Ben.* 5.24.1–25.1.

²¹³ Macrobian *Sat.* 2.4.26. Millar [1977] 1992: 125 omits the soldier's dissatisfaction.

²¹⁴ Sen. *Ben.* 2.7.2.

²¹⁵ Sen. *Ben.* 2.7.2. Other soldiers also asked for assistance.

²¹⁶ Sen. *Ben.* 2.8.2; cf. 2.16.1, 2.3.1, 2.4.1, 2.6.2.

Later emperors who tried to impose a bureaucratic ideology upon the giving of gifts to the army found that the soldiers had internalized the ideology of *beneficia* and regarded the refusal to give as a personal insult. In AD 69 Galba's subordinate Nymphidius Sabinus had earlier promised a donative, but Galba refused to give it, saying, "I levy my soldiers, I don't buy them."²¹⁷ Despite Galba's allusion to the traditional levies of the old Republic, invoking the symbolic order, his remark violated the rules of benefaction by emphasizing the material exchange that he rejected. Tacitus says, "It is agreed that he could have conciliated them with as small an act of generosity as a stingy old man is capable of."²¹⁸ As has been remarked, not the size of the donative mattered, but the act of giving, affirming the bond between the emperor and his army.²¹⁹ To add insult to injury, on his adoption of Piso Frugi Licinianus, Galba did not give the Praetorians and legionaries the routine donative celebrating an imperial designation of an heir.²²⁰ Nero had left behind an empty treasury, but Galba's parsimony appeared to censure the army and dishonor the soldiers. Far from the Praetorians' being "mercenary," interested only in material gain, the symbolic reward or honor of the *donativa* mattered to them.²²¹ Indeed, this sensibility may have been promoted by the use of honor and shame to motivate and punish soldiers; the Praetorians, furthermore, were elite troops.

Herodian on Pertinax shows this more clearly than Tacitus. Faced with an empty treasury after Commodus' excesses, Pertinax refused to give the Praetorians a donative. The Praetorians viewed the donative as an honor and its refusal as an insult; they resented Pertinax's imposition of austerity and fiscal prudence.²²² Herodian elaborates that when Pertinax imposed order on the Praetorians and prevented them from robbing civilians, "they considered the mild leniency of [Pertinax's] requests to be a dishonorable insult to themselves (*hubrin bautôn kai atimian*) as well as the ending of their own unlimited power."²²³

²¹⁷ Tac. *Hist.* 1.5.4.

²¹⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 1.18.

²¹⁹ Kloft 1970: 109; Veyne 1990: 337; Stäcker 2003: 389–91.

²²⁰ Suet. *Galba* 17; Tac. *Hist.* 1.18.

²²¹ On gift exchange as exchanging or transferring honor, Mauss [1925] 1990: 37–40; von Reden 1995: 27; in the Roman army, Lendon 1997: 253–64. Stäcker 2003: 387–96.

²²² Hdn. 2.3.9, also 2.4.1–4; Pertinax did give a small donative, Dio 73(74).1.2–3. Potter 2004: 95–6.

²²³ Hdn. 2.4.4.

Despite Herodian's editorializing, the Praetorians probably internalized the elite view of *beneficia*: giving too late, with a stingy hand or with reproof, or withdrawing privileges are insulting. Galba and Pertinax, succeeding to the profligate emperors Nero and Commodus, had rational reasons to be parsimonious with gifts.²²⁴ But the ideology of giving was personal rather than fiscal: such parsimonious emperors were seen as mean, petty, and avaricious.²²⁵ Aristotle views the stingy man as worse than the prodigal man because the prodigal at least is disposed to give, merely needing restraint.²²⁶ The soldiers themselves were socialized by the elite discourse, sharing elements of benefaction ideology, so they saw Galba and Pertinax as mean and as dishonoring them by refusing to give.

The soldiers perceived stingy emperors as not only mean, but also effeminate, ascribing this worst insult in the military lexicon to Didius Julianus (who failed to pay the donative he had promised), Macrinus, and Alexander Severus. Sallust associates *avaritia* with *luxuria*, an obvious cause of effeminacy.²²⁷ Didius Julianus was given to "unseemly luxury" and dubious pleasures, so that the soldiers thought he was spending imperial monies on himself.²²⁸ Caracalla derided Macrinus' apparent effeminacy; then Praetorian prefect, Macrinus wore a long flowing cloak and other effeminate clothes, including jeweled brooches.²²⁹ According to Herodian, "such extravagance is not admired by Roman troops, appearing more appropriate in barbarians and women."²³⁰ The soldiers regarded Alexander Severus as both stingy and effeminate, "a mean little sissy."²³¹ Alexander, still a boy, was controlled by his avaricious mother Julia Mamaea.²³² The soldiers blamed Mamaea for Alexander's excessive caution in his campaign against the Parthians and eventually defected from him and assassinated him at Maximinus' order.²³³

²²⁴ Kloft 1970: 151.

²²⁵ Suet. *Vesp.* 16; Dio 65(66).8.3–4.

²²⁶ Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 4.3.1–24. Cf. Veyne 1990: 8.

²²⁷ Sall. *Cat.* 11.3; on gender inversion, 13.3, 25; Boyd 1987; Gell. 3.1.1–14 has a different etiology of *avaritia* causing effeminacy.

²²⁸ Hdn. 2.6.6, 2.7.1–2.

²²⁹ Hdn. 4.12.2.

²³⁰ Hdn. 5.2.3–5; cf. Tac. *Hist.* 1.30 (Piso argues that Otho's *liberalitas* is *luxuria*). MacMullen 1964 (in MacMullen 1990: 88, 99–102) suggests that Macrinus' dress was becoming acceptable for elite males. Later Roman authors still criticize men's jeweled clothing and ornaments: Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 39.2; HA *Alex.* 4.2, 41.1, 51.1–3, *Elag.* 23.3–5, *Maxim.* 29.8–9; Amm. 22.4.6–8. Campbell 1984: 385.

²³¹ Lendon 1997: 241; Hdn. 6.9.5.

²³² Hdn. 6.1.5; cf. 6.8.3–4.

²³³ Hdn. 6.5.8–9, 6.8.3–4. On Alexander's downfall Hdn. 6.9.5–7; cf. HA *Alex.* 59.5–8.

COINAGE AND DONATIVES

Payments to the soldiers, especially donatives, under ideal conditions, affirmed the symbolic relationship between the emperor and his soldiers while maintaining a certain distance: to conform to the ideology of *disciplina*, imperial patronage should not be blatant or deteriorate into a mutual material exchange. In tandem with this value rationalization, the emperors may have left the design of the coinage to the senatorial moneyers. Coin themes and legends often did not refer to the army, and when they did, they depicted the emperor as a symbolic military leader rather than alluding directly to the *donativa* or individual legions. Furthermore, the volume of new coins (minted by the present ruler or even minted for a particular *congiarium* or *donativum*) was diluted by the amount of old coinage that persisted in circulation. This contrasted with minting during civil wars. Coins designated as donatives for the soldiers, addressing specific troops, were struck mainly during periods of prolonged civil warfare, when large amounts of old coinage were called in and recoinced. The coinage's main military significance was as value itself, a value that became debased during the third-century crisis.

Payments to soldiers (*stipendia*, *donativa*, and *viaticum*) were often made in *aurei*, gold coins, though also in silver. One *aureus* is equivalent to 25 silver denarii. This use of gold coins for payments was in part pragmatic. Given the scale of imperial handouts to soldiers and civilians, gold had the advantage of compactness.²³⁴ Gold furthermore symbolized royal gifts.²³⁵ To be sure, soldiers probably handled this gold coinage only briefly, as it was deposited to their units' accounts *ad signa*. In these pay records, denarii and sestertii were used as units of account, and the soldiers probably withdrew silver and base coins for everyday purchases.²³⁶

Modern authors frequently assume that the emperors addressed the soldiers through the coinage. The direct reading of Roman coin issues, legends, and images as political messages is problematic.²³⁷ Little is known about the production of

²³⁴ G. R. Watson 1969: 114; Millar [1991] 2004a, 95–7; Howgego 1992: 11–12; Duncan-Jones 1994: 82; Harl 1996: 222; Blois 2002: 101, 222; Suet. *Dom.* 73; Cic. *Phil.* 12.8 and 20, *Sel. Pap.* 1.112.

²³⁵ MacMullen 1962: 159; Veyne 1990: 439 n. 40. According to Harl 1996: 49, Sulla was the first Roman to mint gold *aurei* to pay his army; gold *aurei* were next minted in the civil war of 49–46 BC as donatives.

²³⁶ Howgego 1992: 11; Harl 1996: 18.

²³⁷ Levick 1981–2: 104ff, 1999; Campbell 1984: 142–6, 2002: 140–42. Wallace-Hadrill 1986 moderates this argument. Ando 2000: 206–28 and Hekster 2007: 349–51 emphasize coinage as propaganda or imperial communication.

coin types and legends; the elite authors seem unaware of coin types and legends, and may have regarded coinage with “actual contempt.”²³⁸ Augustus’ *PRINCEPS IVVENTVTIS* issues in honor of Gaius and Lucius Caesar in 2 BC continued to be issued as late as AD 9–10, several years after the young men had died and Tiberius became Augustus’ heir. Probably Augustus himself (and emperors after him) had little to do with the selection of types.²³⁹

Other than the imperial head and titles, the moneyers, who were junior officials of relative unimportance, may have chosen coin images and legends, repeating themes from earlier issues or that were popular with their own aristocratic order. The moneyers represented the emperor as they envisioned him, not with the intention of persuading the recipients of the coinage.²⁴⁰ Their intention was to flatter the emperor.²⁴¹

“Military” coin messages often promoted the martial image of the emperor, rather than addressing or motivating the army *per se*.²⁴² Coins depicted the emperor, even the elderly and unmilitary Antoninus Pius, in military dress. They showed Caesars or young co-emperors as military leaders, celebrated victories, depicted personifications of defeated countries, and celebrated the recovery of captured Roman standards from enemies. The coins also advertised abstract concepts such as *Victoria*.²⁴³ Such images and legends were far more numerous than those representing or addressing the army directly; when *Liberalitas* featured on coins, the recipients were almost always civilians.

Some “military” representations may have been directed not toward the army, but toward the emperor and civilians, flattering the emperor or suggesting to the senate and civilians that the army was loyal and possessed the invoked virtues. For instance, Galba’s coin legends and images could not have persuaded the soldiers, who did not receive the donative that his subordinate had promised. The legend *AEQVITAS* would merely have irritated the Praetorians, who felt that Galba treated them unfairly. His Republican themes were probably directed at the public and

²³⁸ Levick 1981–2: 107; Duncan-Jones 1994: 97; Harris 2006b: 3–4 suggests that aristocrats ignored coinage because they were accustomed to transactions on *tabulae*.

²³⁹ Levick 1981–2: 107.

²⁴⁰ Levick 1981–2: 108.

²⁴¹ Levick 1999: 49; Duncan-Jones 1994: 98.

²⁴² Campbell 1984: 172, 2002: 126–7, 140–41.

²⁴³ Pius: BMC vol. 4, 270, no. 1075. Caesar: RIC vol. 3, 296, no. 1046; *Fides*, BMC vol. 4, 805, no. 577. Judaea, BMC vol. 2, Vespasian, nos. 543, 746. Campbell 1984: 48, 52, 85; Hekster 2007: 349–50.

the upper orders.²⁴⁴ From AD 68, Vindex's coins included a *FIDEI EXERCITVVM*, with a reverse legend *CONCORDIA PRAETORIANORVM*. Because Vindex revolted in Gaul, far from the Praetorians, this legend could not have persuaded the Praetorians to cooperate, but instead was meant to persuade the populace that the Praetorians were loyal to Vindex.²⁴⁵

Furthermore, the messages of any new issues were diluted by the large volume of circulating older coinage. New emperors did not normally call in and restrike the older gold and silver coins of their predecessors, unless a predecessor underwent *damnatio memoriae* in which all of his images and titles on inscriptions were destroyed. Therefore, a given donative is unlikely to have contained only the new coinage of the present emperor, let alone new issues coined for the distribution itself. Older coins circulated for decades.²⁴⁶ A soldier receiving a donative was likely to get a mixture of old and new issues. Only in periods of prolonged civil wars were wholesale recall and recoinage necessary due to the scale of payments to armies. In 42–31 BC, Octavian and Antony collected and reminted most of the aurei and denarii of their defeated rivals, due to the scale of these wars and a relative shortage of metal and booty.²⁴⁷ Such massive reminting also occurred in the third-century crisis, with the exception that better silver coins tended to be hoarded. Large-scale reminting during civil wars was the most likely scenario for “propaganda” issues.

Some coin issues can be identified as possible donatives addressed to troops. Antony produced aurei and denarii for distribution to 23 legions, each of which was indicated on the issue.²⁴⁸ Countermarked coins from camps in Lower Germany from the period of the Rhine mutiny in AD 14 show that before Tiberius could strike coins with his own image, Germanicus had Augustan coins countermarked to inculcate loyalty to the new regime.²⁴⁹ Countermarks also appear on the coinage of the civil war emperors in AD 69.²⁵⁰ Hadrian produced a series of provincial

²⁴⁴ *RIC* pp. 205–17, nos. 1–132 and 518–21; though Harl 1996: 92 speculates that these themes maintained public confidence in a debased coinage, the public may have not been aware of this debasement.

²⁴⁵ *RIC* I² 201. Levick 1999: 46–7.

²⁴⁶ Howgego 1992; Duncan-Jones 1994: 86–7, 98–9, 105, 159; Harl 1996: 3. Though Millar [1991] 2004a: 96 suggests that *donativa* were paid in new coins, the various palace auctions and emergency donatives, such as Tac. *Ann.* 1.37 and donatives by usurpers, suggest that there was often no time to mint new coins.

²⁴⁷ Harl 1996: 57.

²⁴⁸ Harl 1996: 60; Crawford 1974: I no. 516–17, 520–22, 527–8; Sear 1998: 229–30, nos. 348–83.

²⁴⁹ Harl 1996: 85; M. A. Speidel 2000: 74 n. 60. Donative issues: Campbell 1984: 71 n. 8, 184–5.

²⁵⁰ Harl 1996: 85.

exercitus issues that were perhaps meant for the army, and Septimius Severus also produced issues featuring specific legions.²⁵¹ Over two centuries later, the Tetrarchs minted special gold issues that were multiples of aurei, probably minted for donatives, impractical for any other purpose; even later, special issues were minted for donatives given at the imperial *decennalia* and *vicennalia*.²⁵²

The literary evidence shows that soldiers cared about the gift of money itself, not what was written or depicted on it. Though images of *congiaria* appear frequently on coins, with the legend *LIBERALITAS AVG(VSTI)*, images and legends that directly commemorate donatives to soldiers hardly appear.²⁵³ This probably reflects elite consensus seeking to downplay the donative.

The material value of the coinage itself began to fall. As noted earlier, the morality of exchange required that the emperor give to many and take from none.²⁵⁴ Debasement of the coinage may have seemed a rational means of increasing the imperial wealth, as long as the debasement was not obvious. Modern metrological studies show that first- and second-century emperors debased the denarius slightly, its lowest silver content being eighty percent silver.²⁵⁵ A slow inflation resulted, tolerated by the public.²⁵⁶ However, in the third century, especially after 235 AD, debasement created a vicious cycle. When the external sources of gold and silver from mining and booty began to wane, the imperial budget ran short. Confiscations alienated the aristocracy; reducing payments to the army alienated soldiers. The only politically acceptable solution was the debasement of the silver coinage.²⁵⁷ Gold was not alloyed, but in the third century aurei gradually became lighter.²⁵⁸ The result was steep inflation in prices, so that soldiers needed larger payments to compensate for the drop in real value of the silver coinage.²⁵⁹ This financial

²⁵¹ *RIC* II (Hadrian) nos. 912–37; Duncan-Jones 1994: 177. According to Wheeler 1978: 352, Hadrian's *exercitus* issues were not directly linked with his military reviews; they depict provinces not visited by Hadrian at those dates. Severus: *RIC* IV (Severus) nos. 1–17 (c. 193–4), resembling Antony's. Surprisingly, given his behavior in Dio and Herodian, Caracalla's coinage addressed the army very little.

²⁵² Bastien 1988.

²⁵³ Campbell 1984: 190 n. 52; Veyne 1990: 438 n. 133.

²⁵⁴ *Op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 159.

²⁵⁵ Duncan-Jones 1994: 223–31; Harl 1996: 90–91 (Nero), 93–4 (Vespasian). Hadrian and the Antonines also reduced the silver content of the denarius.

²⁵⁶ Duncan-Jones 1994: 25–9; Harl 1996: 125–6.

²⁵⁷ Howgego 1992: 9.

²⁵⁸ Harl 1996: 133.

²⁵⁹ Blois 2002: 93–7, 100–101, 104; Harl 1996: 229–30.

crisis ensured the army's support of new emperors. Even if the new ruler could not promise more than his predecessors gave, he would give a donative at his accession. Eventually the worthlessness of the coin corresponded to a succession of ephemeral emperors, the so-called "Thirty Tyrants" of the mid-third century. By AD 270 the denarius was reduced to base metal thinly coated with silver that easily rubbed off or was extracted by users to sell as bullion.²⁶⁰

THE ORNAMENTS OF *VIRTUS*

Roman military decorations, *dona militaria*, also underwent a routinization and were dissociated from sordid wealth.²⁶¹ Though in the late Republic, common soldiers and low-ranking officers had won legendary numbers of decorations for equally legendary valor, this "charismatic" mode of reward was routinized in the Principate, when most decorations were awarded to officers of senatorial and equestrian rank.²⁶² For this reason, Suetonius' Augustus gave out decorations most sparingly to common soldiers.²⁶³

Golden torques, *phalerae*, and *armillae* were given to soldiers below centurion rank, but the most prestigious ornaments were given to officers of centurion rank and higher, usually senators and equestrians. The *basta pura* (a miniature silver spear without a point) and *vexillum* (miniature standard) were given to *primipili* and higher ranks. The *corona aurea*, *corona muralis* (traditionally awarded to the first to surmount a city or fort wall), and *corona vallaris* (traditionally awarded to the first across the ditch surrounding a fort) might be granted to *evocati* and centurions, but went most often to senatorial and equestrian aristocratic officers. The *corona navalis* was granted to senatorial officers, regardless of whether the victory was on land or sea. The *corona civica* was reserved for the emperors.²⁶⁴

²⁶⁰ Harl 1996: 132.

²⁶¹ G. R. Watson 1969: 114–17; Le Bohec 1994: 61–3; Maxfield 1981: 67–9, 70–74; Campbell 2002: 40; Rosenstein 2007: 134.

²⁶² Domaszewski 1908: 68–9, 110–12, 137–9, 184; G. R. Watson 1969: 114–15; Maxfield 1981: 63–4; Campbell 1984: 198–203, 348–62; Le Bohec 1994: 60–63; Lee 1996: 206; Wesch-Klein 1998: 57, 59–60. On the principle of hierarchy, Lendon 1997: 154–5; Eck 2000; Southern 2007: 150–2. In the Republic, Lendon 2005: 188; e.g., Livy 42.34.10–11.

²⁶³ Suet. *Aug.* 25.3.

²⁶⁴ Maxfield 1981: 74–6, 76, 79–80, 80–81, 82–4, 84–6 on ornaments for officers; Maxfield 1981: 86–95, 98 on ornaments given to *milites*. On *dona* Polyb. 6.39.1–11; Joseph. *BJ* 7.13–16; Gell. 5.6.pr–27; Plin. *NH* 22.4.6–6.13; on Polybius, Rawson 1971: 22–3.

Military decorations were thus rationalized in the value-rational sense, by being conferred according to rank. Auxiliaries were probably not eligible to receive them.²⁶⁵

Though often made from precious metals, *dona militaria* were dissociated from monetary value. The most prestigious military decorations, the grass and oak crowns, were made from intrinsically worthless materials, yet were the highest traditional honors. Regular military decorations were forms of bullion that were ideally non-convertible. Pliny regards golden *dona militaria* as less subject to corrupt use than other forms of gold, though he laments that Roman soldiers melt down the rewards of valor to make objects of luxury.²⁶⁶

The prizes of *virtus* were distinct from gifts.²⁶⁷ They also contrasted with ordinary jewels and ornamentation, which the Roman literary tradition depicted as inappropriate for soldiers. Jewels were associated with feminine ornament, and a jeweled soldier represented a ludicrous oxymoron, the subject of satire, invective, and jokes.²⁶⁸ This discourse underlies the indignation of Pliny the Elder and Herodian on the conferral of golden rings on unsuitable persons, including low-ranking soldiers. Herodian states that Septimius Severus allowed soldiers, probably centurions and *principales*, to wear golden rings. Herodian associates this privilege with soldiers' raise in pay; their adoption of a luxurious diet; the permission to live with their wives; and in general their poor discipline and disobedient conduct.²⁶⁹ Herodian elides the diversity of the military diet and the soldiers' affectionate family relationships, which had suffered from the legal disabilities of the marriage ban.²⁷⁰ The passage echoes Pliny the Elder's diatribe against the wearing of golden rings, which claims that archaic Romans wore rings only of iron, that men gave

²⁶⁵ Maxfield 1981: 122–5. *Diplomata* as imperial gifts: Eck 2003: 83–4.

²⁶⁶ *Corona graminea and civica*, Plin. *HN* 22.4.6–6.13; precious metal decorations, Plin. *HN* 33.10.37–8, 33.44.153, cf. 33.54.112.

²⁶⁷ Maxfield 1981: 99, 103; decorations were not given in civil war or in low-intensity conflicts; *dona* were still used to motivate soldiers in the early Empire, Lendon 1997: 260. Literary authors criticized giving decorations to unsuitable people or for trivial reasons: Cíc. *Verr.* 2.3.185; Gell. 5.6.24–6 (for digging ditches). Marius conferred a crown on one of his *milites* who killed an officer who tried to rape him: Plut. *Mar.* 14.3–5.

²⁶⁸ Amm. Marc. 22.4.6–8; HA *Gallieni* 16.4 (jeweled belt and bootlaces); n. 230 above. The legend of Tarpeia in Livy 1.11.8–9 illustrates the opposition of feminine ornaments and masculine valor.

²⁶⁹ Hdn. 3.8.5.

²⁷⁰ On Hdn. 3.8.5, E. Birley 1969: 64; Campbell 1984: 194–5, 372, 375, 401–4; R. E. Smith 1972: 494–5, 497. Diet: see Chapter Seven. Marriage: Phang 2001: 381–2.

iron rings to their fiancées, and that even when golden rings came into use, only senators and ambassadors could wear them.²⁷¹ The iron ring belongs purely to the symbolic order. In the decadent present, golden rings have been corrupted by usurpers of higher status and by the luxurious, who confuse them with women's jewelry.²⁷² Pliny regards even the wearing of golden rings by equestrians as a step toward this corruption.²⁷³

By criticizing Severus' grant of golden rings to *milites*, Herodian suggests that military decorations, including golden rings, should belong entirely to the symbolic order as signs of honor, neither confused with objects of personal adornment and vanity nor associated with indiscipline. Herodian obscures the institutional benefit of Severus' policies, which may have made military recruitment more attractive and raised the morale of soldiers in service. Instead of corrupting military discipline, Severus seems to have promoted it, as dedications to *Disciplina* in Britain may date from his campaign there.²⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

The elite would have liked to reduce payments to the army, returning to the earlier republican citizen-soldier army and to an idealized past when Rome's heroic fighters were satisfied with subsistence.²⁷⁵ Such legends were an exercise in nostalgia. It was impossible for the emperors to reduce the payments to the army without offending the soldiers and thus threatening their own power. Instead, the emperors sought by other means to associate payments to the army with the symbolic order, subjecting them to value rationalization. *Donativa* and rewards could seem honorable as long as the army was disciplined in other respects, as Trajan and Hadrian were careful to emphasize. Therefore pay was not raised very often, as low pay left the option of donatives open and thus created more scope for expressing discipline. Paradoxically, low pay made the soldiers more dependent on the donatives.²⁷⁶ Nonetheless, Herodian represents Septimius Severus' pay

²⁷¹ Plin. *HN* 33.4.11–12; Reinhold 1971: 284–6.

²⁷² Plin. *HN* 33.8.32.

²⁷³ Plin. *HN* 33.6.22, 33.6.27, equestrians. 33.7.29, 33.8.32.

²⁷⁴ *RIB* 1127, 1723, 1978. E. Birley 1969: 69.

²⁷⁵ Val. Max. 4.3.5a; Flor. 1.5; 1.47; Eutr. 1.17. These resemble the dissociation of philosophical teaching from commercial gain in Too 2000: 14.

²⁷⁶ Republic: Harl 1996: 213. Principate: R. E. Smith 1972: 492; Blois 2002: 91–2.

raise as bad for military discipline, especially because it was combined with other privileges contrary to traditional discipline.

Discipline was best imposed not through fiscal austerity, but through military training and work (*labor*) and through austerity in consumption. These activities repressed the soldiers' impulses and appetites and therefore controlled soldiers' use of pay and benefits. In the absence of campaigns in which they demonstrated valor, soldiers might earn their payments through work and austerity. These features of discipline are analyzed in the next chapters.

6 *LABOR MILITARIS*: WORK AS DISCIPLINE



INTRODUCTION

The popular imagination envisions the Roman soldier sweating and toiling, whether on the march or at work. Roman authors emphasized soldiers' and officers' expenditure of *labor* (effort, work), which reconciled the aristocracy somewhat to imperial patronage of the army and the expenses of the army. Through the labor of physical training, described in Chapter Two, soldiers were made into fighters and maintained these skills.¹ Besides training, soldiers' *labor* included guard activities; the production, maintenance, and repair of equipment and other necessities; the requisition and transport of supplies; and military and civil construction.² Especially on campaign or in remote areas, where civilian labor was lacking, soldiers built bridges, roads, and canals. More routine forms of work were the crafting, upkeep, and repair of equipment, the gathering and transport of supplies, the building of camps, and guard duties.³ In regions with extensive civilian settlement, the building and upkeep of roads was a *munus publicum*, the responsibility of the local communities, which contracted labor or levied a *corvée*.⁴ So-called *viae militares* denoted strategically important routes, not roads built by soldiers.⁵ Soldiers seem usually to have built aqueducts.⁶ This section will not survey all evidence for Roman soldiers' work, which would require an archaeological survey of the empire; it focuses on examples of the control of work.⁷

¹ Horsmann 1991: 16, 30, 44, 58, 61ff., 81–102.

² This chapter treats forms of temporary and permanent building other than castrametation (discussed in Chapter Two).

³ Alston 1995: 96; G. Webster 1998: 272–3. In earlier Republican Italy (Wiseman 1970; Kissel 2002) or in new provinces as in *P. Mich.* 8.465–6.

⁴ Kissel 2002. In Tac. *Agric.* 31, the British leader Calgacus claims his people were conscripted to build roads, cut forests, and drain swamps.

⁵ Rebuffat 1987b.

⁶ Hodge 1991: 191; Février 1979; Sonnabend 1999: 568–73.

⁷ G. R. Watson 1969: 143ff; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 35–41, 51–3, 54–65); Mitchell 1987: 336–9; Le Bohec 1994: 109–15, 207–9, 219–20; Austin and Rankov 1995: 149–55; M. A. Speidel 2001: 50–53; Herz 2007: 307. Local studies, e.g., Alston 1995: 69–116, esp. 79–81; Bowman 1994a: 34–50.

The Roman military bureaucracy administered these forms of labor, displaying a high degree of rationality for an ancient society, though the slowness of transportation and communication in the Roman Empire limited bureaucratic efficiency. Soldiers' *labor* was also central to the moral economy of the Roman army. Though its material productivity was important to the Roman army, the main aim of military *labor* was social control, maintaining the military hierarchy. Commanders imposed work to subordinate soldiers and accustom them to obedience. In peacetime, monumental building substituted for campaigning. Soldiers' exertion produced and displayed *virtus*, an essential function of military *labor*.

In contrast with the *labor* that reproduced the military hierarchy, degrading and repetitive work – typically servile – threatened this hierarchy. Management of military labor resembled the management of slave labor in agronomic treatises, yet commanders had to avoid assimilating soldiers to slaves. Soldiers resisted work that seemed servile, seeking slaves to perform this work; from time to time commanders expelled soldiers' slaves. Resenting excessively degrading labor, soldiers might mutiny. The participation of the commanders, emperors, and aristocratic officers in at least symbolic military labor (such as travel on campaign, or even construction) defused this potential conflict. By sharing his soldiers' labors, the commander evaded the charge of being a master of slaves, and actively shared in *labor's* production of *virtus* and reproduction of empire. The emperor's *labor* had a charismatic quality influenced by Stoicism.

Roman military labor displayed Rome's domination of the natural and human world, as has already been seen for castrametation. Construction of temporary works during campaigns intimidated the enemy. Military labor on permanent building projects displayed "the grandeur that was Rome," even though much monumental building was in fact not carried out by the army.

ROMAN WORK-DISCIPLINE

The records of the Roman army, preserved on papyrus at Dura-Europos in Syria and in Egypt, on ostraka (sherds of pottery) in Egypt and North Africa, and on wooden tablets at Vindolanda and Carlisle on Hadrian's Wall in Britain and at Vindonissa, often suggest Weberian bureaucratic rationality and modernity.⁸

⁸ The following on military documents is adapted from Phang 2007, with the permission of P. Erdkamp.

These documents maintained lists of personnel and imposed work-discipline, assigning tasks by the day or for longer periods. Such work-discipline aimed at preventing and repressing desertion and absences without leave, problems encouraged by the slowness of ancient travel and communication and by the absence of a civilian police force (outside some large cities).

The main purpose of military records was to keep track of personnel and their tasks, as well as finances and supplies, from day to day, probably from month to month, and also from year to year. Vegetius describes the ideal bureaucracy of the Roman army as maintaining daily administrative and financial records and as recording assignments of soldiers on watch and on duty and the recipients and length of furlough, "so that nobody was either passed over or given too many duties."⁹ Before the later Empire, both the literary sources and the jurists show little consciousness of military documentation, as opposed to the imperial petition and response system.¹⁰ Due to literary authors' lack of interest, the details of Roman military administration are reconstructed from surviving documents, many of them fragmentary.

Modern authors have delivered highly variable estimates of the rationality, efficiency, and honesty of Roman military bureaucracy and government.¹¹ Ancient bureaucracy tends to take on a moral color of exemplary modern Western efficiency or dilatory and corrupt Kafkaesque or Ottoman inefficiency.¹² Both views are anachronistic judgments. As a patrimonial bureaucracy, Roman administration represents neither the Weberian ideal type of patrimonial rule nor the ideal type of modern rational bureaucracy. Efficiency in the modern sense was lacking: because communications could not be sent instantaneously or speedily, a military clerk might be slow to unearth the personal data and location of personnel under inquiry. Nor were all aspects of Roman military life subject to bureaucratic regulation, as in modern times.¹³ Nonetheless, the Roman army's documentation

⁹ Veg. *Mil.* 2.19.2–4. Financial documents were discussed in Chapter Five.

¹⁰ For the latter, Millar [1977] 1992: 203–59.

¹¹ Bowman 1994a: 34–42, 96; Austin and Rankov 1995: 155–60; and Stauner 2004: 205–7, 210–13 stress efficient bureaucracy. MacMullen 1963: *passim*, 1988: 129–132, 161, 268 n. 115 emphasize inefficiency and corruption. Harries 1999: 165–6, 171 and Kelly 1994 and 2004: 117–29, 190–91, 228, 275 n. 1, strike a balance on the later Roman civilian bureaucracy.

¹² Kelly 1994: 166.

¹³ Harris 1989: 217; Lendon 1997: 2–3; Campbell 2002: 32 doubt pervasiveness. On documentation in civilian life, Gardner 1986. Nonetheless, soldiers and their families might need documentation to protect their interests in *de facto* marriages: Phang 2001: 38–52.

displayed a bureaucratic rationality that was intended to check the excesses of patrimonialism.¹⁴ Documentation could prove in writing that soldiers were in camps and assigned to duties, not loitering among civilians or appropriated by the governor or other officials to carry out personal wishes. Documentation of *commeatus* (furlough) could show whether soldiers were absent without leave and might determine their punishment.¹⁵ Documentation of duties could, as Vegetius suggests, prove to soldiers that their officers treated them fairly. Furthermore, documentation maintained continuity in units despite the coming and going of personnel.

The pragmatic purposes of the Roman military bureaucracy were to exclude social undesirables, enroll new personnel, keep track of the numbers and location of personnel, and repress desertion. The first step was to enroll the new recruit.¹⁶ The potential recruit underwent *probatio*, an inquiry into his legal status and qualifications for the branch of the service that he wished to enter. Because slaves were excluded from all *militiae*, and noncitizens from the Praetorians and legions, a recruit might be required to produce an affidavit of his legal status, as when T. Flavius Longus declared his free birth, Roman citizenship, and right to serve in a legion.¹⁷ The height of recruits might be measured and their good eyesight confirmed.¹⁸ A summary of six recruits, stating their names and distinguishing marks such as scars, and authorized by C. Minicius Italus, the Prefect of Egypt in AD 103, was sent to the commander of coh. III Ituraeorum.¹⁹ After the *probatio* came a short period used for preliminary training before the recruits arrived at their units and were enrolled on the rosters (*in numeros referri*). As governor of Bithynia, Pliny the Younger wrote to Trajan that some slave recruits were detected before being sent to their unit. Slaves were forbidden to enter the army, facing capital punishment if they did so, but Trajan replied that if other people had presented the slaves as legitimate recruits, these others should be punished.²⁰

¹⁴ Cf. Harries 1999: 72; Ando 2000: 7.

¹⁵ Documentation and military punishment *op. cit.* Chapter Four nn. 256–7.

¹⁶ Gilliam 1957; G. R. Watson 1969: 37–42, 1974: 496–7; Davies 1969a (in Davies 1989: 17–19); Stauner 2004: 36–9; Wesch-Klein 2007: 435–7. Southern 2007: 132–3.

¹⁷ *CPL* 102 = Campbell 1994: no. 1.

¹⁸ *P. Oxy.* 39 = Campbell 1994: no. 6; measurement, *Acta Maximiliani* 1.4; Veg. 1.5.1–3.

¹⁹ *P. Oxy.* 1022 = *CPL* 111 = Daris 4 = *RMR* 87 = Campbell 1994: no. 9: *tirones sexs probatos a me in coh[orte]*. Stauner 2004: 35.

²⁰ Plin. *Ep.* 10.29–30. Others may not have been caught; in Dio 67.13.1, an ex-centurion, Claudius Pacatus, proved to be a slave.

Ideally, a recruit brought a letter of recommendation with him. Such recommendations were personal commendations by their authors.²¹ In contrast with modern educational institutions, civil services, and militaries – and the imperial Chinese bureaucracy – which require examination scores, the Roman army had no objective qualifications for service other than the status qualifications mentioned above and possibly standards for height and good health. However, bribery might also suffice. In the early second century AD, the would-be cohort soldier Claudius Terentianus lamented that without money, he had no influence with the bureaucracy: “Here nothing happens without money and recommendation letters are worth nothing unless someone helps himself.”²² Such bribery, however, enabled subjects of the empire who lacked aristocratic personal connections to gain access to the military and civilian bureaucracy.²³

Duty rosters attest the allocation of personnel to work assignments in daily service. A papyrus from Legio III Cyrenaica in Egypt between AD 90 and 96 assigns tasks to thirty-six (extant) soldiers for the first ten days in October, in the form of a table.²⁴ The table represents the intersection of two sets, the set of thirty-six soldiers (rows) and the set of ten days (columns), a format found in another document, an ostrakon from the outpost at Mons Claudianus in the Egyptian desert.²⁵ This format is now called a Carroll diagram, named by the Victorian mathematician and author of *Alice in Wonderland*. Such a diagram compresses information efficiently: the user could see at a glance the duties of a given soldier for the entire ten days, or the tasks of all soldiers on any one of those days. In other instances, duty rosters cover only one day’s tasks.²⁶ Guard duty rosters list personnel assigned to specific places at specific dates.²⁷ Duty rosters might also list personnel assigned to a specific project. Some documents from Vindolanda

²¹ *P. Oxy.* 1.32; another recommendation letter, *P. Oxy.* I 122 = *SP* 1.22 = *CPL* 249; on recommendations, A. R. Birley 2003: 4–5 and App. 1–12. Such *immaterial* patronage, rewarding good moral qualities, was expected throughout the army.

²² MacMullen 1988: 129; *P. Mich.* 8.468 = *CPL* 250 = Campbell 1994: no. 43: *hic a[ut]em sene aer[e] } [ni]bil fiet neque epistulae com- } mandaticiae nihil val[eb]unt nesi } si qui sibi aiutaveret.*

²³ Kelly 2004: III, 132–3.

²⁴ *P. Gen. Lat.* 1 verso col. v = *CPL* 106 = *CbLA* 7a-b = Daris, *Doc.* 10 = *RMR* 9, G. R. Watson 1974: 500–502; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 48–51); Stauner 2004: 20, 36–8.

²⁵ *O. Claud.* 308; Stauner 2004: 26–7. On the site Maxfield 2001 and 2003.

²⁶ Rebuffat and Marichal 1973: 285; on Bu Ngem, Rebuffat 2000.

²⁷ E.g., *RMR* 12, 15–17, 19 from Dura; *O. Amst.* 8 assigns watchmen to upper and lower posts. Stauner 2004: 74–7.

make note of soldiers assigned to various building and quarrying projects: on one day, 18 of 343 soldiers were assigned to the building of a bath-house.²⁸

The morning reports at Dura in the early third century are a more general and formal category of daily document.²⁹ The morning report represents, though it may not literally transcribe, the military *salutatio* or muster that the unit held every morning. Such reports list the numbers and ranks of personnel present, the arrival of new personnel, and those leaving on duties and returning on that date. A tribune assigned the watchword, for example, one of the seven known planets, *Mercurius sanctus*. Another officer announced the orders of the day, and the soldiers presumably recited the formula “whatever we may be ordered, we will do, and at every command we will be ready.”³⁰ The guards at the standards (*[qui] excubant ad signa*) were announced and rotated. The morning reports also listed whatever sacrifices would be performed. Such documents affirmed the unit’s identity and its personnel’s commitment to duties. The specific tasks of those who stayed in camp are not listed.

Extracts were sometimes made to track individuals’ assignments and arrivals and departures across a period of time, but no individual dossiers on separate pages as such are extant.³¹ The documents also show how frequently soldiers were absent from base, whether on expeditions, detached as guard personnel for different garrisons or for the governor, on logistic duties, or sick.³² The more often personnel came and went, the more opportunity they had for desertion or absence without leave, as the discussion of *commeatu*s will show.

²⁸ *T. Vindol.* 2.155; cf. 156.

²⁹ E.g., *P. Dura* 82 = *CPL* 326 = *ChLA* 337 = *RMR* 47, col. 1 = Campbell 1994: no. 180, c. 220–25. Stauner 2004: 29–30.

³⁰ *P. Dura* 89 = *CPL* 331 = *ChLA* 344 = *RMR* 50: *quod imperatum fuerit faciemus et ad omnem tesseram parati erimus* (May 27–8, AD 239). *RMR* 47–57: Fink 1971: 180–81; Stauner 2004: 73ff.

³¹ *P. Gen. Lat.* recto part 2 lists soldiers’ departures and returns on detached duties, kept over time. *RMR* 10 = Campbell 1994: no. 184, c. 80–87 (not from Dura) lists individuals by their names, summarizing departures and returns below each name. G. R. Watson 1969: 73–4, 1974: 502; Stauner 2004: 60–61. App. BC 3.7.43 suggests the existence of dossiers or at least marks indicating the character of personnel. Marks added to Dura rosters may have indicated status of soldiers, Fink 1971: 11–17; Austin and Rankov 1995: 158. The Greek letter theta signified “deceased.” Promotion dates listed for decurions and centurions, *P. Mich.* 3.164 = *RMR* 20.

³² *T. Vindol.* 2.154; Stauner 2004: 88–90. Of 296 present, 15 were sick, 6 wounded, and 10 suffering from a debilitating eye infection. *RMR* 63 includes (permanent) losses and their causes: death by drowning, murder by bandits, and death in battle.

Reports (*renuntia*) were made at Vindolanda to attest the completion of daily assignments. A fully extant example displays the formula of this type of document. This formula is not known elsewhere, and a certain degree of local differentiation of documentation is likely.³³ Longer-term reports were also made, cumulating information about personnel over time. The *pridianum* was a strength report listing total numbers of personnel, accessions, and losses from a given unit for that year; it may feature details of accessions or losses, such as new recruits and transfers, or causes of death. A *pridianum* may have been issued every year by units, but twice yearly in Roman Egypt.³⁴ Other cumulative reports were probably interim reports.³⁵ A *pridianum* extract appears in a papyrus from 105/6 AD, documenting the coh. I Hispanorum Veterana at Stobi in Macedonia: in additions, losses, and detachments. Lists for the coh. XX Palmyrenorum at Dura in 219 and 222 may represent yearly summaries.³⁶

Pridiana were laid out in clear blocks with headings in capital letters and with numbers repeated in the margin, suggesting the rational vertical transmission of information: these documents were created for outside readers unfamiliar with the internal bureaucracy of units. *Pridiana* may have been intended for the short-term senatorial and equestrian commanders or provincial governors, who needed to familiarize themselves with troop strengths and losses.³⁷ The emperors may even have read them. The Augustan *breviarium totius imperii*, which included the numbers and disposition of troops, may have been compiled from similar reports.³⁸ According to the *Historia Augusta*, Alexander Severus (representing the ideal emperor in the *HA*) knew each of his soldiers' names and service records.³⁹ However, lower-level

³³ *T. Vindol.* 3.574: *renuntium* [unit] *omnes ad loca qui debunt et impedimenta renuntiarunt optiones et curatores detulit* [name] *optio* (centuria). Austin and Rankov 1995: 156; Bowman 1994a: 38–9; Stauner 2004: 91–2. The defective Latin (*debunt* for the subjunctive *debent*) suggests that the *renuntium* formula was a local creation.

³⁴ G. R. Watson 1969: 72–3; Stauner 2004: 95–102. Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 40) suggests that reports were made monthly, up to several times a month.

³⁵ *T. Vindol.* 2.242. Bowman 1994a: 37.

³⁶ *RMR* 63 = *CPL* 112 = Campbell 1994: no. 183; *BGU* 696 = *CPL* 118 = *ChLA* 411 = *RMR* 64 (AD 156); *P. Brook.* 24 (AD 215); *ChLA* 501 (48–52). Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 34); Stauner 2004: 103–4.

³⁷ Stauner 2004: 109, 112.

³⁸ *Breviarium*; *op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 80.

³⁹ *HA Alex.* 21.6–8. Credited by Austin and Rankov 1995: 156; doubted by Saller 1982: 105; also Hadrian, *Epit. de Caes.* 14.3; *HA Hadr.* 10.8–11.1.

documentation was probably not intended to be read outside the unit, and many features (such as the marks annotating rosters) remain unclear.

The internal documentation of the Roman army displays a relatively high degree of formal rationality for its time and place. By modern standards these documents manifest some inefficiencies. A modern archive would categorize records according to date, the location of individuals, and individual names. The surviving documents do not permit us to reconstruct the archives of any one unit, even at Dura. The precise workings of the bureaucracy may have been different at different locations and times.

Unique identification of individuals is necessary for the rational functioning of bureaucracy. In modern times individuals (and objects, such as library books and museum accessions) are given unique classification numbers, a relatively late development.⁴⁰ In the Roman army, unique identification was hindered by Roman nomenclature. Soldiers were identified by their names (Latin *nomen* and *cognomen*), filiation, place of origin, year of enlistment, and/or their *centuria*, identified by their centurion's name.⁴¹ Military rosters listed soldiers according to their enlistment dates. Nonetheless, individuals are not identified by enlistment date in most other surviving documents. Identity confusion was possible. The nomenclature of provincial soldiers, because most were or were descended from new citizens, was stereotypical enough so that homonymous persons were frequent and needed to be distinguished by different places of origin, centuries, or matriculation dates.⁴²

The unit's bureaucracy probably operated most efficiently not by absolute standards but through the clerks' familiarity with unit records and with the unit's members. In the early Empire, legionary *librarii* were promoted on a track that may have given them only a few years' experience. Septimius Severus revised this system and created a cadre of long-term military clerks, who may have served until their eyes failed.⁴³

⁴⁰ Such numbers pre-date computers, however; the U.S. Social Security number was created by the Social Security Administration in 1936.

⁴¹ G. R. Watson 1974: 507. Filing by name and subject is suggested by Austin and Rankov 1995: 159, who also stress (157–8) the great volume of military documentation.

⁴² In *P. Gen. Lat.* 1 verso col. v, two otherwise homonymous individuals (C. Iulius Longus) are distinguished by *origo*.

⁴³ Eyeglasses are a medieval invention, unknown in classical times, Horsfall 1995: 49–51. The elite relied on slave assistants to read aloud and take dictation.

AWAY FROM THE STANDARDS: *COMMEATUS* AND OTHER ABSENCES

Premodern and even early modern military work-discipline needed first of all to prevent desertion. Roman punishments for desertion are discussed in Chapter [Four](#), but the administrative aspects require examination. In the Roman army, desertion and absence without leave were a greater risk because soldiers frequently traveled on errands for the army.⁴⁴ The military bureaucracy recorded soldiers' destinations, but their locations in transit would be hard to ascertain.

In judging cases of absence without leave, the time that a soldier needed to return from furlough was taken into account, requiring him to prove unavoidable delays.⁴⁵ His general record was examined, as was his conduct during his absence.⁴⁶ A well-known study emphasizes that in peacetime, deserters might escape with modest punishment.⁴⁷ More precisely, as seen in Chapter [Four](#), the emperors and jurists continued to decree severe punishment for proven deserters, but were inclined toward judging an individual suspect an *emansor*, absent without leave, which was treated much more leniently. This method of lawfinding both invoked traditional severity and avoided its literal imposition. To check absence without leave and desertion, commanders repressed excessive furlough (*commeatus*), a policy that both fulfilled the ideology of *labor* and kept soldiers with the standards (*ad signa*), where officers could presumably control them.

To grant too much leave was a sign of poor discipline; a good commander granted *commeatus* very sparingly.⁴⁸ The mutinous legionaries in AD 14 complained of the rarity of *commeatus*.⁴⁹ This was not merely a literary complaint. In papyrus

⁴⁴ RMR 47 (AD 223–5), 63 (AD 105–6), 10 (AD 80–87): personnel sent to gather fodder or attend the governor; to obtain clothing, collect and guard grain, and bring and guard cattle; to guard duty, dredging harbors and making paper. Duncan-Jones 1990: 8–29, Kelly 2004: 115–16 emphasize the slow and variable speed of transport and communications in the Roman Empire. Signal methods (Sheldon 2005: 205–7) were used, if at all, in emergencies, not for routine administration.

⁴⁵ D. 49.16.14.pr (Paul *Poen. mil.*); Jung 1982: 980.

⁴⁶ D. 49.16.5.pr. (Menander *Re mil.* 2), 49.16.5.6 (*ibid.*). Jung 1982: 986; D. 49.16.5.2 (Menander *Re mil.* 2).

⁴⁷ Campbell 1984: 309.

⁴⁸ Sall. *Jug.* 44.5; 45.2; Suet. *Aug.* 24.1, *Galba* 6.2; HA *Hadr.* 10.3; Veg. *Mil.* 2.19.4–5. Bagnall 1976: Introduction and O *Florida* 1; M. P. Speidel 1985: 283–4; Bowman 1994a: 39–40, 107–8; Wesch-Klein 1998: 96–8, 2000: 400–401. The letter P. *Dura* 55 = RMR 90 = ChLA 310 (AD 211–20) requests that soldiers of Coh. XX Palmyrenorum who have left the standards (*sublat[i]s si[gni]s derelectis*) be returned *sine mora* (without delay) *ut ex disciplina aga[nt]*. Fink 1971: 380.

⁴⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.

letters, soldiers are uncertain whether they will obtain *commeatus* and visit their family members. For instance, Julius Apollinarius, a young legionary clerk, promises to visit his parents “directly if the governor should give me *commeatus*.”⁵⁰ The *Sortes Astrampsychi*, a numerical oracle with stock questions and answers that was popular in Roman Egypt, includes the question “will I obtain *commeatus*?” According to the stock answers to this question, the oracle’s authors expected the client to have only a fifty per cent chance of doing so.⁵¹ At Vindolanda soldiers’ requests for *commeatus* took the form of a standard petition with the formula: “I beseech, my lord, that you hold me a worthy person to whom to grant leave.”⁵²

Even if leave was granted, the time might be restricted. In a letter from Roman Egypt, one Pausanias, writing to his brother, says that he visited his son (also called Pausanias), a legionary who transferred to a cavalry *ala*. The son’s furlough, granted by the prefect of Egypt, was too short to allow a side trip to visit the brother.⁵³ *Commeatus* might be limited to ten days, as a pass written for a soldier named Ammonas shows, with two days allowed for return. The soldier on leave probably carried and displayed such a pass if he was stopped and questioned. A less fortunate soldier was allowed only one day of leave.⁵⁴

Work-discipline also required the repression of unauthorized leave or exemption from duties. According to the mutinous legionaries in AD 14, centurions exacted bribes from soldiers in return for leave or exemption from duties.⁵⁵ The practice continued in the mid-first century, where Tacitus depicts entire units as debilitated by these corrupt grants of leave. As described in the [previous chapter](#), Otho and Vitellius routinized these payments by granting soldiers regular funds for furlough.⁵⁶ Commanders might also grant excessive leave or absence from duties to gain favor with soldiers, an illicit form of patronage.⁵⁷ A generation later, at Vindolanda and in Roman Egypt, soldiers applied to their commanders

⁵⁰ *P. Mich.* 8.466 = Campbell 1994, no. 36. (AD 107).

⁵¹ *P. Oxy.* 1477 = *Sel. Pap.* 1.195.

⁵² *T. Vindol.* 2.166–77, esp. 167–9 and 171–2: *rogo, domine, dignum me habeas cui des commeatum*.

⁵³ *P. Oxy.* 14.1666 = *Sel. Pap.* 1.149.

⁵⁴ *O. Florida* 1; SB 9272. At Mons Claudianus the Roman army provided civilians with travel passes to and from the imperial quarries: Maxfield 2003: 165–6.

⁵⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 1.176; cf. *Ann.* 1.35.

⁵⁶ Tac. *Hist.* 1.46, 1.58.

⁵⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 2.55 (Cn. Piso), *Hist.* 2.93 (Vitellius).

for leave. Possibly the granting of *commeatus* by centurions had been abolished; nonetheless, Hadrian repressed bribery for grants of leave.⁵⁸

Another practical principle of Roman military work-discipline discouraged soldiers from performing outside work unrelated to *militia*. When Pliny the Younger wrote to Trajan, requesting soldiers to guard prisons, Trajan stated as a general rule that as few soldiers as possible should be called away from the standards.⁵⁹ In law soldiers were granted the status *absens rei publicae causa* (away on public business) and thus were exempt from duties legally imposed upon civilians, including the *sordida munera* (corvée) imposed on low-status civilians.⁶⁰ Hadrian also exempted soldiers from being summoned to give witness in civil cases, because this called them away from the standards.⁶¹ Soldiers were also forbidden to own or acquire land in the provinces where they served. However, personnel frequently violated this directive, especially when provincial recruitment became usual.⁶²

That soldiers should work solely in their public capacity, shunning work for private citizens or even for the governor as a private person, was stated in a lost work known as the *disciplina Augusti*, apparently a book of advice to the governors on military discipline (or on administration in general). The emperor wrote, “Even though I know that it is not inappropriate for soldiers to be employed on jobs as craftsmen, I nonetheless fear that if I should permit any such thing to be done for my convenience or yours, limits tolerable to me would not be imposed on this practice.” The jurist quoting this work states that the governor should not use military personnel to fish or hunt for his table.⁶³ This interpretation suggests that the emperor did not forbid the detachment of soldiers for administrative duties or public works; he forbade work in a private capacity, which approached clientage.

⁵⁸ *T. Vindol.* 2.166–77; *P. Mich.* 8.466; *HA Hadr.* 10.3 (*numquam passus aliquem a castris iniuste abesse*). Corrupt grants of *commeatus* recurred in the later Empire: Wesch-Klein 2000: 462–3.

⁵⁹ *Plin. Ep.* 10.19–20; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 35, 56). Cf. *Caes. BG* 6.34: *continere ad signa manipulos . . . ut instituta ratio et consuetudo exercitus Romani postulabat*; *Livy* 8.34.7–10; *Dio* 56.19.1. *D.* 49.16.12.2 (*Macer Re mil.* 1) urges keeping soldiers with the standards. Provincials complained that soldiers strayed from their assigned routes in order to extort lodging and transport; *op. cit.* ch. 4 n. 251; 5 nn. 113–14.

⁶⁰ *Sander* 1958: 217–18; *C.* 12.35.2.

⁶¹ *D.* 22.5.3.6 (*Callistratus Cogn.* 4). *Campbell* 1984: 257.

⁶² *D.* 49.16.9.pr. (*Marcian Inst.* 3), 49.16.13.pr.–1 (*Macer Re mil.* 2). *Campbell* 1984: 239–40.

⁶³ *D.* 49.16.12.1 (*Macer Re mil.* 1); *Neumann* 1936: 1–5. This tactful tone suggests Augustus himself, who sought to conciliate the Senate (cf. *Lendon* 1997: 20–21).

These provisions approached the Weberian ideal of a rational bureaucracy, but the situations that inspired and frustrated these regulations show that rational administration competed with more fluid patronage-based social relations. Soldiers might regard their governor or commander as their patron; he might have accepted them into the army, such approval being based on moral criteria or personal influence. However, bad governors were thought to employ soldiers to gratify their personal wishes; such clientage, because soldiers were required to obey their commanders, dangerously approached servitude.⁶⁴ Patronage or exploitation might also emerge further down the chain of command, as when centurions exacted bribes from soldiers as the price of *commeatus*. *Disciplina militaris* ideally discouraged material patronage relationships between ranks.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the Roman army could not be an ideal-type formally rational Weberian bureaucracy in which soldiers performed solely combat and logistic functions, all other kinds of work “confusing roles” and corrupting the institution.⁶⁶ Soldiers performed much “civilian” work due to the empire’s shortage of civilian government personnel.⁶⁷ For example, soldiers performed police work because, outside some individual municipalities, there was no civilian police force.⁶⁸ The district centurions in Roman Egypt judged minor local disputes between civilians.⁶⁹ Governors routinely employed soldiers in low-level public administration, especially the low-ranking officers known as *beneficiarii* and *speculatores*.⁷⁰ Because of their arms and armor and combat skills, soldiers were often the logical choice to handle prisoners, guard mines, and travel in remote bandit-infested or otherwise insecure areas. The desire to keep soldiers with the standards conflicted with provincial administrators’ need for guard and police personnel, and also with the multifarious logistic duties of the army.

⁶⁴ Campbell 1984: 247; *CTh* 7.1.15 of 396 fined with 5 lbs. of gold anyone who kept a soldier in private service.

⁶⁵ Cf. regulations against fraternization between ranks in modern militaries.

⁶⁶ MacMullen 1963; especially 156–62 stresses “confusion of roles.”

⁶⁷ Lendon 1997: 3–6; Campbell 2002: 89–91; even in the later Empire, Kelly 2004: 115.

⁶⁸ Nippel 1984, 1995: 93–7, 102–4; only Rome and some Greek cities had watches, not to be equated with modern police. The *vigiles* or night watch at Rome were considered soldiers. Soldiers appear often as guards and torturers in the *Acta Martyrum*.

⁶⁹ Alston 1995: 86–96.

⁷⁰ Rankov 1999: 20–21.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Life in the Roman army was certainly more time-regimented than in other areas of ancient society below the elite.⁷¹ Josephus marvels that Roman soldiers followed a schedule *en masse*, arising at the sound of the trumpet, eating at the same time, and breaking camp by stages in unison at the sound of trumpets.⁷² His admiration suggests that this degree of time regimentation was unusual in classical society.

The preceding evidence for work-discipline does not show work rates in detail. The duty rosters from Dura, Vindolanda, Egypt, and elsewhere list tasks for the day or the present; unlike modern militaries, schools, and industry, they do not display the chronological schedules or procedures divided by hour, minute, and even second that the refinement of clock technology made possible in seventeenth-century Europe.⁷³ Polybius emphasizes that the ideal commander should master the art of telling time in order to conduct the most successful campaigns, alluding to astronomy and emphasizing the effect of the time of year.⁷⁴ He does not mention the clepsydrae (water-clocks) and sundials that the urban elite was familiar with.⁷⁵

The army's best-known chronological regimentation was the keeping of the night watches (*vigiliae*) in camp. The watches were divided into four equal parts of the night by the water-clock, and *tesserae* (wooden tablets) with the watchword were circulated to ensure that all guards remained at their posts.⁷⁶ The administration of the watchword and the watches is the earliest bureaucratic procedure known in the Roman army.⁷⁷ In inspecting the night guard, four cavalrymen collected

⁷¹ The elite and urbanites refer casually to "hours," also for astrology, but rural people might have little idea of the passage of time, Remijsen 2007: 129; cf. Thompson 1967: 58–9 (medieval and early modern).

⁷² Joseph. *BJ* 3.85. The entire camp did not dine *together*, as Chapter Seven shows; higher officers dined with the commander in the *praetorium*.

⁷³ Foucault 1977: 149–56.

⁷⁴ Polyb. 9.14–15.

⁷⁵ Gell. 3.2.1–16; Vitruv. 9.7.1–8.14; Plin. *HN* 7.212–15. Laurence 1994: 122–8; Humphrey et al. 1998: 517–22. Sundials marked hours of variable length depending on season and latitude; the Roman "first hour," "second hour," etc. (counted from midnight) were approximations. Water-clocks were used at night and indoors.

⁷⁶ Polyb. 6.35.6–36.9; Veg. *Mil.* 3.8.16–18; Hellenistic precursors, Aen. *Tact.* 22.24–5; Onas. 10.10–12; Neumann 1962: col. 1693–4. The Dura morning reports record individuals assigned to watches. The duties of tribunes in D. 49.16.12.2 (Macer *Re mil.* 1) include *vigilias circumire*. New documents (Cuvigny 2005) show that the Roman military post also logged hours of couriers' arrivals, Remijsen 2007: 130–39.

⁷⁷ Polyb. 6.34–5, discussed by Neumann 1962: col. 1695–7.

the tablets distributed to the soldiers of the first watch. They received written orders from the tribune specifying the sequence in which to visit the guard posts. Dio's complaint that Ulpius Marcellus, then governor of Britain, kept his officers awake by sending them tablets during the night suggests that a similar practice of circulating the *tesserae* was still in use in the late second century AD, though Dio seems not to understand it and claims that Marcellus was merely tormenting his subordinates into staying awake.⁷⁸

As seen in Chapter Two, the most regimented work-discipline appeared in castrametation, the building of temporary camps. On campaign or during field exercises, troops were able to build a camp from turf or sandbags in a few hours after the day's march, and not doing so was regarded as reprehensible negligence. Scipio, in imposing punitive training (building camps, walls, and so forth), determined and measured out the time during which these tasks had to be finished.⁷⁹ Appian does not specify these times, and Scipio's purpose was clearly disciplinary, not a routine standard. Rather, military *labor* ideologically demanded a maximization of effort.

From archaeological and comparative evidence, the time that it would take Roman soldiers to build a permanent fort from wood or stone, or civilian builders to build the Baths of Caracalla, can be estimated in man-hours or man-days, but it is not known how many builders worked on such projects or how many hours a day they worked.⁸⁰ It is not known whether the Romans preferred to maximize the amount of labor used in such projects, shortening the building time, or whether they preferred to use a smaller number of workers, keeping them employed for a longer time and freeing personnel for other tasks.⁸¹ Not all personnel could be pressed into building a fort or other projects simultaneously, as men were required to secure logistic needs such as the building materials and food for the workers, to administer the work force, and to provide guards. Soldiers would still require physical training and might need to fight the enemy. Builders might also make errors and work have to be redone. Roman soldiers were not flawless and standardized builders, as actual layouts of military buildings in Roman Britain show.⁸²

⁷⁸ Dio 73(72).8.3–5.

⁷⁹ App. *Iber.* 86.

⁸⁰ DeLaine 2001: 23.

⁸¹ Shirley 2001: 130; Hadrian's Wall, Kendal 1996.

⁸² Evans 1994: 151; on inefficiency, Shirley 2001: 123; DeLaine 1997: 59, 129; R. Taylor 2003: 68–75, 138: methods such as concrete wall filling did not require skill.

Task orientation seems to have focused on the day. The antiquarian Varro, the emperor Trajan, and the jurist Ulpian agreed that lucky and unlucky and festival days ought to be ignored in the interests of maintaining military discipline.⁸³ Due to the proliferation of festivals associated with the imperial cult, by the second and third centuries AD over half the Roman calendar was occupied.⁸⁴ Discipline signified all military activity, including combat. During the Jewish War, noticing that the Jews observed their Sabbath even in the field, the Romans used this period to attack them.⁸⁵

The representation of Roman military work-discipline is compounded by the literary authors' moralistic assumption that Roman soldiers should exert themselves to their utmost. To be morally virtuous and useful as social control, military *labor* retained an element of formal irrationality, demanding maximum expenditure of effort, so that anything less could be denounced as *ignavia* or *desidia*. This appears rhetorical rather than realistic. Panegyric required praising the *labores* of the present emperor and his army and denouncing the idleness of predecessors.

Maximum *labor* was induced by requiring soldiers, as individuals or groups, to compete against one another to finish a task first. Nonius Datus says that he imposed such a contest in digging an aqueduct tunnel near Saldæ in North Africa, making the digging teams (fleet soldiers and auxiliaries) compete against one another; competition between units may have been used in building Hadrian's Wall.⁸⁶ Combat construction also featured such contests, for example, the circumvallation of Jerusalem in the Jewish War.⁸⁷ The Flavian general Antonius Primus allocated tasks in the siege of Cremona "so that the division of labor might distinguish the brave from the sluggish and that they might be inspired by the competition for honor."⁸⁸ A division of labor here promoted not rational efficiency, but maximum *labor*, inseparable from the person whose *virtus* it demonstrated.

The ideal of maximum *labor* also appears in the theme of military *sudor* (sweat). *Sudor* is a proof of "moral feeling" in classic Hollywood Roman films, the proof of

⁸³ Fink, Hoey, and Snyder 1940: 160. D.2.12.9 (Ulpian *Off. procos.* 7); Macrobian *Sat.* 1.16.27 (citing Varro).

⁸⁴ Schor 1991: 6.

⁸⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 5.4.

⁸⁶ *CIL* 8.2728 = *ILS* 5795: *certamen operis inter classicos milites et gaesates dedi*. Hadrian's Wall: Goldsworthy 2003: 349.

⁸⁷ Joseph. *BJ* 5.502–3. MacMullen 1984 (in MacMullen 1990: 232); Lendon 1997: 246, 2005: 250.

⁸⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 3.27.

Roman leaders' and soldiers' maximum effort.⁸⁹ A true Roman man regarded *sudor* from honest toil as less disgusting than perfume. In Seneca's description of Scipio Africanus' bath-house, Scipio bathed to wash away the sweat of agricultural toil, not perfume suggestive of luxury and effeminacy.⁹⁰ Roman soldiers were allowed to bathe – forts usually had bath-houses outside the walls, to discourage the risk of fire, but also to locate a morally dubious leisure activity (as with *collegia*) outside the *castrum*. A low-ranking officer dedicated a bath-house at Bu Njem on the Roman African frontier, representing soldiers' relaxation in cool water as earned by toil in the desert heat.⁹¹

In Pliny's *Panegyricus*, Trajan displays sweat as proof of the commander's maximum effort.⁹² Vegetius advises that soldiers be worked for most of the day, "until the sweat runs off them."⁹³ In the preamble of Diocletian's Price Edict, the military emperors strove for the restoration of the empire with profuse sweat.⁹⁴ The author of the *Historia Augusta*, ever alert to satirical possibilities, even *quantifies* the giant soldier-emperor Maximinus' *sudor*: during his exercises Maximinus collected enough of his sweat to display two or three pints of it.⁹⁵ The image may be intentionally grotesque, displaying "the inhumanity of the military condition" from the author's pro-senatorial perspective.⁹⁶ As Chapter [Seven](#) shows, Maximinus embodies all that the Roman elite regarded as monstrous in soldiers.

In the later Empire, the civilian bureaucracy adopted the identity of *militia*, organized and ranked like soldiers. Constantine, in a law of AD 326, describes the civilian bureaucrats as familiar with "the dust and labors of the camps." Subsequent emperors confirmed this ideology.⁹⁷ The bureaucrats were required to travel with the rest of the court – no doubt quite slowly – and thus shared in "dust and labor." Nonetheless, *sudor* was still associated with the *militia armata* (the

⁸⁹ Barthes [1957] 1972: 27; Carrié 1993: 115. Caesar's men snow-shoveled Alpine passes with much *sudor*, Caes. *BG* 7.8; however, Marius' men were so well trained that they did not break a sweat fighting the Cimbri, Plut. *Mar.* 26.5.

⁹⁰ Sen. *Ep.* 86.4–6, 8–12; perfume, 86.11.

⁹¹ Carrié 1993: 118; *IRT* 918; *sub. vid.* n. 292.

⁹² Plin. *Pan.* 13.1, 15.4.

⁹³ Veg. *Mil.* 3.4.4.

⁹⁴ R. R. R. Smith 1997: 197.

⁹⁵ HA *Maxim.* 4.3.

⁹⁶ Carrié 1993: 117.

⁹⁷ C. 12.30.1.1; cf. *CTb* 6.36.1. On later Roman bureaucracy as *militia*, MacMullen 1963: 49 n. 2, 65–6, 70–76; A. H. M. Jones 1964: 1.367, 565–6, 2.1143 n. 2; Kelly 2004: 20.

military service). A law of 369 rejected the claims of civilian bureaucrats who had not actually “sweated” (*sudasse*) in the army.⁹⁸

THE THINGS THEY CARRIED: *SARCINA*

Modern military logistics is overwhelmingly a matter of machines. Tanks, trucks, jeeps, railroads, ships, submarines, naval convoys, aircraft, and aircraft carriers make modern warfare dependent on heavy industry, thus creating total war in which national economies are fully militarized.⁹⁹ In the ancient world, except for shipping, employed where practicable, logistics depended on the muscle power of men and animals. The near-obsession of the Roman literary sources with military *duritia* (toughness) and with austerity, thus increasing stamina and reducing loads on the march, arose from this necessity, though it also was a cultural formation. Vegetius emphasizes that soldiers should practice the carrying of loads, including arms and rations, quoting Vergil: “Just as the bold Roman in his traditional arms/Cruelly laden takes the road.” Good Roman commanders made soldiers carry all of their gear.¹⁰⁰

The precise contents and weight of Roman military *sarcina* are hard to determine. Weight estimates range widely from a low of 30 lbs. to a high of nearly 100.¹⁰¹ The high estimate, 90 to 100 lbs., was probably two-thirds of an average soldier’s body weight in the case of shorter Italian men, and seems unrealistic, though some modern authors have expressed confidence.¹⁰² On a more realistic scale, estimates range from 48 lbs. to the 43 lbs. (60 Roman pounds) stated by Vegetius, excluding armor and weapons, to 30 lbs.¹⁰³

The high estimates are based on the assumption that each soldier carried every item of gear that is attested in the sources. These included cooking gear, including a metal canteen, mess kit, and string bag for foraging; a leather satchel; a cloak and an extra tunic; the *dolabra* or pickaxe used for building camps; a stake for

⁹⁸ *CTh* 7.20.10 (AD 369); cf. *CTh* 7.1.8 (AD 365). Carrié 1993: 116.

⁹⁹ The paradigms are the twentieth-century world wars; guerrilla warriors and terrorists still depend on the international arms trade and arms production by industrial nations.

¹⁰⁰ *Veg. Mil.* 1.19.3 (quote), 1.19.1–2. Roth 1999: 71; *Plut. Mar.* 13.1 (Marius made soldiers carry most of their gear); depicted on Trajan’s Column, Coulston 2001: 110–12, 117–18.

¹⁰¹ G. R. Watson 1969: 62–6; Junkelmann 1986: 196–203, 1997: 94–102; Roth 1999: 71–5.

¹⁰² Kromayer and Veith 1928: 423; G. R. Watson 1969: 62–3; Keegan 1993: 301–2; Roth 1999: 73, 75.

¹⁰³ G. R. Watson 1969: 63–4. Cf. Southern 2007: 112, 223–4.

entrenching; and the pole added by Marius. Josephus states that every soldier carried a saw, basket, bucket, leather strap or rope, sickle, chain, and spade, in addition to his lance and shield.¹⁰⁴

To this burden was added rations: grain or biscuit, oil, and salted meat or cheese. Some ancient authors claim that soldiers were taught to march with seventeen days' or even thirty days' worth of rations.¹⁰⁵ Full arms, armor, clothing, and equipment, with seventeen days' rations, would be insupportable. More likely only enough rations for three days were carried with the full equipment and pack.¹⁰⁶ If personnel carried seventeen or more days' rations, they must have omitted some of the recorded equipment, as did the *expediti* (lightly laden) troops used by Julius Caesar.¹⁰⁷

Ancient metal equipment and fittings were of iron, bronze, and copper alloys, and sometimes lead, all of which are much heavier than today's aluminum and titanium alloys. Soldiers tried to reduce the weight of their equipment through skimping on their armor, employing *calones* or additional beasts of burden, and living off the land.¹⁰⁸ In an eight-man squad, each soldier might not need to carry a full set of implements; because the members of the *contubernium* were expected to cook and dine together, they could share their cooking gear.¹⁰⁹ The *contubernium's* mule carried the heaviest items, the leather tent (40 kg or 88 lbs.) and stone hand mill (27 kg or 60 lbs.).¹¹⁰

On the other hand, commanders attempted to eliminate excess baggage, especially luxuries: Scipio Aemilianus broke the unnecessary and luxurious dining implements of soldiers and officers, and Tiberius inspected baggage himself, limiting what personnel could take across the Rhine.¹¹¹ However, Roman commanders insisted that soldiers should carry all of their necessary equipment and especially

¹⁰⁴ Joseph. *BJ* 3.95.

¹⁰⁵ Seventeen days in Cic. *Tusc.* 2.37; Amm. 17.9.2 (both rhetorical passages); thirty days in Livy *Per.* 57; exceptionally, in HA *Alex.* 47.1 Alexander the ideal emperor reduces the *sarcina* of his soldiers. Junkelmann 1986: 200 argues that soldiers could carry a total burden of 47.9 kg, including arms and armor, shield, pack, and rations.

¹⁰⁶ Veg. *Mil.* 1.19.1.

¹⁰⁷ In Caes. *BC* 1.78 (twenty-two days' rations). *Expediti*: Caes. *BG* 2.19, 5.2, 6.5, 7.40 (a forced march to suppress the revolt of the Aedui); [Caes.] *B. Afr.* 75; he equipped 300 men in each legion as *expediti*.

¹⁰⁸ Junkelmann 1986: 197–200.

¹⁰⁹ Junkelmann 1986: 198; Roth 1999: 24.

¹¹⁰ Roth 1999: 77.

¹¹¹ Livy *Per.* 57; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.1; Plut. *Mor.* 201c (Scipio Aemilianus); Suet. *Tib.* 18.1 (Tiberius); HA *Avid.* 5.3, *Pesc.* 10.1–2. The tribune C. Avienus loaded an entire ship with his own goods, servants, and animals, [Caes.] *B. Afr.* 54.

wear their armor, as described in Chapter [Three](#). This policy was meant for their safety, but it also represents a cultural ideology of *labor* as discipline, instilling endurance and a masculine *habitus*. In order to understand its place in the symbolic economy of military service, the meaning of *labor* itself must first be discussed.

MILITARY LABOR IN THE SYMBOLIC ECONOMY

To the Romans, work was inseparable from the social identity of the worker. The abstract labor of modern economic theory, whether neoclassical or Marxist, did not yet exist.¹¹² Hence this chapter refers to the Latin term *labor* (and its Greek analogy *ponos*, toil) to avoid confusion. Thus the Roman elite esteemed the agricultural *labor* of the idealized citizen-farmer on his small estate in the old Republic. They also regarded as honorable the *labor* of the present-day aristocrat mastering oratory and advocacy, or holding public office. These forms of *negotium* (work, duties) were uncompensated, requiring the aristocrat's *otium*, or leisure, made possible by the labor of his slaves or tenants.¹¹³ These forms of *labor* produced the *habitus* of self-mastery, reproducing the archaic citizen and the present-day aristocrat, respectively.¹¹⁴

In contrast, the Roman elite regarded the *labor* of poor wage-earning workers, artisans or agricultural day laborers, let alone slaves, as degrading. Their work was inseparable from their status.¹¹⁵ This attitude intensified in the late Republic onward, as social inequality increased in Roman Italy.¹¹⁶ The Stoics show a somewhat more favorable attitude to *labor*; Dio Chrysostom even endorses trades that do not, as Cicero put it, cater to the pleasures (*voluptates*).¹¹⁷ Artisans and vendors of luxuries who catered to others' pleasures evoked slaves' dependence on pleasing their masters.¹¹⁸ Dependent manual laborers were also not separated from their

¹¹² Finley 1973: 21, cf. 19, 65ff.; Schiavone 2000: 36; Cartledge 2002: 23.

¹¹³ Gleason 1995: 88–94 on oratorical training; Sen. *Contr.* 1.pr.8–9 denounces youths for shirking the *labor* of oratorical training.

¹¹⁴ On the parallel concept of *ponos* in Greek culture, Loraux 1982: 172; Johnstone 1994; discussed, Phang 2005: 204–5.

¹¹⁵ Treggiari 1980: 50; Joshel 1992b: 63.

¹¹⁶ Finley 1973: 41ff; Hoven 1996 discusses Stoic views of work.

¹¹⁷ Luxury trades degrading: Cic. *Off.* 1.150. Dio Chrys. *Or.* 7. 117–121, 123–4. For the army, Veg. *Mil.* 1.7.1–2. Maxey 1938; on Cic. *Off.* 1.150–51, Brunt 1973: 26–30; Treggiari 1980; Joshel 1992b: 66–8.

¹¹⁸ Joshel 1992b: 64.

labor and were often assimilated to slaves.¹¹⁹ We will return to this problem of so-called servile occupations and tasks in soldiers' work.

Nonslave paid labor often justified redistribution of state income to the urban poor employed upon public works.¹²⁰ Labor on public works could not be formally rational and more efficient if its major purpose was social control and the legitimation of redistribution.¹²¹ According to Suetonius, when an inventor brought Vespasian a device that would have saved labor in construction, the emperor rejected it, in order to continue to provide the Roman *plebs* with employment on public works.¹²² Vespasian clearly viewed their employment as charity (as *pascere* suggests). Lower-class paid labor might also be disciplinary of these same classes, a form of domination.¹²³ The stone quarrying at Mons Claudianus in Egypt was a public works project or government enterprise rather than a commercial enterprise.¹²⁴ Likewise, monumental building also lacked formally rational economic calculation.¹²⁵

Even some modern forms of labor, such as forced labor in prisons, have the goal of domination rather than economic exploitation.¹²⁶ An extreme example is the forced labor that the Nazis imposed on the Jews and other concentration camp inmates. A recent social historian of the Holocaust terms this labor noninstrumental. The labor of concentration camp inmates was often make-work, such as digging and filling up holes, or carrying mattresses back and forth across the prison yard.¹²⁷ This labor was "manifestly irrational," intended to degrade and destroy the workers rather than extract economic value. In Weberian terms, it was value-rational, an end in itself, expressing the degradation of the Jews.¹²⁸

A lesser version of socially disciplinary labor occurs in regular militaries. In the Allied armies in the Second World War, private soldiers regarded "disciplinary"

¹¹⁹ Joshel 1992b: 67–8.

¹²⁰ Brunt 1980: 94–8.

¹²¹ On work as social reproduction, reproducing both domination and the ideology of the dominant classes, Althusser [1971] 2001: 89; on Althusser and Ideological State Apparatuses, Chapter One, nn. 59–62.

¹²² Suet. *Vesp.* 18; cf. Dio 65(66).10.2. Finley 1973: 75.

¹²³ Anderson 1997: 119, 126; Kyrtatas 2002.

¹²⁴ Mattingly and Salmon 2001: 6; on nonagricultural production also Aubert 2001: 92–4; DeLaine 2001.

¹²⁵ Mattingly and Salmon 2001: 7.

¹²⁶ Foucault 1977: 120–26.

¹²⁷ Goldhagen 1997: 283, 285–6.

¹²⁸ Goldhagen 1997: 286.

patrols, chores, cleaning, and inspections as motivated by the sadism of low-ranking officers, work that one author indeed likens to the pointless and utterly degrading labor of the camps.¹²⁹ Such labor subordinated and punished personnel, rather than producing material goods or accomplishing military strategic or tactical objectives. Slave labor also has a large dominative element, according to Weberian social theory, and therefore is inefficient, because the extent of coercion required to make an unwilling labor force productive reduces the rate and quality of production.¹³⁰ Even Roman masters desired to motivate slaves to cooperate, discussed in a later section of this chapter.

This is not to deny that Roman soldiers' labor was necessary. However, military labor was in part dominative, imposed to accustom soldiers to obedience and keep them occupied, as the [next section](#) shows. Ultimately, it accustomed them to obedience in combat. Such disciplinary labor was more necessary if many imperial soldiers were still conscripts, as has been argued. Soldiers thus formed a subset of dependent, coerced labor. However, because the ancient laborers were not separated from their work, such a status generated contradictions. Roman soldiers traditionally derived honor and esteem from their *labor* in defense of the republic. This prestige was contradicted when they were assimilated to slaves or impoverished free wage laborers. In imposing military *labor* as discipline, commanders faced a problem of legitimation. As one mode of legitimation, commanders shared in the *labores* they imposed on soldiers; another mode of legitimation was the association of *labor* with *virtus*.

MILITARY LABOR AS SOCIAL CONTROL

Otium, leisure or idleness, was an ambiguous value in Roman culture. Though the upper orders might discreetly enjoy *otium*, they regarded *otium* as corrupting the lower strata.¹³¹ Gentlemen could make beneficial use of their leisure time,

¹²⁹ Fussell 1989: 80, 82–3.

¹³⁰ Weber 1978: 126–9, 162–4. In the Roman Empire, owners gave more autonomy to slaves in management and various trades (Aubert 1994: 40–70, 146–57), offering some slaves manumission or the purchase of freedom.

¹³¹ André 1965; Connors 2000: 493–4, 500. Elite and military recommendation letters frequently praised *industria*, Saller 1982: 101–3; A. R. Birley 2000: 100–103, 2003: 4–5; in later Empire Kelly 2004: 130. Cic. *Leg. Man.* 28; Tac. *Agric.* 18; Fronto *Ad amic.* 1.6; HA *Pert.* 2.1, 2.7. Horsmann 1991: 189–90 emphasizes *labor* as essential to *disciplina militaris*.

devoting themselves to literary and philosophical study, morally acceptable forms of self-cultivation. The heights of philosophy were not required, as Pliny shows for Vestricius Spurinna's retirement.¹³² The lower orders, believed incapable of such cultivation, would waste their *otium* on drunkenness, gluttony, gambling, bathing, and sexual immorality.¹³³ In contrast, a gentleman's cultivation of knowledge that conferred distinction legitimated the privilege of his leisure.¹³⁴

The Roman elite believed that the mob (*vulgus*) when idle becomes unruly and should always be kept busy.¹³⁵ The elite authors disparaged the unemployed or underemployed civilian poor not because they were economically unproductive (as today) but because they were not subordinated by work.¹³⁶ According to Livy, Numa Pompilius, an early Roman king and culture hero who supposedly founded many institutions, introduced religion to Roman society to discipline the citizens when they were no longer restrained by the fear of the enemy and exigencies of warfare.¹³⁷ Traditional religious rites were precise and time-consuming. The labor of slaves also controlled them. In his manual on agriculture, Cato the Elder instructs the owner to make his bailiff keep his slaves at work, thus keeping them from misbehavior.¹³⁸

Because the urban *plebs* was regarded as more idle than the rural poor, soldiers should be recruited from the countryside, not from the urban rabble. Vegetius recommends recruiting rural youths acquainted with outdoor agricultural labor, "with limbs toughened to endure every kind of toil," accustomed to wielding tools, digging ditches, and carrying burdens.¹³⁹ In contrast, he views urban recruits as effeminate, luxurious, unaccustomed to work, and useless as soldiers. This moral dictum may not have been applied in practice; documentary sources show that many soldiers were recruited from urban areas.¹⁴⁰ Urban plebeians themselves were not idle.¹⁴¹

¹³² Plin. *Ep.* 3.1.1–12.

¹³³ Connors 2000: 493–4.

¹³⁴ André 1965: 306–7, 308.

¹³⁵ Finley 1973: 80 still assumes the "idle mob" stereotype. E. M. Wood 1988; Ober 1989: 206–8 (Athens); Garland 1980; Aldrete and Mattingly 1999: 173; and Erdkamp 2000 (Rome) stress its rhetoricality.

¹³⁶ Finley 1973: 75.

¹³⁷ Livy 1.19.4.

¹³⁸ Cato *Agr.* 5.2.

¹³⁹ Veg. *Mil.* 1.3.1.

¹⁴⁰ Le Bohec 1994: 88–9; Phang 2001: 150 and n. 37, 2005: 204.

¹⁴¹ *Op. cit.* Chapter Six n. 135.

The body politic was said to waste away (*marcescere*) during times of peace; *otium* was particularly bad for troops.¹⁴² The danger, however, was not simply that their physical strength, stamina, and other athletic capabilities would wane due to idleness. The authors write as if a few days of rest immediately produced deterioration. This cannot be read in merely physical terms. Rather, work and training were valued for social reasons, as work discipline producing good morale and attitude. *Otium's* bad effects on soldiers' dispositions appeared well before its bad effects on physical fitness.

Labor was viewed as maintaining order and preventing mutiny: when soldiers became insubordinate, elite authors assume that they were idle. The pleasures of Capua ruined Hannibal's troops. Becoming accustomed to luxurious living when wintering in the notorious resort city, they deserted when training resumed and they had to face labor and discomfort: they "gave out both in body and spirit after the manner of raw recruits."¹⁴³ In this case, the soldiers allegedly abandoned training all winter and suffered physical as well as emotional effects. In his account of the *Bellum Catilinae*, Sallust presents Sulla's troops as demoralized by *otium* and the unaccustomed pleasures of Asia.¹⁴⁴ In the Jugurthine War Metellus finds the African army "idle and cowardly, enduring neither danger nor toil, more ready to talk back than lend a hand." *Otium* motivated troops to insubordination when they had to resume *labor*, as when the Syrian legions received the rumor (spread by Vespasian's man Mucianus) that Vitellius intended to transfer them to colder, more arduous service in Germany.¹⁴⁵ These periods of *otium* had also lasted some time.

In other cases of the demoralization of soldiers by *otium*, the period of idleness was much shorter. In the account of the mutiny against Scipio Africanus at Sucro in 206 BC, idleness caused the soldiers to become insubordinate.¹⁴⁶ Tacitus suggests that the temporary suspension of duties upon Augustus' death encouraged the legionaries to mutiny in Pannonia in AD 14. "The soldiers grew insubordinate and quarrelsome, gave hearing to any glib agitator, and became eager for luxury and leisure, disdainful of discipline and labor."¹⁴⁷ According to Tacitus, the Pannonian

¹⁴² Livy 33.45-7, in Hannibal's supposed letters in 195 BC urging war with Rome.

¹⁴³ Livy 23.18.15-16; Wheeler 1996: 238-9.

¹⁴⁴ Sall. *Cat.* 11.5. Cf. Plut. (capit.) *Luc.* 30.4.

¹⁴⁵ Sall. *Jug.* 44.1; Tac. *Hist.* 2.80. Tacitus adds that the troops resented breaking ties with the local community.

¹⁴⁶ Polyb. 11.25.7; Livy 28.24.6.

¹⁴⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 1.16. Cf. Maecenas' advice to keep soldiers constantly training: Dio 52.27.2-3.

legionaries' complaints that they were overworked and underpaid were encouraged by Percennius, an agitator from the city.¹⁴⁸ Tacitus also blames the mutiny on the Rhine on urban recruits, a *vernacula multitudo* (mass of home-bred slaves) accustomed to the ease of life in the capital.¹⁴⁹

The Vitellians at first displayed industry and attention to duty, but eventually, under the bad influence of the emperor Vitellius' idleness and luxury, imitated their leader.¹⁵⁰ Tacitus stresses the *torpedo* and *socordia* of Vitellius and his army, but Tacitus finds mere idleness too colorless a vice, and the soldiers pass their *otium* in pillaging and terrorizing the Italians, attending drunken parties, and loitering with the entertainers accompanying Vitellius. Billeted in the city of Rome, the soldiers wander around the city.¹⁵¹ Here Tacitus stresses the lack of properly ordered military space (the camp) and routine; the soldiers spill through the city, without duties or training, and waste time on idle and shameful pleasures.¹⁵²

When the Vitellians then return for duty, their *otium* has rendered them useless as soldiers. Very different from when they entered Rome, the Vitellians appeared listless and "marched in a slow and drawn-out column, dragging their weapons." They could not endure toil or the hardships of heat, dust, or storm and were more inclined to quarrel.¹⁵³ In his account of two Rhine legions' mutiny against Hordeonius Flaccus in AD 70, Tacitus stresses that a period of leisure and festivity made them disobedient.¹⁵⁴

Commanders might undertake campaigns or building projects simply to avoid *otium* of soldiers. C. Flaminius made his soldiers build a road from Bologna to Arretium in order not to keep his soldiers idle.¹⁵⁵ P. Scipio Nasica in 194/3 BC had his soldiers construct ships "lest the soldiers be demoralized by idleness or inflict harm on the allies due to the license resulting from leisure."¹⁵⁶ Caesar set his troops to building fortifications so that they should not be idle.¹⁵⁷ In

¹⁴⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 1.17.

¹⁴⁹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.31.

¹⁵⁰ Tac. *Hist.* 1.62 vs. 2.62, 2.68.

¹⁵¹ Tac. *Hist.* 2.71, 2.87 on the entertainers (*scurrae, bistriones, aurigae*), 2.93.

¹⁵² Tac. *Hist.* 2.93.

¹⁵³ Tac. *Hist.* 2.99.

¹⁵⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 4.36 (encouraged by a payment given by Hordeonius).

¹⁵⁵ Livy 39.2.6; cf. Livy 39.1.1–8: campaigning in impoverished and hostile Liguria was undertaken to maintain *virtus* of soldiers.

¹⁵⁶ Front. *Strat.* 4.1.15.

¹⁵⁷ [Caes.] *B.Afr.* 32.2.

38 BC Octavian undertook a campaign in Dalmatia, “wishing to keep his soldiers from being ruined by idleness, the great enemy of discipline.” Recalled from an offensive by Claudius, Domitius Corbulo made his men construct a canal to avoid their *otium*.¹⁵⁸ Soldiers’ employment on permanent building projects was regarded as a form of disciplinary *labor* in peacetime. The building of Hadrian’s Wall and the Antonine Wall in Britain, and of other *limes* works throughout the empire, may represent such disciplinary *labor* rather than the grand strategic rationale of defending linear boundaries of empire.¹⁵⁹

However, these passages reflect the ideology that building should be imposed as a form of discipline; they do not suggest that it was routine. Modern scholars have suggested that the employment of soldiers on monumental building projects such as roads, forts, aqueducts, tunnels, and bridges was routine enough to provide regular discipline.¹⁶⁰ Some earlier scholars exaggerated the extent of Roman military building in the provinces, projecting their nations’ contemporary imperial and colonial ambitions upon the Romans.¹⁶¹ In nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Algeria, French officers collected thousands of Latin inscriptions and even rebuilt Roman military installations, presenting the French as heirs of the Romans.¹⁶² As aforesaid, Roman soldiers performed building chiefly on campaign or when no civilian labor was available. Monumental building, in its mobilization of labor and logistics, resembled a military campaign and was as intermittent.¹⁶³ Routine building is more likely to have been impermanent, such as turf castrametation; it also included repair of permanent structures.¹⁶⁴

¹⁵⁸ Vell. Pat. 2.78.2; Tac. *Ann* 11.20: *ut tamen miles otium exueret*, 13.53.

¹⁵⁹ *Epit. de Caes.* 14.5; Kendal 1996: 151–2. Luttwak 1976, Whittaker 1994, 2004: 28–49 and Isaac 1992 discuss the *limes* controversy, reviewed by Wheeler 1993 and Mattern 1999: 109–22.

¹⁶⁰ Esp. Le Bohec 1989: 532–3; cf. G. R. Watson 1969: 144; MacMullen 1959: 216, 219; Humphrey et al. 1998, xvii; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 61, 63); Le Bohec 1994: 110, 116. Hörster 1997 and 2001: 168–87 and 118, 171, 175 revise downward the incidence of military building. Hörster 2001: 169 n. 7 removes *CIL* 10.6075 + *AE* (1931), 38 = *IAM* 2.307, and *CIL* 13.8250 from MacMullen 1959.

¹⁶¹ Parker [1928] 1958: 225 and French scholars on the African and Syrian *limes* works (MacMullen 1963: 5) disparaged native capacity to build. Whittaker 1994: 4, 194–7; Isaac 1992: 269–304, 416–18; Mattingly 1996: 51–5; and Hingley 2000: 39–42, 65–8, 87–8, 130–52 criticize these racist assumptions. Also J. Webster 1996b: 5; Freeman 1996: 23–7; Hingley 1996: 36–7. Shaw 1984 shows that indigenous North Africans built competent irrigation works. On the influence of Italian and Spanish Fascism on classical archaeology, Galaty and Watkinson 2004.

¹⁶² Mattingly 1996: 50–51, 54.

¹⁶³ Hörster 2001: 168–87.

¹⁶⁴ *Sub. vid.* Chapter Six n. 293.

Vegetius stresses that *labor* effects obedience. Soldiers accustomed to soft living and who do not want to work raise a fuss and claim that they want to be led out to battle. The more *labor* they endure in training, the less they will be inclined to this type of insubordination.¹⁶⁵ Vegetius advocates the prevention and punishment of mutinous tendencies by a program of rigorous *labor* and training, using corporal or capital punishment as a last resort. It is preferable to instill obedience in soldiers through the imposition of hard work and routine rather than through intimidation by cruel punishments.¹⁶⁶

Some forms of military labor were deliberately intended to shame soldiers, punishing and rehabilitating disobedient or disgraced soldiers. Scipio at Numantia purged the army of sutlers, wagons, and pack animals and made the soldiers march on foot and carry their own gear; he forced them to carry a month's grain and several stakes apiece; he led them on frequent marches carrying extra rations in bad weather; and he imposed daily castrametation, digging trenches, and building high walls.¹⁶⁷ Florus has a more negative view of these labors as "excessive and for the most part servile tasks." Scipio orders his men to dig ditches and "to stain themselves with mud, because they had refused to stain themselves with blood."¹⁶⁸ This shaming of the Roman troops resulted in their successful restoration of their honor by defeating the Numantines. At the very least, shaming or punitive labor was intended to frustrate soldiers enough to make them demand to be led out to battle.¹⁶⁹

Campaigning against the Dardanians in 75 BC, Gaius Curio forced a mutinous legion to cut straw and excavate ditches.¹⁷⁰ When his soldiers did not want to fight, Sulla, campaigning in Greece, set them to diverting the river Cephissus; when they complained and demanded action, he taunted them, "You don't want to fight, you merely don't want to work."¹⁷¹ In Lower Germany, Domitius Corbulo imposed traditional routines, watches, and sentry duties on troops who displayed *ignavia* and insolence to local civilians.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁵ Veg. Mil. 3.4.pr–2. Cf. Ones. Strat. 9.2–3.

¹⁶⁶ Veg. Mil. 3.4.10.

¹⁶⁷ App. Iber. 85–6; Front. Strat. 4.1.1; Livy Per. 57; Val. Max. 2.7.1; Plut. Mor. 201C = Apophth. Scip. Min. 16.

¹⁶⁸ Flor. 1.34.10.

¹⁶⁹ Val. Max. 2.7.1; Plut. Sulla 16.5–6, cf. 21.

¹⁷⁰ Front. Strat. 4.1.43.

¹⁷¹ Plut. Sulla 16.5–6; cf. Front. Strat. 1.11.20; Scipio's similar reproof at Numantia, Plut. Mor. 201D = Apophth. Scip. Min. 19.

¹⁷² Tac. Ann. 11.18.

SOLDIER AND SLAVE DISCIPLINE

The next sections concern the boundary between military labor and slave labor, both in concept and in practice. For Roman elite authors, slave and military labor posed similar problems of discipline and motivation. Little attention has been drawn to the relationship between slave management and military discipline. Ancient authors on the Late Republic stereotypically opposed soldiers and slaves, representing citizen smallholders, Rome's traditional recruitment base, as supplanted by slave laborers on plantations.¹⁷³ In legal status and economic terms, soldiers were distinct from slaves. Nonetheless, the Roman elite of the late Republic and Principate was situated so high above the common soldiers in the social hierarchy that elite authors, fearing both mutinies and slave revolts, adopted similar strategies of personnel management.

Many of the principles of *disciplina militaris* are paralleled by the ideal management of slaves in the agricultural treatises of Cato the Elder, Varro, and Columella.¹⁷⁴ The exploitation of both types of human resources expanded in the mid and late Republic. The Roman conquest of the East and of Gaul resulted in a mass influx of slaves.¹⁷⁵ In parallel, the army was enlarged by the wars of the Late Republic: the Social War, the wars of Marius, Sulla, and Pompey, and the Caesarian and triumviral civil wars. In theory, soldiers and slaves were poles apart: citizen soldiers entered voluntary service or patriotically assented to conscription and won honor through courage, whereas defeated enemies were humiliated and typically enslaved.¹⁷⁶ Soldiers were granted various legal privileges, whereas slaves lacked legal personality and civil rights. Elite ideology, furthermore, sought to repress the comparison because, as seen in Chapter Four on the AD 14 mutinies, soldiers who were treated like slaves might mutiny. Nonetheless, because Roman soldiers might be conscripts and were required to serve for two decades or more, risking execution for desertion and serious legal disabilities for dishonorable discharge, their voluntary service was somewhat notional. There were few provisions for soldiers'

¹⁷³ App. *BC* 1.1.7; Plin. *HN* 18.4.21.

¹⁷⁴ On slave management Bradley 1987: 21–8, 1994: 72–5; theories of management, Aubert 1994: 18–24, 161–3, 2001: 95–6, 106–8; appeal to competitiveness, Lendon 1997: 97. A. R. Birley 2003: 5 suggests that elite officers were accustomed from childhood to giving orders; cf. Dionisotti 1982.

¹⁷⁵ In Roman literature, domestic and imperial slaves are often “Greek.” Slaves from the northern and western frontiers, lacking Mediterranean culture, were probably assigned to field work.

¹⁷⁶ Mattern 1999: 137. On images of the defeated in triumphal art, Phang 2004: 217–20; Corbeill 2004: 79; Whittaker 2004: 116–23.

voluntarily leaving the army before their time.¹⁷⁷ The potentially “mercenary” qualities of soldiers in the late Republic and empire could assimilate them to slaves, as “hirelings” dependent on their paymasters.¹⁷⁸

Besides promoting economic productivity, slave work-discipline had the aim of social control, inducing and forcing slaves to work.¹⁷⁹ Columella’s aim was to maximize the yields of agricultural labor, though he does not seem concerned with quantitative efficiency.¹⁸⁰ Rather, as in the Roman army, motivation of slaves took a qualitative form. Slaves could be organized into small groups or squads, termed *decuriae*, that competed in completing tasks. Similarly, the Roman *contubernium* of eight soldiers was the smallest unit of organization within the army.¹⁸¹ Columella notes that such an organization of slave labor also catches the idle, whose poor performance can be singled out for punishment without causing the others injustice.¹⁸² As has been seen earlier in this chapter, a similar division of labor might be used to motivate soldiers.¹⁸³ The division of labor into competing groups was intended to maximize the effort of both slaves and soldiers, but soldiers earned greater honor.

Another similarity was the jurists’ construction of *peculium castrense*, the fund used by a soldier who was a son-in-power (*filius familias*), legally unable to own property but allowed to acquire, manage, and dispose of this fund.¹⁸⁴ The *peculium* of the *filius familias* resembled that of the slave, though in practice the social statuses, treatment, and prospects of the two were very different.¹⁸⁵

The ideal traits of the *vilicus* (farm manager, who himself was usually a slave) paralleled those of the commander or officer. The *vilicus* praises good slaves and sets an example in agricultural work; he listens to his subordinates’ concerns, as

¹⁷⁷ On conscription, Brunt 1974. Disabled soldiers could take *causaria missio* (medical discharge). Hadrian and the jurists on the capital punishment of a suicidal soldier (Chapter Four *op. cit.* nn. 146–7) resemble the jurists’ attitude to suicidal slaves, though more lenient to the soldier. D. 21.1.1.1, 21.1.17.4 and 6, 21.1.23.3 (all Ulpian *Aed. Edict.*); cf. D. 48.21.3.6 (Marcian *Delat.*). D. 21.1.43.4 (Paul *Aed. Edict.* 1) most resemble Hadrian in D. 49.16.6.7.

¹⁷⁸ Scheidel 2002: 175–7. Pliny and Trajan concurred that soldiers and public slaves should not guard prisons together, as demoralizing to both: Plin. *Ep.* 10.19–20.

¹⁷⁹ Bradley 1987: 26–31, 1994: 72–80.

¹⁸⁰ Bradley 1994: 73.

¹⁸¹ Columella *Rust.* 1.9.7; on army organization, Ch. 2 n. 126.

¹⁸² Columella *Rust.* 1.9.8. Columella 1.9.6–7 presents larger groups of slaves as unmotivated. Bradley 1994: 73.

¹⁸³ *Op. cit.* this chapter nn. 86–8; Lendon 1997: 246.

¹⁸⁴ Lehmann 1982; Campbell 1984: 229–36; *op. cit.* Ch. 5 n. 131.

¹⁸⁵ Saller 1994: 119; Bradley 1994: 59–60.

officers should do with their men.¹⁸⁶ Both *disciplina militaris* literature and manuals on slave management view personnel as corrupted by excessive bathing, fortune-tellers, city life, and luxuries.¹⁸⁷ Columella stresses that the *vilicus* should not use his fellow-slaves (*conservi*) for his personal service or private business. The *vilicus* should dine with his fellow slaves, eating and drinking the same food, in order to detect that their food is properly prepared and not spoiled.¹⁸⁸ The *vilicus* is also advised to taste the food of the chain-gang field slaves.¹⁸⁹ As Chapter Seven explains, in Roman *disciplina* ideology the commander shares his soldiers' rations, no doubt for this pragmatic reason but also to share hardship and create camaraderie.

Tacitus and Dio depict soldiers from the northern and western frontiers as rather slow-witted and boorish, in contrast with the stereotypical conniving (*cal-lidus*) house slave; however, the vices of urbanized soldiers, such as the *nitidi et quaestuosus* Syrians, resembled those of house slaves and petty traders.¹⁹⁰ The agricultural writers recommended that the *vilicus* have a wife as a helpmeet, whereas wives were considered bad for imperial soldiers' discipline, making them effeminate.¹⁹¹ *Disciplina militaris* promoted *virtus* (manliness) to a degree not found in slave discipline. Masters may have encouraged slave-breeding, whereas an imperial policy of creating a hereditary caste of soldiers is highly improbable.¹⁹²

The jurists set a legal boundary between soldiers and slaves. Slaves might not enter the army, and a soldier who sold himself into servitude was capitally punished.¹⁹³ But both soldiers and slaves were subject to corporal punishment as discipline, as seen in Chapter Four. The jurist Arrius Menander likens soldiers'

¹⁸⁶ Praise, Cato *Agr.* 5.2; Columella *Rust.* 1.8.10. Example in work, *Rust.* 1.8.3–4; also Varro *Rust.* 1.17.6; Cato *Agr.* 5.5. Accessible, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.16–18. Officers: D. 49.16.12.2 (Macer *Re mil.* 2). The *vilicus* should be stern without being cruel, leading by example rather than punishment, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.10–11 cf. Sall. *Jug.* 45.3 (Metellus). middle year, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.3–4, cf. HA *Hedr.* 10.6.

¹⁸⁷ Columella *Rust.* 1.8.2; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 1.31. Fortune-tellers, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.6; cf. Scipio's expulsion of fortune-tellers, App. *Iber.* 85.

¹⁸⁸ Columella *Rust.* 1.8.12; cf. D. 49.16.12.2 (*op. cit.*). The main staple of slaves' and soldiers' diet was grain; cf. Cato *Agr.* 5.6. The *vilicus* should not take on extramural work, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.13; cf. D. 49.16.12.1 (Chapter Six *op. cit.* n. 63). He should stay on the farm, Columella *Rust.* 1.8.7; cf. Chapter Six *op. cit.* nn. 48, 58–9.

¹⁸⁹ Columella *Rust.* 1.8.18.

¹⁹⁰ Slaves and *institores*: Aubert 1994: 18–24. Rustic soldiers: Tac. *Ann.* 1.28, *Hist.* 2.88; Dio 62.2.4.1–2, 62.10.2, 79(78).1.1–3. Urbanized soldiers: Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.

¹⁹¹ Wives for *vilicus* and herdsmen: Columella *Rust.* 1.8.5; Varro *Rust.* 1.17.5, 2.10.6. Marriage bad for soldiers: Caes. *BC.* 3.110; Phang 2001: 361–5.

¹⁹² Promotion of slave reproduction: Columella 1.8.19. Soldiers, Phang 2001: 326–43.

¹⁹³ D. 49.16.11 (Marcian *Reg.* 2), D. 48.19.14 (Macer *Re mil.* 2).

absence without leave to slave truancy, their desertion to slave flight; the senator Cassius Longinus, defending owners' right to execute slave households, justified ancient decimations of soldiers.¹⁹⁴ However, the Severan jurists' advice on the punishment of soldiers absent without leave was considerably more lenient than the treatment of runaway slaves. For obvious reasons, soldiers represented a greater investment of the imperial budget and investment in training. Soldiers themselves desired to create a boundary between themselves and servile labor, discussed in the next section.

SOLDIERS AND MENIAL LABOR

Countering the ideology of maximum *labor*, soldiers resisted performing forms of menial labor – repetitive and degrading tasks that slaves might perform, such as grinding grain for bread, cooking food, tending and mucking out animals, carrying all of their baggage, excavating mines, and digging ditches and clearing canals. That soldiers found these tasks degrading is suggested by the mutinous legionaries on the Rhine in AD 14. When Germanicus emphasized the shame of insubordination, the soldiers emphasized what they considered more shameful, the scars and wounds of beatings and the constant toil of digging, foraging, and gathering wood, “and whatever else is imposed to prevent *otium* in camps.”¹⁹⁵

A duty roster from Dura assigns such tasks to soldiers, including sweeping, *ad sterqus* (cleaning latrines or mucking out animal stalls), tending a centurion's gear, and possibly stoking the baths.¹⁹⁶ Modern authors often assume that Roman soldiers, in addition to their physical and combat training, artisan or administrative work, and watches, usually performed all of these tasks.

Labor associated with logistics included foraging for food, firewood, fodder, and water, especially on campaign.¹⁹⁷ Appian emphasizes the *labor* of foraging, which resembled the agricultural labor that soldiers recruited from the countryside may have hoped to escape.¹⁹⁸ The preparation of food was another routine task.

¹⁹⁴ D. 49.16.4.14 (Menander *Re mil.* 1); cf. Val. Max. 2.7.12; Tac. *Ann.* 14.44.

¹⁹⁵ Tac. *Ann.* 1.35. The following material (through “Resistance”) is drawn from Phang 2005, with the permission of Jean-Jacques Aubert and Zsuzsanna Várhelyi.

¹⁹⁶ Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 35–9). *RMR* 9: *op. cit.* Ch. 6 n. 24.

¹⁹⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 1.35; Joseph. *BJ* 3.85; Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; Corbulo's soldiers in Armenia. Roth 1999: 118–20. App. *Iber.* 88; *Pun.* 7.40; Livy 44.33.1; and Plut. *Paull.* 14.1–11 show that soldiers dug wells in the absence of other water sources.

¹⁹⁸ App. *BC* 2.10.66; Roth 1999: 132.

Soldiers were issued rations for and cooked food in their eight-man squads; there were no central kitchens.¹⁹⁹ On campaign, soldiers were issued unground grain and required to grind it to make bread. This tedious, repetitive work took about 100 minutes for the daily ration of a *contubernium*.²⁰⁰ Caracalla's enthusiasm for the lifestyle of a common soldier included grinding barley for his bread.²⁰¹ Using a hand mill may have strengthened soldiers' hands and arms, but cooking and grinding grain by hand were servile tasks in Roman society.²⁰² Images of martial effort and the ideology of maximum *labor* tend to efface reality. The literary authors do not tell us that permanent camps usually had central milling and baking facilities and that some of these mills, where the hydrography permitted it, were turned by water power.²⁰³

Soldiers sometimes resisted the imposition of excess labor upon them by the commanders, seen in the conflicts over the equipment they carried. Anecdotes of indiscipline attest these forbidden expedients. Grinding grain was unpopular, and commanders repeatedly forbade soldiers to sell their grain ration to civilian bakers and forbade them to buy bread and other cooked food from sutlers.²⁰⁴

Another routine form of military *labor* was the cleaning and maintenance of their arms, armor, clothing, and other equipment.²⁰⁵ Officers made inspections.²⁰⁶ The cleaning of weapons and armor kept them sharp and bright; Vegetius says that the brilliance of armor inspires great terror in the enemy.²⁰⁷ However, cleaning was not absolutely necessary to the operation of weapons, as in early modern times down to today, where military training emphasizes the field-stripping of personal artillery, easily jammed by dirt.²⁰⁸ The Roman army showed a high level

¹⁹⁹ Junkelmann 1997: 94.

²⁰⁰ Roth 1999: 49.

²⁰¹ Hdn. 4.75. Junkelmann 1997: 51. But the soldiers and workers at Mons Claudianus ate barley, Veen 1998: 106.

²⁰² Bradley 1994: 90–91.

²⁰³ At Haltern in Westphalia, at Valkenberg in Holland, and on Hadrian's Wall at Aesica, Chester, and Vindolanda, large millstones have been found, turned by water or animals; bread stamps suggest baking facilities. Junkelmann 1997: 124–7; Wilson 2002: 10–11; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 53).

²⁰⁴ Sall. *Jug.* 44.5, 45.2; Suet. *Galba* 7.2.

²⁰⁵ E.g., Livy 44.34.8; Veg. *Mil.* 2.9.12–14; Onas. *Strat.* 28.

²⁰⁶ HA *Hadr.* 10.6, *Avid.* 5.3; 6.2, *Maxim.* 6, *Aurel.* 7.6; Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; Veg. *Mil.* 2.9.5–6, 2.10.2, 2.12.4, 2.14.5–7; D. 49.16.12.2 (Macer *Re mil.* 1). Stoll 1998: 142–3.

²⁰⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 2.14.8. Sharpening: Livy 26.51.4, 44.34.3, 44.34.8.

²⁰⁸ Plastic small arms with fewer moving parts are more immune to fouling: Singer 2006: 45–6.

of sanitation for a premodern society; permanent forts had water supplies, latrines, and sewers, helping to prevent water-borne diseases.²⁰⁹

Other menial tasks included the grooming and care of horses and the stoking of bath-house furnaces. Fronto blames soldiers in Syria for not keeping their horses groomed; their horses were shaggy, he claims, whereas the men depilated themselves.²¹⁰ A frequent assignment in the Legio III Cyrenaica duty roster, the obscure term *ballio*, is usually thought to refer to bath fatigues, stoking the bath-house furnaces, which was distinctly a servile task in civilian life.²¹¹

Various field labors might also seem servile and repetitive: the mutineers in AD 14 complained of entrenching and building ramparts and other tasks imposed to counter *otium*.²¹² Officers might impose the digging of ditches and building of walls as a form of shaming or remedial labor.²¹³ In contrast, Roman soldiers did not balk at castrametation, in which the Romans took pride. Seventeenth-century Dutch troops were reluctant to dig and entrench when the classicizing military reformers introduced reconstructed Roman forms of training.²¹⁴

As noted in Chapter Two, certain *milites* were *immunes*, exempted from general duties or *munera* because they were artisans or administrative specialists.²¹⁵ The list of artisan specialists was extensive.²¹⁶ Because all personnel were probably required to fight, their combat training was distinguished from general *munera*. In 107 AD a young legionary *librarius* (clerk) boasted of such exemption from the hard labor of cutting stones for a road through the new province of Arabia.²¹⁷ In comparison with common *milites*, centurions and higher pay grades below the centurionate may

²⁰⁹ Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 48); Scheidel 2007: 430–31; smaller auxiliary forts might have inferior sewerage. Civilian sanitation was worse: Scobie 1986.

²¹⁰ Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; cf. Tac. *Hist.* 2.99.

²¹¹ Possibly related to *baiulare*, as in Veg. *Mil.* 1.19.1 (*baiulare pondus*). *Ballio* may refer to physical training as such, possibly running while carrying gear. *Baiuli* are messengers in *CTb* 2.27.1 (2), probably “runners”: Le Bohec 1994: 58 and n. 118. The frequency of *ballio* in the roster supports this, as physical training was essential to *disciplina*, while stoking bathhouse furnaces in the Egyptian summer would have been highly punitive in nature.

²¹² Tac. *Ann.* 1.35.

²¹³ App. *Iber.* 86; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.1; Flor. 1.34.10; Sall. *Jug.* 45.2; Suet. *Aug.* 18.2; Tac. *Ann.* 11.18. Shaming ceremonies discussed in Chapter Four might also impose labor.

²¹⁴ Lipsius 1623: [155].

²¹⁵ Sander 1954–5: 93–5; G. R. Watson 1969: 75–7; Le Bohec 1994: 60, 62. Discussion: *op. cit.* Chapter Two nn.58–62.

²¹⁶ D. 50.6.7 (Tarrutienus Paternus *Re mil.* 1).

²¹⁷ P. Mich. 8.465, 107 AD; cf. 466.

have had slightly more privileged backgrounds and did not expect to perform hard labor.²¹⁸

Nevertheless, senatorial aristocrats such as Dio Cassius regarded centurions, if they had risen from the ranks, as degraded by common soldiers' toil. According to Dio's Maecenas, new equestrians risen from the ranks, men "who have carried kindling and charcoal," should not be allowed to enter the Senate.²¹⁹ Dio is probably referring to centurions, who could attain equestrian rank by ascending a complex hierarchy of posts. Civilians who were already equestrians might also be commissioned as centurions. Those centurions who had risen from the ranks had carried burdens when common soldiers, also shown by an anecdote from the AD 14 mutinies. The Pannonian legionaries punished the *praefectus castrorum* Aufidienus Rufus by making him carry the loads of a common soldier on the march. Having endured this toil as a common soldier, Rufus, when he became an officer, had imposed it no less harshly on the *milites*.²²⁰ A centurion bore a *vitis* (vine stock), symbolizing his office and his right to chastise soldiers; carrying it also displayed his exemption from menial tasks. Officers above the rank of centurion also did not normally carry burdens or do manual labor, as seen in the later section "Master or Commander."

Even in modern professional armies, private soldiers have not always performed menial labor. Officers above a certain rank employed servants.²²¹ Slaves or low-status colonial subjects performed menial and hard labor in the American Confederate army and in the European colonies.²²² In an extreme case, African slaves performed all heavy labor in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British army in the West Indies; the army purchased or leased slaves because Europeans could not tolerate toil in the tropical climate.²²³

In the contemporary American army, private soldiers no longer perform the cooking, cleaning barracks and latrines, and guard duties of the military during World War II and the Cold War through Vietnam.²²⁴ Unofficially, American personnel in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Pacific hired local inhabitants to provide

²¹⁸ Le Bohec 1994: 76–8. This was certainly true of centurions appointed *ex equite Romano*.

²¹⁹ Dio 52.25.7; Campbell 2002: 33. Though Caesar had made some of his centurions senators, the remark probably alludes to the prominence of equestrian officers in Dio's own time.

²²⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 1.20; Neumann 1936: 3.

²²¹ Officers' servants, Farwell 1981: 134.

²²² Wagner et al. 2002: 572.

²²³ Buckley 1998: 130–36.

²²⁴ Johnson 2004: 143.

cleaning and laundry and other services.²²⁵ In the 1990s to the present, the U.S. armed forces recruited civilian contractors to provide menial labor, including cooking and cleaning.²²⁶ This trend toward privatization reflects free-market ideology and the shift to a smaller all-volunteer force. Due to the decline of secure manufacturing jobs in the United States, young people enter the military for its occupational prestige and benefits.²²⁷ To require private soldiers to perform menial work such as cleaning would reduce this attraction.

As a relatively small and partly volunteer force, the Roman army also needed to attract recruits. Military service might appeal to relatively wide social strata, including the poor and relatively well-to-do persons.²²⁸ Though before enlistment they belonged to the social strata subject to civil *munera sordida* (corvée labor, including road-building and canal-dredging), Roman soldiers were freed from these personal *munera* by their status as *absentes rei publicae causa*, absent on public service.²²⁹ According to the jurists, soldiers were freed from civilian personal *munera* to become *munifices*, soldiers who performed fatigues.²³⁰ However, soldiers themselves might desire liberation from military *munera sordida* as well. They sought slaves to perform these labors.²³¹ The next section examines the impact of slave servants upon discipline.

SOLDIERS' SERVANTS

The boundary between soldier and servile labor was negotiated in conflicts over soldiers' use of slave servants. In contrast with the elite ideology of military *labor*, soldiers seem to have resisted the ethic of maximum *labor*. Soldiers sought to own slaves to perform menial tasks for them and thus confer a minimum prestige on their owners, as with civilian owners.²³² Roman commanders repeatedly sought

²²⁵ Often sexual services: Sturdevant and Stoltzfus 1993.

²²⁶ Singer 2003: 143–6 on Kellogg Brown & Root, then Brown & Root Services, in the Balkans.

²²⁷ Johnson 2004: 99.

²²⁸ Dio Cassius 52.27.5 emphasizes poverty; on higher-status recruits, *op. cit.* Chapter Three n. 28.

²²⁹ D. 4.6.7 (Ulpian *Edict.* 12), D. 4.6.35.9 (Paul *Leg. Iul. et Pap.* 3), D. 4.6.45 (Scaevola *Reg.* 1). Campbell 1984: 236–9; M. A. Speidel 2001.

²³⁰ D. 50.4.3.1 (Ulpian *Opin.* 2); *munifices*, M. A. Speidel 2001.

²³¹ M. P. Speidel 1989: 242.

²³² On soldiers' servants, MacMullen 1963: 106–7; Rouland 1977; MacMullen 1984 (in MacMullen 1990: 227–8); M. P. Speidel 1989; Roth 1994; Wesch-Klein 1998: 112–15; Roth 1999: 91–115. Camp slaves: HA *Hadrian* 13.7.

to eliminate soldiers' personal slaves; however, the army still required slaves to handle and defend the baggage train and tend animals.

Legal writings and documents show that many Roman soldiers owned slave servants. In contrast with the dozens or hundreds of slaves owned by aristocrats, a soldier or centurion might own one or a few slaves, attested by the jurists in the Digest and numerous documents.²³³ In these texts, soldiers inherit or borrow slaves from their parental households, buy them while in service, obtain them as plunder, or inherit them from comrades.²³⁴ These slaves and freedmen were probably personal servants.

Other slave servants performed necessary functions for the Roman military and were probably camp property. *Calones* or grooms, *agasones* and *muliones* or baggage handlers, and *galearii* or helmet-wearers, collectively termed *servitia castris* (camp slaves), tended horses and baggage animals and led the animals in the baggage train. They were organized and trained to defend the baggage in case of attack.²³⁵ The *calones* were also responsible for feeding and mucking the animals when the army was stationary.

The *servitia castris* overlap with the servants of individual military personnel; cavalrymen possessed *calones* of their own. The obscurity as to whether military servants belonged to the camp or to soldiers, suggested by legal sources and anecdotes of the ejection of slaves, reflects the partial privatization of supply in the Roman army.²³⁶ Partial privatization was perhaps the most practical means of handling supply under ancient economic conditions. The institutional production and issue of identical gear to all personnel and the recruitment and pay of noncombatant support personnel would burden the imperial budget further.²³⁷ On the other hand, the partial privatization of supply impeded discipline as the Roman elite perceived it. That the army needed slaves to handle and defend the baggage train – there was no question of eliminating them altogether – enabled soldiers'

²³³ Vendrand-Voyer 1983: 251–2; Wierschowski 1984: 65–71.

²³⁴ D. 29.1.13.3–4 (Ulpian *Edict.* 45), 29.1.31 (Marcellus *Digest* 13), 37.14.8.pr (Modestinus *Reg.* 6), 38.2.3.8 (Ulpian *Edict.* 41), 38.2.22 (Marcian *Inst.* 1), 38.16.3.7 (Ulpian *Sab.* 14), 40.4.51.pr (Papinian *Resp.* 14), 40.5.42 (Marcian *Fideic.* 7), 49.17.9 (Ulpian *Disp.* 4), 49.17.13 (Papinian *Quaest.* 16), 49.17.15.3 (Papinian *Quaest.* 35), 49.17.18.pr (Marcian *Fideic.* 1), 49.17.19.1 (Tryphoninus *Disp.* 18), 49.17.19.3–5 (*ibid.*), 49.17.20 (Paul *Reg. Caton.*).

²³⁵ Rouland 1977: 29, 35, 43; defense, Veg. 3.6.18–20; Dio 79(78).26.5; M. P. Speidel 1989: 245; Roth 1994: 355 and 1999: 103–5. Usually sutlers, *lixae* are servants in Tac. *Hist.* 1.49, 2.41, 2.87, 3.20, 3.33.

²³⁶ Wesch-Klein 1998: 66; Whittaker 2004: 91–3, suggested by D. 49.16.12.1 (*op. cit.* Ch. 6 n. 63).

²³⁷ Attempted in the later Empire: A. Jones 1964: 834–6.

ownership of personal slaves. An anecdote from the *Historia Augusta* illustrates the conflict: Pescennius Niger made his servants carry burdens on the march, so that his soldiers would not be aggrieved that his personal slaves were unburdened.²³⁸

Legionary or auxiliary cavalrymen may have been most expected to have servants. Cavalrymen received larger *stipendia* than infantry soldiers, which were probably intended to feed their horses, but rations from the later Empire suggest that cavalrymen received rations for themselves and their grooms.²³⁹ The Syrians and the Vitellians in Rome failed to groom their horses; whether or not they were required to do the work themselves, they were responsible as well for the labor of their *calones*. *Calones* tending horses often appear on cavalrymen's gravestones.²⁴⁰

Roman commanders, repeatedly ejecting excess personal slaves and camp followers (*calones* and *lixæ*), emphasized that soldiers should not claim the civilian privileges of slave ownership. These purges, promoting the speed and efficiency of march by reducing the baggage train, were also ideological. Thus at Numantia in 134 BC Scipio eliminated excess baggage, especially luxuries; confiscated soldiers' baggage animals; and ejected soldiers' servants and camp followers, including slaves who assisted their owners to bathe. He said sarcastically that "only mules, having no hands, need others to wash them."²⁴¹ Among the dismissed servants and camp followers were body servants, baggage hands, sutlers, fortune-tellers or sacrificers, prostitutes, and pimps.

Soldiers on campaign were thus denied the personal services and status affirmation that slave ownership provided. At Numantia, Roman personnel were humiliated and demoralized by two decades of unsuccessful warfare against the Spanish tribes and by the recent disgraceful surrender of C. Hostilius Mancinus.²⁴² Nonetheless, Scipio's concept of discipline rejected self-affirmation through consumption of luxuries and possessions, including slaves. According to the Stoic Seneca, dependence upon slaves was a trait of luxurious and effeminate men.²⁴³ These owners were themselves enslaved by such dependence.²⁴⁴ Soldiers who

²³⁸ HA *Pesc.* 11.2.

²³⁹ M. A. Speidel 1992: 95, 2000: 84; the cavalryman was paid about sixteen percent more than the infantryman. Rations: A. H. M. Jones 1964: 647.

²⁴⁰ Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; Tac. *Hist.* 2.99; M. P. Speidel 1994: 17, 113 (plates opposite).

²⁴¹ App. *Iber.* 85.

²⁴² Goldsworthy 2003: 117–20; Moore forthcoming.

²⁴³ Sen. *Ep.* 47.2–8. Joshel 1992b: 147–52.

²⁴⁴ Joshel 1992b: 152.

depended on slaves or animals and on their possessions were regarded as useless. At Numantia, Scipio said to one officer who had jeweled cups in his gear, "You have become useless to me and the state only for a time; to yourself, forever!"²⁴⁵ To soldiers who rode horses or mules on the march, he said, "What can you expect in a war from men who are not even able to walk?"²⁴⁶ The popularity of the Numantia anecdotes with the literary elite is more evidence of the value of military *labor*.

SOLDIERS' RESISTANCE

Soldiers' sardonic humor also suggests resistance to military *labor*, especially the imposition of drudgery. Because Marius made them carry heavy loads, his soldiers were called or called themselves *muli Mariani* (Marius' mules). In another account of the term, Marius, then a young officer at Numantia, displayed a strong, docile, hard-working mule, which Scipio praised. In mockery, the soldiers called any good soldier "Marius' mule."²⁴⁷ Mules were employed in Roman baggage trains; the soldiers thus jokingly equated themselves with animals.²⁴⁸ The donkey or mule also suggests a slave; both slaves and such animals worked in mills.²⁴⁹ In Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, the protagonist Lucius, a respectable youth, is magically transformed into an ass; his life as an animal resembles that of a slave, as he is sold to one person after another, unable to speak human language, and beaten and forced to toil.²⁵⁰ The *muli Mariani* thus suggested their anxiety about being treated like slaves or animals and hinted at resistance, because the mule or ass is notoriously stubborn and known to kick.

Another sardonic joke about military *labor* arose from Curtius Rufus' employment of soldiers in a silver mine in Upper Germany in 47 AD. Curtius Rufus forced his men to work underground, "building beneath the surface of the earth works that would have been challenging even in the open air."²⁵¹ His exhausted troops petitioned the emperor, asking him to grant triumphal ornaments beforehand to

²⁴⁵ Front. *Strat.* 4.1.1; Plut. *Mor.* 201D = *Apopth. Scip. Min.* 17; cf. Sall. *Jug.* 45; HA *Pesc.* 11.2.

²⁴⁶ App. *Iber.* 85.

²⁴⁷ Plut. *Mar.* 13.1; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.7. Roth 1999: 72; 206; Plut. *Mar.* 13.2.

²⁴⁸ Punitive barley rations also suggested animality, *op. cit.* Chapter Four n. 86.

²⁴⁹ Apul. *Met.* 9.12.

²⁵⁰ Bradley 2000.

²⁵¹ Tac. *Ann.* 11.20.

the commanders whom he appointed.²⁵² The soldiers' petition displays a certain grim humor. By forcing his men to labor in the mine, the general triumphs over his own men as if they and not the barbarians were the enemy.²⁵³

Despite Tacitus' claim that many soldiers had to do similar work in other provinces, the incident was probably extraordinary. Auxiliary and fleet soldiers excavated an aqueduct near Saldæ in the mid-second century AD.²⁵⁴ Mining had always been slave labor; mining and quarry work (*metallum*) were imposed on convicts of *humiliores* status.²⁵⁵ Soldiers usually guarded quarries and mines that were worked by slaves and convicts, but did not labor in them. At Mons Claudianus, an imperial quarry producing porphyry (an extremely hard red stone reserved for imperial statues and palaces), soldiers were employed as guards and administrators, not laborers.²⁵⁶ As surviving documents show, the quarry workers at Mons Claudianus were imperial slaves and free artisans.²⁵⁷ In the mid-third century, the jurist Modestinus stated that soldiers are not sentenced to the mines or *metallum*, implying that soldiers in good standing did not perform such degrading labor; two centuries earlier, this provision may not yet have existed.²⁵⁸

Soldiers did not man water-lifting machinery, such as the *noria* (resembling a capstan, worked by slaves or animals) or Archimedes' screw (worked by foot pedals). This repetitive and unproductive form of toil was usually imposed on slaves. At a legionary camp at Babylon, near Cairo in Egypt, water-lifting devices that raised water from the Nile to the camp were powered by 150 prisoners.²⁵⁹

Another onerous form of labor that was imposed on soldiers was ditch- and canal-clearing. Such labor was dirty, wet, and cold in winter; because ditches and canals silted up again, clearing them was also repetitive and unproductive. To avoid *otium*, Augustus had soldiers clear the canals in the Nile delta. Soldiers complained of similar labors in the AD 14 mutinies.²⁶⁰ Canal-clearing and road-mending were among civilian *munera sordida* or corvée labor from which soldiers were exempt.

²⁵² Senatorial and equestrian commanders were permitted only triumphal ornaments, not triumphs.

²⁵³ Humphrey et al. 1998: 5.16; Parker [1928] 1958: 227–8; Healy 1978: 135; Campbell 2002: 111.

²⁵⁴ Saldæ: *sub. vid.* nn. 295–8. On above-ground mines in Roman Spain, Wilson 2002: 17–19.

²⁵⁵ Millar 1984: 137–9; Garnsey 1968: 141, 1970: 104–7; Aubert 2002: 101, 109.

²⁵⁶ Soldiers may have labored in military quarries: MacMullen 1963: 32; Davies 1974 (in Davies 1989: 63); Mons Claudianus, Maxfield 2001 and 2003.

²⁵⁷ Maxfield 2001: 154.

²⁵⁸ *Op. cit.* Chapter Four n.133.

²⁵⁹ Strabo *Geogr.* 17.1.30. Humphrey et al. 1998: no. 8.36.

²⁶⁰ Suet. *Aug.* 18; Tac. *Ann.* 1.17, 35.

Centuries later, an emperor who imposed canal-clearing on soldiers was assassinated by his troops. The emperor Probus (AD 276–82) never permitted the troops to be idle, making them construct bridges, porticoes, basilicas, and harbors, drain marshes, and convert them to agricultural land.²⁶¹ It is notable that his soldiers did not mutiny against these labors until Probus forced them to drain marshes at Sirmium. This caused the soldiers to revolt and assassinate him.²⁶² Commanders needed to be cautious in imposing toil, because soldiers might mutiny or revolt against excessively degrading or onerous toil that resembled slave labor. In a fictive letter on military discipline, the third-century soldier emperor Aurelian declared, “Let one yield obedience to another as a soldier and no one as a slave.”²⁶³

MASTER OR COMMANDER

Roman management of military and servile labor shared many principles. However, the commander who assimilated his soldiers to slaves was seen as arrogant and brutal, contrary to the traditional citizen-soldier ethic.²⁶⁴ In short, the Roman consul or *princeps* could be master or commander (to parody the title of the Patrick O'Brian novel and film): a master of slaves, or a commander of willing soldiers, even *commilito* (fellow-soldier) with them.²⁶⁵ During the Jugurthan War, Plutarch's Marius made a point of sharing his soldiers' labors:

For as a general thing it would seem that every man finds solace for his labors in seeing another voluntarily share those labors; this seems to take away the element of compulsion; and it is a most agreeable spectacle for a Roman soldier when he sees a general eating common bread in public, or sleeping on a simple pallet, or taking a hand in the construction of some trench or palisade. For they have not so much admiration for those leaders who share honors and riches with them as for those who take on their toils

²⁶¹ HA *Probus* 9.4, 20.2.

²⁶² HA *Probus* 21.2–3. Cf. Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 37.4; Eutr. 9.17.2. But Zos. 1.71.4–5 and Zonar. 29 claim that Probus' men revolted when the armies of Raetia and Noricum acclaimed Carus (emperor 282–3).

²⁶³ HA *Aurel.* 7.8.

²⁶⁴ Hdt. 7.101–4; Forsdyke 2006.

²⁶⁵ Lau 1975: 91. Livy 21.4.5 (Hannibal), 34.18.4–5 (Cato), 44.41.1 (Paullus); Suet. *Iul.* 57 (Caesar). Moore forthcoming. For the Principate, Campbell 1984: 32–59; Lendon 1997: 240–41; Tac. *Hist.* 2.11 (Otho), 2.5 (Vespasian); Plin. *Pan.* 10–16; Dio 68.14.1–2, 68.31.3 (Trajan), 69.9.2–4 (Hadrian), 78.3.2, 78.13.1–2; Hdn. 4.7.4–7 (Caracalla).

and dangers, but have more affection for those who are willing to join in their toils than for those who permit them to lead an easy life.²⁶⁶

The commander demonstrated his legitimate authority and achieved his acceptance by the soldiers by sharing their *labores*, at least symbolically. Notably, Plutarch contrasts this ideal with the general as material patron, a relationship which imperial *disciplina militaris* ideology rejected. As the shows, at the symbolic level military labor produced a masculine *habitus* in both elite officers and soldiers. Sharing in military labor provided officers with the prestige that they needed to command and helped bridge the social distance between themselves and the soldiers. This social gulf grew in the late Republic, when the aristocracy's wealth grew and the social status of soldiers fell. *Novi homines* such as Marius especially stressed their labors in order to legitimate themselves. In Sallust's *Bellum Jugurthinum*, Marius contrasts himself with the nobility: he speaks of the honor "which I sought through many labors and dangers."²⁶⁷ Marius thus associated himself with the virtue of the ancient Romans, contrasted with the decadent nobility.²⁶⁸

The labor of Roman generals may be linked to Greek *ponos* (toil) through Xenophon, who stresses the Greek gentleman's *ponos* in farming, hunting, and military service, and who was one of Scipio Aemilianus' favorite Greek authors.²⁶⁹ Scipio, praising Xenophon, used to say "that the same toils in war were not equally severe for general and soldier, because his honor itself lightened the general's toil."²⁷⁰ Though Scipio implies that he performs the same toil as his soldiers, nonetheless Roman generals did not usually participate in the routine building labors and fatigues of their soldiers, as opposed to symbolic efforts or weapons training and travel. Elite officers did not routinely carry *sarcina*, as the anecdote of Aufidienus Rufus the *praefectus castrorum* shows.²⁷¹ Commanders' and emperors'

²⁶⁶ Plut. *Mar.* 7.3.

²⁶⁷ Sall. *Jug.* 85.30; cf. 100.2–4. Lau 1975: 130; conversely, the highly rhetorical "servitude" of the imperial Roman elite was associated with *otium*. On master vs. father models of authority, Saller 1994: 151–2; imperial, M. Roller 2001: 228. Though emperors might be "fathers" of the troops (Suet. *Calig.* 22.1; HA *Alex.* 50.3), it was too indulgent a model of authority for senators as commanders: Tac. *Ann.* 2.55, 3.13 (Piso); cf. Campbell 1984: 53–5; the Torquatus legend emphasized severity, Y. Thomas 1984b.

²⁶⁸ Sall. *Jug.* 85.20–25, 41–3.

²⁶⁹ *Ponos*: Loraux 1982; Johnstone 1994: 219 on *ponos* in Xenophon. Not all labor produced elite masculinity; some was servile, as aforesaid. On gendered labor Scheidel 1995 and 1996b. Scipio: Cic. *Tusc.* 2.62.

²⁷⁰ Cic. *Tusc.* 2.62.

²⁷¹ Tac. *Ann.* 1.20; Sander 1954–5: 104.

participation in building was symbolic; Vespasian began the rebuilding of the Capitoline Temple by taking up the first bucket of rubble with his own hands. Caracalla showed an extreme *commilito* spirit in building, ditch-digging, and carrying burdens with his soldiers.²⁷²

Nonetheless, military *exempla* and panegyric routinely praise the commander's *labor*: he cannot be subdued by any labors, as with Livy's Papirius Cursor, who, in another instance of Roman military humor, mocked his men's request for less toil. His horsemen asked him for a reprieve from duties, and he answered, "'That you may not say that I have excused you from nothing, I freely excuse you from the effort of rubbing your backs when you dismount.'" ²⁷³ The commander set an example by his labors, ideally undertaking the hardest possible *labor* himself so that no subordinate would have an excuse to shirk. Lucan describes Cato the Younger as marching on foot before his soldiers in the African desert, teaching them to endure labors.²⁷⁴ Trajan also marched on foot with his soldiers, frequently changed the order of march, and forded rivers with them; Pliny describes more graphically that he mingled his sweat and dust with theirs.²⁷⁵ Hadrian traveled with the army on foot or in horseback, never in a chariot or cart, "so that [his soldiers] should be benefited by observing him."²⁷⁶ The author of the *Historia Augusta*, exaggerating Roman military ideals, claims that Pescennius Niger even carried *sarcina* himself.²⁷⁷ Pescennius swears before the army that "he had not and would not act otherwise than as a simple soldier," in imitation of Marius and similar commanders.²⁷⁸ In this tradition, the antiquarian Julian waded canals with his soldiers in Persia, getting muddy and wet.²⁷⁹

The emperor's *labores* were also administrative. He was depicted as perpetually toiling to govern the Empire for his subjects' sake. According to Pliny, the emperor "alone takes on the cares and labors of everyone for the common

²⁷² Suet. *Vesp.* 8.5. Possible building by commanders: Plut. *Mar.* 7.3 (castrametation); Tac. *Hist.* 2.5 (Vespasian). Caracalla: Hdn. 4.7.4–7.

²⁷³ Livy 9.6.14–16.

²⁷⁴ Lucan *Phars.* 9.588–89.

²⁷⁵ Dio 68.6.3; Plin. *Pan.* 13, 14.1–5, 15.3. Cf. Fronto *Princ. Hist.* 11–12 (Loeb II pp. 208–10), reversed by HA *Verus* 6.7–7.7. In Suet. *Calig.* 43, Caligula imposes forced marches, but travels in a litter, with the roads sprinkled to lay the dust.

²⁷⁶ Dio 69.9.3.

²⁷⁷ HA *Pesc.* 11.2.

²⁷⁸ HA *Pesc.* 11.3.

²⁷⁹ Lib. *Or.* 18.223–6.

good.”²⁸⁰ Pliny’s panegyric to Trajan contrasts Domitian’s indolence with Trajan’s energy. Trajan is refreshed rather than wearied by *labor*, whereas Domitian was notoriously indolent, rarely walking even in Rome; when he traveled he used a litter.²⁸¹ Pliny compares Trajan to Hercules, a Stoic exemplar of strength and *labores*.²⁸² This discourse effaces the time that emperors did not spend on campaign or at work. They may also have been conversing, reading, dining, bathing, making love.²⁸³ All the same, the ideal of *labor* presumes that either the emperor is constantly at work or else he indulges in *otium*, *luxuria*, and *desidia*. This model of effort also applies, perhaps most of all, to the emperor as commander. Precisely because the commander could not control at a distance the actions of his subordinates, his presence upon his arrival is represented as magically animating the entire enterprise. *Praesentia* (leadership in person) is emphasized by the imperial panegyrics.²⁸⁴

The theme of imperial *labor* was also popular in the later Empire, in part because emperors traveled around the empire and thus could be represented as perpetually on campaign. The fictional anecdote of Alexander Severus and Ovinus Camillus illustrates this mentality. Ovinus Camillus, a luxury-loving senator, was accused of aspiring to the purple. Rather than punishing or threatening him, Alexander embarked on a journey and required Camillus to keep up, at first on foot, then, when Camillus tired after five miles, on horseback, and finally in a carriage. When Camillus, exhausted, begged for mercy, Alexander merely permitted him to retire to the country.²⁸⁵ Clearly, the qualification of a candidate for the imperial office was the ability to endure *labor*.²⁸⁶

THE ASSOCIATION OF *LABOR* AND *VIRTUS*

Military *labor* was also legitimated and made acceptable to the soldiers by its association with *virtus*, even in peacetime. *Virtus* originally meant courage or prowess in combat. It also signified virtue and masculinity. Through the association of toil

²⁸⁰ Plin. *Ep.* 3.20.12; Trajan in Plin. *Pan.* 3, 7, 10, 24, 26, 44, 77, 79, 82, 87, 91 and 93. Cf. Dio Chrysostom’s *On Kingship* discourses and the *Euboean Discourse*, Brunt 1973: 9–10, 14–17.

²⁸¹ Trajan: Plin. *Pan.* 77.5; Domitian: Suet. *Dom.* 19.

²⁸² Plin. *Pan.* 14.5.

²⁸³ Hopkins 1978b thus criticizes Millar [1977] 1992 for assuming the positivist reality of this discourse of imperial *labor*.

²⁸⁴ R. R. R. Smith 1997: 196–7.

²⁸⁵ HA *Alex.* 48.1–6, perhaps inspired by Suet. *Galba* 6; HA *Hadr.* 10.4.

²⁸⁶ Campbell 1984: 426.

with masculinity, Roman soldiers were socialized to identify with at least some of the *labores* that were imposed on campaign and in routine service. The body of the male (*vir*) was made more vigorous by *labor*, increasing his corporeal *vires* (strength) and embodying his *virtus*, at least in younger men. The old soldier no longer possessed *vires*, so his labor merely degraded him, as with the worn-out old soldiers in the Rhine mutiny, who forced Germanicus' fingers into their toothless mouths to prove their senile condition.²⁸⁷ Hadrian forbade either too young or too old personnel to serve, declaring "that no one should violate ancient usage by being in the service at a younger age than *virtus* warranted, or at an older age than common humanity permitted."²⁸⁸

Labor militaris as building could display a redefined *virtus*, especially when there was less opportunity to display *virtus* in combat. *Virtus* was redefined to signify hardihood not just in combat but in endurance of *labor*, as when Hadrian displayed his *virtus*, his "soldierly spirit" according to the Loeb translator David Magie, by walking twenty miles fully armed.²⁸⁹ Military building inscriptions also attest the display of *virtus* in noncombat activities.²⁹⁰ A detachment of Legio III Augusta built a fort at Golas or Gholaiā (Bu Njem) in the desert of Tripolitania at the turn of the third century AD. Two acrostic inscriptions dedicating the buildings survive, spelling out the names of two centurions with the first letters of each line: one Q. Avidius Quintianus (c. 202–3), and the other M. Porcius Iasuchthān (c. 222).²⁹¹ Quintianus states that his men constructed a bath-house for the soldiers' refreshment from the desert heat.²⁹²

Iasuchthān stresses the soldiers' *labor* in restoring a deteriorated gate of the fort, claiming that his predecessors avoided this work.²⁹³ This is a stock accusation, frequent in the imperial panegyrics, essential to the ideology of *labor*. The soldiers' work is powered by "the firm vigor of the young [warriors]," *rigido vigore iuvenum*, and by *virtus militum*; even a hauling machine (*chamulcus*) is powered by *militum virtus*.²⁹⁴ The *virtus* of the soldiers is mentioned a full seven times, often as *virtus*

²⁸⁷ Tac. *Ann.* 1.34.

²⁸⁸ HA *Hadr.* 10.8. Cf. 10.6.

²⁸⁹ HA *Hadr.* 10.4; cf. Lendon 2005: 250–52 (of soldiers).

²⁹⁰ Adams 1999: 110–11 (Quintianus), 111–12 (Iasuchthān).

²⁹¹ Kroll 1931: 151–2; Rebuffat 1987a.

²⁹² Carrié 1993: 118.

²⁹³ *Omnes praeteriti cuius labore vitabant* (l. 6–7). Such discourse also in Fronto *Princ. Hist.* 10 (Loeb II p. 206).

²⁹⁴ *Rigido vigore iuvenum* (l.8), *virtus militum* (10); hauling machine powered by *militum virtus* (12). The soldiers chant as they work, cf. Varro *Rust.* 3.16.30.

militum, “the prowess of the soldiers,” in a context that has entirely to do with building and not with combat.

The Saldae aqueduct inscription also redefines *virtus* as displayed by the peacetime building work of the army.²⁹⁵ Located in Mauretania Caesarensis, this inscription is a dedication to the personified virtues *Patientia Virtus Spes*.²⁹⁶ Related in the form of letters to his superiors, the engineer Nonius Datus, a veteran of *legio III Augusta*, describes the construction of the aqueduct tunnel. The initial excavations, one from each end, missed each other in the mountain, and he was required to begin again. He set teams of *auxilia* and fleet soldiers to compete against each other to speed the work, and he himself endured dangers and difficulties, at one point escaping naked and wounded from bandits.²⁹⁷ The tunnel was 428 meters long and took many years, from AD 137, when the plan was drawn up, to 152, when it was dedicated. As an archaeologist suggests, *Patientia*, “Endurance,” and *Spes*, “Hope,” are easily understood, but in this context *Virtus* must be translated not as “Valor” but as “Energy.”²⁹⁸

In the definition of Roman military *virtus*, a contradiction becomes apparent: though *labor* subordinates soldiers, it also produces *virtus*, and the Roman elite associated the *vir* and *virtus* with mastery. The *virtus* of soldiers in civil warfare had destroyed the Republic. The redefinition of *virtus* as produced by regular *labor* encoded the *virtus* of soldiers as a subordinate masculinity, one that soldiers could display without challenging the social hierarchy or threatening the imperial power.²⁹⁹

Labor, furthermore, enabled the emperor to display *virtus* if he did not fight in person, as most emperors did not before Maximinus Thrax in the early third century. For instance, Hadrian set an example in *virtus* by his physical exertion and endurance.³⁰⁰ *Labor* also enabled senatorial commanders to display *virtus* in military service without engaging in the independent, aggressive campaigning that displayed the traditional *virtus* of Roman commanders but threatened the imperial prerogative of victory.

²⁹⁵ CIL 8.2728 = 18122 = ILS 5795.

²⁹⁶ These were female personifications.

²⁹⁷ Grewe 1998: 138–9; Campbell 1994: no. 204, pp. 125–6; M. A. Speidel 2001: 53–4; Phang 2005: 219; this method of tunneling was normal, R. Taylor 2003: 74–5.

²⁹⁸ Grewe 1998: 139. *Virtus* might also refer to Datus’ courage in escaping from brigands.

²⁹⁹ Connell 2005: 78–9, 196–8, 213–14.

³⁰⁰ HA *Hadrian* 10.4.

Monumental building and construction undertaken as part of a military campaign were also expressions of *disciplina* and *virtus*. The soldiers supplied the *virtus*, though the commander's labors may also be spoken of in terms of *virtus*; the commander and his subordinates who directed the work provided *disciplina*. The continuing imposition of work as a form of *disciplina* maintained the *vires* and thus *virtus* of soldiers.

Major works might be constructed as part of a campaign — circumvallations and siege works, canals, bridges, and roads — though on campaign the Romans used river transport where possible. Scenes on Trajan's Column emphasize the association of building and *labor* with warfare.³⁰¹ Though the actual walls may have been turf or timber, the sculptors of the Column depicted walls of dressed stone, which was associated with monumental building as an expression of social power.³⁰²

Monumental building (civil or military) displayed the patron's or commander's resources and his ability to organize supplies, including food and shelter for the workmen and their animals. Such building also displayed his ability to manage and discipline his labor force.³⁰³ In peacetime, such building was a "moral equivalent of war" without war's expenditure of life and limb.³⁰⁴ Building was a statement of legitimation.³⁰⁵ Monumental building was a form of symbolic violence that naturalized the violence of conquest: who could resist the Romans when they built such monuments?³⁰⁶

In wartime, building not only had a functional strategic or tactical purpose, its display of Roman power intimidated less technologically advanced enemies.³⁰⁷ In the *Gallie Wars*, Caesar emphasizes this phenomenon, presenting Roman building as a triumph of rationality over an irrational enemy. The Greco-Roman ethnographic tradition stressed the irrational and volatile nature of the Gauls and Germans.³⁰⁸

³⁰¹ Lendon 2005: 250–52 suggests that legionaries were distinguished as builders, but this was not exclusive.

³⁰² R. Taylor 2003: 17–20, 237.

³⁰³ R. Taylor 2003: 2, 6. DeLaine 1997: a possible motivation for Hadrian's Wall, Kendal 1996: 150–52.

³⁰⁴ Much building was *during* warfare, roads and bridges expediting campaigns in undeveloped territories; siege-works.

³⁰⁵ R. Taylor 2003: 8, 19; Schneider 1986: 23–8, 41–2. In *RGDA* 20, Augustus, repairing Roman aqueducts and roads, legitimated himself as "restorer" of the Republic. Conversely, destroying enemy cities (Carthage and Corinth in 146 BC, Numantia in 134, and Jerusalem) signalled their total defeat: Purcell 1995: 140–44.

³⁰⁶ Veyne 1990: 365.

³⁰⁷ Le Bohec 1994: 111; Cancik 1986: 170–71. Caes. *BG* 2.12, 2.30–31, 7.22.

³⁰⁸ Isaac 2004: 413.

Tacitus' *Germania* depicts the Germans as incapable of *disciplina*, both organization and sustained effort.³⁰⁹ Caesar and Livy depict the Gauls as unable to endure *labor*, by nature and not only when they invade the Mediterranean region and face the hotter climate.³¹⁰ Livy boasts that the Romans would have defeated Alexander the Great, if the Macedonian had lived longer and invaded the west: Roman soldiers had greater ability to endure *labor*.³¹¹ It is unclear whether these ethnographic stereotypes, tending to be frozen in time, are equivalent to modern racism.³¹² The Roman authors did not believe that Gauls and Germans were by nature *incapable* of learning Roman ways. In fact, the most rapid path of assimilation for these groups was through service in the imperial army.

CONCLUSION

Cicero stresses that the Romans acquired their empire “not due to fortune, but through prudence and discipline.”³¹³ *Labor* was a measure of Roman greatness; its decline (replaced by *avaritia*) represented the decline of the empire.³¹⁴ Tacitus frequently condemns the failure of the emperors to undertake the *labores* of warfare.³¹⁵ Tiberius is described as “uninterested in extending the boundaries of the empire,” preferring to terrorize the aristocracy instead.³¹⁶ Agricola and Domitius Corbulo were exemplars of military *labores*.³¹⁷ Their aggressive campaigns incurred the jealousy of inactive emperors, the context of Corbulo's remark “once they were fortunate, those commanders of Rome.”³¹⁸ Tacitus depicts peace and the inactivity of the *princeps* as causes of degeneration, using highly negative terms for idleness.³¹⁹ He also associates peace with the inactivity and decline in combat effectiveness

³⁰⁹ With the exception of the Chatti, Tac. *Germ.* 30.3.

³¹⁰ Isaac 2004: 23–38 explores the relationship of ancient ethnocentrism and xenophobia to racism.

³¹¹ Livy 9.19.9.

³¹² J. Webster 1996a: 113, 116–17; Isaac 2004: 411–26. Caes. *BG* 7.22 describes the Gauls as quick to imitate and learn.

³¹³ Cic. *Rep.* 2.30.

³¹⁴ Lau 1975: 102, 100, 103–14.

³¹⁵ Lau 1975: 152.

³¹⁶ Tac. *Ann.* 4.32.

³¹⁷ Agricola: Tac. *Agric. passim*; Domitius Corbulo, Tac. *Ann.* 11.18–20, 13.8, 13.35–6, 15.26.

³¹⁸ Tac. *Ann.* 11.20.1 alludes to the consuls' and Republican generals' ability to wage aggressive war without restriction.

³¹⁹ Lau 1975: 159.

of the army.³²⁰ Subrius Flavus, a military tribune, was executed at Nero's orders. Before the sentence was carried out, Flavus inspected his own grave. Finding it too shallow and narrow, he said to the soldiers standing nearby, "Poor discipline even here."³²¹ Tacitus thus shows that Nero's corrupt rule has penetrated to the army and to such routine procedures as digging graves.

This picture of idleness is contradicted not just by monumental building, but by the numerous noncombat activities of the Roman army. Diatribes on military idleness focus on the soldiers' physical ineptitude.³²² Documentary and material evidence suggests that soldiers who were not campaigning, training for combat, or working on monumental building were probably occupied with policing, administration and taxation, or the procurement, artisan production, and distribution of the army's requirements. On the other hand, artisan work, which had little prestige in the elite moral order, might be seen as effeminizing. No doubt the literary authors would regard such work, not using great *vires* or promoting any particular martial *virtus*, as *otium* or *desidia*. For the warrior or the militarist, only the extremes of military service and conquest formed masculine *habitus*. In the Western tradition, the soldier turned unwarlike bureaucrat has been a figure of humor into modern times.³²³

³²⁰ Lau 1975: 159 on Tac. *Ann.* 13.35.

³²¹ Tac. *Ann.* 15.67.

³²² Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19. On "Syrian" legions Wheeler 1996.

³²³ E.g., Captain Bluntschli in George Bernard Shaw's comedy *Arms and the Man* (1895) or Milo Minderbinder (and many other characters) in Joseph Heller's *Catch-22* (1962). On this bias against non-combatant personnel, Goldsworthy 2003: 303, 311.

7 FEASTS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: *DISCIPLINA* AND AUSTERITY



INTRODUCTION

Besides *labor*, an important feature of *disciplina militaris* was dietary austerity: controlling consumption, or at least governing representations of eating and drinking, in military service. Representations of food, drink, and dining reflected Greek and Roman concepts of social hierarchy, social control, and community. The subject of dining in *militia* is distorted by literary exclusions. Despite the warriors' feasts in Homer's *Iliad*, in classical culture warfare and feasting were incompatible categories and literary genres. In literature, those preparing and eating food were often of low social or moral status, rather than the normative elite male.¹ Roman "high" genres such as history, philosophy, and oratory inherited a classical Greek tradition that relegated descriptions of food and feasting to comedy, epigram, and biography; the Romans added satire and fiction.² The Greek critic Longinus regarded concrete terms for food as unsuited to lofty military narrative or panegyric; many Roman authors agreed.³ The ancient Spartans' reputation for military austerity was contrasted with Persian luxury.⁴ The Platonic tripartite division of the self canonized control over the appetites: reason in the mind and courage in the heart dominated the physical appetites in the stomach. These corresponded to the rulers of a city, their soldiers, and the masses. For elites and soldiers to indulge their appetites and stomachs was inappropriate, or even antisocial.⁵ The classical Greek ideal of military austerity may have emerged from hoplite warfare, emphasizing rigorous equality and unity of effort, reflecting the democratic principle of

This chapter is in memory of John H. D' Arms and his seminar on Roman dining at Columbia University.

¹ Gowers 1993: 16, 24.

² Davidson 1997: 264; more generally Murray 1992. Comic juxtapositions of dining and warfare, e.g., Ar. *Acharnians* 1085–1141; Justin 38.10.4; Cic. *Verr.* 2.5.26, 28–9, 32.

³ [Longinus] *On the Sublime* 43.2–3; cf. Gowers 1993: 22–3.

⁴ E.g., Hdt. 9.82; Nepos *Paus.* 3.1–3; Funari 1992: 134.

⁵ Pl. *Rep.* 9.571a, 372b–d, and 373c emphasize vegetable foods, associating meat-eating with luxury; 3.390b–c disapproves of Homeric feasts, alluding to Hom. *Od.* 9.8–10.

isonomia.⁶ However, Roman military austerity was framed by more specific social and political anxieties. Rather than being fundamentally democratic, Roman military austerity was hierarchical, promoting both social control and the maintenance of cohesion.

Disciplina militaris made soldiers' consumption patterns, as well as their remuneration and labor, a site for contestation and control. The discourses concerning consumption in *militia* resemble those concerning pay and donatives, but have their own logic, due to the importance of communal and private dining in Roman society and morality. The type of food and its preparation, its quantity and quality, its expense, the social statuses of the host and guests, and the eating habits and manners of the diners might be socially and morally revealing. Correct dining practices were a means of social reproduction, constituting appropriate social and power relations.⁷ Generosity, extravagance, or austerity had social and political implications. In civil life, a display of tasteful generosity toward peers earned the host social and symbolic prestige, whereas the elaborately vulgar dishes of the wealthy freedman Trimalchio or the emperor Vitellius confirmed their baseness.⁸ A notable or emperor also gained or lost reputation via mass distributions of food and drink to ordinary citizens.⁹

Reputation could also be earned through the repression or repudiation of luxury. In the late Republic and Empire, politicians and moralists legitimated themselves and discredited others by condemning extravagance and invoking the modest lifestyle of the ancient Romans, such as Manius Curius' meals of boiled turnips served on wooden plates.¹⁰ In the last two centuries of the Republic, the Senate and People enacted a series of sumptuary laws restricting the kinds and

⁶ Detienne and Svenbro 1989: 148–63 emphasize egalitarianism. Kurke 1992 explores the origins of democratic simplicity, displayed by Dem. *Against Meidias* 21. Davidson 1997: 246–9, 255–60 and Edwards 1993: 173–205 examine the anti-civic nature of individual luxury.

⁷ Roman: Corbier 1989; Gowers 1993; Dupont 1999; Corbier 1999; Erdkamp 2000; Donahue 2003; Purcell 2003; M. Roller 2003; Donahue 2004: 3, 23–4; M. Roller 2006. Classical: Murray 1991; Slater 1991; I. and H. S. Nielsen 1998; Garnsey 1999; Montanari 1999. Earlier Greek societies: Detienne and Vernant 1989 focus on animal sacrifice and structural anthropology; Davidson 1997 emphasizes materialist interpretation of literary evidence. On the sociology of food Douglas [1975] 1999: 235–40; Bourdieu 1984. Veen 2003 adopts a sociological approach to the archaeology of “luxury” foods.

⁸ Edwards 1993: 173–205.

⁹ Veyne 1990: 236–45, 390–96, 398–400; Corbier 1999: 129–30, 132; Donahue 2004; Cornell and Lomas 2003; Aldrete and Mattingly 1999: 177–8; Erdkamp 2000. Republic background: Nicolet 1980: 189–209.

¹⁰ Dench 1996: 250–52, 1998: 134 and Purcell 2003: 343–52 trace the transmission of Greek ideals of austerity to Roman elites in the third/second century BC.

amounts of foods served at aristocratic dinners. Republican nobles used elaborate dinners to canvas for political support, invoking *amicitiae*, political friendships. Such dinners represented unfair competition to those unable to afford such extravagance.¹¹ The emperors restrained the lower orders' consumption, restricting cheap cookshops' comestibles and hours of service.¹² In their turn, the aristocracy observed the dining habits of the emperors with jealous attention.¹³ These patterns shaped Roman depictions of military eating and drinking, to which specifically military anxieties were added: the material dangers of incapacitation in the field, the precarious nature of the military *habitus*, the fear of a rapacious soldiery, and the commanders and emperors' need both to control the soldiers and to legitimate their own commands.

Militia occupied a special zone in the cultural construction of dining: it was above all a zone of austerity, a major element of *disciplina militaris*.¹⁴ Except for triumphal feasts, there is little or no literary evidence for "institutional commensality," troops or at least ranks dining together. There is a lack of archaeological evidence for mass dining facilities, on a larger scale than the dining room(s) for officers in the commander's *praetorium*.¹⁵ Common soldiers cooked and dined together in their *contubernia* (tents or barracks quarters for groups of eight men), where they also slept.¹⁶ The army did not usually give cooked food to soldiers, and commanders might repress soldiers' purchase of cooked food.¹⁷ This austerity was emphasized by anecdotes in which feasting and drinking in the field resulted at best in distraction, elation, and misjudgment. At worst, untimely feasting and drinking resulted in commanders' and troops' incapacitation and destruction, such that armies might employ food and drink as a stratagem to incapacitate

¹¹ On competition as motive, Daube 1969: 127. Sumptuary laws: Lintott 1972: 631–2, 1990: 5–6; Gruen 1990: 170, 172–3 regards these as chiefly symbolic; Gowers 1993: 26, 70; Nippel 1995: 6–9 on censors; Wytznar 2002: 20–21, 31; Rosenstein 2006: 629 also stresses political competition.

¹² Corbier 1989; see Ch. 7 n. 209.

¹³ Wallace-Hadrill [1982] 2004: 40, 42; D'Arms 1990: 338–43; S. Braund 1996: 43–7; Lendon 1999: 49–50, 133; Corbier 1999: 137; M. Roller 2001: 135–73. On the dining habits of women, slaves, children, and barbarians, Shaw 1982–3; Bradley 1998; M. Roller 2003: 355–6, 2006: 19–21, 169–77.

¹⁴ Fiebiger 1903: col. 1177.

¹⁵ Neumann 1962: col. 1695; Donahue 2003: 426 (contrasting modern barracks, schools, and other total institutions); Scheidel 2007: 430 suggests that the absence of central facilities discouraged mass food poisoning. Cf. the fish poisoning episode *P. Mich.* 8.478.

¹⁶ Roth 1999: 44–51. Centurions had more space: Hoffmann 1995.

¹⁷ App. *Iber.* 85; Sall. *Jug.* 45.2; HA *Pesc.* 10.4–6; Hdn. 4.75; Tac. *Hist.* 2.88 disapproves of Vitellius' handing out cooked rations.

the enemy. Long before the appearance of modern medical disorders, such as alcoholism or obesity, overindulgence in food and drink caused a catastrophic collapse of military *habitus*.

As shown in Chapter [Three](#), the Roman military tradition restricted bodily and material gratifications because these slackened or dissolved the military *habitus*. This chapter focuses on dining and drinking. However, luxurious food and drink might be consumed while enjoying other pleasures such as music, perfume, and sex, for the life of luxury was usually a package deal in antiquity. Dining itself implied a collapse of sorts from the standing *habitus* expected of soldiers, for the Roman upper classes reclined upon couches to dine.¹⁸

The literary authors depicted feasting and drinking soldiers and commanders as threats to the social and political order; their appetites were associated with mutiny, civil warfare, and abuse of civilians.¹⁹ As seen in Chapter [Five](#), soldiers' access to wealth was regarded as potentially illegitimate, associated with civil warfare and with imperial tyranny and confiscations. Such troops and the tyrants associated with them are depicted as carnivorous beasts. In contrast, soldiers' austere diet was associated with good discipline. The construction of an austere military diet emphasized grain rather than meat. Meat dishes connoted excess, luxury, and barbarism, whereas grain and vegetable dishes represented austerity, civilization, and the virtuous past.²⁰ However, because soldiers needed to maintain their strength, they did consume some meat, restricted to frugal modes of preparation.

Military commanders sought to achieve cohesion, avoiding the resentment likely if the commanders and officers dined openly on luxurious foods while forcing common soldiers to consume the simplest foods. The commander or emperor, posing as *commilito* by eating the same food on campaign as his soldiers, legitimated his command and reconciled his soldiers to the hardships he imposed. Austerity thus repudiated another road to social power, the emperor's or commander's lavishing feasts on his troops along with excessive gifts of cash and leisure. A plain and simple diet leveled the emperor, the senatorial and equestrian officers, and the soldiers in the only way that the aristocracy and Roman tradition found acceptable.

¹⁸ Dupont 1992b: 248–9, 282–3; M. Roller 2003: 383–5, 2006: 1–2, 5, 16–18.

¹⁹ Praetorians: Tac. *Hist.* 1.80.

²⁰ Montanari 1999: 71–3, 75; Dupont 1999: 126; Junkelmann 1997: 155; Purcell 2003: 332–6.

This ideal of austerity is less apparent in the documentary and archaeological evidence, although austerity, like poverty, leaves little material trace. Soldiers' dining habits may have composed part of a lower-class *habitus*, like that of the late twentieth-century French working class in Pierre Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1984). Bourdieu's working-class male prefers a hearty diet in large quantities without pretensions to culture or manners, elements of the bourgeois *habitus*.²¹ However, the literary sources on Roman soldiers' eating habits are not equivalent to Bourdieu's interviews and statistical surveys. The literary sources represent the Roman aristocracy's claim to distinction, restricting soldiers' access to privileged food items such as meat that the soldiers allegedly consumed in an uncivilized way. Many Roman representations of dining are exemplary, instructing elites or those being socialized as elites, such as aristocratic children or social climbers.²²

QUALIFYING "AUSTERITY"

In factual terms, Roman military austerity requires considerable qualification. The archaeological and documentary evidence for consumption patterns in the imperial Roman army suggests a varied and abundant diet, and soldiers rarely complained about inadequate diet; involuntary hardships occasionally occurred during campaigns.²³ Modern estimates of rations suggest that Roman soldiers received adequate calories and nutrition for an active lifestyle.²⁴ An extensive study of Roman logistics estimates that a 5 ft. 7 in. legionary required about 3,000 calories per day and reconstructs possible rations estimated at 3,390 calories a day. Soldiers on active campaigns (marching twenty to twenty-five miles a day, building camps, and fighting) would probably need more than this, as would taller men; sedentary bureaucrats needed less.

Of estimated daily rations, over three-fourths was of vegetable origin and a much smaller fraction was animal protein. Bread provided 1,950 calories, whereas meat provided a mere 640 calories, and cheese 90 calories, with small amounts

²¹ Bourdieu 1984: 196.

²² Bradley 1998: 146–7.

²³ Davies 1971 (in Davies 1989: 205–6); Roth 1999: 43–4. Garnsey 1999: 44 and Scheidel 2006: 54–6. Contrasted with the chronically malnourished rural and urban poor, soldiers were “a privileged group in terms of diet,” Garnsey 1999: 59. On logistics proper, Erdkamp 1998 (Republic); Roth 1999 (Republic and Empire); Whittaker 2004: 88–114 (Vindolanda); Kehne 2007.

²⁴ Roth 1999: 7–39.

of lentils or other legumes, olive oil, and wine.²⁵ The meat portion is very small compared with the modern Anglo-American diet.²⁶ Rather, meat was consumed as a relish or side dish (the Greek *opson* or Roman *pulmentarium*) rather than a staple.²⁷ Soldiers could not dispense with meat altogether; Cato the Elder ate meat to maintain his body for military training.²⁸ The construction of Roman military austerity is based on the products consumed, their methods of preparation, and the social context of dining, rather than on total calories as in modern weight-loss or maintenance diets.²⁹ This grain- and vegetable-based diet was that of the masses in the ancient Mediterranean; the Roman upper orders regarded it as their own archaic diet. Though the elite could afford and may have eaten much more meat, they regarded a grain- and vegetable-based diet as appropriate for soldiers and the lower classes.³⁰

Documentary sources show that soldiers sought food items from family and friends outside the camp, goods probably not supplied by the army. Soldiers may also have bought goods from sutlers or shops outside camps or permanent forts.³¹ As with their free disposal of their income and their ownership of slaves, soldiers claimed status through their consumption of these food items.³² Documentary sources also attest *feriae* throughout the year, and especially at the Saturnalia, when troops celebrated with feasts.³³ (On this festival, the only literary evidence is a Christian martyr act, the *Acta S. Dasii*; not surprisingly, the classical authors

²⁵ Roth 1999: 18–43; cf. Kehne 2007: 324 with estimates by weight, 880 g unground wheat (bread, containing water, is heavier), 620 g beans or other vegetable, 160 g meat, half a pint of wine or vinegar, and small amounts of oil and salt.

²⁶ Garnsey 1999: 18; Groenman-van Waateringe 1997 estimates from animal bones that each Roman soldiers received 25 to 160 grams of meat daily, averaging 63 grams (that is, from 0.9 to 6.5 ounces, averaging 2.2 ounces). Cf. Junkelmann 1997: 154–68.

²⁷ Davidson 1997: 20–6. *Opson* was fish in classical Athens. Its archaic Roman equivalent was *pulmentarium*, a meat dish eaten with *puls* or wheat porridge, Corbier 1989: 227; Purcell 2003: 333. In rations documents such as RMR 78 *opsonion* = *cibaria* rather than meat/fish.

²⁸ Plut. *Cato Maior* 4.3; Corbier 1989: 229.

²⁹ Contrast Rush 2006: 70–84; Bonn 2005 does not emphasize weight-control advice for U.S. officers, possibly because officers' competitive *habitus* motivates them to keep fit.

³⁰ Corbier 1989: 227, 229–30; Montanari 1999: 69–78; Potter 2004: 13–15.

³¹ E.g., Davies 1971 (in Davies 1989: 134–5); Carrié 1993: 120; Roth 1999: 96–101. *CPL* 303–4; *P. Mich.* 3.203, 206, 8.467–8, 474, 476, 478, 481, 483; *T. Vindol.* 3.301–2. Archaeological evidence: Davies 1971 (in Davies 1989: 191–200); Junkelmann 1997.

³² Carrié 1993: 120.

³³ Corbier 1989: 226; Stoll 2007: 455, 457, e.g., deductions labeled *Saturnalicium k(astrense)* in pay records; for the festival of Fors Fortuna in *T. Vindol.* 1.4; on the *Feriale Duranum*, Ch. 3 n. 99.

emphasizing austerity and hierarchy ignored the camp Saturnalia altogether.) Military austerity was framed from the perspective of the Greek and Roman elite. This chapter investigates what the classical authors *thought* about military austerity, why the theme was so popular in aristocratic sources, and why feasting in *militia* was elided.

The literary sources acknowledge that soldiers on campaign must eat and drink sufficiently to maintain their strength and vigor. The good commander supplies the basic needs of his soldiers. Vegetius writes (exaggerating somewhat) that “armies are more often destroyed by starvation than battle, and hunger is more savage than the sword.”³⁴ He advises the general to allow his soldiers to eat and rest shortly before a battle, lest they grow hungry or fatigued during combat.³⁵ This had been known to happen: the Roman defeat at the Trebia in 218 BC was attributed to Ti. Sempronius Longus’ making his men ford a cold stream without having eaten, causing them to become weak from cold and hunger, and Frontinus recommends the stratagems of feeding one’s troops before a battle and delaying battle so that the enemy becomes tired and hungry.³⁶ If a commander failed to provide for his soldiers, they might revolt against and assassinate him, as happened to Maximinus Thrax in 238.³⁷

The ideology of austerity, outside Suet. *Galba* 7 and the *Historia Augusta*, does not purport to starve soldiers. Nonetheless, campaigns and military service were demarcated by relative austerity: Vegetius specifies *parco cibo*. From an institutional perspective, austerity would seem instrumentally rational, given the sheer scale of the army’s requirements and the limitations of ancient production and transportation.³⁸ Austerity reduced costs, the burden on logistics, and personnel’s incapacitation from excesses, maintaining a lean and fit military machine, as the modern stereotype has it. Cato the Elder boasted that his army would supply itself entirely from the land and from pillage.³⁹ Autarchy was often impossible,

³⁴ Veg. *Mil.* 3.3.1. Cf. Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.25, *Anab.* 2.6.8; Onas. 6.6, 6.14, 10.7–8 Aen. *Tact.* 10.3, 10.12, 40.8; Veg. 3.6, on importance of supplies.

³⁵ Veg. *Mil.* 3.11.3.

³⁶ Trebia: Livy 21.54; Polyb. 3.72.4–5; stratagem, Front. *Strat.* 2.1.1 and 5; Roth 1999: 312–13. Civilians brought the Vitellians food during the second battle of Cremona, Tac. *Hist.* 3.32.

³⁷ Hdn. 8.1.4–5. Ando 2007: 375–6; cf. Ando 2000: 194–9 on emperors’ provisioning their traveling courts and armies.

³⁸ Kehne 2007: 325–6 estimates that the army needed 423 metric tons (1,000 kg) of grain and 298 metric tons of other foods a day, or 154,395 metric tons of grain and 108,770 metric tons of other foods a year.

³⁹ Livy 34.9.12.

but streamlining supply on campaign was desirable, and hence commanders forced soldiers to travel light.⁴⁰ However, the persistence of the ideal of austerity in the period of stationary camps suggests an ideological, value-rational stratum. Roman military austerity was not simply a pragmatic policy, but was a specific cultural formation, reinforcing military *habitus* and maintaining the military hierarchy. At the very least, elite commanders legitimated their authority through condemnation of excess and imposition of austerity.

CONTROLLING PATRONAGE

As was stated earlier, a major purpose of *disciplina militaris* in the Principate was the prevention of usurpations and revolts, “emperors made elsewhere than at Rome.” The repressive aspects of *disciplina* ran counter to the Roman concept of patronage, especially imperial patronage, in which the noble or emperor was generous to his civilian friends, acquaintances, and subjects, giving them money and other material gifts, or granting them privileges, such as exemptions from taxes and *munera*.⁴¹ A classic study of the emperor’s relationship to the army imposes this model on the Roman emperor as commander.⁴²

The most material form of patronage, most extravagant and volatile, was the provision of public feasts and entertainment, “bread and circuses.” In classical antiquity, giving a public feast displayed charismatic power. However, such a display was highly unstable unless so managed as to affirm the social order.⁴³ That commanders and emperors were discredited by allowing soldiers luxury suggests that unmodified patronage or patrimonialism is an inaccurate description of Roman command. If the emperor had solely a personal relationship to his soldiers, his gifts to them should have been acceptable in the moral economy. Instead, such gifts were subject to *disciplina* ideology. The commander who paid heed only to

⁴⁰ E.g., App. *Iber.* 85.

⁴¹ Murray 1991: 83.

⁴² Millar [1977] 1992: 39 notes that he and Brunt advised Campbell’s dissertation, later Campbell 1984.

⁴³ “Excess is power” (Gleason 1999: 71). Veyne 1990: 106, 113–14, 124, 145–6 on Greek and Hellenistic public feasts; 220, 225, 235–6 on Roman Republican public feasts; 382–3, 390 on Imperial Rome; Lendon 1997: 133; Deniaux 1987: 299–300; Edwards 1993: 173–206, esp. 194–5; Garnsey 1999: vi; Donahue 2004: 60–69. See Ch. 5 n. 154. Actual benefactors countered this prejudice. According to *AE* 1965, 270, a *flamen Augustalis* from Arles gave an orderly and decorous banquet for his fellows, *secundum disciplinam moresque*. Donahue 2004: app. no. 274.

his soldiers, bestowing unlimited benefactions on them, was illegitimate in the eyes of the aristocracy and people.⁴⁴ If he was not the emperor, such behavior suggested that he aspired to the throne and threatened the political order.⁴⁵ Even if this patron of the army was the emperor, his power attained thus was highly insecure, as Vitellius' reign shows.

Imperial patronage of the army needed to reinforce hierarchy, not destabilize it as mass revelry tended to. In elite ideology, the benefactor who provided mass feasts was contaminated by the appetites of his guests: he needed the capacity of thousands for food and drink.⁴⁶ His guests' misbehavior and lack of self-control reflected on him, rendering his authority illegitimate. This was especially so in *militia*, as soldiers were thought to lack self-control, consuming food and wine to the point of drunkenness and incapacitation. Their indulgence in luxury slackened their *habitus* and made them more prone to anger, another source of political instability. Yet commanders might be tempted to give these feasts to their soldiers, due to elation, the excessive expectation of or premature exultation in victory.

ELATION: *NIMIA VICTORIAE FIDUCIA*

Elation characterized the *topos* of victorious feasts held before the victory itself has been secured. Not only did such leaders anticipate triumphs, they posed as *triumphatores* before actually achieving victory, if not as blatantly as in the moralizing depiction of Metellus Pius. While campaigning in Spain in the 70s BC, Metellus Pius enjoyed extravagant banquets in honor of himself, in which he wore triumphal garb and was received with incense like a god. These dinners featured unheard-of delicacies.⁴⁷ Valerius Maximus moralizes on the inappropriateness of

⁴⁴ Displayed by civilians' resentment of military requisitions and billeting, and praise of emperors who avoided them, Ando 2000: 190–99; Kehne 2007: 327–8; Plut. *Sulla* 25.2; Suet. *Tib.* 38; Tac. *Hist.* 2.56, 2.62; Plin. *Pan.* 20; HA *Pius* 6.1, *Pesc.* 3.6, 10.5–6; *Alex.* 15.4–5, 52.3–4; fantasy of an empire without soldiers in HA *Probus* 23.2–3. On documentary evidence see Ch. 5 nn. 113–14.

⁴⁵ SC de Cn. Pisone patre II. 54–7; Tac. *Ann.* 3.13. See Ch. 5 n. 144.

⁴⁶ Dio Chrys. *On Reputation* (Or. 33.9). On the representation of the “grotesque body” as expanding beyond its proper boundaries, Gowers 1993: 30, 55; on crowd images of gluttony, 12–13, 19, 27. Such feasts at Rome: Suet. *Nero* 27.3; Dio 62.15.1–6. Conflation of ruler's and populace's appetites, Donahue 2004: 68–9.

⁴⁷ Val. Max. 9.1.5; Sall. fr. 2.70 Mainbocher = 2.59 McGurhin = Macrobian *Sat.* 3.13.7–9; Plut. *Sert.* 22.2. Gowers 1993: 38–9. Wiedemann 1992: 4–5 doubts that Metellus held this feast in Spain; nonetheless,

such *luxuria* not merely in any context, but on campaign: “not in Greece nor in Asia, where *Severitas* herself may be seduced by their *Luxuria*, but in a rough and warlike province.”⁴⁸ Commanders and personnel needed to delay gratification on campaign. Frontinus’ *Stratagemis* displays this principle: in his campaign against the Cimbri and Teutones in 102 BC, Marius encamped where the water supply was in enemy territory. When his soldiers complained about this, Marius, “pointing towards the enemy, said, ‘There is where you must get it.’”⁴⁹ Frontinus tells a similar story of Cyrus the Great. Wanting to stimulate his men’s desire to fight, Cyrus employed them for an entire day cutting down a forest. The next day he gave them a lavish feast, and asked them which they preferred. When they said that they preferred the feast, Cyrus replied, “And yet it is only through the former that we can reach the latter; for unless you conquer the Medes, you shall not be free and happy.”⁵⁰

The concept of delayed gratification is apparent: the army should put off its feasting until it is victorious, as in the Roman triumphal banquets. When Aemilius Paullus said that “the same spirit was required both in planning a campaign and in presiding at a banquet,” that of logistics, he held his festivities and games at Amphipolis *after* defeating Perseus of Macedon at Pydna in 168 BC.⁵¹ A banquet was only safe when the war had been concluded and the categories of warfare and revel no longer risked confusion.

The Caesarian account of the battle of Pharsalus, where Caesar defeated his rival Pompey, employs the imagery of the premature feast. Before the battle, Pompey and his army set out a feast with bowers, much silver plate, couches constructed from fresh turf and wreathed with ivy, “and many other indications of excessive luxury and confidence of victory.”⁵² The Pompeians had expected to win easily, but after the battle this feast was eaten by the winners, Caesar and his

Valerius Maximus displays disapproval of luxury in *militia*. On *Graecia et Asia*, Wheeler 1996: 229, 238–42. Vitellius as premature *triumphator*: Suet. *Vit.* 10.2.

⁴⁸ Val. Max. 9.1.5.

⁴⁹ Front. *Strat.* 2.7.12; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 18.3–4.

⁵⁰ Front. *Strat.* 1.11.19; Hdt. 1.126; Polyaeus 7.6.7; Justin 1.6.4–6.

⁵¹ Plut. *Paull.* 28.5; Plut. *Mor.* 198B = *Apophth.* *Paull.* 6. On triumphal feasts, Veyne 1990: 235; Deniaux 1987: 298; Donahue 2004: 61. Their scale was enormous. Lucullus’ triumph required 100,000 jars of wine, Plut. *Luc.* 37; in 46 BC Caesar required 22,000 couches and 3,000 eels, Plut. *Caes.* 55.4; Plin. *HN* 9.81.171; Macrobi. *Sat.* 3.15.10; Deniaux 1987: 301. Even after warfare ended, a leader’s luxury might be censured, e.g., Plut. *Luc.* 38.2–41.6.

⁵² Caes. *BC* 3.96.

army.⁵³ The passage recalls the contrast of Persian and Spartan dinners in Herodotus. After the battle of Plataea in 479 BC, the Spartan general Pausanias was struck by the luxury of the Persian king's tent, where the king's dinner was laid out, and ordered a Spartan dinner to be served in comparison. With this allusion, Caesar likens Pompey to the effeminate and defeated Persian Xerxes, legitimating his downfall.⁵⁴ Tacitus uses the imagery of untimely feasting to discredit Vitellius and his army, who embark on endless feasts and celebrations while their rivals prepare for civil war. Tacitus shows the bad effects of such feasting in graphic detail.⁵⁵

MEDICAL EFFECTS: DRUNKENNESS AND INCAPACITATION

In modern times, alcoholic intoxication (and drug abuse) is a major source and sign of poor military discipline, causing irrational and destructive behavior and insubordination, and leading to incapacitation.⁵⁶ Modern biographers have diagnosed Alexander the Great with alcoholism and might diagnose Marius, Sulla, Mark Antony, and the emperors Vitellius, Trajan, and Caracalla as similarly afflicted.⁵⁷ Drunkenness would be the most facile explanation of Roman soldiers' misbehavior.⁵⁸ To a certain extent, ancient writers support this. Polybius disparages

⁵³ App. *BC* 2.11.81.

⁵⁴ Hdt. 9.82; Goldsworthy 1998: 211–12; Rossi 2000. Cf. Octavian's invective against Antony in Zanker 1988: 33–77.

⁵⁵ Vitellius' personal banquets, Tac. *Hist.* 1.62, 2.62, 2.95, 3.36; Suet. *Vit.* 13.1–3. His officers and soldiers, Tac. *Hist.* 2.68, 3.76; Suet. *Vit.* 10.2.

⁵⁶ Present U.S. military policy in Iraq forbids use of alcohol and drugs, with the goals of maintaining discipline, health, efficient operations, and respect for nondrinking Muslims, as well as repudiating the Vietnam-era reputation of the U.S. armed forces for alcohol and drug abuse.

⁵⁷ Alexander's alcoholism, O'Brien 1994; Marius, suggested by Posidonius, discussed in the main text below. Antony: Cic. *Philipp.* 2.50, 59, 63, 67; Plut. *Ant.* 2.3, 4.2, 9.3–4, 21, 51.2; Plin. *HN* 14.14.8. Vitellius: Tac. *Hist.* 1.62, 2.68, 3.36; Suet. *Vit.* 10.3, 13.1, 17.2. Trajan: Dio 68.7.4; Aur. Vict. *Caes.* 13.10. Caracalla: Dio 78.(77)17.4. Galerius: *Anon. Vales.* 14. This list omits hard-drinking emperors who did not campaign, such as Claudius or Nero.

⁵⁸ Sall. *Cat.* 11.6; Livy 23.18.12, 23.45.1–5; Tac. *Hist.* 1.80 (drunken Praetorians mutiny against Otho); Plut. *Galba* 22.7 (acclamation of Vitellius); Tac. *Hist.* 2.68; implied in 2.93 (Vitellians); HA *Avid.* 5.5–12, *Pesc.* 3.9–11, Fronto *Princ. Hist.* 12; *Ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19. Caracalla drank with his soldiers, Dio 78.(77)17.4; Hdn. 2.5.1 (Praetorians). Soldiers and wineskin, Dio 79(78).1.1–3. On drunken soldiers in the later Empire, Amm. 22.4.6, 22.12.6; Paschoud 1987; Junkelmann 1997: 13; Carrié 1993: 119; drunken emperors, Humphries 2002: 77–83. Plutarch claims Cato drank mostly water on campaign: Plut. *Cato Maior* 1.7; he drank the same wine as his rowers, Front. *Strat.* 4.3.1; Val. Max. 4.3.11.

drunkenness and attributes it to numerous leaders and even peoples in his *Histories*, and both Pliny the Elder and Seneca the Younger note the deleterious effects of drunkenness.⁵⁹ However, references to drunkenness should not be collected out of context. A focus solely on alcohol consumption and alcoholism is anachronistic: the culture of dissolute dining was regarded as a package, in which alcohol consumption was only one item. Excessive or extravagant eating was just as objectionable, and received more attention, as did overall lapse of *habitus* and the failure of the revelers to attend to duties.⁶⁰ As a later section shows, excessive or extravagant eating provided the authors of invectives with violent and grotesque imagery.

Roman authors acknowledged that drunkenness deranged the reason. Roman jurists viewed drunkenness as a possible cause of military indiscipline. According to the jurist Callistratus, the emperor Hadrian issued a rescript to the legate of Aquitania, stating that a soldier who set a prisoner free or intentionally allowed him to escape should be put to death, but if the escape occurred due to the drunkenness or laziness of the guard, he should be beaten and demoted in the service.⁶¹ Hadrian emphasized carelessness, not intoxication. Hadrian also ruled that the soldier who injures himself or another when drunk or in irresponsible play should be demoted in rank.⁶² Because soldiers' deliberate self-wounding or suicide attempts in order to escape military service were capitally punished, drunkenness probably was not considered a serious offence, but a mitigating factor.

However, serious episodes of insubordination and even sedition are also attributed to drunkenness. In Tacitus' *Histories* the drunkenness of the city troops leads to insubordination: as the rumor that the senate intends to assassinate Otho circulates in the mob of soldiers, more prone to rumor and violence because they are drunk, the soldiers lose control and break into Otho's aristocratic banquet, frightening the guests.⁶³ On the Rhine in AD 70, Hordeonius Flaccus' troops became drunk and mutinied against him.⁶⁴ Didius Julianus was drunk when he

⁵⁹ Eckstein 1995: 285–9, 1997: 177; Sen. *Ep.* 83.18–26, emphasizing the intoxicated man's violence and lack of self-control; Plin. *HN* 14.28.137–42. Caesar claims that some Gallic and Germanic peoples banned wine as effeminizing, Caes. *BG* 4.2 (Suebi), 2.15 (Nervii, who also banned trade).

⁶⁰ Emphasized in Tac. *Hist.* 3.36.

⁶¹ D. 48.3.12.pr. (Callistratus *Cogn.* 5): *per vinum aut desidiam custodis*. A. Watson [1970] [1975] 1991: 245. Drunkenness attributed to Aquitanian Gauls, cf. HA *Pesc.* 3.9–11.

⁶² D. 49.16.6.7 (Menander *Re mil.* 3), with 49.16.6.6. A. Watson [1970] [1975] 1991: 246–7.

⁶³ Tac. *Hist.* 1.80.

⁶⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 4.36.

proposed the “auction of the empire,” and in the fourth century, the usurper Magnentius was elevated at a drunken banquet.⁶⁵ Drunk soldiers could not keep secrets, even when the commander, tribune, and centurions ordered silence.⁶⁶

Military reverses are also attributed to drunkenness. Compilers of stratagems urged commanders to take advantage of the enemy’s lack of self-control by setting out food and drink as bait. The enemy would consume it to excess and become incapacitated, easily ambushed and killed.⁶⁷ The food and drink might even be poisoned. These “feasts of mass destruction” were employed most frequently against barbarians, regarded as lacking in prudence and self-control.⁶⁸ Marius caught the Cimbri and Teutones at Aquae Sextiae “feasting and enjoying themselves” by bathing in the locality’s hot springs.⁶⁹ However, Roman troops sometimes succumbed to temptation and were ambushed.⁷⁰ In the Jugurthine War the Roman garrison of the town of Vaga was caught off guard and was slain in the midst of their feasting.⁷¹ During Pompey’s campaign against Mithridates VI of Pontus in 66 BC, the Heptacomitae, a local people, set out bowls of poisonous honey as a trap for the Romans: when the soldiers consumed the honey and became incapacitated, the Heptacomitae ambushed and defeated them.⁷²

⁶⁵ Hdn. 2.71. Cf. Didius Julianus’ extravagant dinner on winning the empire, Dio 74.13.1, denied by HA *Did.* 3.8–10. Magnentius: *Epit. de Caes.* 41.22.

⁶⁶ Sen. *Ep.* 83.12.

⁶⁷ Mayor 2003: 101–3, 143–69; Aen. *Tact.* 16.5–6, 12–13.

⁶⁸ Polyb. 16.3 (Gauls); Tac. *Ann.* 4.48 (Thracian auxiliaries); Polyaeus 8.25.1 (Celts). Poisoned or drugged wine: Polyaeus 5.10.1; Front. *Strat.* 2.5.12 (Carthaginians added mandrake); Polyaeus 7.42 (Celts added purgatives); poisoned water, Front. *Strat.* 3.7.6; Polyaeus 6.13 (Greeks in First Sacred War). Greek troops suffered reverses because drunk: Eckstein 1995: 285–9. Romans use food and drink against barbarians: Livy 41.2.10–13 (Histri in 178 BC pillage Roman camp and are ambushed); Front. *Strat.* 2.5.14 (Spain in 178 BC); Tac. *Ann.* 1.50 (Germanicus and his troops ambush German tribes stupefied by a native festival); Dio 67.5.6 (a Roman commander uses food and wine against the Nasamones); against the Syracusans (Front. *Strat.* 3.3.2; Livy 25.23; Plut. *Marc.* 18). Veg. *Mil.* 3.10.8 recommends ambushing the dining or sleeping enemy. Hindley 1994: 360 records a Spartan commander ambushed during sex, Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.18.

⁶⁹ Plut. *Marc.* 19.2–3.

⁷⁰ Plut. *Sert.* 3.4 (Celtiberians ambush drunk Romans); 27 (Sertorius’ death); Front. *Strat.* 2.5.13 (Hannibal uses food against Romans). Caesar’s troops might have been ambushed at Gomphi, App. *BC* 2.10.64. Amm. 22.12.6 is a civilian version: instead of attacking, the Antiochenes carry Julian’s stupefied soldiers to barracks. Avidius Cassius punished plundering soldiers because they might have been ambushed: HA *Avid.* 4.6.

⁷¹ Sall. *Jug.* 66.3.

⁷² Strabo *Geog.* 12.3.18; cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4.8.20–21. Honey from *Rhoddendron ponticum*, widespread in the Black Sea mountains, contains grayanotoxin, causing short-term dizziness, weakness, vomiting, convulsions,

The commander's self-incapacitation from feasting and drinking also might lead to reverses: during the Hannibalic War, the Roman commander C. Livius lost the citadel of Tarentum because he was drunk.⁷³ Vitellius' banqueting and drinking at all hours rendered him incompetent to wage war against the Flavians.⁷⁴ According to Ammianus Marcellinus, the Roman commander Lupicinus failed to respond to a Gothic invasion due to his befuddled mental state late in a banquet.⁷⁵ Lesser forms of military incompetence, such as soldiers' abandoning watches, sleeping through the night, and not wearing armor, also resulted from excessive drinking.⁷⁶

In contrast, the Roman elite tended to ignore heavy drinking as long as the drinker maintained his self-control, with an appearance of dignity (*gravitas*) and steady and severe *habitus*.⁷⁷ Various individuals are known whose drinking did not affect their bearing or behavior. The future emperor Tiberius, when still a young man on campaign, was nicknamed "Biberius Caldius Mero" – "drinker of neat hot wine" – but was a highly competent commander.⁷⁸ Trajan was reputedly a heavy drinker, but it never affected his behavior.⁷⁹ Pliny in the *Natural History* discusses the deleterious effects of heavy drinking, but describes one Novellius Torquatus who was unaffected by his remarkable consumption.⁸⁰ These representations contrast with modern times, in which a prominent person's heavy drinking would be regarded as pathological, even if the person was able to hold his or her liquor, a modern symptom of alcoholism.

Nonetheless, the Romans probably associated heavy drinking in *militia*, especially before battle, with barbarians or personnel of barbarian origins. Romans are not seen drinking to counter jitters before battle.⁸¹ When Tacitus ascribes

and cardiac irregularities. Ingestion of 50 g of honey causes severe poisoning. Mayor 2003: 153; Spörke and Smolinske 1990: 25–8. A poisonous root made Antony's troops hallucinate, Plut. *Ant.* 45.5–6.

⁷³ Polyb. 8.27.1–6.

⁷⁴ Tac. *Hist.* 1.62, 2.62, 68, 71, 87, 90, 93, 95, 3.36; cf. Suet. *Vit.* 10.2; 13; Dio 64(65).2.2–3.3.

⁷⁵ Amm. 31.5.6.

⁷⁶ Fronto *ad Verum* 2.1.19; HA *Pesc.* 3.9–12.

⁷⁷ D'Arms 1995: 305–7. E.g., Papirius Cursor, Livy 9.16.14; Cato the Younger, Plin. *Ep.* 3.12.3; L. Piso, city prefect under Augustus, Sen. *Ep.* 83.14. The drunken lower orders could not maintain self-control, D'Arms 1995: 313–14.

⁷⁸ Suet. *Tib.* 42.1; cf. 59.

⁷⁹ Dio 68.7.4.

⁸⁰ Plin. *HN* 14.28.144–6.

⁸¹ Goldsworthy 1996: 261.

this practice to the Vitellians in the civil war of 69 AD, this detail is intended to barbarize them, drunkenness being a stereotypical trait of Gallic and Germanic barbarians.⁸² Only once is it suggested that indulgence in wine benefited Roman soldiers. Before the battle of Pharsalus, Caesar allowed his soldiers, who had suffered from severe privations, to pillage the town of Gomphi in Thessaly and to sate themselves with food and drink. The Caesarians' morale and health were paradoxically restored by this plundering and drunkenness, which "brought their bodies into a different habit."⁸³

Roman soldiers' overconsumption of alcoholic drink was not always seen as a specific problem, perhaps because distilled liquors, with their higher alcohol content, were unknown. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century British army and navy consumed hard liquor in quantity and employed it to raise soldiers' spirits before battle.⁸⁴ The Greeks and Romans consumed wine with an alcoholic content of not more than sixteen percent.⁸⁵ Hard liquors, though distillable from almost any fermented carbohydrate, became widely available in the seventeenth century onward with the mass production and trade of New World cane sugar.⁸⁶ At the source of this production, British soldiers in the eighteenth-century West Indies drank to unusual excess, according to supply and medical records.⁸⁷

In the Roman setting, not just the consumption of alcohol itself was deleterious, but also its social context, in which drinking was not clearly distinguished from eating and from festivity in general.⁸⁸ The Greek *symposium* was a long-drawn-out affair, in which wine was usually mixed with water. Hard drinkers drank their

⁸² Tac. *Hist.* 2.21; hinted in Sen. *Ira* 1.13.3, Ash 1999: 42. Ash 1999: 39, 47 on Tacitus' depiction of the Rhine legions and *auxilia* as barbarians, resembling the Gauls who sacked Rome in 390 BC (Tac. *Hist.* 1.69, 2.20, 2.88, 2.93, 2.99, 3.71–2).

⁸³ Plut. *Caes.* 41; App. *BC* 2.10.64 depicts the pillaging and drunkenness as destructive; *Caes. BC* 3.80–81 emphasizes control. Gilliver 1996b: 230–31. Elsewhere soldiers might incapacitate themselves through overeating after hardship, App. *BC* 3.11.81 (Decimus Brutus' troops); Plut. *Ant.* 49.4.

⁸⁴ Murray 1991: 83–7.

⁸⁵ Davidson 1997: 40. Plin. *HN* 14.8.62 (Faustian wine burns).

⁸⁶ Caribbean sugar cane, farmed by African slaves, was processed into sugar and molasses and made into rum in New England; the rum was traded for African slaves. H. Thomas 1997 on the slave-trade cycle; Mintz 1986 on sugar.

⁸⁷ Buckley 1998: 281–8. Buckley 1998: 283 argues that despite the damage to military discipline and health, the British supplied personnel with hard liquor because their addiction discouraged desertion.

⁸⁸ Davidson 1997: 37–8.

wine straight.⁸⁹ Romans usually consumed wine (also mixed with water) with food, in the dinner or banquet setting known as the *convivium*; a period of separate drinking, the *commissatio*, might follow. The Roman literary authors associate the sole consumption of wine, its object being intoxication, with barbarians. In both cultures, the *symposium* or *convivium* had associations of relaxation, pleasure, and luxury, in a delimited social and physical space inappropriate to the campaign.

MEDICAL EFFECTS: FOOD

A modern analyst of the relation of Greek warfare to dining comments that “while a well-fed warrior is a strong one, a fat warrior exhibits an element of the dysfunctional.”⁹⁰ Roman invective on fat men is strongly differentiated according to literary register: satirical poetry and fiction present the bloated bodies of moral degenerates and the fattened, overstuffed animals they consume.⁹¹ Imperial biographies list the physical traits of emperors; many tyrannical emperors had potbellies and thin legs.⁹² However, in other registers what mattered was the body’s ability to perform *labor*; obesity might be a sign of *desidia* (sloth). Cato the Elder, during his censorship in 184 BC, deprived the *eques* Lucius Veturius of his public horse because Veturius was too fat, proof of a degree of *desidia* that rendered him unfit for military service.⁹³ Seneca the Younger reproves bodies fattened by *desidia*, unable to bear their own weight, let alone *labor*, and compares habitual nocturnal revelers, who sleep all day, to birds being fattened for the table by confinement in the dark.⁹⁴ Such behavior was especially inappropriate in military personnel, because their likeness to livestock suggested their impending slaughter.⁹⁵

⁸⁹ Unmixed wine, the Greek *akratos* or Roman *merum*, was associated with barbarians, the dissolute, and the Spartans, despite the ideal of Spartan austerity, Davidson 1997: 61–9.

⁹⁰ Murray 1991: 83; Gowers 1993: 13; Roth 1999: 13. This section is confined to classical authors’ views, rather than modern remarks on portrait sculptures.

⁹¹ Gowers 1993: 13, 16–17, 122, 184–5; Rimell 2005: 83–5.

⁹² Suet. *Calig.* 50.1, *Nero* 51, *Vit.* 17.2, *Dom.* 18.

⁹³ Gell. 6.22.1–4 (= ORF ed. 4 Cato fr. 78); Plut. *Cato Maior* 9.5; Astin 1988: 20 and n. 27; Gowers 1993: 13. Plut. *Caes.* 62.10; Suet. *Vit.* 7.1: such men were not to be feared. The consul Vetilius, App. *Iber.* 63 (148 BC).

⁹⁴ Sen. *Prov.* 2.6, *Ep.* 122.4; used of the state, Livy pr.4.

⁹⁵ Gowers 1993: 73–5, 176–7. In Tac. *Hist.* 3.36 the comparison of Vitellius to a pig (or other torpid animal) prefigures his defeat and death and suggests the ambush topos, as in Livy 41.4.4 (Histri): *aliis somno mors continuata est*.

Prescribing the desirable physical traits of military recruits, Vegetius recommends a lean physique, broad-shouldered, flat-bellied, and narrow-hipped. He likens this recruit to the good bee in Vergil's *Georgics*, contrasted with the drone, which is "shaggy from idleness and dragging its broad, cowardly paunch."⁹⁶ This comparison, and Vegetius' insistence that recruits be levied from the countryside, accustomed to hard agricultural labor, suggest that the criterion was the ability of recruits to sustain physical effort. Vegetius' recruit should also have lean legs and feet, another physiognomic detail suggesting masculinity.⁹⁷

However, in contrast with modern Western attitudes, an overweight leader might still be commended if he (often an older man) still displayed energy and ability to perform *labor*.⁹⁸ Though they were elderly and had become corpulent, Marcius Philippus (the immediate predecessor of Aemilius Paullus in the Third Macedonian War) and Marius, when he returned from his exile to train young soldiers at Rome, were commended for their physical efforts.⁹⁹ Such representations might be reversed if a commander was defeated, or if he succumbed to luxury and idleness. Vitellius, who was very tall as well as corpulent, must initially have been an impressive figurehead; such an appearance suggested a lavish patron.¹⁰⁰ His body becomes torpid and incapacitated from his compulsive feasting and drinking, resembling "those sluggish beasts, who, as long as you supply them with food, lie and doze."¹⁰¹ At his death he is stripped and the Roman *plebs* mocks his physical defects, including a huge belly.¹⁰² The massively built emperor Galerius is termed handsome by a pagan biographer, and was praised for his personal feats in the field. But Christian authors on Galerius, the main agent of the "Great" Persecution of 303–11, stress his obesity and his prostration with a gangrene-like illness.¹⁰³ Ammianus depicts Chnodomarius, the German leader at the Battle of Strasbourg, as a huge man impressive in armor and mounted on his horse, but

⁹⁶ Veg. *Mil.* 1.6.4–5; Vergil *Georg.* 4.92–4.

⁹⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 1.6.4; Gleason 1995: 7.

⁹⁸ Cf. Mosse 1996: 168–80 on the Nazi cult of the idealized athletic male body; in contrast, the Italian Fascists emphasized physical labor and vigor instead of appearance.

⁹⁹ Marcius Philippus: Livy 44.4.10–11, praising his *labor*; Marius: Plut. *Mar.* 34.3.

¹⁰⁰ Suet. *Vit.* 17.2; R. R. Smith 1997: 191–3 (early Empire).

¹⁰¹ Tac. *Hist.* 3.36.

¹⁰² Tac. *Hist.* 3.85; Suet. *Vit.* 17. On his obesity, Ash 1999: 101–2.

¹⁰³ *Epit. de Caes.* 40.15; Amm. 16.10.3; Lact. *Mort. Pers.* 9.3; illness, 33.1–9; Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* 8.16.4. R. R. Smith 1997: 192–3, 195–7 on the Tetrarchs' *labor*; Humphries 2002: 82–3.

unable to get up when he falls, borne down by his own weight, his armor, and the mud of the battlefield.¹⁰⁴

Stereotypical common soldiers were tall, brawny men, whose size predisposed them to bully civilians.¹⁰⁵ As with their payments and eating habits, this imagery suggested civilians' resentment of the burden of the military budget and of the army's excessive weight in politics.¹⁰⁶ Such imagery also suggested the barbarization of the army. In practice, Roman soldiers on the northern frontiers may have needed to match their enemies in physique. Body mass probably added to *impetus*, onslaught or impact with the enemy, especially when running downhill.¹⁰⁷ However, when running uphill against gravity in the tactical location known as *locus iniquus*, body mass was not an advantage. Nor was it an advantage in endurance.

In the main elite tradition of body ideals, the Roman general and soldier should maintain a muscular but lean body, with more agility and stamina, less prone than a corpulent body to reverses of fortune and representation. However, too small or slight a man also risked credibility as a soldier or officer. The Greeks mocked Agesilaus' small size, and Plutarch apologizes for Julius Caesar's slight and pale appearance, which belied his abilities as a warrior and commander.¹⁰⁸

In Greek and Roman medical thought, excesses of food afflicted the bodily interior rather than its appearance: the body's vigor, level of activity, and "heat." The ideal male body was animated by a vital heat (*pneuma*), an energizing fire associated with masculinity.¹⁰⁹ A "hot, high-spirited momentum" in his bearing reflected this internal heat, but if it cooled, the man risked becoming effeminate.¹¹⁰ Pre-Christian dietetics attempted to increase vital heat and/or to render the male body as "dry" as possible through austerity. Dissolute living or even an incautious diet swamped the male body with unhealthy humors, rendering it cold and moist, more like the female body; luxurious foods were construed as "rotten," weakening the body and causing its dissolution.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁴ Amm. 16.12.24; 59; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 37.2 (Marius in the water).

¹⁰⁵ Juv. 16.14; Phaedrus *App.* 10; Tac. *Hist.* 2.88; Apul. *Met.* 9.42; Amm. 22.12.6 with 15.12.1 (the Gauls were tall).

¹⁰⁶ Carrié 1993: 119.

¹⁰⁷ Wiedemann 1992: 116 suggests that gladiators were fattened (*saginare*) to protect them against sword-cuts, but more credibly that gladiators built up body mass to increase their *impetus* in combat.

¹⁰⁸ Plut. *Ages.* 36, *Caes.* 17.2; on short commanders, Chapter Three *op. cit.* n. 134.

¹⁰⁹ Brown 1988: 10; Gleason 1995: 84–7; Celsus 2.27; Oribasius 3.31–2.

¹¹⁰ Brown 1988: 11.

¹¹¹ Rousselle 1988: 59; Dupont 1992a: 29–30, 1999: 122–3; grain made the body more "dry," cf. Gleason 1995: 84, 1999: 71; Humphries 2002: 83.

Though medical treatises, aimed at elite males, do not discuss the health of soldiers, soldiers' bodies probably required such heat, enabling their *impetus* or *ira* in battle. Soldiers may have possessed an excess of heat, flaring up into rage at the slightest provocation. Either their diet of wheat made their bodies "drier" and more inflammable, or excess meat-eating predisposed them to anger.¹¹² The older Greek moral and medical concept of *koros* (satiety, eating to excess) associated it with insolence and violence (*hubris*), as in the friskiness of overfed horses or the luxuriance of vines.¹¹³ The association of luxury and insubordination or violence is explored further below.

THE COLLAPSE OF DISCIPLINED *HABITUS*

The dangers of excessive or extravagant dining in *militia* emphasize the collapse of *habitus* in the susceptible.¹¹⁴ A wild "party" atmosphere distracted military personnel from their duties or even incapacitated them. Tacitus relates that "in Vitellius' circle all was chaos and drunkenness, an atmosphere more suited to late hours and wild bacchanals than to discipline and camp life."¹¹⁵ Tacitus stresses that the emperor's behavior set a bad example for his officers and soldiers. A fictional letter of Septimius Severus to Ragonius Celsus, the governor of Gaul, describes his soldiers as dancing, drinking, and singing constantly. Such soldiers became incapable of either *labor* or obedience.¹¹⁶

These effects reflect the Roman construction of *otium* (leisure) and *negotium* (business), in which dining was a characteristic activity of *otium*; elite Romans literally relaxed their *habitus* by reclining for dinner.¹¹⁷ Lying down in a state of relaxation was incompatible with the upright and alert *habitus* required in *militia*. Descriptions of eating in *militia* often stress the avoidance of reclining. When battle was imminent, or on the march, personnel might eat standing.¹¹⁸ Tiberius, not yet emperor, took his dinner seated; according to another source, he even sat

¹¹² Violent soldiers: *op. cit.* Chapter Two nn. 74, 76; Chapter Four n. 11. Abuse of requisitions, *op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 30.

¹¹³ Michelini 1978.

¹¹⁴ Wheeler 1996: 229–32, 253.

¹¹⁵ Tac. *Hist.* 2.68.

¹¹⁶ HA *Pesc.* 3.9–11.

¹¹⁷ Gowers 1993: 25–6; Fredrick 2002a: 255–6; M. Roller 2003: 381–4, 2006: 1ff.

¹¹⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 201c and Front. *Strat.* 4.3.9 (Scipio on the march); Plut. *Crass.* 23.5 (before Carrhae); Plut. *Ant.* 13.3 (Antony).

on the ground.¹¹⁹ In a late anecdote, the emperor Carus (282–3) is said to have received Persian ambassadors while seated on the ground, wearing an old cloak and eating pease porridge and bacon.¹²⁰

In stationary camps and on campaign, senatorial and equestrian officers probably were accustomed to recline for dinner as in civilian life.¹²¹ Though Tiberius dined in a sitting position, he allowed his officers to recline.¹²² Caligula, during his northern expedition in AD 39–40, in which he imposed an exaggerated military discipline, forced his officers to recline for dinner in their armor.¹²³ Normally, when dining, Roman aristocratic males doffed their togas and donned looser, more festive costume, the *cenatoria* or *synthesis*; nobody would recline for dinner in armor.¹²⁴ In contrast, the common soldiers in legionary and auxiliary barracks lacked space in which to recline, unless upon their bunks; they may have sat to eat.¹²⁵ When Caracalla served wine to the Praetorians, mixing their wine and passing around the cups, an elite style of dining is implied; Caracalla adopted the role of a slave boy at such dinners.¹²⁶

In practice, aristocratic commanders and officers were permitted to recline for dinner because they, as educated gentlemen, possessed the cultural knowledge of how to comport themselves and control their consumption at banquets. Among officers, austerity could be carried too far, giving offense to one's peers. This is

¹¹⁹ Vell. Pat. 2.114.3; Suet. *Tib.* 18.2. M. Roller 2006: 85, 88–9; standing might also be punitive, imposed by Scipio at Numantia for the midday meal (Plut. *Mor.* 201C); on cowardly freedmen recruited after Cannae, Livy 24.16.12–18.

¹²⁰ Synesius *Regno* 16 (Fitzgerald ed. I pp. 128.5–130.8). Amended from “Carinus,” Carus’ elder son, who did not campaign against the Persians, and who was dissolute rather than austere.

¹²¹ Roth 1999: 57–9; officers said to “dine” (*epulare*); Roller 2006: 89–90. L. Calpurnius Piso, *cos.* 133, forbade a cowardly officer to attend *convivia* or bathe, Val. Max. 2.7.9; Front. *Strat.* 4.1.26. The Histri found couches spread for dinner (*stratos lectos*) in the Roman quaestor’s tent, Livy 41.2.12. Even Scipio allowed personnel to recline for dinner, Plut. *Mor.* 201C = *Apophth. Scip. Min.* 16, and himself reclined with Marius, Val. Max. 8.15.7; Plut. *Mar.* 3.3. Marius claimed that he could not give a banquet, Sall. *Jug.* 85.39; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 3.4. Hadrian may have repressed excesses, Dio 69.9.2; HA *Hadr.* 10.4 (possible satire). On actual “luxury” Förtsch 1995 (Augustan *praetoria* in Rhine camps); Whittaker 2004: 98–9 (Vindolanda).

¹²² Vell. Pat. 2.114.3; Roller 2006: 89.

¹²³ Suet. *Calig.* 45.2: *ut erant loricated ad discumbendum adhortatus est.*

¹²⁴ Gowers 1993: 59–60; M. Roller 2006: 19.

¹²⁵ Roth 1999: 44–6, 55; cf. Tac. *Ann.* 13.16; space, MacMullen 1984 (in MacMullen 1990: 227). In Rome’s *popinae*, low-status eating houses, diners sat on chairs, stools, or benches, Roller 2006: 92–5 (HA *Pesc.* 3.10 speaks rhetorically).

¹²⁶ Dio 78.17.4; slaves stood at dinner, the standing posture signifying lower status during *otium*, M. Roller 2006: 19–21.

shown by Dio's irritated account of Ulpus Marcellus, who was legate in Britain, a stern disciplinarian, "not at all pleasant or agreeable," who "lived the life of a soldier in all respects."¹²⁷ Marcellus imposed *vigiliae* very strictly, and in order to stay awake he trained himself to eat little, sending to Rome for his bread so that it would be stale and hard by the time it reached Britain. Because he had sore gums, he was unable to eat much of this bread. Dio, who did not serve under Marcellus but may have known those who did, is clearly exasperated by the man, and adds that "he purposely exaggerated his natural tendency [to vigilance] by simulating, in order that he might have the greatest possible reputation for wakefulness." Sleepiness and excessive eating were closely associated, as the section on ambushes shows. Rather, Marcellus' offensiveness was due to his lack of good cheer: he was sour and stern, which failed to reconcile his subordinates to his austerity. In contrast, Marius as a young officer at Numantia displayed good cheer despite the hardships Scipio imposed, and Hadrian took care to be seen cheerfully (*libenter*) eating common soldiers' food in public.¹²⁸

Dio and Herodian depict Caracalla's attempt to live the life of his soldiers in all respects, grinding and baking his own bread, as a similar affectation. Macrinus, Caracalla's Praetorian prefect, a wealthy equestrian, preferred more refined dishes and expressed distaste for soldiers' food.¹²⁹ Elite officers seem to have desired a double standard of lifestyles in *militia*, in which they enjoyed civilized dinners, entertaining conversation, and moderate drinking in the *triclinium* of the commander's quarters.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, this moderate ideal of comity and relaxation risked a total collapse of *habitus*, slipping into overindulgence and incapacitation. A few men were able to alternate valor and effort in *negotium* with overindulgence in luxury in *otium*, but they are depicted as paradoxical.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Dio 73(72).8.3–5; on this method, cf. Plut. *Brut.* 36.2. Gleason 1995: 86 suggests that dry bread kept the body medically "dry." On Marcellus' acerbity, cf. Amm. 18.6.7 describing Sabinianus the commander at Amida as "so shamefully nervous that he could barely endure a noisy party, let alone the din of battle." No doubt Sabinianus had disapproved of his officers' parties.

¹²⁸ A leader's dour manner gave public offence, a tradition Jehne 2000 derives from the "struggle of the orders." Comity helped maintain social harmony. Cf. Tac. *Ann.* 15.30, Corbulo's reception of Tiridates; Dio 71.3.1–3, the charming Martius Verus; Gleason 1999: 73; A. R. Birley 2000: 102; Moore *forthcoming*. Marius: Plut. *Mar.* 3.2. Hadrian: HA *Hadr.* 10.2.

¹²⁹ Dio 78(77).17.4; Hdn. 4.7.5.

¹³⁰ Campbell 1975: 19; A. R. Birley 2003: 5; Roth 1999: 58–9, e.g. Plut. *Brut.* 40.1–4 (Brutus' and Cassius' conversation at dinner before the battle of Philippi).

¹³¹ J. Griffin 1977: 21; La Penna [1976] 1983, [1980] 1983; Cic. *Cael.* 12–13 (Caelius); Sall. *Jug.* 95.3; Plut. *Sulla* 2, 35.2–4 (Sulla); Sall. *Cat.* 5 (Catiline); Vell. Pat. 2.88.2 and Sen. *Ep.* 114.4–7 (Maecenas); Tac. *Ann.* 16.18

Most authors fail to describe the mental or emotional processes involved in the collapse of *habitus*; they moralize that the person is defeated by luxury.¹³² The language is a physical one of relaxation or slackening. The late Republican general Sertorius, previously known for his austerity, relaxed his efforts, took up a luxurious way of life, indulging in women, carousing, and drinking, “and as a result was defeated continually.”¹³³ A more psychological account of Marius’ end in 86 BC is given by Posidonius (quoted by Plutarch):

Marius himself by now exhausted with toils and deluged, as it were, by anxieties and worn down, could not sustain his spirit, which trembled in the face of the vivid thought of a new war, of fresh struggles, of terrors known by experience to be dreadful, and of utter fatigue. . . . he fell into dreadful distresses and terrors by night and disturbing dreams. . . . Since most of all he feared sleeplessness, he threw himself into drinking bouts and drunken states at inopportune times and unbecoming a man of his age, trying to induce sleep as an escape from his anxieties.¹³⁴

Undone by fears and visions of a terrible fate, Marius finally collapses and dies of pneumonia. Today Marius would be diagnosed with psychotic (agitated) depression, of which insomnia is a symptom. An analysis of Posidonius’ construction of motivation suggests that fear and distress “enter into” the self, overwhelm the rational part of the soul, and cause a literal collapse of *habitus*.¹³⁵ Expecting defeat and humiliation, Marius allows himself to be overwhelmed by fear and distress. However, his overindulgence in drink and desire for sleep are motivated by the appetitive part of his soul.

The luxurious man cannot resist the Stoic “first movements” or impulses, whether fears or desires for food and drink, sleep, and sexual pleasure. Seneca emphasizes that he is prone to cowardice as a result.¹³⁶ The most famous case of

(Petronius); Tac. *Hist.* 1.10 (Licinius Mucianus); Tac. *Hist.* 1.13 and 22, *Ann.* 13.46 (Otho). In Front. *Strat.* 1.1.5 Caesar employed self-indulgence in Egypt as a stratagem to hide his plans. Paradoxical soldiers: Suet. *Jul.* 67.

¹³² Antiochus III of Syria in Flor. 1.24; Caes. *BG* 6.24; Berry 1994: 67; Funari 1992.

¹³³ App. *BC* 1.13.113.

¹³⁴ Posidonius F 255/249 = Plut. *Mar.* 45.2–4; Hahm 1989: 1331–2.

¹³⁵ Hahm 1989: 1354. Marius’ despair is a *falling* (*enepipte*) into “dreadful distresses and terrors by night.” He “did not hold his soul up,” *tên psukhên . . . ouk anephēre*.

¹³⁶ Sen. *Ep.* 78.11–14, cf. *Brev. vit.* 1.3, *Ep.* 124.2.

such deterioration was that of Hannibal's troops at Capua, and a similar decline occurred in Vitellius' army and in Roman troops stationed in Syria.¹³⁷ Pleasure insinuates itself into the soul and softens and weakens the soldier's combat-ready disposition; after the winter at Capua, Hannibal's troops were unable to withstand the resumption of training and hardships in the spring. Love itself might enter the soul and weaken the character in this manner, as infatuation with Cleopatra destroyed Mark Antony.¹³⁸

Such collapse often takes the form of going native, whether Greek or barbarian. Austerity sought to maintain a "Roman" *habitus* in soldiers, whatever their origin. Luxury or excess in eating (especially meat, as will be seen) and drinking assimilated soldiers to stereotypical Greeks or Germans, discrediting the commanders who supplied soldiers with such excess.¹³⁹ A fictional letter of Marcus Aurelius praises Avidius Cassius for repressing "Greek" luxury in the Syrian legions.¹⁴⁰

Excess leisure, food and drink, and entertainments in *militia* also merged soldiers with the urban *plebs infima*, a social stratum despised by the elite, and especially with the practitioners of dishonorable occupations, such as gladiators, dancers, actors, effeminate, and urban slaves.¹⁴¹ These excesses thus merged military personnel with despised social strata, creating a community in which all distinctions collapsed in a state of abjection. At Numantia the soldiers became indistinguishable from the camp followers, called a *sentina* (bilge water, cesspool), until Scipio ejected the latter. In contrast, the imposition of austerity maintained the distinct and higher occupational status of soldiers.

DESTRUCTIVE BEHAVIOR

The imagery of feasting and drinking in *militia* also emphasizes the predatory behavior of soldiers and their commanders, especially in civil warfare. The political economy of imperial Rome was not a formally rational one. It employed shorthand images, literalizing the fiscal demands of the military as soldiers' rapacious consumption of food and drink, and even as their predation upon the body politic.

¹³⁷ Funari 1992; Tac. *Hist.* 1.62, 2.62, 2.68, 2.87, 2.93, 2.99. Livy: Ch. 6 n. 143.

¹³⁸ Russell 1998: 124–5; e.g., Plut. *Ant.* 53.11.

¹³⁹ Ash 1999: 39, 42, 47.

¹⁴⁰ HA *Avid.* 5.10. Cf. Dench 1998: 248 on luxury "othering" other nations or individuals.

¹⁴¹ Cic. *Att.* 1.16.11, 1.19.4, ad *Quintum fratrem* 2.5.3; Suet. *Aug.* 40.3. Ste. Croix 1981: 355; Gowers 1993: 14–16.

Sallust explains such behavior in relatively rational economic terms. As Chapter Five shows, *disciplina* ideology sought to control soldiers' use of money, discouraging squandering. Overconsumption of food and drink was necessarily wasteful and extravagant, especially if the items were costly, because food and drink, unlike other consumer goods, are destroyed in the process of consumption.¹⁴² *Avaritia* in support of *luxuria*, and especially culinary *luxuria*, was the most reprehensible form of avarice, because the luxurious might expend irrecoverable fortunes on ephemeral pleasures. Such persons fell into debt and in Sallust's view were the most frequent supporters of sedition. Among them were Sulla's veterans, whom he had accustomed to an extravagant lifestyle in Asia in order to win their support.¹⁴³

Ethical literature provided a deeper etiology: the man who indulges in luxury becomes more prone to anger; lacking self-control, he cannot restrain his impulses.¹⁴⁴ Scipio Africanus' soldiers' mutiny at Sucro displays this pattern.¹⁴⁵ Scipio Africanus allowed his troops too much leisure and food after a victory; these made them restive, leading to their mutiny and its harsh repression.¹⁴⁶ Vegetius' explanation of mutiny is similar.¹⁴⁷ According to Dio and Herodian, permitting soldiers luxuries or raising their pay, as Severus did, enabling a more luxurious way of life, made them insubordinate.¹⁴⁸

The ultimate result of lax discipline was *feritas*, "savagery" or "beastliness," literalized as soldiers' excessive consumption of meat. Gluttony was a trope for the Romans' rapacious imperialism.¹⁴⁹ The *Historia Augusta* claims that the brutal and uncultured soldier-emperor Maximinus the Thracian was eight and a half feet tall and could consume a Capitoline amphora (26 liters) of wine and at least forty pounds of meat in a sitting; he never ate vegetables.¹⁵⁰ This imagery did not criticize merely the size of the military budget or soldiers' undeserved

¹⁴² Edwards 1993: 178–90; Shaw 1975: 193; Corbeill 1997: 102–4; cf. Davidson 1997: 286–8, 301–3.

¹⁴³ On the *Sullani*, *op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 6.

¹⁴⁴ Harris 2001: 377–8 on Sen. *Ira* 1.21.1–2, 2.21.6–11, 2.25.1–3.

¹⁴⁵ Chrissanthos 1997.

¹⁴⁶ Polyb. 11.25.7, 11.25–30; Livy 28.24.6.

¹⁴⁷ Veg. *Mil.* 3.4.1.

¹⁴⁸ Dio 80.4.2; Hdn. 3.8.5.

¹⁴⁹ Gowers 1993: 19; as censor, Scipio Aemilianus punished a young man for letting his guests plunder a cake in the shape of Carthage; Plut. *Mor.* 200E = *Apophth. Scip. Min.* 11. In earlier Greek tradition, insatiability is associated with *hubris* and the downfall of states, Hdt. 9.82; Redfield [1985] 2002: 42–4; cf. Polyb. 31.25.3–7.

¹⁵⁰ HA *Maxim.* 4.1–2; Corbier 1989: 241; Carrié 1993: 118–19.

privileges, such as meat-eating.¹⁵¹ Such imagery underlined the barbarous character of Maximinus.¹⁵² The imagery of beast-like or cannibalistic rapacity was a sharp criticism of greed and violence in a society that routinely displayed shows in the arena in which hunters killed, or criminals were savaged by, fierce animals.¹⁵³ In the senatorial tradition, late Republican and imperial tyrants displayed a cannibalistic cruelty.¹⁵⁴ Domitian was described as a monstrous beast (*immanissima belua*).¹⁵⁵ The senators appear as the emperor's prey in a personal anecdote of Dio's. The emperor Commodus, after killing many other animals in the arena, decapitated an ostrich; brandishing its head and his bloody sword, he "wagged his head with a grin, indicating that he would treat us in the same way."¹⁵⁶

In the rhetorical accounts of civil warfare, carnivorous soldiers became predators upon the body politic. Their greed was rhetorically associated with cannibalism.¹⁵⁷ During the proscriptions of the Second Triumvirate, a centurion cut off the Roman noble Salvius' head at a banquet; the other guests were forced to remain at table.¹⁵⁸ Ovid calls an (equestrian) soldier a butcher "nourished on blood," *sanguine pastus*. Petronius' would-be epic poet Eumolpus speaks of the civil war soldier's acquisitive hunger.¹⁵⁹ Pliny praises Trajan for refraining from purges and confiscations so that "the children of citizens are not fed by these like troops of

¹⁵¹ Carrié 1993: 119.

¹⁵² Corbier 1989: 241.

¹⁵³ On *venationes* Coleman 1990. Kyle 1998: 184–212 argues that the Roman *plebs* routinely ate the flesh of the beasts, prompting cannibalism imagery such as Petr. *Sat.* 66.5–6. Predation imagery is cross-cultural, maybe prehistoric in origins. Burkert 1983: 47–8 suggests common prehistoric origins of war, hunting, and sacrifice. Brown 1988: 30–1; Ehrenreich 1997: 51–2, 76, 82, 94, 138–9, 148–50, 202–3; Detienne and Svenbro 1989: 161–3; Canetti 1962: 203–24, esp. 206, 210; Burkert 1996: 34–55; S. Braund 1996: 40–41, 51; M. Roller 2001: 5; Fredrick 2002a: 257; on echoes of Odysseus and the man-eating Cyclopes in later images of rapacious kings and politicians, Worman 2002: 103, 108–10; on the Cyclopes also Rundin 1996: 179–80.

¹⁵⁴ Sen. *Contr.* 9.2.7; Cic. *Cat.* 2.10–11, 20, 23; App. *BC* 4.4.20; Plut. *Ant.* 24.3–4; Plin. *HN* 14.28.148; cf. Macrob. *Sat.* 3.17.15; Suet. *Calig.* 27, 32; Dio 60.13.3–4; Suet. *Claud.* 34; Dio 67.9.1–5; Lact. *Mort. Pers.* 9.2–3; 21.5–6. In the *SC de Cn. Pisone* ll. 67–8, after the death of Germanicus, Piso celebrates *convivia*, in keeping with his *feritas morum*.

¹⁵⁵ Plin. *Pan.* 48.3, 49.3. Soldiers as beasts: Cic. *Philipp.* 8.9, 10.22. But Suet. *Tib.* 25.1 (the emperor says that he holds a wolf by the ears) refers to the entire empire, not just the army.

¹⁵⁶ Dio 73(72).21.1–2; cf. Sen. *Const.* 2.2 (senator compared to ostrich).

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Petr. *Sat.* 141.7; Hdt. 3.38.1–3.

¹⁵⁸ App. *BC* 4.4.17.

¹⁵⁹ Ov. *Am.* 3.8.10; Petr. *Sat.* 119 lines 32–3. *Otium* and *licentia* made the Vitellians violent as well as slack, Tac. *Hist.* 2.56, 2.68, 2.73, 2.76–7, 3.76; in 3.83, battle merges with revelry.

beasts on the blood of slaughtered men.”¹⁶⁰ Pliny refers to the charitable funds Trajan established to feed Italian boys and girls, but alludes to the civil wars when soldiers received confiscated estates.

Soldiers’ predation was not merely a rhetorical trope. Soldiers are attested as abusing the hospitality of the civilians with whom they were billeted or whom they were stationed near, demanding food and furniture; oil for food, bathing, and lighting; and personal services.¹⁶¹ By imposing austerity on soldiers, the Roman authorities reassured their provincial subjects that the empire’s soldiers would not pillage and extort from them. This aspect of discipline was needed to maintain provincial loyalty.¹⁶² The emperor’s own austerity on campaign or progresses may have mollified the local communities, who were often required to provide hospitality on a vast scale.¹⁶³

Soldiers’ excess consumption of meat and drink suggested that they were both predators and prey, as in Ammianus’ account of Julian’s sacrificial feasts at Antioch. Julian, a convinced pagan, offered sacrifices of numerous oxen and other animals and birds to the gods. The meat was consumed by his soldiers, who gorged and drank themselves insensible and were carried from the pagan temples to their barracks by the Antiochenes.¹⁶⁴ Ammianus stresses the barbarity and boorishness of these mostly Gallic and Germanic troops, who were unable to exercise self-control. However, their incapacitation also foreshadows the defeat of Julian’s expedition in Persia.

Soldiers’ endurance of austerity, however, could also suggest the ferocity of hungry predators. In the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, shortly before the battle of Pharsalus, Caesar’s men endured with *singulari patientia* severe shortages of rations, because the Pompeians had carried off all the supplies.¹⁶⁵ The Caesarians apparently still had barley, vegetables, and meat to eat, but no wheat. Their hunger must be interpreted in cultural terms: barley was regarded as food for animals and criminal soldiers, meat was eaten in too small a portion to make up the day’s

¹⁶⁰ Plin. *Pan.* 27.3. Cf. *Pan.* 20.

¹⁶¹ Soldiers’ extortion, *op. cit.* Chapter Five no. 113–14, 130.

¹⁶² Ando 2000: 194–9.

¹⁶³ E.g., P. Beatty *Panop.* 1.276–331 (AD 299), documenting requisitions for Diocletian and his troops in Egypt.

¹⁶⁴ Amm. 22.12.6. Nomadic barbarians were thought to eat much half-cooked or raw meat, e.g., Caes. *BG* 4.1, 5.14, 6.22; Shaw 1982–3; Corbier 1989: 226; Isaac 2004: 207–11.

¹⁶⁵ Caes. *BC* 3.47.

calories, and vegetables provided little nourishment. So the Caesarians made bread from a root called *chara*.¹⁶⁶ Morale remained high: the men swore that “they would feed on bark from the trees before they would let Pompey slip from their hands.”¹⁶⁷ Suetonius says that the Caesarians’ endurance of hunger intimidated Pompey: when Pompey saw the bread made from roots, he said “that he was fighting with wild beasts,” and ordered the bread to be hidden before his soldiers could see it, “lest the endurance and resolution of the enemy break their spirits.”¹⁶⁸ The Caesarians did not strike fear into Pompey merely because of their high morale and endurance; beneath these abstract qualities, the Caesarians seem like barbarians or ravenous animals, who will “eat” the Pompeians. They follow the military ethic of delayed gratification observed earlier, but their austerity makes them more terrible. This psychology appears in Book 19 of the *Iliad*, where Odysseus tries to persuade Achilles, mourning for Patroclus, to eat and thus restore his strength for combat, and to let his soldiers dine.¹⁶⁹ Achilles rejects the thought of eating, for he prefers to consume his own rage and anticipates the “cannibalistic” killing of Hector.¹⁷⁰

Though ordinary soldiers probably did not recline for dinner, the association of dining with reclining and relaxation conjured vulnerability in *militia*. As the “feasts of mass destruction” stratagem suggests, an army in this state was vulnerable to ambush. In contrast, as long as soldiers were not actually weakened by hunger, relative austerity conferred a kind of invulnerability through the reinforcement of military *habitus*. Austerity protected soldiers from incapacitation and the dissolution of military *habitus*. Nonetheless, austerity was also a repressive and punitive ideology. Austerity had to become acceptable to the soldiers, and this was done through an ideology of commensality.

¹⁶⁶ Caes. *BC* 3.48; cf. App. *BC* 2.9.61; Plut. *Caes.* 39.1. On meat vs. grain and shortages, Davies 1971 (in Davies 1989: 203–4); Junkelmann 1997: 103–4, 155–8; Roth 1999: 17–18. App. *Iber.* 54; Caes. *BG* 7.17; Tac. *Ann.* 14.24. On food substitutes during famine, Garnsey 1999: 40.

¹⁶⁷ Caes. *BC* 3.49; App. *BC* 2.11.66.

¹⁶⁸ Suet. *Iul.* 68.2. Cf. App. *BC* 2.11.75; Plut. *Caes.* 39.2–3. Caes. *BC* 3.48 relates that his men threw the bread at the Pompeians to taunt and intimidate them. Barbarians stereotypically made bread or cakes from substances other than grain, such as herbs, fish, or lice, Hdt. 3.22; Strabo *Geog.* 15.2.2; Arr. *India* 29.9.15; Shaw 1982–3: 29; Davidson 1997: 305. Cf. Dio 62.5.5, Boudicca taunts the Romans: “they require kneaded bread and wine and oil, and if any of these things fails them, they perish; for us . . . any grass or root serves as bread, the juice of any plant as oil, any water as wine.”

¹⁶⁹ Worman 2002 on Hom. *Il.* 19.179–367.

¹⁷⁰ Worman 2002: 106–7 and n. 21.

AUSTERITY AS COMMENSALITY

Ideally, commanders and even emperors on campaign shared the soldiers' rations. If there was little to eat, the ideal commander also endured this hardship: Marius stresses that he shared his soldiers' hardships, including *inedia*.¹⁷¹ According to Pliny, Trajan's troops bore hunger and thirst with him.¹⁷² Hadrian "cheerfully" consumed before the army such military rations as bacon, cheese, and vinegar, in imitation of Scipio Aemilianus, Metellus, and his own adoptive father Trajan.¹⁷³ The emperor Caracalla went so far as to use wooden dining utensils on campaign. He also ground his own grain and made unleavened bread baked on coals, which he ate.¹⁷⁴

The emperor or commander set an example for the common soldiers in doing this. The commander's consuming the same food as the soldiers may also have reassured his men that he would detect inferior or adulterated supplies, a bugbear of logistics in early modern and even modern European and American militaries. However, the emperor's eating the soldiers' food fossilized into a ritual in which he tasted samples (*indicia*) presented at his imperial accession. The future emperor Jovian, while still a private citizen, received these samples by accident, a portent of his imperial rule.¹⁷⁵ Julian, however, revived *commilito* austerity. Though Constantius II sent him a menu appropriate for Caesar's table, including pheasant and sow's womb, Julian rejected it and contented himself with the "coarse and ordinary" rations of common soldiers.¹⁷⁶

When practiced by the officers, military austerity removed one of the men's major sources of resentment in a highly hierarchical military: that the officers live in comfort and safety while ordering the men to risk death and wounds, or

¹⁷¹ Sall. *Jug.* 85.34–5; cf. Plut. *Mar.* 7.3.

¹⁷² Plin. *Pan.* 13.1.

¹⁷³ HA *Hadr.* 10.2. Cf. Lucius Verus, Fronto *Princ. Hist.* 12: "his table plain, his food the common camp fare; his drink the local wine, the water of the season." Plut. *Cato Maior* 4.3, 6.1; Livy 34.18.5 (Cato), *Mar.* 3.2, 7.3; Sall. *Jug.* 85.33 (Marius); Cic. *Cat.* 3.16 (Catiline); Plut. *Ant.* 17.3, 45.5 (Antony); Tac. *Ann.* 14.24 (Corbulo in the East); Hdn. 2.11.2 (Severus); HA *Pesc.* 11.1 (Pescennius Niger), *Alex.* 51.5 and 61.2 (Alexander Severus). Antony also imitated soldiers' manners, Plut. *Ant.* 4. In Gedrosia, to share his men's thirst, Alexander poured out a helmet of water brought to him, Front. *Strat.* 1.1.7; Polyaeus 4.3.25; Curt. 7.5.9–12; Plut. *Alex.* 42.3–6. Cf. Moore *forthcoming*.

¹⁷⁴ Hdn. 4.7.5; cf. Dio 78.13.1–2.

¹⁷⁵ D. 49.16.12.2 (Macer *Re mil.* 1): *frumentationes commilitonum interesse, frumentum probare*. Ritual: Amm. 21.16.21 (in 363).

¹⁷⁶ Amm. 16.5.3, 25.2.2.

at least effort and privation. This contrast is most obvious in modern warfare where battles may last for months and be spread out over many miles, and the commanders reside far from the front or in secured areas.¹⁷⁷ Many American private soldiers in the Vietnam War disliked the officer caste's privileges.¹⁷⁸ They perceived these officers as careerists indifferent to their men's welfare; officers lived in relative luxury at their bases, did not share the burdens of combat, and received undeserved medals.¹⁷⁹ Such a contrast was perhaps less evident in Roman warfare and military service. Nonetheless, commanders in the Principate did not usually fight in the front or adopt the soldiers' hard labor.

In the last two centuries of the Roman Republic, *novi homines* such as Cato the Censor and Marius drew attention to such inequalities, emphasizing their own conspicuous *commilito* austerity on campaign, sharing all hardships with their men, in contrast with the luxurious *nobiles* denounced by Marius.¹⁸⁰ The illustrious aristocrat Scipio Aemilianus, who had acquired his consulships (146 and 134 BC) irregularly, also justified his commands through imposing and enduring austerities. Augustus himself, from a "new man" family and whose degree of power was unprecedented, displayed personal austerity, though he eschewed a *commilito* image and enforced a severe *disciplina*.¹⁸¹

Dietary austerity represented a symbolic leveling, important in a society that demonstrated hierarchy and power with extravagance, especially at the dinner table. The emperor, as supreme commander, condescended to dine with his common soldiers, as *commilito*, eating their rough food. Thus, the emperor cemented the personal relationship between himself and the soldiers, on which his power rested.¹⁸²

Commensality usually reinforces community and social cohesion.¹⁸³ The ideology of the Roman aristocratic *convivium* or banquet emphasized the setting aside

¹⁷⁷ Modern warfare: Keegan 1976: 307–16.

¹⁷⁸ Gabriel and Savage 1978: 12, 14–15, 63, 67.

¹⁷⁹ Gabriel and Savage 1978: 71.

¹⁸⁰ Sall. *Jug.* 85:34–5.

¹⁸¹ Austerity, Suet. *Aug.* 76–7; discipline, Suet. *Aug.* 24.

¹⁸² Campbell 1984: 51; Lendon 1997: 118. Both Junkelmann 1997: 12 and Stäcker 2003: 93 doubt that emperors usually practiced austerity on campaign; they may have dined more luxuriously in private, suggested by Amm. 16.5.3. Cf. the British royal family's display of symbolic austerity during the Second World War, Zweiniger–Bargielowska 1993.

¹⁸³ Community emphasized by D'Arms 1984 and 1990: 338–40, 344–5; hierarchy by M. Roller 2001: 138–9; Donahue 2003.

of social divisions.¹⁸⁴ A good emperor dined with his peers, the senatorial and equestrian aristocracy at Rome. He thus confirmed his identity as *civilis princeps*, presenting himself as modest, affable, accessible, and living with relative simplicity as should his notional peers the senators. He thus rejected the ostentation of a Persian or Hellenistic king.¹⁸⁵ In contrast, the arrogant over-powerful patron or autocrat dined alone or humiliated his guests by giving them inferior positions at table, serving them worse food, and otherwise reinforcing hierarchy in an offensive manner.¹⁸⁶

Explaining this insistence on commensality as community, a cultural critic speculates that the ritual of dining together emerged as an affirmation that the commensals will not eat each other.¹⁸⁷ A culture in which tyrants were routinely compared to carnivorous beasts needed such reassurance. As discussed above, the Roman elite held these anxieties concerning the military, regarding the soldiery as a greedy, predatory horde.

Austerity in *militia* did not only promote community; it also had to reinforce hierarchy, explaining why *austeritas* was required. The commander might have shared extravagant feasts with his soldiers to cement commensality. In fact, the army probably held sacrificial feasts to celebrate the cult holidays attested in the *Feriale Duranum*; the *Saturnalia* was also marked by feasting.¹⁸⁸ These holiday feasts are not represented by the literary authors, due to their negative valuation of feasts in *militia* and high valuation of austerity.¹⁸⁹ Aside from triumphal or Saturnalian feasts, the different ranks did not dine together.

Roman *contubernia* must have cooked, dined, and drunk together, receiving rations per *contubernium*, but the depiction of Roman *contubernia* does not display these bonding practices, unlike the Spartan *syssition*.¹⁹⁰ The professionalization of the Roman army may have dissociated it, at least in discourse, from such

¹⁸⁴ D'Arms 1990; Donahue 2003: 432, 434–5; on archaic Greek origins of this ideology, Rundin 1996: 194, 205–8.

¹⁸⁵ S. Braund 1996: 49–52; Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 40.

¹⁸⁶ Juv. *Sat.* 1.135–41. In Plin. *Pan.* 49.4–6 the misanthropic Domitian dines alone, eating nothing at his public feasts and harassing his guests. Stat. *Silv.* 1.6.35–8, 43–50 flatters Domitian as a “divine” host at his public banquets, cf. Mart. 8.39, 9.91; S. Braund 1996: 49–50; Donahue 2003: 436.

¹⁸⁷ Canetti 1962: 220; S. Braund 1996: 38–9.

¹⁸⁸ Roth 1999: 31. The *Feriale Duranum* (*P.Dura* 54 = *RMR* 117) records 24 holidays between 3 January and 23 September on which cattle were sacrificed.

¹⁸⁹ Joseph. *BJ* 7.16: after the fall of Jerusalem, Titus held a banquet for his army with sacrifices.

¹⁹⁰ Murray 1991: 92–4; Rundin 1996: 205–8.

civilian communal practices as mass commensality, whereas the Greek hoplite armies, as citizen armies, retained the civilian forms. Such a dissociation also suggests Weberian bureaucratic rationalization, resembling the separation of work from the domestic sphere and from entertainment. However, the Roman elite imposed a punitive austerity on soldiers to reinforce the military and social hierarchy.

A PUNITIVE MODEL OF AUSTERITY

The imposition of austerity as part of military discipline promoted not just social cohesion, but social control, invoking the discourses linking soldiers' dietary excesses with moral decline, military defeat, and civil war. In the elite view, soldiers did not deserve *voluptas* (pleasure) in reward for *labor*.¹⁹¹ Cicero's Stoic treatise *Tusculan Disputations* exalts *labor*, including military training, and disparages the Epicureans' alleged pursuit of *voluptas*. To frame *voluptas* as a reward of *labor* would overturn such arguments. The jealous aristocracy, regarding soldiers' social ascent as morally unjustified, denied soldiers legitimate access to *voluptas*.¹⁹² A Platonic model of military hierarchy justified this socially controlling aspect of discipline: the commander was equated with the soul or reason, the soldiers with the body or appetites. The soul should control the body and keep the appetites in check.¹⁹³ The Roman aristocracy regarded soldiers as incapable of self-control, requiring restraint from above.¹⁹⁴

Thus, to punish the soldiers and restore their fighting spirit, Scipio Aemilianus imposed severe austerities at Numantia in 134, driving out the sutlers and camp followers, reducing soldiers' baggage to a minimum, and requiring them to cook and dine with a spit, a brass kettle, and one cup. In addition, personnel were limited to plain roasted and boiled meats.¹⁹⁵ Metellus forbade the sale of bread or cooked food to soldiers.¹⁹⁶ Hadrian reduced luxuries and is said to have banned *triclina* from camps.¹⁹⁷ The *Historia Augusta's* Avidius Cassius restricted soldiers'

¹⁹¹ Carrié 1993: 117.

¹⁹² Juv. *Sat.* 16.

¹⁹³ Carrié 1993: 103–4; Joshel 1992a: 120; C. A. Williams 1999: 141.

¹⁹⁴ Alston 1998: 216–17.

¹⁹⁵ *Op. cit.* Chapter Six n.167.

¹⁹⁶ Sall. *Jug.* 45.2; Val. Max. 2.7.2. On the sutlers Roth 1999: 96–7.

¹⁹⁷ HA *Hadr.* 10.4 seems satirical. Archaeology shows that commanders' residences retained *triclina*.

provisions to *laridum* (bacon or salt pork), *bucellatum* (biscuit), and *acetum* (vinegar or sour wine).¹⁹⁸ Pescennius Niger went Scipio one better and forbade any silver dishes, requiring military personnel to drink from wooden cups. He prohibited wine and baked bread and the preparation of hot food, requiring soldiers to live on biscuit and cold water while on campaign.¹⁹⁹ The author of the *Historia Augusta* admired military austerity, basing such fictional passages of the *Vitae* of Avidius Cassius and Pescennius Niger on old-Roman *exempla*.²⁰⁰ In reality, however, Septimius Severus banned soldiers' *collegia* from military camps; *collegia* were burial societies that emphasized commensal eating and drinking.²⁰¹

Except for Scipio's and Metellus' roasted and boiled meats, the elite restricted the access of the soldiers to specific privileged food items, especially meat.²⁰² Grain and vegetable foods were regarded as virtuous and archaic, consumed by the more virtuous ancient Romans.²⁰³ Disciplinary ideology thus imposed grain and vegetable products on soldiers as the most virtuous forms of cuisine. Commanders never imposed a totally vegetarian diet of grain on soldiers.²⁰⁴ Such an impression arises from the emphasis of war narratives on securing the *main* food item, grain, often not available locally, whereas relatively small amounts of meat might be salted or easier to secure locally.²⁰⁵ In addition, this impression may reflect elite anxiety about soldiers' gluttonous meat-eating, seen above. However, the imposition of an *unground* grain ration was also punitive and "ideological," imposing the work of grinding this grain (described in the [previous chapter](#)).²⁰⁶ Soldiers preferred to sell their grain ration to bakers and buy bread, a practice repressed by Metellus and others. In grinding his own grain for flatbread, Caracalla thus took on the

¹⁹⁸ HA *Avid.* 5.3.

¹⁹⁹ HA *Pesc.* 10.1–2, 3–4.

²⁰⁰ On Avidius, *op. cit.* Chapter Four n. 267.

²⁰¹ D. 47.22.1.pr (Marcian *Inst.* 3); *neve milites collegia in castris habeant*. MacMullen 1984 (in MacMullen 1990: 227); contrary to Ginsburg 1940: 150 and Pegler 2000: 40, *collegia* were not banned altogether. On civilian *collegia*, Donahue 2003: 433, 2004: 84–9.

²⁰² Corbier 1989: 229–30; on food distributions to the *plebs urbana*, Aldrete and Mattingly 1999; Erdkamp 2000.

²⁰³ Corbier 1989: 245–6; Purcell 2003: 333–4; grain as civilized food as opposed to barbarian meat, Shaw 1982–3: 15–17. Scipio imposed bread or porridge at Numantia, Plut. *Mor.* 201C = *Apophth. Scip. Min.* 16.

²⁰⁴ Despite Dupont 1992b: 125.

²⁰⁵ Groenman-van Waateringe 1997: 263–4.

²⁰⁶ Roth 1999: 49–50 stresses the rational nature of an unground wheat ration, as less likely to mold. However, it also resembles slave rations.

greatest possible austerity and the most extreme campaign conditions.²⁰⁷ A further punishment was the assignment of barley rations to mutinous or cowardly soldiers, a descent to slavery or animality.²⁰⁸

In similar fashion, the emperors attempted to regulate the diet of the *plebs urbana*, repressing the *popinae* or disreputable snack-bars that sold cooked food, cooked meat, and hot water for mixing with wine.²⁰⁹ Ammianus censures Julian's soldiers feasting on sacrificial meat and depicts the Roman populace as gluttons obsessed with cooking and eating meat.²¹⁰ Nonetheless, outside the pages of the *Historia Augusta*, the Roman emperors never attempted to eliminate meat from soldiers' diet altogether. However, the most frugal forms and preparations of meat were imposed.²¹¹

Why did Scipio Aemilianus and Metellus restrict soldiers' diets to roasted and boiled meats? A meat diet without grain may have been unwelcome, intended as punishment; the roasted and boiled meats cannot have been viewed as a luxury.²¹² They represented the primitive diet of archaic or barbarian peoples; Scipio banned more elaborate and decadent forms of cooking, such as meats cooked in sauces.²¹³ Scipio's and Metellus' imposition of a meat diet transpired before the civil wars of the late Republic; after these wars, the emperors chose to impose the *next* most primitive diet, grain and vegetables, which was also more civilized.

Nonetheless, to make this essentially punitive austerity acceptable to the soldiers, commanders had to share it with them, achieving community without the moral and political transgressions of luxury and unrestrained patronage. The *commilito* anecdotes show the commander or emperor sharing the soldiers' hardships. Plutarch relates that Marius did so: "it is a most agreeable spectacle for a

²⁰⁷ Hdn. 4.75; Corbier 1989: 239; Purcell 2003: 335–6 stresses the moralistic theme of archaic Romans doing their own baking.

²⁰⁸ *Op. cit.* Chapter Four n. 86; Junkelmann 1997: 104. Metellus: Front. *Strat.* 4.1.2.

²⁰⁹ Corbier 1989: 245–6; Gell. 2.24.1–13 and Macrobian *Sat.* 3.17.1–12 (Republic); Gell. 2.24.14 (Augustus); Gell. 2.24.15 and Suet. *Tib.* 34.2 (Tiberius); Dio 59.11.6 (Caligula); Suet. *Claud.* 38.2; Dio 60.6.7 (Claudius); Suet. *Nero* 16.2; Dio 62.14.2 (Nero); Dio 65(66).10.3 (Vespasian).

²¹⁰ Sacrifices, Amm. 22.12.6; *plebs*, 28.4.34.

²¹¹ Corbier 1989: 229–30.

²¹² Diets of meat without grain were associated with shortages. Luxuries probably varied locally. Fresh vegetables were a luxury in Egyptian desert outposts, sent as a gift in *O. Claud.* 226 and 370; Veen 1998; Maxfield 2003: 167. A decadent luxury in Italy, oysters may have been common in Britain; some military sites show oyster shells in large numbers, Davies 1971 (in Davies 1989: 193–4); Junkelmann 1997: 166–7.

²¹³ Corbier 1989: 235, 242–3. Junkelmann 1997: 155 suggests that Scipio punished troops with this diet.

Roman soldier when he sees a general eating common bread in public.”²¹⁴ Sallust’s Marius declared, “To live in luxury yourself but control your army by punishments is to be a master of slaves, not a commander.”²¹⁵ By the imperial period, the commander’s or emperor’s sharing austerities and hardships with his soldiers reassured the civilian elite that these leaders would not overindulge the soldiers, preventing both their deterioration and the risk of insurrection. However, when indiscipline had set in, commanders needed to restore order and austerity by severe measures.

AUSTERITY AND THE BODY POLITIC

The purgation of luxurious items and camp-followers from Roman camps is represented as restoring not just discipline, but morale and courage, restoring *habitus* by eliminating abject persons and behaviors. Scipio Aemilianus ejected servants, prostitutes, pimps, fortunetellers, and sutlers from the Roman camp at Numantia; Valerius Maximus describes these camp-followers as “shocking and shameful bilge water.”²¹⁶ After this purgation and after a period of retraining, Scipio’s army, previously demoralized by defeat and by the shameful surrender of Hostilius Mancinus to the Numantines, successfully defeated and destroyed Numantia.²¹⁷ In a similar manner Metellus restored *pristinæ disciplina militiæ* (ancient military discipline) to the Roman troops in Africa.²¹⁸ In these extensive descriptions, Valerius Maximus employs *habitus* or body language: once the army is purged of luxuries and of camp-followers, its *virtus* and victories return, as if it were a human body.

Austerity in *militia* may be regarded as a dominant and imperial discourse, one that imposed the old Republic’s notional austerity, reversing the decline of the state. In a famous anecdote, Manius Curius Dentatus received a Samnite embassy and rejected their bribes of gold while eating turnips.²¹⁹ His turnips and wooden dishes were then ascribed to other exemplars.²²⁰ The austerity of the emperor on

²¹⁴ Plut. *Mar.* 73.

²¹⁵ Sall. *Jug.* 85,35.

²¹⁶ Val. Max. 2.7.1.

²¹⁷ App. *Iber.* 80, 83.

²¹⁸ Val. Max. 2.7.2.

²¹⁹ Val. Max. 4.3,5; Plin. *HN* 19.26.87; Plut. *Cato Maior* 2.2, *Mor.* 194F = *Apoth.* M.’ *Curii* 2; Cic. *Sen.* 55, *Dench* 1995: 138.

²²⁰ Harris 1979: 264–5; Plin. *HN* 33.142 (Sex. Aelius Catus); Val. Max. 4.4.9 and Plin. *HN* 33.142 (Q. Aelius Tubero).

campaign became a stock item of praise that recalled such stories, and by the later Empire explicitly imitated them.²²¹ However, this ethic had to counter another, in which access to a variety of foods was a trait of Mediterranean civilization.²²²

CONCLUSION

What then was the ideological purpose of austerity in *militia*? It manifested the tensions of *disciplina militaris* in a heightened form. In the political economy of the empire, *disciplina militaris* restrained and legitimated the emperors' redistribution of wealth to the army. Due to rational accounting, military *stipendia* may have aroused fewer anxieties than food and drink, which represented wealth that was consumed and thus destroyed by its recipients. Elite authors such as Cicero disapproved of the "pouring out" (*effundere*) of benefactions upon the mob, especially as food and drink. In contrast, an army that dined on bread, cheese, and vinegar on campaign approached closer to an autarchic ideal. The austere army would not be incapacitated by feasting and drinking. Drunkenness in *militia* led to insubordination and even military defeats: drunken soldiers might be ambushed by the enemy, a repeated *topos* and stratagem. The sources display less concern for the longer-term effects of heavy drinking and overeating, as likely to produce overweight and alcoholic military personnel. Rather, feasting and drinking, associated with a state of relaxation, represented an immediate risk to military *habitus*.

The common soldiers' rapacity also took the literal form of excessive meat-eating. The image of a carnivorous army evoked the class and economic anxieties suggested above: meat was a privileged food that the masses in the Roman Empire could not afford on a regular basis. Furthermore, Greco-Roman ethnography associated a diet containing much meat with barbarians; soldiers' meat-eating demonstrated their barbarism. Eating meat also suggested the potential violence of warfare and brutality of soldiers: enemies and civilian victims became prey.

Though soldiers were permitted a small amount of meat, *disciplina* emphasized a grain diet, in particular the unmilled grain used as campaign rations because it was less likely to spoil. Grain, however, was also an ideological food, associated with Mediterranean civilization. This grain diet, and the hard work of milling the grain, recalled archaic Roman eating habits and thus imposed antiquarian virtue

²²¹ Vespasian, Tac. *Hist.* 2.5, *cibo fortuito*; Julian, Amm. 16.5.3, *vili et fortuito cibo*. Lendon 2005: 290–309.

²²² Woolf 1998: 169–205; Carrié 1993: 120.

on the soldiers. The soldiers probably disliked this imposition. Soldiers, however, did not prefer a diet of meat either, as the story of Julius Caesar's troops baking a substitute bread from roots suggests. In peacetime conditions, soldiers sought a variety of foodstuffs associated with civilization.

Emperors and commanders assumed austerity in *militia* in order to bridge the gulf between themselves and the soldiers. By adopting the diet of the common *miles*, emperors weakened soldiers' potential complaints about the unjust privileges of their superiors. Leaders could be *commilitones* with their soldiers if they shared austerity and hardship with them; these hardships inflicted symbolic violence that reproduced the social hierarchy of the army. The ideology of *disciplina* rejected other modes of camaraderie with soldiers, such as the emperor's or commander's feasting communally or drinking with his soldiers, except at triumphal feasts.

GENERAL CONCLUSION



THE RATIONALITY OF DISCIPLINE

In the early Empire, *disciplina militaris* attempted to routinize the army as a source of imperial power, mitigating conflict between emperors, aristocracy, and soldiers and discouraging usurpations by promoting both protobureaucratic rationalization and values or behaviors that produced the *habitus* appropriate to soldiers and officers. Ironically, discipline's dissociation of service from "sordid" economic matters also resembles Weber's concept of charismatic authority.¹ Unlike an industry or a civilian bureaucracy, a military institution cannot be fully rationalized. Military service must motivate its personnel to undergo extraordinary risks and effort; it requires their social cohesion; and it demands special leadership qualities of its officers.² Value-rational policies (a code of honor, etc.) are often promoted. In the Roman army, instead of a formal code, exemplary narratives, anecdotes, and treatises promoted specific *habitus*.

In the Roman army, full rationalization was impeded by tradition and by the charismatic authority projected by the commanders. *Imperium militiae* and its descendant in the Empire gave commanders unfettered authority over soldiers. Commanders could punish with inventive severity, as when Galba starved a soldier to death to punish him for extortion, or conversely to mitigate punishment, as Marius did with Trebonius or Septimius Severus with the Praetorians.³

Disciplina militaris's rationalization countered patrimonial elements of authority in the Roman army, which was a cross section of Roman society, from the emperor and senatorial legates at the top to common soldiers and soldiers' servants (the despised *calones* and *lixæ*) at the bottom. Such rationalization was in the material interests of both emperors and senate. The emperors wanted to prevent the emergence of rivals supported by the army, and the aristocracy feared and disliked emperors' excessive handouts to the army, associating these with the civil wars and confiscations of the late Republic. For these reasons, Augustus set the

¹ Weber 1978: Chapter One *op. cit.* n. 33.

² Janowitz [1960] 1971: xiii–xxvi emphasizes "the limits of civilianization" in an all-volunteer force.

³ Suet. *Galba* 7; Plut. *Mar.* 14.4–5; Hdn. 2.13.6.

pay and pensions of soldiers on a rational foundation by creating a new treasury (the *aerarium militare*); pay was distributed regularly and rationally accounted for. Even *donativa* were routinized by their association with accessions, predecessors' legacies, adoptions of heirs, and other predictable dynastic events. Ideally, these gifts constituted relations of patronage, not mutual exchanges of influence in which emperors and usurpers paid the Praetorians to support coups and assassinations.

Disciplina's repression of corruption was both instrumentally rational and value-rational. Rules prohibiting extrainstitutional work and income discouraged commanders' self-aggrandizement, officers' exaction of bribes from soldiers, and soldiers' extortion from provincials. These rules drew upon an archaic economic ideology that regarded commerce with contempt. Starving to death a soldier who sold his rations at an extortionate price, Galba (then legate, not emperor) imposed on him the punishment of Midas, as related by Aristotle in condemnation of profit.⁴ Documentation, both financial and administrative, was essential to the instrumental functioning of the army, but such documentation also assured the empire's civilians that soldiers were being paid in a routine and limited manner and that they received regular work assignments. Unless it itself was falsified, documentation could reveal corruption or absence without leave. For these reasons, the author of the *Historia Augusta* depicts both Hadrian and the idealized Alexander Severus as poring over military documentation.⁵

The limitations placed upon soldiers' official rations were more value-rational than instrumentally rational. Grain might be harder to procure on campaign than meat; promoting austerity reduced baggage and time-consuming, potentially dangerous foraging; soldiers remained alert and physically fit. However, military austerity is a feature of Roman *disciplina militaris* for ideological reasons. A repressive attitude toward feasts (or even dining *en masse*) in *militia* countered patronage, as the giving of feasts was one of the most uncontrollable forms of benefaction. Grain-eating represented archaic virtue, whereas excesses of wine and meat were associated with elation, incapacitation, violence, and barbarian status. The imposition of hard labor also served the purposes of social control and was regarded as an ancient Roman virtue. The maintenance of work-discipline and the infrequent granting of furlough were also essential elements of *disciplina*.

⁴ *Op. cit.* Chapter Five n. 118.

⁵ HA *Hadr.* 11.1; *Alex.* 21.6–8.

Rationalization for its own sake, as an assertion of power, is less apparent in the Roman army, by contrast with early modern militaries. Formal elements of military discipline that were used for social control in early modern and modern armies, such as close-order drill and military uniform, are less evident in the Roman army. Roman fighting methods depended on a high degree of individual initiative and aggression, against which tactical discipline had to be external, immediate, and coercive. Soldiers' aggression alarmed the Roman aristocracy, as well as civilians. Only castrametation is described in a way similar to modern drill, as a symbolic, socially regimenting and regulating activity.

A basic aim of *disciplina* was the production and maintenance of *virtus*. *Virtus* is not so much opposed to *disciplina*; rather *disciplina* became a way to produce, maintain, and redefine *virtus* in a manner consistent with imperial stability.⁶ *Virtus* became a charismatic quality in the civil wars period, a martial prowess dissociated from social reproduction and indeed sabotaging it.⁷ An example from Tacitus' *Histories* will serve: a soldier demanded a reward for valor because he had killed his brother, who had joined the enemy.⁸ When the *virtus* of soldiers exceeded that of their officers and especially that of emperors and usurpers who abased their dignity in seeking the army's support, the soldiers (most of all the Praetorians) lost respect for these commanders and officers, ushering in the instability of the third century AD and the eventual exclusion of senators from commands.

Virtus had to undergo routinization; the Romans accomplished this by associating *virtus* with physical effort and hardship, so that the emperor or his commanders and the soldiers could display *virtus* through *labor* and austerity. Associated with *labor*, *virtus* became "efficacy" or "energy" rather than "prowess."⁹ *Virtus* in this way became a subordinate masculinity, consistent with the *modestia* that soldiers should display in a stable imperial order.

The honorable occupational status of soldiers was safeguarded by discipline, which maintained soldiers' "Roman" identity regardless of their actual ethnic origins. If they became too slack, indulging in luxury, they were likened to "Greeks" or "Asiatics." If they were uncouth and violent, they were likened to northern

⁶ *Virtus* contrasted with *disciplina*: Lendon 2005: 177–8, 186, 192, 207–8, 211, 231. He focuses on *disciplina* as submission to authority and obedience in combat.

⁷ *Virtus* merged with *ferocia*: M. Roller 2001: 30–54.

⁸ Tac. *Hist.* 3.51.

⁹ *ILS* 5795; Grewe 1998: 139.

barbarians (Gauls and Germans).¹⁰ *Disciplina militaris* was in this sense a civilizing process, imposing Roman ideals. However, the ancient authors were always aware of soldiers' low social status.

CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE

A double standard of discipline for the senatorial and equestrian officers versus the regular *milites* is evident. Senatorial and equestrian officers were not subject to capital and corporal punishment. Even centurions were much better paid than common soldiers, and personnel from the upper orders were usually wealthy. Senatorial and equestrian officers and centurions did not perform fatigues and other forms of menial labor, which common soldiers themselves resented and tried to transfer to the camp slaves or their own slaves. Senatorial and equestrian officers dined in the commander's residence with a modicum of luxury, which *disciplina* ideology denied to soldiers.

The jurists' concept of military discipline illustrates the gulf between the officers and the *milites*. The agronomists advocate similar techniques for the motivation and control of slaves. In Roman tradition, however, soldiers and slaves were poles apart; a commander who treated his soldiers as slaves became a tyrant. Leaders attempted to bridge the gap between the ranks in order to legitimate themselves to the soldiers. Customary rituals emerged in which emperors and commanders shared some of the *labores* of the soldiers, such as the hardships of travel on horseback or on foot, and were seen eating the soldiers' food. Whether these actions impressed the soldiers or not, they became part of the upper ranks' performance of military *habitus*.

Punishment employed a complex negotiation of tradition and present conditions. The elite, including emperors, jurists, and aristocratic officers, admired the severity of the past. In old Rome, "military discipline was valued more by our ancestors than parental affection," according to one of these jurists.¹¹ Abused and jealous civilians wanted to see soldiers punished for insubordination, violence toward civilians, and extortion of food, lodging, and transport. Restraining the army was a major element of imperial legitimation.

¹⁰ Tac. *Ann.* 13.35; Fronto *ad Verum Imp.* 2.1.19; Wheeler 1996; violent soldiers, Tac. *Ann.* 2.88; Ash 1999: 39, 47.

¹¹ D. 49.15.19.7 (Paul *Sab.*16).

In practice, however, the imperial system depended on keeping the goodwill of the army, not alienating it with *saevitia* (cruelty). This was more necessary because soldiers were already vulnerable. The legal status of soldiers as *humiliores* permitted them to be beaten. They were also subject to execution for desertion, flight from the battlefield, and other offenses. The upper orders, *onestiores*, did not run these risks. Perhaps influenced by *exempla* and Platonic and Stoic philosophy, some emperors and elite officers (such as Galba, Pertinax, Macrinus, and Dio Cassius himself) emphasized a more rigid and absolute model of discipline; such abstractions did not help them maintain a working relationship with the soldiers.

One solution was the invocation of tradition, but not its literal enactment. Legal experts could emphasize the traditional capital punishment of desertion, but favor finding soldiers guilty of lesser offenses such as “absence without leave” (*emansio*). Shaming punishments echoed bloodier punishments, such as decimation or flogging and decapitation with the axe, that became obsolete in the Empire. Shame itself might be institutionalized and rationalized as dishonorable discharge and infamy.

The marriage ban was another policy marked by severe principle and a lack of enforcement. The soldiers who formed their *de facto* families were not subjected to positive punishment, merely to the legal disabilities of an illegitimate union, which affected the wives’ recovery of dowry and the wives’ and children’s ability to inherit from soldiers.¹²

Imperial payments to the army also represented a compromise with abstract *disciplina* ideology. The emperors could not discontinue payments to soldiers. They attempted, instead, to distribute payments according to elite *beneficium* ideology, as symbolic exchanges that both honored and subordinated soldiers. Good soldiers ideally were well provided for, splendidly armed, and decorated for valor, but saved their income instead of spending it.¹³ Tragically, because payments and especially donatives became signs of honor, the army felt dishonored by emperors who tried to reduce these handouts. Emperors might give *donativa* and *congaria* together in order to preserve the illusion of the equality of army and *plebs*. Prudent emperors found other ways to benefit soldiers than giving them cash, and other ways to discipline soldiers than by refusing to give them money. Ideally, they granted soldiers other privileges, such as the *testamentum militare* (created by *constitutiones* of

¹² Phang 2001.

¹³ Dio 53.10.6; HA *Alex.* 52.3.

Nerva and Trajan) and *peculium castrense*, along with a Hadrianic edict granting inheritance rights to soldiers' illegitimate children.¹⁴

Compromises also appear in the discipline of military labor. Military *labor* became as it were a substitute for combat, so that *virtus* could be displayed through physical endurance or the exertion of building. But too much degrading and low-status *labor* assimilated soldiers to slaves. Soldiers resisted the imposition of menial labor. If they could afford it, soldiers owned slaves who could carry their baggage and do their more degrading chores. From time to time commanders sought to repress soldiers' ownership of slaves, expelling unnecessary noncombatants from camps, but eliminating slaves was difficult because the army needed some slaves to handle and defend the baggage on the march and to care for animals.¹⁵

The commander's symbolic participation in and endurance of *labor* made him not seem a slave-master. Augustus had rejected the use of *commilito* as unsuited to the imperial dignity and political stability, but in later reigns the emperor might be *commilito* (fellow-soldier) with his troops if he showed them how to endure effort and hardships. *Labor militaris* was an especially flexible method of discipline (other means, such as reducing payments, were less flexible).

Camps had no central refectory or kitchen; soldiers cooked and dined in their *contubernia* or eight-man squads. This absence of central eating facilities was probably due to *disciplina* ideology: the army provided staple rations to soldiers, so that they had to procure nonstaples and cook on their own. The soldiers may have been reconciled by the commander's symbolically sharing the hardships of *militia* with them. The emperor shared their biscuit or porridge to make the consumption of these staples (archaic and austere) acceptable.

¹⁴ D. 29.1.1.pr; BGU 140.

¹⁵ Roth 1994: 355.

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